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Disclaimer 
The material included in this Legal Almanac is produced by The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and 
Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of Technology, with contribution from some authors outside QUT. It 
is designed and intended to provide general information in summary form on legal topics, current at 31 
December 2014 unless indicated otherwise, for general informational purposes only. The material may not apply 
to all jurisdictions. 
The contents do not constitute legal advice, are not intended to be a substitute for legal advice and should not be 
relied upon as such.  
You should seek legal advice or other professional advice in relation to any particular matters you or your 
organisation may have. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years, Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Frances Hannah and Anne Overell have compiled 
one to two page summaries of cases involving nonprofit organisations and published them on The Australian 
Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Developing Your Organisation (DYO) website.
1
 You can be 
alerted of new case summaries as they are posted to the DYO website by subscribing to the ACPNS RSS feed or 
the ACPNS twitter service.
2
 
There were some significant cases during 2014. The appeal decision in The Hunger Project case was handed 
down, changing PBI jurisprudence (see case note 2.8.2). The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission has issued an interpretation statement on the matter.
3
 The council rating case, Community 
Housing Limited v Clarence Valley Council (see case note 2.1.2) also provides a salutary lesson for anyone 
drafting object clauses in constitutions. In terms of advocacy and charity status the New Zealand Greenpeace 
decision (see case note 2.1.4) and United Kingdom’s Human Dignity Trust case (see case note 2.1.6?) will be 
closely studied by charities and their lawyers. 
A set of 2013 cases involving New Zealand’s Christchurch Cathedral and insurance issues following the 
earthquake, had a further sequel in New Zealand High Court and is instructive for church officers and counsel 
(see case note 2.9.7). 
My pick for the most interesting case this year is Foundation for Anti-Ageing Research v Charities Registration 
Board (see case note 2.1.3). 
A number of cases summarised in this Almanac are working their way through the appeals process, and care 
should be taken when considering their application to any matters. In addition, some of the cases are from 
jurisdictions outside Australia, and readers should exercise caution when considering the implications of these 
cases for Australian law.  
LEGISLATION 
The Almanac includes a review of major statutory amendments during 2014, which are relevant to the 
nonprofit sector in all Australian jurisdictions. Special thanks must go to the JusticeConnect team for providing 
legislative updates for Victoria.  
SPECIAL ISSUES DURING 2014 
A number of legal practitioners have contributed articles on significant legal issues facing nonprofit 
organisations. My thanks to Paul Paxton-Hall, Mark Fowler, Alice Macdougall, Andrew Lind, Jessica Lipsett and 
Derek Mortimer. 
DOWNLOAD 
This complete publication is available in PDF format through QUT e-prints http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ (search 
for all of: nonprofit legal almanac 2014). Earlier editions are also available. 
                                                          
1
 https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Legal+Case+Notes  
2
 Click on ACPNS RSS feed at https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/ACPNS+Wiki+Home; or go to 
http://twitter.com/CPNSinsides. You can also ‘watch’ some or all pages 
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Legal+Case+Notes?watchingPage=false&watchingSpace=false&watchingBlogs=false
&isAdmin=false&isBlogPost=false. 
3
 https://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Pblctns/Interp/ACNC/Publications/Interp_HungerProject.aspx  
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2.0 CASES BY CATEGORY 
 
Cases in this section are presented according to subject categories (presented alphabetically), with some cases 
appearing in more than one category. Any cases which do not fit within a named category are presented in the 
‘Miscellaneous’ category which appears at the end of this section. 
 
2.1 CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE STATUS 
2.1.1 CHARITY COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND V BANGOR PROVIDENT TRUST LTD 
[2014] NICH 19 (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CHANCERY 
DIVISION, DEENY J, 12 AUGUST 2014) 
The Charity Commission for Northern Ireland (the Commission) is a body established under Section 6 of the 
Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (the Act). On 8 August 2012 the Commission instituted an inquiry into 
the Bangor Provident Trust Limited (Bangor). On 17 September 2012 Bangor applied to the Charity Tribunal for 
Northern Ireland (the Tribunal), a body established under section 12 of the Act, for a review of the 
Commission’s decision to institute an inquiry. Under section 12 of the Act (together with Schedule 3 
paragraphs 3 and 4, and the Table in paragraph 5), the Tribunal is empowered to direct the Commission to end 
such an inquiry. On 10 May 2013, the Tribunal allowed the application by Bangor and directed the Commission 
to end its inquiry in relation to Bangor, pursuant to Schedule 3 of the Act. It did so on the basis that Bangor 
was not in law a charity, and not, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission for that or other 
purposes. The Commission appealed that point to the High Court in this case. 
Bangor Provident Trust Ltd is an industrial and provident society registered in Northern Ireland, originally 
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1893. It was later deemed to have been registered under the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act (NI) 1969 (the 1969 Act). Its main object was to provide housing for the 
aged and poor, as set out in Rule 2 of its Rules: 
The objects of the Society shall be to erect, provide, improve and manage housing accommodation in 
Northern Ireland for persons of advanced years and limited means who are eligible to occupy or use 
housing accommodation provided under the Housing Acts (NI) 1890-1953 (or under any acts 
amending or substituted for the said Acts) on terms appropriate to their means and to provide such 
amenities as the Society shall think fit for the occupiers of such accommodation and to do all other 
things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects. 
There was no doubt that the provision of housing to the aged and poor was a charitable object. However, the 
Tribunal found that Bangor’s objects were not exclusively charitable. The basis of this finding was the use of 
word ‘conducive’ in Rule 2, which the Tribunal said was indicative of the possibility of non-charitable objects, 
so that, on balance, the Tribunal held that Bangor was not charitable and therefore, the Commission could not 
instigate an inquiry into it. 
Was Bangor in fact charitable? Section 1(1) of the Act provides that: 
For the purposes of the law of Northern Ireland, “charity” means an institution which – 
(a)   is established for charitable purposes only, and 
(b)   falls to be subject to the control of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to 
charities.  
 10 
 
His Honour was quite clear that Bangor was a charity (at [30]): 
In the light of this case law and bearing it in mind I return to the Rules of the Bangor Provident Trust 
Ltd. …. I state quite plainly that it seems to me that in its natural and ordinary meaning, in the context 
of a body set up to provide housing ‘for persons of advanced years in limited means’ the natural and 
ordinary meaning of it is that the third clause [in Rule 2] was to facilitate such objects and not to allow 
the Society to launch into non-charitable activities.  
The interpretation of the use of ‘conducive’ in Bangor’s Rules was not such as to indicate non-charitable 
activities as an object (at [35]–[36]): 
Finally, I observe that the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘conducive’ as ‘tending to 
promote or encourage’. While mindful of the judicial observations on its meaning the starting point, it 
seems to me...is that this language of ‘incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects’ 
is not inconsistent with merely allowing the Society to engage in activities ancillary to its main and 
indisputably charitable objects. It may be that they would include the lobbying of the legislature in 
regard to the provision of housing to the aged of limited means. That would be ancillary. That would 
not, on a proper reading of these rules, at the time the Society came into existence, lead one to 
conclude that its objects were not exclusively charitable. In the light of all the factors before the court 
I consider that the Charity Tribunal erred in finding that Bangor was not a charity. I allow the appeal of 
the Charity Commission which is at liberty to proceed to discharge its statutory functions in regard to 
Bangor Provident Trust Ltd. 
Therefore, since Bangor was a charity, the Commission could conduct an inquiry into it. 
The case may be viewed at: https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-
GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2014/[2014]%20NICh%2019/j_j_DEE9285Final.htm 
Implications of this decision 
Was there a political dimension to the objects of the Bangor Trust, indicated by the use of the word 
‘conducive’? His Honour considered the well-known case of McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321, a 
case concerning Amnesty International. Although not itself a charity, Amnesty sought to set up a Trust with a 
view to obtaining charitable status for some of its activities. Slade J refused a declaration that the Trust ought 
to be registered as a charity, finding that although a trust set up for the relief of human suffering and distress 
would be capable of being charitable in nature, it would not be charitable if any of its main objects were of a 
political nature; that trusts for the purpose of seeking to alter the laws of the United Kingdom or a foreign 
country or persuading a country’s government to alter its policies or administrative decisions were political in 
nature; and that, accordingly, the object of the trust to secure the release of prisoners of conscience by 
procuring the reversal of governmental policy or decisions by lawful persuasion was of a political nature and 
since that object affected all the trusts of the trustee, the trust was not a charitable one. However, in this case, 
His Honour held that the object clauses of the Trust set up by Amnesty were very different from the rules of 
Bangor, so that the decision was ‘clearly distinguishable’ (at [15]).  
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2.1.2 COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED V CLARENCE VALLEY COUNCIL [2014] NSWLEC 193 
(NEW SOUTH WALES LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT, HARRISON J, 23 DECEMBER 
2014) 
This case dealt with whether lands owned by Community Housing Limited (CHL), a nonprofit company limited 
by guarantee were rateable by the Clarence Valley Council (the Council). Clause 3 of the Constitution of CHL 
provides: 
The object for which the Company is established is to be a nonprofit corporation that: 
(a) acquires on its own behalf, or manages or holds as trustee on behalf of any public, government, 
semi or local government or charitable person, association, bodies, funds, institutions or 
organizations, land and buildings so that: 
(i) shelter is provided to persons in crisis and/or who have inadequate access to safe and 
secure housing; 
(ii) housing may be provided to low income persons including members from ethnic groups, 
young people (single, dependent or otherwise), people with disabilities, people who are 
aged, childless couples, single parent families, families and/or other households in need; 
(b) provides housing advice and referral services which may assist homeless persons into stable and 
long term housing. 
(c) provides training, vocational and related education, and skills development to improve 
employment opportunities. 
The relevant legislative provision was section 556(1)(h) of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (the Act): 
(1) The following land is exempt from all rates, other than water supply special rates and sewerage 
special rates: 
... 
(h) land that belongs to a public benevolent institution or public charity and is used or occupied by the 
institution or charity for the purposes of the institution or charity…. 
The company claimed to be both a public benevolent institution and a public charity, and contended that the 
land it owns is used exclusively for its charitable purposes. It therefore claimed that its lands were exempt 
from council rates. The council denied the claim to an exemption and levied rates. The council disputed that 
the company was either a public benevolent institution or a public charity and that the lands that belong to it, 
upon which the rates had been levied, were used or occupied by the company for its purposes as either a 
public benevolent institution or a public charity. 
The first issue for determination was therefore whether the company was a public benevolent institution or a 
public charity for the purposes of section 556(1)(h) of the Act. His Honour noted that the company could be 
both (at [24]). A public benevolent institution must be ‘public’ in the sense that it must be of a public character 
and not merely for the benefit of particular private individuals. An institution will be public if it is for the 
benefit of the community, or of an appreciably large class of the community. The concept of ‘public 
benevolent institution’ is a narrower concept than that of a ‘public charity’. The term ‘public charity’ is applied 
to an entity if its objects are within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Elizabethan Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601 (43 Eliz I, c 4). The list of charitable objects in that statute has been grouped into four 
categories or heads of charity: the relief of poverty, age or impotence; the advancement of education; the 
advancement of religion; and other purposes beneficial to the community but not falling under any of the 
preceding heads: Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] UKHL 1. Any non-
charitable object must be incidental to the charitable purposes of the entity. 
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His Honour said that clause 3 of the company’s Constitution was ‘infelicitously drafted’. Whilst clauses 3(a) 
(with clause 3(a)(ii) accepted as incidental to clause 3(a)(i)) and (b) (either as incidental to the main purpose, or 
as a separate charitable purpose) were accepted as charitable objects, clause 3(c) was not (at [51]), [53]: 
Despite the accepted fact that clause 3 of the company’s Constitution is infelicitously drafted, its 
apparent structural and semantic difficulties do not disguise at least one fundamental problem for the 
company. That problem is, in my opinion, that clause 3(c) identifies as one of the company’s purposes 
a non-charitable object that is not merely incidental to the company’s charitable purpose identified or 
expressed in the preceding words of the clause….  
The provision of training, vocational and related education, and skills development to improve 
employment opportunities is in my opinion neither an independently charitable purpose nor merely 
incidental to some otherwise evident or identifiable main charitable purpose of the company. It is 
fundamentally general in its terms and incapable as a matter of language of being accommodated 
within any recognised description or category of charitable purpose. ‘Training’ does not have any 
charitable content standing alone and does not acquire any from the context in which it appears. The 
same can be said of ‘vocational’. The reference to ‘related education, and skills development’ does 
not succeed in qualifying the clause as an independent charitable purpose for the advancement of 
education. Even if it were capable of meeting the description of a charitable purpose for the 
advancement of education, the exemption sought by the company would not be available to the 
extent that there is no evidence that any of its properties are used for any such purpose. 
There was no doubt that the company’s main purpose was the relief of poverty, but (at [57]): 
…clause 3(c) does not amount to or describe a charitable purpose. It cannot be saved as incidental or 
ancillary to a charitable purpose. The all or nothing rule means that the company does not qualify as a 
public benevolent institution or a public charity. To the extent that clause 3(c) is neither charitable 
nor incidental to a charitable purpose, the first limb of s 556(1)(h) has therefore not been satisfied.  
Though not determinative of the outcome of the case, the question of whether the company’s lands were 
used or occupied for the purposes of a public charity or public benevolent institution is determined by 
comparing the purpose of the landowner as disclosed in its instruments with the actual use to which the land 
is put. If the land was used solely for the purposes in clauses 3(a) and (b) of the company’s Constitution, then 
the use was exclusively charitable. His Honour said on this point (at [68]): 
One immediately obvious fact is that the evidence does not appear to disclose that any of the 
properties are used to provide training, vocational and related education and skills development to 
improve employment opportunities. Even assuming that I were in error in finding that clause 3(c) was 
not charitable, or was not incidental to an otherwise identified charitable purpose, with the 
consequent disentitling result for the company’s status as a public benevolent institution or public 
charity, no rates exemption under s 556(1)(h) would be triggered by that purpose in any event. Both 
relevant ownership and use are required. However, a failure to use properties for a legitimate 
charitable purpose contained in the company’s objects clause would not matter if the properties were 
otherwise used for some other charitable purpose. 
His Honour was thus satisfied that the properties were used by it for the purposes identified in clauses 3(a) 
and 3(b) of its Constitution, and these purposes were charitable. The second limb of section 556(1) of the Act 
was satisfied. However, as CHL did not satisfy the first limb of the section, and the limbs are cumulative and 
not alternatives, CHL’s application for exemption from Council rates was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2014/193.html 
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Implications of this case 
This case, decided in a state court, was determined using the traditional common law concepts of charity. The 
case affirms that the provision of housing to moderate income households is charitable when it is part of a 
strategy for the relief of low income households. In addition, it categorises vocational training as outside the 
charity concept of education. 
 
2.1.3 FOUNDATION FOR ANTI-AGEING RESEARCH V CHARITIES REGISTRATION BOARD 
[2014] NZHC 1153 (NEW ZEALAND HIGH COURT, WILLIAMS J, 28 MAY 2014) 
The Foundation for Anti-Aging Research (FAAR) and the Foundation for Reversal of Solid State Hypothermia 
(FRSSH) applied to the Charities Commission of New Zealand (now the Charities Registration Board (the 
Board)) for registration as a charitable entity under the Charities Act 2005 (the Act). Both applications were 
rejected. This was the appeal from those rejections. 
The Foundations jointly applied for: 
(a) leave to adduce further evidence; 
(b) leave for evidence to be given orally; 
(c) service of the appeal on the Attorney General; and 
(d) leave to cross-examine an analyst from the Department of Internal Affairs. 
The Board opposed all these applications. The appeal dealt mainly with technicalities of appeal process in New 
Zealand. However, of interest was the court’s decision in relation to service on the Attorney General of New 
Zealand in the light of the purposes of the entities involved. 
FAAR was established by deed executed on 20 September 1999 and incorporated under the Charitable Trusts 
Act 1957 on 27 October 1999. Its objects were set out in clause 3 of its deed as follows: 
a) to establish and fund the operation of a non-profit making hospital (the Hospital) to treat ageing 
human beings with therapies that are substantiated by peer-review published scientific studies; and 
(b) to provide for funding of scientific research at the Hospital aimed at discovering medical therapies 
that will alleviate and eliminate degenerative diseases in human beings; 
(c) to provide other funding of scientific research projects outside the Hospital for the purpose of 
discovering medical therapies that will alleviate and eliminate degenerative disease in human beings; 
(d) to establish and support a facility to accept anatomical specimens for the purpose of conducting 
research aimed at reversing disease, senescence, traumatic injury and deanimation; and 
(e) to support other non-profit organisations involved in conducting research aimed at reversing 
disease, senescence, traumatic injury and deanimation. 
FRSSH was more recently established by deed executed on 14 July 2011 and incorporated under the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1957 on 13 September 2012. FRSSH’s primary function was to fund research in areas similar to 
those of FAAR. Specifically, clause 3 of the deed establishing FRSSH stated: 
The fruits of the scientific research funded may be used for the general benefit of all of mankind, 
including individuals who may benefit from advancements in organ and tissue transplantation, 
regenerative medicine, genetic engineering, cloning, DNA %transplant engineering, cell colony 
cloning, immunologic engineering, molecular engineering (nanotechnology) during their lifetime, and 
including deceased individuals who have been placed into cryopreservation or individuals who have 
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made legal arrangements to be placed into cryopreservation or who may wish to make legal 
arrangements to be placed into cryopreservation for the purpose of future reanimation. 
In considering charitable registration, the Board found that FAAR’s overwhelming purpose was to fund 
cryopreservation and reanimation research. The Board assessed those purposes under such of the orthodox 
Pemsel Heads of Charity as were referred to in the registration application: education, relief of the aged and 
the generic ‘any other analogous benefit’ head. The Board decided that the proposed research purpose was 
not education because it was not a ‘useful subject of study’ in terms of the decision in McGovern v Attorney-
General [1982] 1 Ch 321. Cryopreservation and reanimation lacked sufficient academic credibility and was too 
speculative to have an educative purpose. In addition, there was no New Zealand authority dealing with this 
question. 
The Board also rejected ‘relief of the aged’ as a purpose on the basis that the clients of cryopreservation were 
already deceased when preserved in that manner, so they were by definition not ‘aged’. Under the Pemsel 
analogous benefits category, the Board concluded that cryopreservation was too expensive – between 
$150,000 and $200,000 for whole body preservation and between $50,000 and $80,000 for neuro 
preservation. These prices led to the conclusion that this service would be narrowly available and essentially 
private. The Board’s conclusions in respect of FRSSH were materially identical to those for FAAR. Thus, the two 
entities were held to have no charitable purposes and were refused registration as charities. 
On appeal, the court held that leave to adduce further affidavit evidence (but not oral evidence) should be 
granted. On service on the Attorney General as the protector and guardian of charities, the appellants argued 
that the appeals raised a number of issues that might potentially impact on New Zealand’s charities law ‘well 
beyond the factual situation pertaining to the Foundations themselves’. The Crown contended that New 
Zealand courts have, in the past, decided broad principles of charities law without appearance by the Attorney 
General. His Honour said (at [72]): 
I agree with the appellants that the appeal does raise novel issues around the treatment of ‘new 
science’ (I use that term neutrally) in charities law. I see no harm at all in directing that the appeal be 
served on the Attorney-General in light of the issues raised. Whether the Attorney-General wishes 
then to apply to intervene is a matter entirely for him. 
Therefore, the appellant Foundations were successful in their appeal on on leave to adduce further affidavit 
evidence and to serve notice on the Attorney General. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/1153.html 
Implications of this case 
This case was decided before the appeal decision in Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2014] NZSC 105, 
regarding charitable purposes. The invitation made by His Honour here was for the Attorney General to 
become involved in a further re-examination of charitable purposes in New Zealand with respect to what His 
Honour referred to as ‘new science’ and whether investigation and research into speculative frontiers of 
science can be charitable.  
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2.1.4 GREENPEACE OF NEW ZEALAND INC, RE [2014] NZSC 105 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW 
ZEALAND, ELIAS CJ, GLAZEBROOK, MCGRATH, WILLIAM YOUNG, ARNOLD JJ, 6 
AUGUST 2014) 
This was an important appeal in New Zealand to settle the question of whether purposes which are political, 
including those that advocate certain views, can be charitable. The Supreme Court of New Zealand, by a 
majority of three to two, held that there should no longer be a political purpose exclusion applied to New 
Zealand charities. This finding accords with the legal position in Australia. 
Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc (Greenpeace) is an incorporated society which sought registration as a 
“charitable entity” under Part 2 of the Charities Act 2005 (the Act). Societies or institutions qualify for 
registration under section 13 of the Act only if they are “established and maintained exclusively for charitable 
purposes”. At the time of application, the decision on registration was made by the Charities Commission, 
which no longer exists in New Zealand. Following statutory amendment, that decision is now made by the 
chief executive of the Department of Internal Affairs (through Charities Services) and the Charities Board.  
The Charities Commission originally declined to register Greenpeace as a charity because two of its objects 
were not charitable. The objects found to be not charitable were the promotion of disarmament and peace 
and the promotion of “legislation, policies, rules, regulations and plans which further [Greenpeace’s other 
objects] and support their enforcement or implementation through political or judicial processes as 
necessary”. 
In distinguishing between charitable objects and those that are “political”, the Commission followed Molloy v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1981] 1 NZLR 688 (CA) in which the Court of Appeal of New Zealand adopted 
the view that “a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid” (at [695]).  This 
followed the decision in Bowman v The Secular Society [1917] AC 406 (HL). The Commission found that the 
political purposes of Greenpeace were not merely ancillary to its charitable purposes but were independent 
purposes. In addition, the Commission concluded that the direct action which it found to be “central” to the 
activities carried on by Greenpeace could entail illegal activity, which also could not be said to be in the public 
interest and charitable. 
In this appeal to New Zealand’s highest court, Greenpeace challenged the Court of Appeal’s view that political 
objects could not be charitable unless they were patently ancillary to the main objects of the charity. It argued 
that the exclusion of political purposes should no longer be applied in New Zealand following the High Court of 
Australia decision in Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42. In Aid/Watch, the majority 
opinion treated contribution to public debate concerning charitable ends (in that case the relief of poverty 
abroad and education about poverty) as of public benefit and charitable in itself, while leaving open the 
question whether generating public debate in relation to other matters could also be charitable.  
Greenpeace argued that there was no proper basis for a free-standing prohibition on political purposes in New 
Zealand. Rather, the only question was whether the purposes of an entity were charitable within the sense 
accepted by the common law. The majority (Elias CJ, McGrath, Glazebrook JJ) held that a political purpose 
exclusion should no longer be applied in New Zealand. They concluded that a blanket exclusion of political 
purposes is unnecessary and distracts from the underlying inquiry about whether a purpose is of public benefit 
within the sense the law recognises as charitable. They rejected the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that 
section 5(3) of the Charities Act enacted a political purpose exclusion, with an exemption if political activities 
are no more than “ancillary”. Rather, section 5(3) provided an exemption for non-charitable activities which 
were ancillary. 
The majority concluded that political purposes and charitable purposes were not mutually exclusive (at [59], 
[62]): 
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We do not think that the development of a standalone doctrine of exclusion of political purposes, a 
development comparatively recent and based on surprisingly little authority...has been necessary or 
beneficial.... 
More importantly, it is difficult to see that all advocacy for legislative change should be excluded from 
being recognised as charitable. Promotion of law reform of the type often undertaken by law 
commissions which aims to keep laws fit for modern purposes may well be properly seen as 
charitable if undertaken by private organisations even though such reform inevitably entails 
promotion of legislation. Such advocacy may well constitute in itself a public good which is analogous 
to other good works within the sense the law considers charitable. 
Charity law should change in response to social conditions, and as such it would not be proper for an inflexible 
approach to be taken (at [69]): 
It is difficult to construct any adequate or principled theory to support blanket exclusion. A political 
purpose or advocacy exclusion would be an impediment to charitable status for organisations which, 
although campaigning for charitable ends, do not themselves directly undertake tangible good works 
of the type recognised as charitable. As well, a strict exclusion risks rigidity in an area of law which 
should be responsive to the way society works. It is likely to hinder the responsiveness of this area of 
law to the changing circumstances of society. Just as the law of charities recognised the public benefit 
of philanthropy in easing the burden on parishes of alleviating poverty, keeping utilities in repair, and 
educating the poor in post-Reformation Elizabethan England, the circumstances of the modern 
outsourced and perhaps contracting state may throw up new need for philanthropy which is properly 
to be treated as charitable.  
However, there was still the need for caution (at [73], [74]): 
Advancement of causes will often, perhaps most often, be non-charitable. That is for the reasons 
given in the authorities – it is not possible to say whether the views promoted are of benefit in the 
way the law recognises as charitable. Matters of opinion may be impossible to characterise as of 
public benefit either in achievement or in the promotion itself.... 
It may be accepted that the circumstances in which advocacy of particular views is shown to be 
charitable will not be common, but that does not justify a rule that all non-ancillary advocacy is 
properly characterised as non-charitable. 
The Court of Appeal had accepted that the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of weapons 
of mass destruction, one of Greenpeace’s objects amended to meet the charity test, was charitable because it 
was uncontroversial.  The Supreme Court did not agree (at [75]): 
We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeal suggestion that views generally acceptable may be 
charitable, while those which are highly controversial are not.... Such thinking would effectively 
exclude much promotion of change while favouring charitable status on the basis of majoritarian 
assessment and the status quo. Just as unpopularity of causes otherwise charitable should not affect 
their charitable status, we do not think that lack of controversy could be determinative. We consider 
that the Court of Appeal was wrong to place such emphasis in the present case on the acceptance in 
New Zealand legislation and society of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and popular support 
in New Zealand for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 
Instead, the Supreme Court said that assessment of whether advocacy or promotion of a cause or law reform 
is a charitable purpose depends on consideration of the end that is advocated, the means promoted to achieve 
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that end and the manner in which the cause is promoted in order to assess whether the purpose can be said to 
be of public benefit within the spirit and intendment of the 1601 Statute (at [76]).  
The majority were not convinced that the object so readily accepted by the Court of Appeal as charitable was 
indeed so (at [87]): 
Perhaps because of the course taken by the litigation, the essential point of the charitable status of 
the objects in issue was in our view inadequately addressed. The Commission and the High Court 
applied a strict political purpose exclusion and dealt with the Greenpeace objects before amendment. 
And in the Court of Appeal, the conclusion that the purpose of promoting nuclear disarmament and 
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction was charitable was made on two bases we think to be 
suspect – the view that the promotion of peace is established by the authorities to be a charitable 
purpose and the assumption that avoidance of the political purpose exclusion (on the basis that the 
objects were not controversial) made it unnecessary to consider more closely the manner of 
promotion. 
The objects needed to be reassessed (at [102]): 
It is the case that it will usually be more difficult for those who promote ideas they consider to be of 
public benefit to show charitable purpose as readily as those who can show tangible utility in the 
good they do. There is truth in the point that where a charity promotes an abstraction, such as 
“peace” or “nuclear disarmament”, the focus in assessing charitable purpose must be on how such 
abstraction is to be furthered. The Court of Appeal treated lack of controversy in New Zealand about 
the goals of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as 
determinative of the question whether the promotion of these ends was charitable. We consider that 
it was necessary to focus rather on the manner of promotion. 
Thus the matter of the charitable status of Greenpeace had not been considered on the correct basis (at 
[104]). Therefore, the matter was remitted for consideration by the Board and the relevant government chief 
executive (at [104]): 
If it is concluded that the object of promoting nuclear disarmament and the elimination of weapons of 
mass destruction is not shown to be charitable, then the question whether the activities undertaken 
by Greenpeace are no more than ancillary to its charitable purposes will require further assessment 
by the chief executive and Board, as the Court of Appeal required. In all the circumstances, the best 
course seems to us to be to remit the application for reconsideration in the light of the changes to the 
Greenpeace objects and in the light of the reasons in this Court. 
Also considered in this case was the question of illegal activities.  The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed 
the appeal by Greenpeace against the Court of Appeal’s finding that purposes or activities that are illegal or 
unlawful preclude charitable status. It was held that an illegal purpose is disqualifying and that illegal activities 
may disqualify an entity from registration as a charity when such activities indicate a purpose which is not 
charitable (at [111]): 
It may be accepted that an illegal purpose is disqualifying. It does not constitute a charitable purpose 
and would mean that the entity is not “established and maintained exclusively for charitable 
purposes”. While illegal activities may indicate an illegal purpose, breaches of the law not deliberately 
undertaken or coordinated by the entity are unlikely to amount to a purpose. Isolated breaches of the 
law, even if apparently sanctioned by the organisation, may well not amount to a disqualifying 
purpose. Assessment of illegal purpose is, as the Court of Appeal recognised, a matter of fact and 
degree. Patterns of behaviour, the nature and seriousness of illegal activity, any express or implied 
ratification or authorisation, steps taken to prevent recurrence, intention or inadvertence in the 
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illegality, may all be relevant. On the other hand, we are unable to accept the submission by 
Greenpeace that only serious offending, such as would permit sanction under the legislation on a 
one-off basis even if not indicative of any system or purpose, is required before illegal conduct 
amounts to a purpose of the entity. 
The conclusions of the majority were therefore (at [113]–[116]): 
1. “Charitable purpose” is not established where objects are of benefit to the community unless the 
benefit is also shown to be charitable within the sense used by the common law. A single test of 
public benefit alone loses the concept of charity which authority establishes as essential. The 
traditional method of analogy to objects already held to be charitable is better policy. 
2. Since charity is generally concerned with matters of tangible public utility, it will be difficult to show 
that the promotion of an idea is itself charitable. But “charitable” and “political” purposes are not 
mutually exclusive if the political purpose is itself charitable because of public benefit within the 
sense the law regards as charitable. A “political purpose exclusion” as a matter of law is not 
necessary. 
3. Section 5(3) of the Charities Act does not enact a political purpose exclusion, codifying the common 
law. It provides that non-charitable purposes do not affect charitable status if no more than ancillary 
and includes “advocacy” as an example of such ancillary non-charitable purpose. It does not deal with 
the case where promotion of views is properly regarded as charitable in itself. Such cases are likely to 
be unusual. 
4. If the object of an entity is the promotion of a cause which cannot be assessed as charitable because 
attainment of the end promoted or the means of promotion in itself cannot be said to be of public 
benefit within the sense treated as charitable, the entity will not qualify for registration as charitable. 
That is because it will not be “established and maintained exclusively for charitable purposes”. Even if 
an end in itself may be seen as of general public benefit (such as the promotion of peace) the means 
of promotion may entail a particular point of view which cannot be said to be of public benefit. 
The minority of the Court (William Young and Arnold JJ) held that section 5(3) of the Act codified the position 
that advocacy in support of a charitable purpose is non-charitable unless it is merely ancillary to that charitable 
purpose. They took the view that the rule that political advocacy is not charitable is defensible not only on the 
basis of the authorities but also as a matter of policy and practicality. There was accordingly no requirement to 
depart from the ordinary language approach to section 5(3).  
The case may be viewed at: http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/decisions/judgments.html 
Implications of this case 
This case aligns New Zealand law with the High Court of Australia’s approach in the Aid/Watch case in relation 
to advocacy by a charity. Thus a “political” purpose can now be a charitable purpose in New Zealand. However, 
the position of Greenpeace has yet to be determined since the consideration of its application for charitable 
status was remitted by the Supreme Court for further review. 
 
2.1.5 THE HIGHLAND TITLES CHARITABLE TRUST FOR SCOTLAND, DECISION OF THE 
OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY REGULATOR (OSCR), 4 MAY 2014 (REVERSAL OF 
DECISION OF 3 APRIL 2014) 
The OSCR published an enquiry report under section 33 of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 
2005 (the Act) on 3 April 2014. The report concluded with a direction under section 31(5) of the Act that The 
Highland Titles Charitable Trust for Scotland (the Trust) should stop misrepresenting itself as a Scottish charity. 
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The Trust was registered as a charity in Guernsey, but was not a registered charity in Scotland. The OSCR found 
that it was carrying out activities in Scotland. The report said (at page 1): 
In our view the words ‘charitable trust for Scotland’ were synonymous with the term ‘Scottish charity’ 
and, when used in the context of soliciting funds are likely to undermine public confidence in the 
charity sector. Section 13(4) of the 2005 Act provides that a body representing itself in this way is to 
be treated as representing itself as a body entered in the Register, and as being established under the 
law of Scotland, or managed or controlled wholly or mainly in or from Scotland. In addition, although 
the organisation is registered in another jurisdiction OSCR takes the view that where a body carries 
out activities in any office, shop or similar premises in Scotland, the 2005 Act provides that it may not 
represent itself as a charity even where it is registered as such under the law of another country or 
territory. 
However, upon further enquiry, the OSCR reversed its direction under section 31(5) of the Act. In undertaking 
its review, OSCR considered representations on behalf of the Trust that it was not in fact referring to itself as a 
‘Scottish charity’. In addition, the Trust contended that whilst it was not registered as a charity in Scotland, it 
was entitled to refer to itself as a charity in Scotland, since it fell within the exception for charities established 
‘outwith’ Scotland that is set out in section 14 of the 2005 Act. In particular:  
 The Trust was established under the law of a country or territory other than Scotland – that is, 
Guernsey – and was registered as a charity in Guernsey;  
 The Trust is based in the Channel Islands, with two current trustees living in Alderney (one of the 
Channel Islands);  
 In terms of section 14(b)(i) of the Act, the Trust did not occupy any land or premises in Scotland; and 
 In terms of section 14(b)(ii), the Trust did not carry out any activities in any office, shop or similar 
premises in Scotland. Its only function was to own the sole share of Highland Titles Limited, the 
company which managed the Highland Titles Nature Reserve.  
The Trust took the view that, even if it were to manage the Highland Titles Nature Reserve (which was not its 
intention), such a reserve would not fall within the definition of ‘similar premises’ in section 14(b)(ii) of the Act 
because it was not similar to an ‘office’ or ‘shop’. The OSCR did not rule on this proposition. 
The OSCR concluded on review that the Trust was not misrepresenting itself as a ‘Scottish charity’ within the 
meaning of the 2005 Act. It was, however, referring to itself in Scotland as a charity. On this point, the OSCR 
found that, in principle, the structure of which the Trust was stated to form a part, where its function was 
stated as being solely to hold the share in Highland Titles Limited, enabled it in these particular circumstances 
to take advantage of the exception set out in section 14. This was the case provided (in particular) that it was 
not carrying out activities in Scotland and that where it referred to itself it did make reference to being 
established under the law of a territory other than Scotland. The OSCR found that there were grounds for 
confusion, which had led to the original complaints that had been made to it (at page 3): 
It is unfortunate that in a number of the instances... it was variously stated that the Trust managed 
the Reserve, or that impression was likely to be gained by a reasonable person. However, in none of 
these cases is it clear that the references to the Trust as a charity were actually made by the Trust 
itself, or even that they were made (in the form in which they appeared) on the Trust’s behalf by its 
subsidiary Highland Titles Limited. On that basis, it did not appear that it had been representing itself 
as a charity in a way that takes it outside the exception for charities established outwith Scotland by 
section 14 of the 2005 Act. OSCR’s issuing of a section 31(5) direction... could not therefore be 
justified on the basis of the available evidence, and the direction has been withdrawn. It is 
unfortunate that the Trust has been publicly referred to in ways that give the impression of non-
compliance or may mislead the public as to the nature of the activities undertaken by the Trust. On 
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the basis of the explanations given by the Trust of the circumstances of these references, OSCR would 
expect the Trust and its subsidiary Highland Titles Limited to use their best endeavours to ensure that 
the Trust is referred to publicly in ways that make its charitable status and the extent of its activities 
clear.  
Therefore, although the Trust’s activities could only be related to Scotland, in that it offered the title of Lady, 
Laird or Lord to anyone buying small plots of land within the Glencoe-based reserve, it was not holding itself 
out as a Scottish charity. 
The decision (and reversal) can be viewed at: http://www.oscr.org.uk/media/474881/2014-05-
06_highland_titles_charitable_trust_for_scotland_updated_report_on_inquiry.pdf 
Implications of this case 
This is a case of the regulator in Scotland making an error in its decision. The complaints made to it were 
apparently based on signage in the Glencoe-based Nature Reserve which indicated that the Trust was a 
Scottish charity which actively managed the Reserve. However, the evidence revealed that this signage was 
not instigated by the Trust itself. The OSCR refers in its published report to this being ‘unfortunate’. It has been 
reported in the media that the Trust is seeking advice on legal action against the OSCR for possible injury to its 
reputation. 
 
2.1.6 THE HUMAN DIGNITY TRUST V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND 
WALES [2014] UKFTT (FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY 
CHAMBER, MCKENNA J, MS S. ELIZABETH, 9 JULY 2014) 
The Human Dignity Trust (HDT) appealed a decision of the Charity Commission not to register it as a charity. 
The appeal was upheld in this decision, and the Commission was directed to rectify the register to include the 
HDT as a charity. 
The HDT is a company limited by guarantee which challenges the criminalisation of private consensual sexual 
activity in countries where criminalisation applies. The HDT counts among its members many leading law firms 
and barristers in the UK. The Charity Commission (the Commission) first denied charitable status to the HDT in 
June 2012. The HDT sought an internal review of this decision.  Charitable status was again denied in a review 
decision published on 3 October 2013. 
The Charity Commission’s original and review decisions 
The basis for the original decision was that the HDT’s objects were not exclusively charitable because some of 
its purposes were directed at changing the law. The Commission said that ‘changing the law’ was not a 
charitable purpose and therefore could not meet the public benefit test under English law. Although the 
Charities Act 2011 recognises the advancement of human rights as a charitable purpose, the Commission said 
(at [3]): 
It is a long standing and important rule in charity law that political purposes cannot be charitable 
purposes, as changes to the law or government decisions, either in this country or abroad, cannot 
necessarily be seen as beneficial and therefore meeting the public benefit requirement. Given that 
the purposes of human rights organisations may be directed towards such aims, whether the public 
benefit requirement is met is also an issue in considering the charitable status of such bodies. 
 21 
 
In its review decision,
4
 the Commission said that the purposes of the HDT were unclear and the public benefit 
uncertain on a reading of its objects. This was because its objects referred to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (a United Nations document) and its references to dignity and social development.  The 
Commission took the view that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in fact contains no express right to 
dignity or social development, although it certainly refers to dignity as something separate from rights. As the 
objects were judged unclear, the Commission then considered the factual background to the HDT, including its 
website contents. It disagreed with the HDT’s contention that there was a body of case law dealing with 
human dignity. The Commission said that the HDT’s sole focus was (at [14]): 
...to bring and assist in bringing legal proceedings either in foreign jurisdictions or international courts 
to seek to change domestic legislation in foreign jurisdictions which criminalise homosexuality. 
Accordingly, it is arguable from the relevant background information that the most significant 
element of the company’s purpose is directed towards procuring changes in such laws of foreign 
countries. 
The HDT’s purposes were found to be not exclusively charitable because although the advancement of human 
rights could be a charitable purpose under the Charities Act 2011 (at section 3(1)(h)), ‘human dignity’ was a 
fundamental value underpinning human rights rather than a fully articulated right in itself. This seemed clear 
from the wording of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that the expressed objects of HDT fell short 
of being charitable (at [19]): 
In determining charitable status the Commission must consider the purposes as set out in the 
constitution of HDT. If the rights, in particular, to human dignity, privacy and to personal and social 
development are not ‘human rights’ as such then the objects of HDT do not fall within the 
advancement of human rights in the Charities Act 2011. 
Although the HDT proposed altering its objects to meet the requirements of the Commission, its proposed 
changes were also rejected as being not charitable. Whilst advancing the administration of justice or clarifying 
the law might be charitable purposes, changing the law was not (at [26]): 
Under charity law a purpose directed towards changing the law or changing decisions or policies of 
government or government authorities either in this country or in foreign jurisdictions is not 
charitable, and as such would not fall within any of the descriptions of purposes set out in section 3(1) 
of the 2011 Act; McGovern v Attorney General following House of Lords authorities National Anti-
Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Bowman v Secular Society Ltd. The rationale 
for this approach being said to be that the courts must proceed on the basis that the law is right as it 
stands and that the court would have no means of judging whether any change in the laws be for the 
public benefit. Further, even if the court were able to conclude prima facie that a change in the law 
was desirable, such changes are a matter for the legislature not the courts who in the last resort may 
need to administer charitable trusts. To take any [other] view would usurp the function of the 
legislature. 
The law stated in McGovern v Attorney-General (1982) Ch 321 (McGovern v AG) was the current law and thus 
bound the Commission. Seeking to change the law of a foreign jurisdiction (as opposed to enforcing it) was 
arguably (at [34]): 
...within the remit of the legal principles established in McGovern precluding purposes seeking such 
challenges from being charitable.... Even if our court could decide that the challenge to the foreign 
law would be for public benefit being consistent with human rights law enshrined in the law of 
England and Wales, it may be contrary to public policy for our court, (which would ultimately be 
                                                          
4
 Charity Commission, 3 October 2013 http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/media/544314/human_dignity_trust.pdf 
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responsible) to control and enforce trusts aimed at changing the law in another jurisdiction. It would 
seem to fail the crucial test of the competence of the court to control it. The English court would, it is 
considered, have no way of assessing how a foreign court might seek to construe its own constitution 
or treaty obligations; in particular in the light of relevant social, religious and cultural circumstances in 
that jurisdiction.  
The Commission recognised that the position might now be different within the United Kingdom since the 
Human Rights Act 1998 had been enacted incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights. However, 
McGovern was still the law, and the position would be even more difficult when it came to changing the law of 
foreign countries. 
On the question of public benefit, the Commission reiterated that McGovern had upheld the decisions in 
Bowman v Secular Society [1917] AC 406 and the National Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31 that trusts for 
political purposes could not be charitable because the public benefit involved was incapable of proof. Was the 
position now different?  The Commission said that it was not. Since there was no public benefit arising from 
the HDT’s activities, it could not be charitable. 
The appeal decision  
The central issue in the appeal decision was whether the HDT (the appellant) was a charity. This involved a 
consideration of its purposes. The Tribunal disagreed with the Commission that the appellant’s purposes were 
unclear or ambiguous. The objects were clearly set out in HDT’s objects clause (at [28]): 
We conclude that HDT’s particular purpose(s) are clearly set out in its objects clause ...being firstly, 
“to promote and protect human rights (as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
subsequent United Nations conventions and declarations) throughout the world…” and secondly, “to 
promote the sound administration of the law”.  
The ‘advancement of human rights’ is a charitable purpose at section 3(1)(h) of the Charities Act 2011, but at 
issue in this appeal was the scope of this term. HDT argued that the term should be given its ordinary meaning, 
and the Tribunal agreed (at [43]): 
We accept HDT’s submission that the term ‘human rights’ is to be given its ordinary natural meaning 
and that there is no authority for the Charity Commission’s view that it is to be understood only as 
referring to those human rights accepted by the law of England and Wales. It seems to us that the 
Charity Commission’s suggested approach would complicate matters further, involving as it would an 
inquiry into the status and enforceability arrangements for any particular human rights instrument 
and a further requirement to define the concept of ‘accepted by the law of England and Wales’. 
Did the appellant’s purposes fall within the descriptions of purposes in section 3(1)(h) of the Charities Act 2011 
(the Act)? The Tribunal said that they did and were therefore charitable. This included the litigation (changing 
the law) part of its activities, even if conducted in foreign countries (at [53]–[54]): 
HDT’s purposes are limited to the protection and promotion of the rights which are set out in the 
UDHR and the subsequent treaties (which includes the ICCPR). However, where these rights are 
particularised in clauses 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of the objects clause, we also find, in reliance upon the expert 
evidence... that the rights to human dignity, to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the right to privacy and to personal and social development fall within the meaning of 
the term ‘human rights’ that we have adopted....  
As we have found that HDT’s strategic litigation activities do not constitute a separate purpose, it is 
not necessary for us to consider whether such a purpose would fall within section 3(1)(h) of the Act. 
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Was the object of ‘promoting the sound administration of the law’ a charitable purpose? The Tribunal held 
that it was both a separate purpose and a charitable purpose. Moreover, this was not ‘political’ activity of the 
kind found to be objectionable in McGovern v AG (at [64]–[65]): 
We find that ‘promoting the sound administration of the law’ was recognised as a description of a 
‘fourth head’ charitable purpose under the ‘old law’ i.e. prior to 1 April 2008 (see s. 3(4) of the Act) so 
that it now falls within s. 3(1)(m)(i) of the Act. There is no legal authority to support the view that the 
conduct of strategic litigation before a competent constitutional court is a proper means of advancing 
the sound administration of the law, but equally we have not been referred to any authority which 
suggests that it is not an acceptable means of advancing such a charitable purpose. We take the view 
that the conduct of the very particular form of litigation supported and engaged in by HDT is an 
acceptable means of advancing the charitable purpose of promoting the sound administration of the 
law. We draw an analogy (to the extent necessary) with the accepted charitable activities of 
promoting prosecutions for cruelty to animals and rewarding policemen for doing their duty, 
although... we regard HDT’s human rights litigation as fundamentally different in nature from the 
authorities concerning domestic law.  
We consider that the public benefit requirement and the question of whether there is any risk to 
foreign policy from such a purpose falls to be addressed in relation to s. 4 of the Act and that we 
should be careful not to merge it into our consideration of the definition of a description of a 
charitable purpose, as the Charity Commission’s submissions seem to suggest that we should. In any 
event we find...that the particular type of constitutional litigation supported and conducted by HDT is 
fundamentally different in nature from the activities found to be objectionable as political in 
McGovern v AG.  
What was the proper test for demonstrating public benefit, particularly when the appellant’s purposes were 
carried out outside England and Wales? The Tribunal’s conclusion on a test for public benefit in these 
circumstances was that it was sufficient to demonstrate (i) that the purpose benefits the public (or a section of 
the public) abroad; and (ii) that the same purpose would be considered charitable in the case of a body 
confining its operations to England and Wales, provided that (iii), there is no reason of public policy not to 
recognise the purpose as charitable (at [76]).  
The Tribunal said that there were no grounds to believe that the appellant’s purposes were inimical to the UK’s 
interests at home or abroad. Indeed, there were possibly both internal and external benefits arising (at [78]–
[79]): 
In the circumstances, we are not satisfied that it is necessary for HDT to demonstrate that there will 
be a benefit to the public in England and Wales arising from its activities abroad. However, if we are 
wrong on that point, we conclude that there is ample evidence before us of the public benefit to the 
community in the UK flowing from HDT’s activities. We accept Professor Chinkin’s evidence... that the 
criminalisation of relevant conduct represents ‘a serious contravention of international human rights 
law’ and, accordingly, we conclude that it is for the public benefit of the community in England and 
Wales (and, indeed, the UK), as well as in the country where such a contravention occurs, for this 
situation to be addressed and for the human rights standards recognised by the international 
community to be promoted and protected. Although we were not addressed on this point, we also 
consider that there may be an identifiable public benefit to the community in the UK if HDT’s 
activities may be seen to contribute to the development of effective measures to tackle the spread of 
HIV infection worldwide. We note the evidence before the Tribunal... that the criminalisation of 
relevant conduct has been recognised by the international community as representing a significant 
impediment to such public health initiatives.  
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We accept that there may be some purposes which, although satisfying the public benefit test in 
principle, should not be recognised for public policy reasons – for example because they are inimical 
to the UK’s interests. However, there is no evidence before us to suggest that HDT’s activities have in 
the past, or do now, cause any concern to the UK Government.  
Of major interest to Australian observers, was the issue of whether the HDT’s purposes were political. The 
Charity Commission firstly referred the Tribunal to the legal authorities in support of the proposition that it is 
not charitable to seek to change the law in England and Wales. These were both decisions of the House of 
Lords: Bowman v Secular Society [1917] AC 406 and National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1948] AC 31. That rule was effectively extended by Slade J in McGovern v AG. Following the 
decision in McGovern v AG, it has been accepted in England that a political purpose is one which (i) furthers 
the interests of a political party; (ii) seeks to procure changes in the laws of England; (iii) seeks to procure 
changes in the law of a foreign country; (iv) seeks to procure a reversal of government policy or of particular 
decisions of governmental authorities in England; or (v) seeks to procure a reversal of government policy or of 
particular decisions of governmental authorities in a foreign country. Slade J’s formula (which he said was not 
intended to be exhaustive) was later adopted by the Court of Appeal in Southwood v AG [2000] EWCA Civ 204. 
Since HDT’s purposes and activities were directed to changing the law in a foreign state, were its purposes 
political? The Tribunal said that this was not so (at [99], [101]): 
We are not satisfied that the litigation supported and conducted by HDT may be described as seeking 
to change the law. It seems to us that the constitutional process involved in interpreting and/or 
enforcing superior constitutional rights might, on one analysis, be seen as upholding the law of the 
state concerned rather than changing it, but it also seems to us that the paradigm of 
changing/upholding the law is one more suited to an analysis of domestic provisions than it is to the 
arena of constitutional rights. We prefer to characterise HDT’s activities as engaging in a legitimate 
constitutional process which occupies a different space from that occupied by the domestic law, 
although we accept that the outcome of that process may have implications for the domestic law. We 
find that it is intrinsic to the process with which we are concerned that the relevant state’s legislature 
has agreed to subjugate itself to the outcome of this constitutional process so that its role is not 
usurped by the court.... 
In conclusion, for the reasons above we are satisfied that the promotion and protection of human 
rights (a) by means which include the support or conduct of litigation which is (b) aimed at securing 
the interpretation and/or enforcement of superior constitutional rights (c) in a foreign country which 
has given effect to the relevant treaty obligation so as to enable that process - is not a political 
purpose, and neither is it in our view a political activity.  
The Tribunal accepted that there was no prior authority for the view they expressed because the promotion of 
human rights through the conduct of litigation abroad had not previously been considered by the courts or by 
the Tribunal. The Tribunal said that it was for the Commission to investigate the issue further ‘if and when it 
reviews its guidance on the promotion of human rights’ (at [100]). 
On whether the appellant’s purposes were for the public benefit, the Tribunal held that they were (at [109]–
[110]): 
In relation to the first aspect of public benefit, we conclude from the evidence that HDT’s support and 
conduct of the type of litigation which takes place in the very particular context which we have 
described in this decision is beneficial. We have already concluded that the conduct of such litigation 
is not a purpose in its own right and is not political, and that, because the purported criminalisation of 
relevant conduct represents a serious breach of human rights norms, there is a public benefit in 
seeking to interpret, clarify and protect superior constitutional rights... [the] evidence...identifies a 
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particular benefit to those individuals whose human rights are promoted and protected by this means 
and also a wider benefit to the community at large from having such rights interpreted, clarified and 
enforced in a process to which their country has assented. We are satisfied by the evidence on this 
point.  
It was not in dispute before us that the benefit accrues to the whole community or a sufficiently 
appreciable section of it and we find that this is the case.  
Therefore, the HDT met the charity test (its purposes were charitable and they were for the public benefit), 
and it should be registered as a charity (at [112]): 
...we are satisfied that HDT is established for the purposes of (i) promoting and protecting human 
rights as set out in the UDHR and subsequent United Nations conventions and declarations 
throughout the world, and in particular (but without limitation) the rights to human dignity and to be 
free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the right to privacy and to 
personal and social development; and (ii) promoting the sound administration of the law. We are 
satisfied that these purposes are exclusively charitable because they fall within the descriptions of 
charitable purposes in section 3 of the Act (sections 3 (1) (h) and 3 (1) (m)(i) respectively). We are also 
satisfied that they are for the public benefit. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and direct rectification 
of the register.  
The decision may be viewed at: http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/human-dignity-
trust-v-charity-commission-judgment.pdf 
Implications of this decision 
This decision had the potential to have widespread ramifications for English charity law, overturning some 
long-established authorities.  However, the Tribunal was careful to confine the decision to its own facts, so as 
not to create a legal precedent (at [113]): 
...we are aware that certain views have been expressed in the press and elsewhere about the 
potential effect of this decision on other human rights organisations seeking charitable status and also 
on those charities already operating in the field of human rights. In the circumstances, it may be 
helpful for us to clarify here that as a matter of law this decision is confined to its own facts and does 
not establish a legal precedent for the registration of other prospective charities. This decision also 
has no legal effect upon charities already registered as such and operating in the field of human 
rights. It does not supersede the Charity Commission’s published guidance or the decisions of 
superior courts in this area.  
Nevertheless, the decision will no doubt impact on the determinations of the Charity Commission when 
considering registration of charities of similar kinds. 
 
2.1.7 HUMANICS INSTITUTE V CANADA (NATIONAL REVENUE), 2014 FCA 265 (CANLII) 
(FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL, CANADA, NOEL JA, STATAS JA, NEAR JA, 17 
NOVEMBER 2014) 
This is an appeal brought pursuant to subsection 172(3) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) 
(the Act) from a decision by the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) confirming a decision by the 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) denying the appellant’s application to be registered as a charity under the Act. 
The Minister denied the appellant’s application on the basis it had not demonstrated, as required under 
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subsection 149.1(1) of the Act, that all its resources were devoted to charitable activities carried on by the 
organization itself. This conclusion was based on the Minister’s findings that: 
 the appellant’s purposes and objects were broad and vague;  
 the activities proposed in support of its stated purposes, particularly the plan to build and maintain a 
sanctuary and sculpture park, would not advance religion or education in the charitable sense;  
 the appellant’s proposed funding of a foreign scholarship would constitute neither the organization’s 
own activities nor the funding of a qualified donee.  
The appellant claimed that the Minister’s interpretation of ‘religion’ was overly narrow. The Federal Court of 
Appeal rejected this contention. The appellant’s philosophy was ‘Oneness of Reality’.  The court said that this 
was (at [5]): 
…so broad and vague as to be practically unascertainable. The appellant has failed to show the 
existence of a ‘particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship’ or a body of teachings and 
doctrine that would bring the concept which it promotes within the legal acceptation of the word 
religion 
The court said that even if the values promoted by the appellant did constitute a religion, the state of the law 
was such that, in order to advance a religion, there must be a targeted attempt to promote it. It was not 
enough to simply make available a place where religious thought may be pursued, as the appellant intended. 
This fell short of charitable advancement of religion. Its plans to promote seminars and other activities were 
not sufficiently formed, but were rather ‘aspirations’. Therefore, there was no unreasonableness in the 
Minister’s determination against the appellant. Nor was there any procedural unfairness. The appellant 
claimed that the Minister had approached its application with a ‘closed mind’. The court said that this was a 
‘general assertion’ without any foundation in evidence. 
The appellant’s claims under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) were also rejected. 
The appellant claimed violation of section 2(a), 2(b) and 15 of the Charter. There was insufficient or no 
evidence for its claims under section 2(a) and 2(b). As for section 15, the court said (at [12]–[13]): 
…its claim under section 15 of the Charter is framed on the basis that the distinction applied by the 
Minister in failing to recognize its non-secular spiritual belief system discriminates against the 
appellant itself…. However, the appellant is a not-for-profit corporation and this Court has expressly 
held that such organizations are not individuals within the meaning of section 15 (National Anti-
Poverty Organization v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 684 (FCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused 1989 
CarswellNat 1290 (SCC) at para. 22). Moreover, as the above discussion illustrates, the Minister’s 
refusal was not based simply on a distinction between the beliefs promoted by the appellants and 
some other set of beliefs. Rather, the appellant failed to show how it would promote those beliefs, 
and therefore failed to meet the registration requirements under the Act. 
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2014/2014fca265/2014fca265.html 
 
2.1.8 MULGRAVE SCHOOL FOUNDATION, RE, 2014 BCSC 1900 (CANLII) (SUPREME COURT 
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, MASUHARA J, 9 OCTOBER 2014) 
Mulgrave School is a co-educational, independent, non-denominational school founded in 1994. It is located in 
West Vancouver, British Columbia. The Mulgrave School Foundation (the Foundation) was incorporated under 
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the Society Act on 27 September 2007, and its application for charitable status as a registered private 
foundation was granted on 12 March 2008. The Foundation subsequently was designated as a public 
foundation in 2009. The objective of the Foundation is the advancement of education through scholarships 
and bursary assistance as well as providing operative grants to the Mulgrave School for the purpose of 
supporting the school in a variety of initiatives. 
In this application, the Foundation sought an order permitting it to apply two gifts made between 2008 and 
2010 of, respectively, $250,000 and $861,217.50 toward the construction of the Mulgrave School’s Senior 
School building project. The donations were, however, made specifically to support the Mulgrave School’s 
scholarship program.  
The respondent donors supported the application, but the Attorney General of British Columbia, on behalf of 
the Crown, opposed the application. It did so based on its responsibility over charity and its view of the 
Charitable Purposes Preservation Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 59, s. 3(4) (the Act). The essence of the Crown’s argument 
was that the gifts in question were made for a discrete purpose, being scholarships and bursaries, and not for 
the school’s capital campaign for the construction of new buildings (at an estimated cost of $23,000,000). 
It was clear from the facts of the case that the donors did not oppose the repurposing of their gifts. However, 
they had placed two conditions on their gifts when they were made: that the funds be used to create an 
endowment (the Endowment Condition) and that the endowment be used to support scholarships at 
Mulgrave School (the Purpose Condition). The donors did not retain or reserve any legal rights in the donated 
funds, nor did they indicate any reservation of a right to suggest an alternative or additional use of the 
donated funds by the Foundation at a later date. Although the four donors expressly consented to the 
repurposing of the donated funds to help fund the Senior School construction, there was no legal mechanism 
by which they could release the Foundation from the imposed conditions. Thus, the Foundation could not take 
direction from them or ignore the earlier Endowment Condition or the Purpose Condition without the 
intervention of the court in this application. 
Could the donated funds be repurposed? Mulgrave School submitted that the Court had inherent jurisdiction 
over charitable matters and could alter the Endowment Condition on the expenditure of capital and the 
Purpose Condition to apply the income of the fund exclusively for scholarships to provide the Mulgrave School 
with access to the capital of the donations.   
Mulgrave School also relied upon s. 3(4) of the Act, which states:  
3(4)     Without limiting subsection (3), if a charity holding discrete purpose charitable 
property is unwilling or unable to continue to keep, administer and use the property 
to advance the discrete purpose, the court may make whatever orders, including 
arrangements, it considers appropriate, including transferring the property to a new 
charity, so that the property is kept, administered and used to 
(a) advance the discrete purpose, or 
(b) advance another charitable purpose that the court considers is 
consistent with the discrete purpose. 
There was no question that the donated funds had a charitable purpose, being the advancement of education 
(with the discrete purpose to fund scholarships). At common law the court has the ability to direct a scheme or 
mechanism under the doctrine of cy-pres when a charitable purpose becomes impossible or impracticable to 
perform. However, there was no evidence to support the notion that the original charitable purpose could not 
be carried out. His Honour held that the Mulgrave’s School’s petition was too broadly based (at [28]–[32]): 
Petitioner’s counsel... urges this court to adopt an expansive interpretation of the aforementioned 
section sufficient to allow a court to intervene and put in place a scheme which differs from the 
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identified discrete purpose even when there is an absence of a charity being unable or unwilling to 
perform the discrete purpose. I note as well that the petitioner has not adduced any evidence which 
indicates that there is impossibility or impracticability in carrying out the discrete purpose. 
Petitioner’s counsel did not provide any authority which supported the expansive interpretation of 
the subject section; nor was any authority or principle that would allow the court to depart from the 
conditions set out under the doctrine of the cy-pres. For the relief sought, an applicant must meet the 
aforementioned specified necessary conditions. Unfortunately, as laudable as the Foundation’s 
initiative and intent is, the petitioner has not met the necessary conditions to obtain the relief sought.  
Therefore, the application to repurpose the donated funds was denied. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2014/2014bcsc1900/2014bcsc1900.html 
 
2.1.9 NICHOLSON V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES [2014] FTT 
(CH) (FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, 
MCKENNA J, 4 AUGUST 2014) 
On 11 March 2014, John Nicholson and five others appealed to the Charity Tribunal in England in respect of 
the Charity Commission’s (the Commission) decision not to remove JNF Charitable Trust (JNFCT), JNF 
Educational Trust (JNFET) and KKL Charity Accounts (KKL) (the Charities) from the Register of Charities. In this 
decision, the appeal was struck out for lack of jurisdiction. 
The Charities were for Jewish causes. The JNFCT raised funds for causes in Israel, the JNFET had as its purpose 
the education of people about Israel and Judaism, and KKL drafted wills and helped people to donate to 
charity. The JNFCT had income for 2012 of £17.5 million, which included all of KKL’s charity accounts 
containing £9 million. It is currently listed on the Register of Charities as dormant. The Commission had ruled 
on 31 January 2014 that the Charities were established for exclusively charitable purposes and so should not 
be removed from the Register. 
The appellants had appealed on the basis that they were persons affected by the decision of the Commission. 
The appellants alleged that the Charities were sham charities, were racist, and involved in violations of human 
rights and international law. The Commission had responded that the appellants were not persons who were 
affected by its decision. The Tribunal therefore ruled that this had to be decided as a preliminary issue. 
Under section 34 of the Charities Act 2011 (the Act), an appeal may be brought by ‘any other person who is or 
may be affected by the order’. Were the appellants such persons? There is no definition of ‘any other person 
who is or may be affected by the order’ in the Act, and there were no directly relevant precedents. The 
appellants’ claim to be interested persons was based on three factors: 
 that they were taxpayers, and they did not wish to see any charitable tax relief directed to the 
Charities;  
 some of the appellants said that they had been misled into donating to the Charities because they 
were on the Register. If they had known of the Charities’ alleged activities, they would not have 
donated; 
 that they were supporters of the Palestinian cause. There was a general public interest underlying 
this. 
Her Honour said that (at [24]–[25]): 
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I recognise that there are some profoundly important and highly complex issues which form the back-
drop to this case. I also acknowledge that the Appellants (and, indeed, others) hold very strong 
feelings about those issues. However, there is no public interest test in respect of standing in the 
Tribunal and I must decide this matter without regard to the wider issues and only having regard to 
the question of whether the Appellants fall within the category of persons... so as to allow their 
appeals to proceed. I am not persuaded that a taxpayer who disagrees with the views or actions of a 
charity is ‘affected’ by its continued registration so as to pass the threshold for having standing in the 
Tribunal. It seems to me that the nature of every taxpayer’s relationship to every registered charity is 
essentially the same and that Parliament cannot have intended that every taxpayer should be able to 
bring an appeal to the Tribunal on the basis merely of his or her disagreement with the enjoyment of 
fiscal advantage by any particular registered charity.  
The appellants ‘deeply held and continuing objection’ to the Charities did not provide them with standing to 
proceed with the appeal. They had not suffered any disadvantage as a result of the Commission’s decision, nor 
had their rights been infringed, nor had the decision affected then more than any other member of the public 
(at 31). That being the case, the appeal was struck out. 
The decision may be viewed at: http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/John-Nicholson-
ruling-preliminary-issue-4Aug14.pdf 
 
2.1.10 PRESTON DOWN TRUST, REGULATORY DECISION (CHARITY COMMISSION FOR 
ENGLAND AND WALES, 3 JANUARY 2014) 
This case has been going since 2009. The Preston Down Trust (PDT) governs a meeting hall of the Plymouth 
Brethren Christian Church (PBCC) in the UK. The PDT had previously sought charitable status and been refused 
by the Charity Commission for England and Wales (the Commission). However, in this decision, the 
Commission decided to extend charitable status to the PDT. The grounds considered by the Commission were 
whether the PDT was an organisation for the advancement of religion (under section 2(2)(c) of the Charities 
Act 2006 of England and Wales), and whether it was for the public benefit. 
The PBCC is a Christian religion which advocates total separation from the rest of society (referred to as the 
doctrine of the separation from evil) for its members. Allegations had been made to the Commission that the 
PBCC used harsh disciplinary measures against its members for even minor transgressions.  These included 
ostracism and threats of legal action against those who spoke out criticising the religion because of its 
practices. Moreover, the organisation had little contact with the wider community, and a restrictive dress 
code. 
In its decision-making process, the Commission examined the nature of the religious practices of the PDT and 
whether they conferred a public benefit. On the evidence, the Commission determined that the doctrine of 
separation from evil, which is central to the beliefs and practices of the PDT and the PBCC, resulted in (i) both a 
moral and physical separation from the wider community and (ii) limited interaction between the PBCC 
members and the wider public. This argued against charitable status. 
In addition, the Commission had regard to the disciplinary practices carried out by the PBCC which gave rise to 
allegations of detriment and harm. There was clear evidence of harsh disciplinary practices within the PBCC.  
From this the Commission concluded, on balance, that there were elements of detriment and harm which 
emanated from the doctrine and practices of the PBCC and which had a negative impact on the wider 
community, as well as on individuals, so as to present a real danger of outweighing public benefit. In particular, 
the nature and impact of the disciplinary practices and the impact of the doctrine and practices on those who 
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left the religion and on children within the PBCC had possible consequences for society. Again, this did not 
suggest charitable purposes. 
However, after long negotiations with the Commission, the PDT agreed to alter its trust documents by a Deed 
of Variation.  This provided new trusts with a statement of the core beliefs and practices of the religion with 
more openness in its provisions. The alterations also included improvements relating to how disciplinary 
matters should be dealt with and the need for more openness in the community, such as by displaying at 
meeting halls notices detailing how non-members could attend services. The variations to the trusts, if 
adopted, were sufficient for the Commission to declare that the PDT existed for exclusively charitable 
purposes for the public benefit. 
The Commission’s reasoning included: 
 The PBCC has a beneficial impact on society through its instruction and edification of the public by its 
Christian way of life; 
 It allowed some public access to worship services – the requirement to be a well-disposed person, 
and to adhere to the dress code did not prevent public attendance as such, and was also found in 
other religions; 
 It engaged in street preaching with the distribution of material to the public which spread the word of 
God; 
 It engaged in some ways with the community such as by assisting in disaster relief, encouraging 
charitable giving and living out Christian beliefs in the community. 
There was some evidence that the PBCC was strongly inwardly focused on nuclear families and extended 
family within its own community. Although the religion seemed to exist predominantly for the purposes of its 
adherents, the Commission concluded that in law this was not necessarily fatal to charitable status where 
there was engagement with the wider community.  
The PBCC and PDT ‘acknowledged past mistakes’ in its disciplinary practices, and agreed in the variations to its 
trusts to enter into pastoral care and engage in Christian compassion. This included not excluding members 
who left the Church, or cutting them off from their families, and not engaging in harsh disciplinary action in 
relation to children. These measures allowed it to come within the charitable purposes of the Charities Act 
2006. 
The decision can be found at: 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/media/591398/preston_down_trust_full_decision.pdf 
Implications of this decision  
As a matter of general and charity law in the UK and Australia, a purpose trust (such as that of the PDT) which 
is not established as an exclusively charitable trust is in law void and of no legal effect. In addition, any trust 
where the purposes are indefinite, uncertain and are not limited to purposes which are exclusively charitable 
is void. In this decision, the Commission decided that, although not completely free from doubt about the 
matter (because of the possibility of different leaders of the PBCC going in new directions), the revised Trust 
Deed disclosed a sufficient intention to establish an exclusively charitable trust of a religious nature. As a 
consequence of being a charitable trust, the trust property is said to be permanently dedicated to charity, so 
that if necessary – for example, if in future the trusts were administered in an irremediably non-charitable way 
– the charitable assets may be applied cy-près for an equivalent charitable purpose trust (at para 35 of the full 
decision). 
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2.1.11 REGENTFORD LTD V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES [2014] 
UKUT 364 (TCC) (UNITED KINGDOM UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY 
CHAMBER), WARREN J, MCKENNA J, 8 AUGUST 2014) 
This was an appeal from the decision of the First Tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber (FTT) given on 21 
August 2013. In the FTT finding, the Charity Commission’s decision to open an inquiry into the conduct and 
financial affairs of Regentford Ltd (Regentford) was upheld. 
Regentford was incorporated in 1990 and was put on the register of charities in early 1991. Its principal 
charitable objects were the advancement of religion in accordance with the orthodox Jewish faith and the 
relief of poverty. Regentford last filed accounts with the Charity Commission (the Commission) on 30 
September 2006, showing assets of about £1 million, and annual income of about £80,000. However, 
investigation by the Commission disclosed that several large bank transactions were not recorded in the filed 
accounts, including two amounts totalling £400,000 which were paid to two trustees of Regentford. In 
addition, there was a transaction recorded in the minutes for 18 July 2007 relating to a 99 year lease over real 
estate belonging to Regentford, which was transferred to a company owned by the same two trustees. The 
company, Quain, was described in the minutes as a wholly owned subsidiary of Regentford, and the interest in 
the real estate was said to be held on trust for Regentford. Neither of these things was true, though the shares 
in Quain were transferred to Regentford five years after the events in question. 
In November 2007, the two trustees obtained a £950,000 interest-only loan on the real estate in question. The 
mortgagee later sold the real estate for £400,000, making a substantial loss. There was no information as to 
what had happened to the £950,000. In April 2010 Regentford was fined £250,000 at Croydon Crown Court for 
breaches of health and safety legislation. This followed the death of a man doing building work on scaffolding 
at premises said to be owned by the company. The judge who sentenced the company formed the view that it 
had operated in an irregular way for a number of years and asked the prosecutor to draw this to the attention 
of the Commission. This was done in a letter dated 9 June 2010. On 29 July 2010 Regentford was dissolved and 
removed from the register at Companies House for failure to file accounts. Because the charity had ceased to 
exist, the Commission removed Regentford from the Register of Charities on 22 September 2010, as required 
under section 34(1)(b) of the Charities Act 2011 (the Act). However, when doing so, the Commission made no 
enquiries.  
It emerged later that, apart from its failure to file accounts and reports since 2006, Regentford had very 
substantial assets, and following an application by one of the trustees referred to above, it was restored to the 
register of companies by an order of the Companies Court in February 2011. The Commission then restored 
Regentford to the Register of Charities in July 2011. Correspondence ensued between Regentford and the 
Commission after its re-registration, but by the time the enquiry was opened, the two trustees in question had 
resigned, and the remaining trustee lived abroad and denied knowledge of the records of the charity. 
The Commission’s grounds for an enquiry were those described above: the unreported bank transactions, the 
Quain transaction, and the mortgage transaction. In the FTT at first instance, counsel for Regentford 
contended that these transactions had since been explained satisfactorily or were ‘unfortunate investment 
decisions’. His Honour said (at [29] of the FTT decision): 
I cannot accept that there remains nothing to enquire about. In my judgement, even now, there has 
been no proper account of the trustees’ stewardship of charitable assets. For example, why did the 
2006 transactions not appear in the annual accounts? What exactly happened to the £950,000 
received by Quain purportedly on behalf of and with the approval of Regentford? These and other 
questions remain unanswered and the ‘attack on the merits’ must fail. 
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Therefore, the application for review failed, and the Commission’s enquiry under section 46(1) of the Act was 
permitted to proceed. This case was Regentford’s appeal from that permission. 
Section 46(1) of the Act provides as follows: 
The Charity Commission may from time to time institute inquiries with regard to charities or a 
particular charity or class of charities, either generally or for particular purposes. 
The object of such inquiries is to maintain public confidence in the operations of charities in the UK. 
The appeal was dismissed. The Upper Tribunal (UT) concluded that there was no error of law in the FTT’s 
decision (at [41]): 
We have concluded that the decision to open the inquiry was a reasonable one in the circumstances 
and that the FTT was correct to dismiss the application before it. We... conclude that it would 
generally be inappropriate for the FTT to direct the Respondent to end an inquiry in circumstances 
where there are significant causes for concern about a charity. We conclude that we should not set 
aside the FTT’s decision in this case. 
The UT adopted the view that the circumstances in which a review of a decision to open an inquiry might be 
conducted by the Commission were so varied that any general guidance to the FTT should be limited to the 
following four principles:  
1. that the FTT must apply the principles which would be applied by the High Court on an application for 
judicial review;  
2. that the application of those principles involved an examination of whether the decision to open the 
inquiry was made having regard to all the relevant and to no irrelevant considerations, and to 
consideration of whether the decision was unreasonable in the circumstances as they existed at the 
time it was made. There were three classes of consideration for the Commission in making its 
decision:  
(i) those to which the Commission must have regard;  
(ii) those to which it must not; and  
(iii) those which it may or may not take into account at its discretion.  
It was for the FTT to decide which category any particular consideration fell into; 
3. that if the Commission had taken into account a consideration that it should not have taken into 
account, there would be no ground for setting the decision aside unless it was found that not taking it 
into account would have made a difference to the decision it made; 
4. that even if the FTT decided that the application for review should be allowed, it would then have to 
decide whether to exercise its discretion to direct the Commission to close the inquiry. In doing so, if 
the circumstances which existed (or as they had developed by the time of the FTT hearing) were such 
as to justify the opening of an inquiry, it would be generally inappropriate for the FTT to direct the 
Commission to close its inquiry. 
This UT decision may be viewed at: 
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/Regentford-v-CCEW.pdf 
The FTT decision may be viewed at: http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/Regentford-
decision-21aug13.pdf 
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2.1.12 REGISTER V THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, CENTRAL DIVISION, REEVES J, 9 DECEMBER 
2014) 
Register (the plaintiff) made an inter vivos charitable donation of $1,000,000 to The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
in 2002. He alleged that he intended the funds to be permanently restricted for the purchase and 
management of a parcel of land in Harrison County, Kentucky, known as Griffith Woods. TNC combined an 
internal loan with Register’s donation to purchase Griffith Woods (the property) in late 2002 for approximately 
$2,000,000. TNC then sold the property. The first tract was sold to the University of Kentucky in 2004, a sale 
which had been contemplated, at least in theory, at the time of Register’s donation. TNC sold the remaining 
tract to the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources (KDFWR) in 2011. Thus, rather than using the 
funds received from the sales for management of Griffith Woods, as Register alleged he intended, TNC used 
the proceeds for other projects.  
Register brought this action against TNC for: (i) breach of contract; (ii) unjust enrichment; (iii) fraud in the 
inducement; (iv) constructive fraud; and (v) imposition of a constructive trust over the donated funds. 
Summary judgement was sought and granted in part, with the claims for unjust enrichment, constructive fraud 
and inducement dismissed summarily. This meant that the breach of contract claim remained for which 
summary judgement was denied. This was a matter for a jury. 
The plaintiff was a long-time supporter of the TNC. Griffith Woods was identified as a prime example of the 
tree species bur ash and blue oak within blue-grass lands. The plaintiff indicated an interest in the 
conservation of Griffith Woods in 2002, and made his $1 million pledge of shares on 13 May of that year. The 
actual gifts of shares were made in September and November of 2002, and in January, 2003. TNC sold the 
shares for $1,007,410. This money was then combined with internal funds to purchase Griffith Woods from its 
private owner. 
TNC sold 391 acres of Griffith Woods to the University of Kentucky (UoK) for $1,120,000 in February 2004.  
There had been a previous understanding about this sale between TNC and UoK before the plaintiff’s donation 
was made. Then in October 2011, TNC sold its remaining interest in the Griffith Woods property to KDFWR for 
$1,380,760. The parties agreed that no part of the plaintiff’s donation was currently being used to benefit 
Griffith Woods. The property had been sold in two parts at a profit of over $500,000. Some of this profit was 
used to pay down debt, and the remainder was placed in the general purpose account of TNC. 
The court said that there was no doubt that the donation was restricted to its purpose. It had been intended 
by the plaintiff to be used for the purchase and conservation of Griffith Woods. However, the court held that 
there were issues still to be decided as to whether TNC’s use of the donation complied with the plaintiff’s 
intent. Thus, although the court decided as a matter of law that the donation was restricted, its use in the 
context of the plaintiff’s intent was held to be for a jury to determine.  
If a jury determined that TNC violated the intent behind the gift, then Register was entitled to the return of his 
gift. This was because there would have been a breach of contract, and in that case, reversion was the 
appropriate remedy (at page 16). TNC argued that Register had acquiesced in the sales of Griffith Woods, and 
was thus estopped from obtaining a remedy, but the court disagreed. The breach was not in the sales 
themselves, but rather in not using the funds for their intended purpose. 
The fraud issues were not upheld by the court and were dismissed summarily because a charity such as TNC 
does not have a fiduciary relationship with its donors under Kentucky law. Therefore, the court ruled that only 
the breach of contract issue was one for a jury to decide.  The parties have since settled out of court, with the 
plaintiff receiving his donation back. 
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The case may be viewed at: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/kentucky/kyedce/5:2013cv00077/72118/115/0.pdf?ts=1418226270 
Implications of this case 
The court declined to extend the doctrine of constructive fraud to charities, finding that there was no fiduciary 
relationship between charities and their donors (at page 21) discernible from the cases available in the US.  
Thus the case was held be one of breach of contract for which the appropriate remedy was return of the 
donation. 
 
2.2 DISCRIMINATION 
2.2.1 AMERICAN ATHEISTS INC V SHULMAN 2:2012CV00264 (UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, NORTHERN DIVISION, BERTELSMAN J, 19 
MAY 2014) 
The plaintiffs were a group of atheist organisations in the United States. The defendant is the Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue Service of the United States (IRS). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief 
against the IRS on the basis that certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) were applied in a 
discriminatory fashion, being preferentially applied to churches and religious organisations. 
The plaintiffs contended that section 501(c)(3) of the IRC which gives tax exemption to various charities and 
other organisations, was unconstitutionally applied by the IRS to discriminate against non-religious tax-exempt 
organisations. The plaintiffs’ position was that the IRS distinguishes between organisations that are religious, 
and those that are charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, dedicated to amateur 
athletics, or for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals. More specifically still, the plaintiffs asserted 
that churches receive even more preference than religious organisations. The reasons the plaintiffs advanced 
for their position included: 
 Churches are not required to file an application (known as a Form 1023) for tax-exempt status 
 Churches are not required to file an annual information return (known as a Form 990) 
 Ministers of the gospel are able to receive a parsonage allowance 
 Salaries of ministers of the gospel are exempt from income tax, withholding tax, and FICA taxes 
 The IRS is required to follow specific (more restricted) structures when examining a Church in a tax 
enquiry. 
The plaintiffs alleged that this differing treatment violated the Equal Protection laws of the Fifth Amendment, 
the First Amendment (which prohibits the establishment of a state religion), and the Religious Test Clause of 
Article VI §3 of the Constitution.  
The court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring the case. 
They had suffered no injury. An injury for standing purposes had to be (a) concrete and particularised and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The plaintiffs said their injury was concrete and 
particularised by them having to make an application for classification from the IRS, use Form 1023, and pay 
the application fee of $850. The defendant contended that this injury would be self-inflicted, since the 
plaintiffs would voluntarily spend time and money trying to apply for classification as a religious organisation. 
The court held that the plaintiffs’ assertion that they would fail to be classified as a religious organisation was 
mere speculation, since they had not in fact tried to do so. Moreover, the relevant case law was clear that a 
church or religious organisation did not have to be theist or deity-centred. Many non-theistic religious 
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organisations had gained tax-exemption under section 501(c)(3) such as Buddhists, Taoists, and Ethical and 
Secular Humanists. 
The plaintiffs also failed to establish that they had representative standing i.e. standing to sue as 
representative of their members. Again, no harm could be demonstrated to their members. As to their 
standing as taxpayers, this also failed as the basis for the suit because the plaintiffs could not point to any 
particular spending of the government which they were disputing. They were merely arguing that certain 
provisions of the IRC were discriminatory. Taxpayer standing requires an ability to point to where the 
government was spending taxpayers’ money in an unconstitutional way (such as on payments to church 
schools). 
The plaintiffs had to concede in argument that some atheist organisations had obtained classification as 
religious organisations under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. Thus, their argument that anti-theistic (as opposed 
to merely non-theistic) organisations would never obtain tax-exemption under the IRC was incorrect. There 
had been no disparate treatment of the plaintiffs because they had not sought the relevant classification so no 
Equal Protection ground could be made out.  
Nor did the No Religious Test (for office or public trust) clause of Article VI of the Constitution apply. The 
plaintiffs sought to show that section 501(c)(3) organisations amounted to public trusts in modern times, 
because they were for the public interest in that they relieved the government from certain payments, but the 
court did not accept this argument. 
As the so-called Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, the court held that the plaintiffs had 
established their claim under that clause. The plaintiffs’ contention that the provisions of the IRC at issue did 
not have a secular purpose and improperly endorsed religion were made out. However, this did not overcome 
their lack of standing, so their action failed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/kentucky/kyedce/2:2012cv00264/71512/35 
 
2.2.2 CHRISTIAN YOUTH CAMPS LIMITED & ORS V COBAW COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICE 
LIMITED & ORS [2014] VSCA 75 (COURT OF APPEAL VICTORIA, MAXWELL P, NEAVE, 
REDLICH JJA, 16 APRIL 2014) 
This case involved a consideration of the interaction of the rights to freedom from discrimination and freedom 
of religion. The respondent (Cobaw) is an organisation concerned with the prevention of youth suicide. The 
appellant (CYC) had a camp facility established by the Christian Brethren Trust, connected with a church known 
as the Christian Brethren. The Christian Brethren are opposed to homosexual activity as being against biblical 
teaching. Cobaw wished to hire a camp facility from the appellants for the use of same sex attracted young 
people. CYC (by its camp manager) refused.  
It was held in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) that the refusal amounted to unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation of those who would be attending the proposed camp. 
Before the Tribunal, CYC contended that if, contrary to their principal submission, the refusal would otherwise 
have constituted unlawful discrimination, the exemption provisions in the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) 
(the EO Act) concerning religious freedom were applicable, such that there had been no contravention. These 
exemptions apply to conduct ‘by a body established for religious purposes’ (section 75(2)) and to 
discrimination by a person which is necessary for that person ‘to comply with the person’s genuine religious 
beliefs or principles’ (section 77). The Tribunal held that neither exemption was applicable. On appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, CYC disputed the finding that its refusal was unlawful discrimination, maintaining that there 
 36 
 
was a fundamental distinction between an objection to ‘the syllabus’ to be taught at the proposed camp — 
that is, to beliefs or opinions which would be expressed by Cobaw to those attending the camp — and 
discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation of those attending. The Tribunal’s decision was upheld by 
a majority of the Court of Appeal in this judgment.   
The Judgment of Maxwell P 
The discrimination issue 
There was no doubt that CYC had refused accommodation to Cobaw within the meaning of section 49(a) of the 
EO Act. However, at the relevant time Cobaw was an incorporated body. As such, Cobaw could not complain 
that it had been discriminated against.  Rather it said that it was a representative body acting on behalf of 
named individuals under section 104(1B) of the EO Act. Section 104(1B) is a machinery provision which enables 
a representative body to bring to the Equal Opportunity Commission, and then to the VCAT, one or more 
individual complaints of discrimination. There are several conditions to be satisfied before a complaint may be 
made by a representative body on behalf of named persons. In particular, each named person must have been 
entitled, as an individual, to make a complaint of discrimination in his or her own right. This was found to be so 
at trial, and this finding was not in contention in the appeal. 
Had the named individuals been discriminated against ‘on the basis of’ their sexual orientation? CYC 
contended on appeal that its objection was not to the orientation of the individuals per se, but rather to the 
promotion of homosexual activity as normal through the means of the camp. This was based on biblical 
teaching. Maxwell P rejected this distinction. There was not merely a difference of opinion involved, but rather 
active discrimination. The finding of fact below had been that there had been discrimination against the 
individuals concerned on the basis of sexual orientation. Maxwell P could see no reason to disturb this finding. 
The effect of section 8 of the EO Act 
Section 8(1) of the EO Act provides as follows: 
(1) Direct discrimination occurs if a person treats, or proposes to treat, someone with an attribute less 
favourably than the person treats or would treat someone without that attribute, or with a different 
attribute, in the same or similar circumstances. 
In other words there is the requirement of a comparator. Who would be an appropriate comparator in this 
instance? The trial judge chose a group of young people who were heterosexual in orientation, or perhaps of a 
particular race or ethnicity, who wished to discuss issues relating to their group. Maxwell P said that these 
were appropriate comparators for the judge to choose, given that the options were ‘reasonably open’ (at 
[71]). 
Who committed the act of discrimination? 
This case raised an important question concerning the liability of a corporation for discriminatory conduct 
which occurs in the course of the corporation’s business. The relevant prohibitions in Part 3 of the EO Act are: 
 A person must not discriminate against another person by refusing to provide goods or services 
to the other person (section 42(1)(a));  
 A person must not discriminate against another person by refusing, or failing to accept, the other 
person’s application for accommodation (section 49(a)).  
Where a complaint is made that there has been a discriminatory refusal of accommodation, it is therefore 
necessary to identify the ‘person’ who engaged in the alleged conduct. Where the service provider or 
accommodation provider is a corporation, and the decision to refuse is made by a person employed by the 
corporation to make such decisions, the question which arises is which ‘person’ committed the alleged act of 
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discrimination? Was it the natural person (the employee), or the corporation on whose behalf the employee 
was acting in making the decision to refuse? Maxwell P said on this point (at [75]–[76]): 
The answer to that question depends both upon the proper construction of the EO Act and upon the 
applicability, in this statutory context, of principles of agency and corporate personality. The following 
propositions are, however, uncontroversial: 
1. A corporation is a ‘person’ for the purposes of the Act. 
2. The prohibitions against discrimination were intended to apply directly to the activities of 
corporations. 
3. Corporations can act only through the agency of natural persons. 
4. The only way a corporate provider of services or accommodation could itself commit an act 
of discriminatory refusal would be for a natural person, employed by the corporation to 
make such decisions, to refuse to provide the corporation’s services or accommodation (and 
to do so on a prohibited ground). 
In my view, Parliament must have intended such an act of refusal to be attributable to the 
corporation for the purposes of the EO Act, so as to make the corporation directly liable as the 
‘person’ committing the act of discrimination. Otherwise, no corporation could ever contravene the 
EO Act in its own right.  
Maxwell P said that this was a case of a corporation acting through a natural person (in this case the camp 
manager). Therefore, for the purposes of the Act, this was a refusal of accommodation by CYC and not by the 
manager personally. Although Cobaw and the Attorney-General of Victoria contended that the Act was 
intended to operate on the basis of the original Tribunal finding i.e. that the camp manager committed the act 
of direct discrimination, and that CYC was vicariously liable for his actions, this was not the finding of Maxwell 
P. He held that CYC had directly discriminated against the individuals in question (at [99]): 
In those circumstances, it follows both from the language of the EO Act and from orthodox rules of 
attribution of conduct to corporations that the act of refusal was the act of CYC, not of [the manager] 
personally. As noted earlier, s 49 of the EO Act prohibits a person from discriminating against another 
person ‘by refusing ... the other person’s application for accommodation’. As a matter of ordinary 
language, the reference to a person ‘refusing’ to provide accommodation must be a reference to a 
person who is in a position to provide accommodation. Only the accommodation provider can 
sensibly be said to ‘accept’ or ‘refuse’ an application for accommodation. 
Attribution to the corporation 
On what basis should the act of direct discrimination be attributed to the corporation? Maxwell P said that 
since there were no rules of attribution in the EO Act, the common law principles of agency should apply (at 
[113], [121]): 
...Parliament is to be taken to have intended that the general principles of agency should apply where 
discriminatory conduct by a company is alleged. There is nothing in the EO Act to suggest otherwise. 
That is, Parliament intended that the conduct of those persons whom the company has authorised to 
provide the relevant services on its behalf should ‘count as’ the conduct of the company for this 
purpose. If that were not so, it would never be possible to establish that a company was itself a 
contravenor....  
The Victorian Parliament was evidently content to rely on the common law principles which enable 
the conduct of the employee to be attributed to the company... there is nothing in the EO Act to 
suggest any intention to exclude those principles from application. Clear words would have been 
required if that had been the intention. 
Therefore, this was not an instance of personal liability of the camp manager, whose appeal was allowed by 
Maxwell P. There was no vicarious liability by CYC. It was the body corporate, CYC, which had committed the 
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act of direct discrimination. Vicarious liability is dealt with in section 102 of the EO Act. Did it still have a place 
in the statutory scheme? Maxwell P said (at [133]): 
Attribution of direct liability to corporations on the basis described above leaves ample scope for s 
102 to operate. In short, s 102 will attach liability to a principal or employer in at least the following 
types of cases, namely: 
 where an employee contravenes a prohibition of the EO Act which is expressly directed at the 
conduct of employees in their capacity as such; or 
 where the prohibited conduct is engaged in by an independent contractor while performing 
services on behalf of the employer or principal. 
Accessory liability under section 98 of the EO Act could have arisen following on from the finding of liability for 
direct discrimination by the CYC. However, since there was no question of liability on the part of the camp 
manager in the appeal, Maxwell P said that he did not need to deal with the issue of accessory liability by the 
camp manager. 
How was VCAT’s finding in error?  
Maxwell P held that CYC had liability for direct discrimination against the named individuals, not the camp 
manager. Thus there was no question of CYC being only vicariously liable for the actions of the camp manager 
(at [148]–[149], [153]): 
It follows that the Tribunal erred in law in finding that [the camp manager] was the contravenor and 
that CYC was vicariously liable by virtue of s 102. Although this issue was not raised by the applicants 
in the grounds of appeal, and only addressed by them after the question had been raised by the 
Court, I consider that the Court has no alternative but to correct the error. This is a matter of 
fundamental importance to the interpretation of the EO Act and its application to conduct engaged in 
on behalf of corporations by their authorised employees. A decision based on what I have concluded 
is an incorrect legal analysis cannot be allowed to stand. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the 
identification of the discriminator has direct consequences for the applicability of the exemptions....  
CYC was a contravenor, but not on the legal basis identified by the Tribunal. On the findings made by 
the Tribunal, the only conclusion open as a matter of law was that the act of discrimination was 
committed by CYC itself. In the circumstances, the powers conferred by s 148 of the VCAT Act enable 
this Court to make the order which the Tribunal should have made. 
The effect of the freedom of religion exemptions in the EO Act 
The religious exemptions to Part 3 of the EO Act are contained in sections 75 and 77 of the EO Act. Section 
75(2) was relied on by the appellants. It provides: 
(2) Nothing in Part 3 applies to anything done by a body established for religious purposes that—  
(a) conforms with the doctrines of the religion; or  
(b) is necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of people of the religion.  
The question on appeal was whether CYC was ‘a body established for religious purposes’. Her Honour below 
had held that it was not. Maxwell P agreed. However, again he disagreed with the reasoning of the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal had discussed section 77 as the applicable exemption for both the CYC and the camp manager. 
Section 77 provides: 
Nothing in Part 3 applies to discrimination by a person against another person if the discrimination is 
necessary for the first person to comply with the person’s genuine religious beliefs or principles. 
Maxwell P said in relation to section 77 (at [161]–[162]): 
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The Tribunal held that CYC, as well as [the camp manager], was ‘a person’ for the purposes of s 77 and 
could invoke its protection. In her Honour’s view, it was no more incongruous to attribute a religious 
belief to a corporation than to attribute other states of mind such as intention, which the law already 
recognised. On the facts, however, the claim to exemption failed. Her Honour was not satisfied that 
the refusal of the application for accommodation was ‘necessary to comply with the genuine religious 
beliefs or principles’ of either [the camp manager] or CYC. As will appear, I do not consider that 
Parliament intended the s 77 exemption to be available to a corporation. On that view, the exemption 
could never have assisted CYC.... 
Although section 77 could not have been available to CYC, Maxwell P was clear that there were exemptions 
available, where applicable (at [166]): 
What is unambiguously clear is that the prohibitions against discriminatory conduct in pt 3 have no 
application to conduct which falls within either s 75(2) or s 77. Such conduct is exempted, or 
excluded, or excepted, from the scope of the statutory prohibitions. Where conduct which would 
otherwise contravene one or more of those prohibitions falls within one of the exemptions, there is 
no contravention. 
Within this scheme of exemptions, corporations have protection under sections 75 and 76, and individuals 
have protection under section 77. This is a scheme which Maxwell P characterised as ‘logical and coherent’, 
and in line with established principles of statutory interpretation (at [323]). Thus, the Tribunal was incorrect in 
its reasoning on this issue. Maxwell P made his position clear (at [325]–[326]): 
It is, of course, unusual for a court of its own motion to raise a question of law not raised by the 
parties, all the more so to proceed to decide the question over the opposition of a party which stands 
to benefit from a finding of error. But, for similar reasons to those given earlier in relation to the 
question of law concerning the ‘person’ who committed the act of discrimination, I consider that this 
is an issue which the Court should decide. It is not an academic or hypothetical question. On the 
contrary, it was the subject of a ruling by the Tribunal. It is, moreover, fundamental to the operation 
of the religious freedom exemptions. Finally — and decisively, in my view — it is both appropriate and 
necessary to correct what seems to me to be a clear error in the Tribunal’s construction of the EO Act. 
As Redlich JA pointed out in the course of argument, to fail to do so would be to run the risk of 
perpetuating the error. 
Did the section 75(2) exemption apply? 
Section 75(2) applied to a body established for religious purposes, including a corporation. Maxwell P said that 
the exemption in section 75(2) was intended to protect religious activity from an interference which would be 
contrary to doctrine or an affront to belief (at [304]). The problem with the appellant’s contentions in this 
regard was that Maxwell P could not agree that the CYC camp premises had any connection to religion. It was 
a place of accommodation, not a church (at [305]–[306]): 
Adherents to a religion must be able to insist that their place(s) of religious observance be used for — 
and only for — the propagation of doctrines and principles to which they subscribe. The Resort does 
not, however, have the character of church premises. It is not a place of religious observance. Nor is 
the accommodation business a religious activity in any relevant sense. There was no evidence to 
suggest that any members of the Christian Brethren were aware of, less still participated in, the 
activities of CYC — apart, of course, from the individual staff members employed to conduct the 
business. 
His Honour therefore dismissed the appeal of the CYC, agreeing with the Tribunal below, though having 
different reasons for his decision. 
 40 
 
The Judgment of Neave JA 
Neave JA dismissed both appeals. Her Honour said that section 49(a) applied to both the camp manager and to 
CYC and both had discriminated against the named individuals, so both were liable. However, she accepted 
that Part 3 of the Act, including section 49(a), was intended to make employers, including corporations, 
directly liable for discriminatory acts committed by their employees or agents. She held that section 102 (on 
vicarious liability) allowed either the camp manager or CYC to be the subject of an action for discrimination. In 
addition, she said that section 98 on accessory liability could have applied, but did not need to be decided in 
this case. 
On the issue of the section 77 exemption, Neave JA agreed with Maxwell P that section 77 did not apply to 
corporations, since (at [413]): 
Like other human rights, the right to freedom of religious belief can only be enjoyed by natural 
persons. Because a corporation is not a natural person and has ‘neither soul nor body’, it cannot have 
a conscious state of mind amounting to a religious belief or principle. It follows that applying the s 77 
exception to a corporation would require the adoption of a legal fiction which attributes the beliefs of 
a person or persons to the corporation. 
Although section 77 did apply to the camp manager as an individual, he could not rely on its exemption to 
escape liability. This was because his refusal of accommodation to Cobaw was, although motivated by his 
religious beliefs, not necessary for him to comply with those beliefs. Thus, both the camp manager and CYC 
were liable for direct discrimination. 
The Judgment of Redlich JA 
Redlich JA allowed both appeals, disagreeing with the other appeal judges’ interpretation of the applicability of 
section 77. He held that section 77 could apply to both CYC and the camp manager. However, he agreed that 
CYC was not a religious organisation. As such it could not rely on section 75(2) (at [439(5)]). The major 
differences in His Honour’s judgement were: 
 He held that section 102 of the EO Act applied to both CYC and the camp manager; 
 He held that the section 77 exemption in the EO Act could apply to corporations, in line with the 
decision of the Tribunal. However, he disagreed with the reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to 
the construction of section 77; 
 He held that the Tribunal erred in its finding that the applicants’ conduct was not necessary in 
order for them to comply with their genuine religious beliefs or principles; 
 He held that if the religious exemption was available to either employer or employee, the other 
could rely upon the exemption. 
The application of the section 77 religious exemption to corporations 
This was the basis upon which Redlich JA allowed the appeals, saying (at [476], [480]): 
Although a corporation is a distinct legal entity with legal rights, obligations, powers and privileges 
different from those of the natural persons who created it, own it, or whom it employs, there is ample 
legal basis to impute to it the religious beliefs of its directors and others who the law may regard as its 
mind or will. The Tribunal observed that subjective intentions may be attributed to corporations, 
including the necessary mental element for a crime. The corporation may make and express moral, 
ethical, environmental or other judgments in the discourse of the public square and participate in the 
defining of social norms. As this case shows, it will not necessarily be difficult to identify the 
corporation’s state of mind. There is no principled reason for treating a corporation as capable of 
forming and acting upon its views in any of these areas but incapable of forming and acting upon 
religious ones....  
 41 
 
Corporations have a long history of association with religious activity. Blackstone, in his 
Commentaries on the Law of England, lists ‘advancement of religion’ first in the list of purposes that 
corporations might pursue. Religious institutions have long been organised as corporations at 
common law and under the King’s charter. It has been repeatedly held by European courts, applying 
art 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that entities and associations including 
corporations, unincorporated associations, institutions and societies are capable of possessing and 
exercising the right to freedom of religious beliefs and principles. 
His Honour said that it would be anomalous if section 75(2) alone applied to corporate bodies (at [490]):  
It would follow that wherever a corporation engages in commercial activity but the corporation was 
not established for religious purposes, s 77 would not enable the exemption to apply to both the 
corporation and those particular individuals whose acts are to be treated as those of a corporation. 
That interpretation would produce the unintended result that individuals who operate a business 
would have different levels of religious freedom, depending upon whether the business was 
incorporated or not. It would force individuals of faith to choose between forfeiting the benefits of 
incorporation or abandoning the precepts of their religion. 
His Honour outlined his reasons for disagreeing with the Tribunal on the application of section 77 of the EO Act 
(at [502]): 
Upon proper analysis, the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal rested upon the combined effect of four 
interrelated matters, each of which [was] resolved adversely to the applicants. The first was the 
narrow construction given to the exemptions. The second was the Tribunal’s objective assessment of 
whether the applicants’ religious principles or beliefs compelled them to act as they did. The third was 
the view that there was only limited scope for religious freedom in the commercial sphere. The fourth 
was the inference which the Tribunal drew from the applicants’ engagement in and the manner in 
which they conducted the Resort in the commercial marketplace. The inference the Tribunal drew 
from that activity was that their religious beliefs or principles did not compel them to refuse to allow 
Cobaw use of the Resort. For the reasons that follow, I consider that the Tribunal’s conclusions on 
each of those matters was, with respect, in error, each contributing to the erroneous conclusion that 
the exemption was not available to Mr Rowe or CYC. 
His Honour paid particular attention to whether CYC and the camp manager were obliged by their religious 
beliefs to refuse Cobaw use of the camp, thus making section 77 available to them as an excuse for 
discrimination (at [572]–[573]): 
Section 77 excuses an act of discrimination in the marketplace when it is known that to perform the 
act will facilitate a purpose that is fundamentally inconsistent with the person’s belief or principles. 
The application of the exemption does not depend upon CYC having advertised that it was a religious 
organisation or provided some means of forewarning that particular uses of their facility would be 
refused. The absence of such steps could not give rise to the inference that their religious principle or 
belief did not necessitate the refusal of the request. As adherents to the faith of the Christian 
Brethren the applicants’ beliefs dictated their response upon being informed of the intended use of 
their facility. Once the applicants were invested with knowledge of the purposes of the WayOut 
forum and the matters which...would inevitably be discussed, the applicants were bound by their 
principles and beliefs to refuse the use of their facility for that purpose. Because of the narrow 
construction given to the exemption, which effectively removed its intended scope of protection for 
discriminatory acts in the market place, and because of the erroneous consequential findings which 
the Tribunal said flowed from the fact that the applicants were engaged in a commercial activity, the 
applicants were denied the benefit of the exemption. The Tribunal erred in its finding that the 
applicants’ conduct was not necessary in order for them to comply with their genuine religious beliefs 
or principles.  
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His Honour then went further, holding that once section 77 was available to protect the conduct of the 
employee or agent, neither party could be liable. He concluded that as Part 3 of the Act did not apply to the 
discrimination by CYC and the camp manager by virtue of section 77, the appeal by both applicants should be 
allowed and the orders of the Tribunal set aside. 
Therefore: 
 The appeal of the camp manager was allowed by 2 to 1 
 The appeal of CYC was dismissed by 2 to 1  
The findings were that: 
 CYC was not a religious organisation 
 CYC was liable for direct discrimination against the named individuals 
 The section 77 exemption did not apply to corporations (incorporated bodies) such as CYC (by 2 to 1) 
 Only section 75(2) applied to corporations (by 2 to1) 
 However, section 75(2) was not available as an exemption in this case. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2014/75.html 
The VCAT decision may be viewed at: www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1613.html. 
Implications of this case 
The outcome of this case was that the Court of Appeal dismissed by 2 to 1 the appeal from VCAT which had 
ruled that CYC discriminated against Cobaw in refusing the provision of accommodation. The Court of Appeal 
held that direct discrimination had taken place, and that the refusal by CYC to provide accommodation was not 
covered by any of the religious exemptions in the EO Act. Similar cases attempting to balance competing rights 
(to non-discrimination and religious freedom) have been decided in the UK in recent times: see e.g. the 
Catholic Care Leeds adoption decision of November 2012 at 
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/cc_Leeds_v_charity_commission.pdf which 
decided in favour of non-discrimination; and the St Margaret’s adoption decision of the Scottish Charity 
Appeals Panel of 31 January 2014 
http://www.scap.gov.uk/pdf/Saint%20Margarets%20Children%20and%20Family%20Care%20Society.pdf 
which decided in favour of religious freedom. 
 
2.2.3 ILIAFI V THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS AUSTRALIA [2014] 
FCAFC 26 (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, KENNY, GREENWOOD 
AND LOGAN JJ, 19 MARCH 2014) 
This was an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court (as it then was) dismissing two separate applications 
with multiple applicants. The applications were made under section 46PO of the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) alleging unlawful discrimination by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints (the Church) against the applicants as members of the Church. 
The Church is an association established to further various charitable purposes, including religious, educational 
and humanitarian purposes. Church congregations are allocated to congregational units known by the Church 
as ‘wards’ and ‘stakes’. A stake is normally a geographical area constituted by five to twelve smaller areas 
called wards. In Queensland, prior to August 2007, the Church operated Samoan-speaking, non-native 
language wards at Kingston, Woodridge and Moreton, and, prior to April 2008, at Ipswich and Goodna (the 
Samoan-speaking wards). The appellants were members of the Samoan-speaking wards. 
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In 2007 and 2008, the Church discontinued the Samoan-speaking wards. Until these wards were discontinued, 
the appellants were able to worship publicly as a group in their native Samoan language at services conducted 
by the Church in the Samoan-speaking wards. Following the discontinuance of the wards, the Church 
announced that the appellants were no longer allowed to use any language other than English in public 
worship and, in consequence, the appellants could no longer use the Samoan language publicly to pray, sing or 
testify in services of public worship conducted by the Church. 
The appellants claimed that in making the decision to discontinue the Samoan-speaking wards and to conduct 
services exclusively in the English language, the Church had done an act that was unlawful pursuant to section 
9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act). Both applications were heard by a Federal Magistrate 
on 27, 28 and 29 January 2010 and on 17 and 18 March 2010. Judgments were delivered on 30 November 
2012 dismissing the applicants’ claims. The applicants appealed. 
Was this a doctrinal matter and so outside the court’s jurisdiction? 
The Federal Magistrate had rejected the Church’s (i.e. the respondent’s) submission that ‘the decision in 
question was a matter solely of ritual, doctrine or ecclesiastical issues’. Accordingly, his Honour considered 
that there was no need to rule on the respondent’s argument that, because the challenged decision concerned 
ritual, doctrine or ecclesiastical issues, the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues in 
the applications. The respondent did not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
The issue in the appeal 
The central issue in this appeal was whether the appellants had in fact identified a right at issue, which was 
properly described as ‘a human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life’, within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. Section 9(1) deals with direct 
discrimination and provides: 
It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human right 
or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
Section 9(1A) deals with indirect discrimination, providing: 
Where: 
(a) a person requires another person to comply with a term, condition or requirement which is not 
reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and  
(b) the other person does not or cannot comply with the term, condition or requirement; and 
(c) the requirement to comply has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, by persons of the same race, colour, descent or national 
or ethnic origin as the other person, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life; 
the act of requiring such compliance is to be treated, for the purposes of this Part, as an act involving 
a distinction based on, or an act done by reason of, the other person’s race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin. 
Was there a relevant right to public worship as a group in the appellants’ native language?  
Section 9(2) of the Act refers to ‘any right of a kind referred to in Article 5 of the Convention’, that is, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which is set out in the 
Schedule to the Act. The appellants relied on items in Article 5(d):  
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(iii) the right to nationality; 
… 
(vii) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and 
(viii) the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 
However, the appellants did not explain precisely how it was that an alleged right to worship publicly as a 
group in one’s native language existed separately and apart from these three nominated rights. The full court 
dealt with this defect in their pleadings by a detailed consideration of the actual Article 5 rights which were 
nominated. In doing so, they applied the usual mode of construction for interpretation of international 
treaties. 
Freedom of religion 
The full court observed that the freedom of religion was a right embracing much complexity. In recent 
European jurisprudence, there had been a re-statement of earlier jurisprudence that emphasised that, in the 
case of dissent from Church rulings, an individual’s freedom of religion was protected by the right to leave the 
Church. The full court held that that right applied to the appellants (at [85]–[86]): 
It may be observed, lest it be thought the point was overlooked, that the right to freedom of religion 
does not, indiscriminately, guarantee an individual’s right to worship publicly in a particular language 
of importance to that individual. In the context of the right to religious freedom, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee observed in General Comment No 22... that the use of a language is likely to 
be protected where it is the language “customarily spoken by a religious group”. In order to 
determine whether or not the use of language customarily spoken by a religious group is protected, it 
is necessary to consider, amongst other things, the identity and scope of that religious group and the 
possibility that that group may customarily speak many languages. Where, however, as in this case, 
members of a religious group (here the Church) dispute that group’s choice of language for the 
conduct of their public worship services, then the ‘exit strategy’ analysis applies. As the foregoing 
analysis shows, the right to freedom of religion, referred to in article 5(d)(vii) of CERD, does not give 
rise to, or otherwise support the existence of, the right to worship publicly as a group in the 
appellants’ Samoan language in the Church’s services of public worship, as the appellants would have 
it.  
Freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is essentially the freedom to communicate and receive opinion, 
information and ideas without interference. The appellants invoked the right to freedom of expression in 
article 5(d)(viii) of CERD, in support of the existence of the supposed right to worship publicly as a group in 
Samoan, but did not develop this argument by reference to any relevant jurisprudence. The court said on this 
point (at [88]–[89]): 
A major difficulty with this part of the appellants’ case is that the appellants did not develop their 
argument by reference to the meaning and content of this right, as outlined in the relevant 
jurisprudence. The appellants’ submissions in the Federal Magistrates Court did no more than name 
the right. The appellants did not traverse and did not attempt to rely on any jurisprudential analysis of 
the principles concerning freedom of expression that might have been relevant to their case. The right 
to freedom of expression engages a sophisticated jurisprudential analysis, which the appellants 
ignored at their peril. 
The full court observed that the right to freedom of expression does not guarantee ‘linguistic freedom as such’ 
or ‘guarantee a right to use the language of one’s choice’ in all circumstances (at [92]), and concluded that the 
argument as it had been put to the court could not be sustained. 
 45 
 
ICCPR Article 27 
Having found that the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants were defective, the full court went on 
to consider its own argument based on Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Article 27 deals with minorities’ right to language. The full court canvassed the argument in detail and 
rejected it as containing a ‘fatal’ flaw (at [95]–[96]): 
For present purposes, there is no need to consider whether the Samoan population in Australia, or 
the Samoan population involved in this case is a minority group. At international law, the meaning of 
minority is not fixed: the parties addressed no argument on this question.... The appellants asserted 
that this proposition meant that they had the right to use their own language when they worshipped 
publicly as a group in the respondent Church’s services of public worship. There is a difficulty at this 
point, which is fatal to the appellants’ argument. Assuming Samoan speakers are a relevant minority 
in Australia, then the right in article 27 is a right, in community with other members of their group, 
to use the Samoan language. That is, as the United Nations Human Rights Committee said in General 
Comment No 23, the relevant right is “[t]he right of individuals belonging to a linguistic minority to 
use their language among themselves (whether in private or in public)”. On the facts as found, there 
was no impairment of this right, since the appellants were free to use their native language amongst 
themselves; the ban was on them using their native language to worship in community with Samoan 
and non-Samoan speaking persons: see paragraph 18(e)(iv) of the Federal Magistrate’s reasons.... 
That is, the Federal Magistrate found that a reason for the recommendation to disband the Samoan-
speaking wards was that “many of the Samoan youth who attended these wards were unable to 
speak the Samoan language”. [emphasis in the judgement] 
Therefore, Article 27 of the ICCPR did not apply to the appellants’ case. 
Right to nationality 
The right to nationality in international law is the right of stateless persons to have a nationality. The full court 
said that it did not apply in this case (at [104]): 
The kind of matters with which the right to nationality is concerned relate to belonging to a Nation-
State. They do not appear to have anything to do with the right being asserted by the appellants in 
this case.... Since the right to nationality is directed to different concerns from those arising here, it 
can be put to one side as not providing any additional support for the existence of the appellants’ 
claimed right to worship publicly as a group in the Samoan language. 
Freedom of association 
The full court agreed with the Federal Magistrate that this right did not apply to this case. 
Were there any rights engaged? 
The full court concluded that there were no relevant rights to consider, and in particular no right to worship 
publically in Samoan (at [110]–[111]): 
...the appellants failed to establish the existence of this right and therefore failed to establish that 
there was a “human right or fundamental freedom ... of a kind referred to in Article 5 of the 
Convention” that engaged s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act of the kind alleged. None of the rights 
to freedom of religion or freedom of expression or right to nationality, as articulated by the 
appellants, protected the appellants’ ability to worship publicly as a group in the Samoan language in 
the respondent’s services. No language or other right in article 27 of the ICCPR supplied this 
deficiency. Since the appellants failed to establish the existence of a right which would, in the 
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circumstances of this case, engage s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act, this provision cannot be 
engaged at all in this case.  
The appeal was dismissed, with costs to be determined. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2014/26.html 
 
2.2.4 KOVAC V AUSTRALIAN CROATIAN CLUB LIMITED [2014] ACAT 41 (AUSTRALIAN 
CAPITAL TERRITORY CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, PROFESSOR P 
SPENDER, 4 JULY 2014) 
This was a case involving discrimination. The respondent, the Australian Croatian Club Limited (the club), was 
established in 1969. The applicant (Kovac) was a member of the club’s board in 1986, but stepped down. He 
was involved in humanitarian work in Croatia in 1995 (during the Balkan conflicts of that time), and moved 
there with his family in 1997. He returned to Canberra in 2000, rejoined the respondent in 2007, and was 
elected vice-president in May 2007.  
The club had been in decline for some years, and had made a loss in the financial year to September 2007. At 
the annual general meeting (AGM) in May 2008, the president (Zvadro Tokic) proposed a resolution: THAT the 
pictures of Croatian heroes be removed from the main hall of the club and placed upstairs, in a private 
members area. Behind the resolution was the club’s hope that there would be more ‘social’ members 
attending the club, and the removal of the pictures would make the main hall space ‘more inviting’ to such 
members. Underlying this was the notion that the internecine conflicts within the history of Croatia were not 
something to be rehearsed before the public in general. The resolution was approved by a vote of 94 to 35 
members attending the AGM. 
On 21 September 2008 an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) was held at which Tokic and all the board 
members resigned, and an interim board was elected. Apparently, concerns were expressed about the 
removal of the pictures and a vote was taken to reinstate them, however no minutes were recorded on 
attendance at the EGM. At a subsequent board meeting on 23 September 2008, feeling that the vote on a 
show of hands at the EGM was insufficient, the board voted to reinstate the pictures by 6 votes to 3. 
On 14 December 2008, the interim board was re-elected for a further term. The applicant renewed his 
membership for 2009 and 2010. Various incidents then occurred: the applicant’s brother was suspended from 
membership of the club for six months for aggressive behaviour; the applicant posted various allegations 
about staff and volunteers on Facebook under the name ‘Justin Case’; and the applicant’s applications for 
membership of the club for 2011 and 2012 were rejected. 
On 17 January 2012, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission (the Commission) 
pursuant to section 42(1)(c) of the Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (ACT) (the HRC Act). On 20 September 
2012, the ACT Human Rights and Discrimination Commissioner (the Commissioner) determined that the 
complaint ‘may raise issues of discrimination on the ground of political conviction’. However, the 
Commissioner decided that conciliation was unlikely to succeed, and closed the complaint in accordance with 
section 78(1) of the HRC Act. By letter dated 15 November 2012, the applicant requested that the Commission 
refer the complaint to the Tribunal, which the Commissioner did on 21 November 2012, pursuant to section 
53A of the HRC Act. On 23 February 2013, the respondent applied to have the application dismissed pursuant 
to section 32 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 alleging that it was frivolous or vexatious or 
otherwise lacking in substance. However, the Tribunal dismissed the respondent’s application on 27 March 
2013 and the matter proceeded to this hearing. 
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The applicable legislation was the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) (the Act). Section 8 of the Act provides that a 
person discriminates against another person if the person treats the other person unfavourably because the 
other person has an attribute referred to in section 7, which includes ‘religious or political conviction’ (section 
7(1)(i)).  
Section 22(2) of the Act states that it is unlawful for a club, the committee of management of a club or a 
member of the committee of management of a club to discriminate against a member of the club: (a) in the 
terms or conditions of membership that are afforded to the member; or (b) by failing to accept the member's 
application for a particular class or type of membership; or (c) by denying the member access, or limiting the 
member's access, to any benefit provided by the club; or (d) by depriving the member of membership or 
varying the terms of membership; or (e) by subjecting the member to any other detriment. 
Had the applicant been discriminated against because of his political conviction? The applicant’s evidence was 
that he took a moderate position politically but that the club was more doctrinaire or ‘right wing’, and that this 
was the reason for its refusal to renew his membership. The respondent club argued that the real and true 
reason for the decision to refuse the applicant’s membership of the club was the need to protect the club, its 
board and volunteers, from a series of antisocial behaviours publicly displayed by the applicant. These 
behaviours comprised a series of Facebook posts attacking the club over 2010 and 2011. 
The Tribunal held that it was satisfied that the applicant had submitted his application for membership of the 
club in 2012. Therefore, section 22(2) of the Act applied. Were his political convictions held against him in the 
refusal to accept his membership application? The Tribunal found that the applicant (at [58]): 
...had a political conviction because he had a settled or strongly held belief about the processes,
 
policies or obligations of the government of the Republic of Croatia. It was a belief that had a bearing 
on the form, role, structure, feature, purpose, obligations, duties or some other aspect of 
government. It is not necessary for the applicant to establish that his political conviction is capable of 
bringing about a change in the government of the Republic of Croatia for it to have a bearing on 
government. The political conviction is not too remote merely because it involves a social club in 
Canberra. An important element of the applicant’s political conviction in this case is that it may be 
distinguished from the political views of others, particularly the members of the...Board.... 
This last point referred to the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant had a moderate political stance, with a 
commitment to the Republic of Croatia as it now was, and not to any historical view of Croatia in the past. This 
commitment embraced the sorts of portraits, slogans, symbols or emblems that ought to be displayed in the 
club premises, including its main hall. The Tribunal held that this dispute was a real and genuine reason for the 
applicant’s treatment within the meaning of section 8 of the Act. 
Was the applicant treated unfavourably as a result of his convictions? The Tribunal concluded that the 
respondent treated the applicant unfavourably by cancelling his membership without complying with the 
Articles of Association, thereby depriving him of his membership (section 22(2)(d) of the Act), failing to accept 
his application for voting membership (section 22(2)(b) of the Act) and offering an inferior form of 
membership, that is, a social membership, and attaching an onerous condition upon any future application 
that the applicant might make for the inferior form of membership (section 22(2)(a)). 
Therefore, the Tribunal found that the respondent unlawfully discriminated against the applicant, pursuant to 
sections 8 and 22 of the Act, by treating the applicant unfavourably because of the applicant’s political 
conviction. As a consequence of this finding, the Tribunal ordered that the matter be listed for further 
directions to consider the further orders that the Tribunal must make pursuant to section 53E of the HRC Act.  
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/act/ACAT/2014/41.html 
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O POPPY V SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED [2014] FCA 656 (FEDERAL 
COURT OF AUSTRALIA, WHITE J, 20 JUNE 2014)  
See Employment and Workplace Relations case note 2.3.3, below 
 
2.2.5 RODWELL V TERREY HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB HOLDINGS LTD TRADING AS 
TERREY HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB [2014] NSWCATAD 34 (NEW SOUTH WALES 
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
DIVISION, J WAKEFIELD SENIOR MEMBER, 24 MARCH 2014) 
In this application, Ms Rodwell (the applicant) sought leave pursuant to section 96(1) of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (the Act) for her complaint of sex discrimination to proceed before the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal determined that leave should be refused. 
The applicant, an experienced and much awarded golfer in Europe, joined the Terrey Hills Golf Club operated 
by Terrey Hills Golf & Country Club Holdings Ltd (the Club) in November 2011. The Club provides a mixed 
golfing competition in which men and women play against each other for prizes. The applicant alleged that the 
Club deliberately and systematically arranged the tee off positions such that women were forced to play a 
‘longer game’ relative to male members and that this significantly disadvantaged female players. She claimed 
that by this conduct the Club discriminated against women on the grounds of their sex by arranging the course 
so that female players were treated less favourably than male players in the same circumstances. The Club 
denied discrimination in relation to the placement of tee markers. 
Section 96(1) of the Act provides the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) with an unfettered 
discretion to grant leave for a complaint to proceed. The applicant bears the onus of persuading the Tribunal 
that it is appropriate that leave be granted. The relevant sections of the Act were sections 24 (what constitutes 
discrimination on the ground of sex), 33 (discrimination in the provision of services) and 53 (liability). The 
applicant needed to show that the Club provided her with a service, and then that there had been either direct 
or indirect discrimination against her in the provision of that service on the basis of her sex.  
On the issue of whether the Club provided a service under section 33 of the Act, the Tribunal held that, given 
the wide nature of the definition of service under section 4(1), and in the associated case law, there was 
material capable of establishing that the Club provided a service to its members by administering the 
maintenance of the golf course and the competitions played by members using it. 
Had there been discrimination in the provision of that service? The Tribunal identified the complaint, which 
had not specified the nature of the alleged discrimination, as one concerning direct discrimination. In order to 
establish a claim for direct discrimination, the applicant had to establish that the Club had treated her less 
favourably than it would have treated a person of the opposite sex in the same circumstances or in 
circumstances which were not materially different. Having done so, she then had to establish that at least one 
of the reasons for her less favourable treatment was her sex. 
To establish differential treatment, the applicant had also to identify a real or hypothetical comparator. No 
submission had been made as to the identity of a real comparator. For the purposes of this application, the 
Tribunal said that the hypothetical comparator was a male member of the Club playing off a blue tee marker 
(the male members’ tee markers; women played off gold tee markers) in a mixed competition on the days 
complained of. The Tribunal considered various pieces of documentary evidence and determined that (at [73]): 
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Taking the evidence which is likely to be submitted by Ms Rodwell at its highest, there is material 
before the Tribunal which is capable of establishing that she was treated less favourably in the 
circumstances of the mixed competition than men playing on the same day in the instances referred 
to. 
Thus, having established differential treatment, the applicant had then to show that at least one of the ‘real’, 
‘genuine’, or ‘true’ reasons for that treatment was her sex. However, the Tribunal could not find any evidence 
to this effect. There was no direct evidence, nor could any inference of discrimination based on sex be drawn 
from the available evidence (at [85]): 
There is a more probable and innocent explanation available on the evidence for the placing of the 
tees, namely course maintenance and to restrict wear and tear in circumstances where the blue tees 
have a substantially higher use than gold tees. The Club has also submitted that it has in place 
procedures to ensure the conduct of competition is fair and meets relevant Golf Australia guidelines. 
Therefore, although the evidence was capable of showing differential treatment of female golfers, it was not 
capable of showing direct discrimination. Thus, the application for leave to proceed was refused. 
The case may be viewed at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCATAD/2014/34.html 
Implications of this case 
On 1 January 2014, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales was abolished and its 
jurisdiction was acquired by the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. This matter was a ‘part 
heard proceeding’ within the meaning of clause 6 of Schedule 1 to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 
2013 (NSW) because it had been commenced under the provisions of the previous legislation, the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW). The Tribunal in this hearing could exercise all the functions 
which the Administrative Decisions Tribunal had immediately before its abolition.  
 
2.2.6 ST MARGARET’S CHILDREN AND FAMILY CARE SOCIETY V OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH 
CHARITY REGULATOR (DECISION OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY APPEALS PANEL, 31 
JANUARY 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) relating to the policy 
of St Margaret’s Children and Family Care Society (the appellant) with respect to adoptions made to same sex 
parents. The original decision of the OSCR (made 22 January 2013, confirmed 4 March 2013) against the 
appellant’s policy was quashed. 
The appellant is a registered charity and a company limited by guarantee in Scotland. It operates an adoption 
and family support service. It was ordered by the OSCR to amend its documentation to ensure that the 
documentation was ‘clear and transparent’ and fully complied with the Equality Act 2010 (the Act) such that it 
did not unlawfully discriminate with respect to the protected characteristics in the Act, specifically religious 
belief and sexual orientation. 
The appellant was established in 1955 to meet the need for an adoption service in parts of Scotland. It was 
operated by the Catholic Church (the Church), and as a matter of Canon law was an agency of the Church. Its 
primary object was stated to be: 
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...to promote, irrespective of creed, the welfare of children, whose interests are paramount, to foster 
the stability of family relationships, and to assess the suitability of adoptive parents all in accordance 
with the teachings of the Catholic Church.... 
The OSCR had accepted the objects of the appellant in 2008, including its charitable purpose of the 
advancement of religion. The appeal panel accepted that the appellant had to comply with an ‘immense 
amount’ of Catholic teaching in order to be recognised as a Catholic agency (at [9]). Much of this teaching 
emanated from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the Congregation), based in Rome, which 
maintains the integrity of Catholic faith and morals doctrine throughout the Catholic world. The Congregation 
had expressed concern about the recognition of same sex unions and the adoption of children by same sex 
couples in a formal document of 2003. 
There was no disagreement that the appellant operated within the framework of the Adoption and Children 
(Scotland) Act 2007. It supplied a wide range of family services, not just adoption services. It had employees of 
various faiths. The process of adoption in Scotland is very rigorous, and involves the matching of parents 
assessed by agencies such as the appellant, and children who come through the processes of local authorities. 
Funding for the appellant comes from the Archdiocese of Glasgow, and the dioceses of Motherwell, Paisley 
and Galloway (described as ‘core funding’ in its accounts). It is also supported by individual donations, parish 
and school donations, adoptive parent donations, local authority funding (described as ‘incoming resources 
from charitable activities’) and the inter-agency fees it receives from adoption placements. However, it could 
not survive without the Church funding. 
The appellant’s adoption policy was to favour Catholic couples first, then couples where one party was a 
Catholic, then couples of any other faith, then singles of any faith. It required the adoption to be ‘within the 
framework of the Catholic faith’. Applicants for adoption, if married, were required to be in a stable 
relationship of at least two years. Lesser priority was given to couples who had been married for less than two 
years, couples in civil partnerships, single people, and couples who did not wish to adopt the Catholic faith. 
Applications were usually from Catholic married couples, or non-Catholic married couples who approved of 
the appellant’s ethos. Although the appellant had never received an application from a same sex couple, under 
its policies (in principle) such couples would not be turned away in the first instance. 
The OSCR began an enquiry into the appellant following a letter of complaint received from the National 
Secular Society. The OSCR formed the view on enquiry that the appellant favoured heterosexual married 
couples for adoption to the exclusion of all others. The appellant responded that every case for adoption was 
considered on its own merits. After much correspondence, the OSCR issued a direction to the appellant to 
clarify its documentation and to ensure that it complied with the Act. The appellant applied for a review of 
that direction. The review decision was that the appellant failed the charity test, because of the potential 
disbenefit that followed from the apparent discrimination arising from its policies, which outweighed any 
benefit from its service. This appeal ensued. 
The appeal panel noted that no other complaints had ever been received about the appellant from any source. 
The panel made strong findings in favour of the Church and its agencies. It held that the procedure used by the 
OSCR in making its decision was procedurally flawed in that separate persons did not make the original 
decision and the review decision.  The panel recommended that the OSCR change its procedures to ensure 
fairness and transparency (at line 629). 
The panel made clear that the appellant’s preferred criteria and priority policies were not unlawful 
discrimination. On the issue of public benefit, the panel held that the OSCR had been in error when it decided 
at an early stage of its enquiry that the appellant had breached the Act, and so failed the public benefit test. 
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The panel said that the public benefit test had been incorrectly applied by the OSCR (at line 750). The panel 
said (at lines 751–767): 
If the Panel had found that there had been a breach of the Equality Act then it would have not agreed 
with the [OSCR] that the Public Benefit test had not been met. In order to pass the test charities must 
show that they have a charitable purpose or purposes, and that the Public Benefit is not outweighed 
by any Private Benefit or Public Disbenefit. There is no evidence of any Private Benefit or public harm, 
same sex couples if not accepted by The Appellant’s organisation for whatever reason are still able to 
avail themselves of other charitable activities of the Appellant and such couples are not prevented 
from using any of the other 35 Scottish adoption agencies, no-one in a same sex relationship has 
complained of the Society to any regulator....  
Since the appellant’s policies were not unlawful discrimination, the panel held that any apparent restriction in 
their policies was not a restriction affecting public benefit. It noted that the OSCR agreed that the appellant 
provided public benefit services in other areas of its work, and said (at lines 803–817): 
The Panel is of the view that it is not as simple to say that if the Equality Act is breached then the 
Public Benefit test is not met and any guidelines contrary to that view should be revised by the 
Respondent... a “blanket policy” is not effective....  
There should be an objective test... applied... to weigh the public disbenefit... against... the public 
benefit. 
The panel also held that the OSCR had erred in not taking into account the appellant’s rights under the 
relevant human rights law in Scotland. In particular, the OSCR had not taken into account that the appellant 
was not just an adoption agency but also a religious organisation. The latter issue engaged Article 9 (freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) as 
enacted in Scottish law. The OSCR had argued that the appellant was not a church or religious organisation, so 
that Article 9 could not apply to it. It was not a religious charity, but an adoption agency. The panel did not 
agree. It held that the requirement in the appellant’s objects that the adoptions be in accordance with the 
Catholic faith meant that it was a charity for the advancement of religion. The fact that the appellant was a 
company did not alter this finding, since religious bodies could take on any form in Scotland. 
In the panel’s view, the evidence was strong that the appellant, regardless of its form, was required to 
conform with Canon law and the teachings of the Church. Moreover it must conform to its own founding 
documentation which referred to Catholic teaching (at lines 1034–1040): 
The Appellant’s founding deed required its activities to be in accordance with the teachings of the 
Catholic Church – those teachings are well defined and the Body is capable of manifesting religion and 
expressing religious thought which is made up of not only of rules and interpretation of sacred 
writings but also of history, tradition, mores, and the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. 
This being the case, Article 9 applied to the appellant and it was free to exercise its religious views. The 
appellant was controlled by the Church and its tenets. There was clear evidence of what was required in 
Encyclical Letters from the Pope and the views of the Congregation.  The appellant had to operate within the 
Catholic framework of teaching so that its preference for married couples as adopters was consistent with 
Catholic teaching.  Adoption by same sex couples was not consistent with that teaching. The panel accepted 
that the policies of the appellant were entirely appropriate as a manifestation of Catholic faith (at line 1082). It 
was not for the panel or the OSCR to decide whether the teaching was in line with modern Scottish life. 
The panel then went on to consider whether the application of Article 9 to the appellant as a religious charity 
was in conflict with Article 14 of the Convention, which prohibits discrimination. The OSCR had found that the 
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appellant had discriminated directly against homosexuals by applying the preferred criteria for adoption that it 
did. The panel strongly disagreed. It said that there could be no question of a finding of discrimination on the 
basis of religion, since there was no barrier to adoption by non-Catholics in the appellant’s policies. On the 
question of sexual orientation, the panel agreed that Article 14 applied to potential adopters. However, this 
had to be balanced against the Article 9 rights of both the appellant and the child to be adopted. Whilst the 
panel agreed that the preferred criteria for adoption applied by the appellant did discriminate against same 
sex applicants, this was at most indirect discrimination. Under the relevant legislation in Scotland, indirect 
discrimination can be permitted by exception: section 193 of the Equality Act 2010. 
Section 193(1) of the Act provides that a person does not contravene the Act if it is acting in accordance with a 
‘charitable instrument’. The panel said that the appellant complied with this section since it was acting in 
accordance with its objects. Section 193(2) permits indirect discrimination if it is a ‘proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim’. The panel was clear that the appellant’s aim was entirely legitimate – it was 
providing a service as a faith-based organisation within the requirements of its faith. The means were also held 
to be proportionate (at lines 1061–1065): 
...the aim is legitimate; it is also proportionate in that if The Appellant was not carrying out the 
adoption service then there would be no Catholic adoption agency providing an adoption service for 
Catholic children who in terms of the Adoption Act are entitled to be brought up in the Catholic faith. 
The panel therefore held that the section 193 exception applied to the appellant.  There was also an exception 
for religious organisations in section 23 of the Equality Act. Since the panel had already held that Article 9 
applied to the appellant, section 23 did also. Overall, there was held to be no contravention of the Equality Act 
by the appellant. 
The panel said that the OSCR should not require what it did from the appellant.  If it followed the original 
ruling of the OSCR it would have to disassociate itself from the Catholic Church. This would mean that it would 
have to close down for lack of funding. This was a disproportionate response from the OSCR.  
Thus the appellant successfully argued that it was not just an adoption agency and a public body (as contended 
by the OSCR), but rather that its whole purpose was the manifestation of religion and the religion of its 
members and supporters. The original decision of the OSCR was quashed, but no order was made as to costs 
because the panel held that the original decision of the OSCR was not unreasonable (though wrong) in the 
light of prior decisions in England.  
The case may be viewed at: 
http://www.scap.gov.uk/pdf/Saint%20Margarets%20Children%20and%20Family%20Care%20Society.pdf 
Implications of this decision 
The OSCR has decided not to appeal this decision, and has altered some of its guidelines because of it. The 
decision puts Scottish jurisprudence at odds with decisions from England which have found Catholic 
organisations discriminatory in similar circumstances. 
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2.3 EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
2.3.1 McINNES [2014] FWC 1395 (FAIR WORK COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER HAMPTON, 24 
MARCH 2014) 
This was an application by McInnes (the applicant) under section 789FC of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the 
Act) for an order to stop bullying at work. The application alleged that the applicant was subjected to bullying 
behaviour over a six year period commencing in November 2007 and ending in May 2013.  
A jurisdictional issue had previously been heard by the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission (the 
Commission) at [2014] FWCFB 1440. The relevant part of the Act, Part 6-4B, had commenced operation on 1 
January 2014. Part 6-4B, consisting of sections 789FA to 789FL, was inserted into the Act by the Fair Work 
Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). The Full Bench had held that the relevant provisions were not retrospective in 
nature, but rather prospective, in that they dealt with the stopping of bullying (which had occurred in the 
past), to prevent it in the future. Therefore, the Commission had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing. 
The relevant provision was section 789FD. Section 789FD deals with the issue of when a worker is ‘bullied at 
work’ as follows: 
(1) A worker is bullied at work if: 
(a) while the worker is at work in a constitutionally covered business: 
(i) an individual; or 
(ii) a group of individuals;  
repeatedly behaves unreasonably towards the worker, or a group of workers of which the 
worker is a member; and 
(b) that behaviour creates a risk to health and safety. 
(2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) does not apply to reasonable management action carried out in a 
reasonable manner.  
(3) If a person conducts a business or undertaking (within the meaning of the Work Health and Safety 
Act 2011) and either: 
(a) the person is: 
(i) a constitutional corporation; or 
(ii) the Commonwealth; or 
(iii) a Commonwealth authority; or 
(iv) a body corporate incorporated in a Territory; or 
(b) the business or undertaking is conducted principally in a Territory or Commonwealth place; 
then the business or undertaking is a constitutionally-covered business. (emphasis added) 
The respondent to this application was Peninsula Support Services Inc t/as Peninsula Support Services (PSS), an 
incorporated association located in Victoria. The issue before the Commission was whether the respondent 
was a constitutionally covered business.  
The Commission held that PSS did not fall within the scope of section 789FD(3)(a)(ii), (iii), (iv) or (b). 
Accordingly, in order to fall within the scope of section 789FD, PSS had to be a constitutional corporation (at 
[5]). 
The term ‘constitutional corporation’ is defined in section 12 of the Act as: ‘a corporation to which paragraph 
51(xx) of the Constitution applies’. The Australian Constitution defines corporations at section 51(xx) as: 
Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth. 
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PSS was incorporated within the limits of the Commonwealth, and it was agreed by the parties that only the 
term ‘trading corporation’ could be applicable to PSS. PSS contended that it was not a trading corporation 
within the meaning of Act due to its activities and nature, and as a result, the workplace was not conducted by 
a constitutionally-covered business. 
PSS is a community based organisation, which provides support to people with psychiatric disabilities and their 
carers living within the Southern metropolitan region (Mornington Peninsula, Frankston and parts of Kingston) 
in Victoria. It is incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) and registered as a 
Community Support Service under the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic). PSS was issued with an ABN in June 2000; 
it is registered as a charity with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, is endorsed by the 
ATO as an income tax exempt charitable entity, and is registered for GST purposes. 
Was PSS a trading corporation? Much of the evidence turned on the provision of government funding to PSS. 
PSS currently delivers various types of programs that are directed to support people with severe and enduring 
mental illness. The types of programs and projects include rehabilitation for individuals and groups, home-
based outreach support, mental health and homelessness, carer support and intake functions. The services 
provided by PSS are almost exclusively funded by the Victorian and Commonwealth Governments from: 
 the Victorian Department of Health (DoH) under a service agreement for a period of three years 
commencing in 2012 (the DoH service agreement); 
 the Commonwealth Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (as 
it was known at the time) confirmed through formal correspondence and a funding agreement (the 
DaHCSIA agreement). 
Some of this funding (though a minority) is obtained through competitive tendering processes, where the 
relevant government department invites organisations to bid for funding to undertake services in nominated 
areas. PSS also operates with a small surplus of income over expenditure. 
McInnes contended that PSS was a trading corporation because of its funding arrangements, its operating 
surplus and because the sale of services for grant money is a commercial transaction and represents a 
significant trading activity for PSS. PSS replied that is was not a trading corporation because it was a nonprofit 
service provider which did not obtain the majority of its funds from competitive tenders. It provided its 
services free of charge to clients, and did not engage in any major trading activity. Moreover, its small surplus 
and the ‘miniscule’ interest earned on its bank account were not indicative of any trading activity. 
There was a good deal of case law on what is a trading corporation. This had resulted in the following 
principles being identified, summarised in Aboriginal Legal Service (WA) Inc v Lawrence (No 2.) (2008) 252 ALR 
136 at par [68]: 
(1) A corporation may be a trading corporation even though trading is not its predominant activity; 
(2) However, trading must be a substantial and not merely a peripheral activity;  
(3) In this context, 'trading' is not given a narrow construction. It extends beyond buying and selling to 
business activities carried on with a view to earning revenue and includes trade in services;  
(4) The making of a profit is not an essential prerequisite to trade, but it is a usual concomitant;  
(5) The ends which a corporation seeks to serve by trading are irrelevant to its description. 
Consequently, the fact that the trading activities are conducted is the public interest or for a public 
purpose will not necessarily exclude the categorisation of those activities as 'trade';  
(6) Whether the trading activities of an incorporated body are sufficient to justify its categorisations 
as a 'trading corporation' is a question of fact and degree;  
(7) The current activities of the corporation, while an important criterion for determining its 
characterisation, are not the only criterion. Regard must also be had to the intended purpose of the 
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corporation, although a corporation that carries on trading activities can be found to be a trading 
corporation even if it was not originally established to trade;  
(8) The commercial nature of an activity is an element in deciding whether the activity is in trade or 
trading. 
In addition, there was case law on the effect of government funding, mostly to the effect that funding to 
service providers did not result in trading activity where there was no fee for service component.   
It was common ground that PSS was not established to trade or to make profits. The Commission said (at [40], 
[43]: 
However, this is not relevant to the characterisation of its activities and only indirectly relevant to its 
overall characterisation.... 
This matter in essence rests upon the characterisation of the activities associated with the 
government grants received by PSS. These services are in the nature of community welfare, however 
this is not of itself relevant. The services are also significant in both relative and absolute terms and if 
the whole, or a reasonable part, of those grants were considered to be trading activities, this would 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that PSS was a trading corporation. 
Organisations such as PSS do not engage in competitive tendering processes for funding where the 
government pays them for the provision of the service directly. This might be trading. But PSS was in the 
alternative category where governments subsidise the services provided by the organisation. The Commission 
said on this point (at [45]): 
Typically, these involve the provision of bulk grants that might be linked to performance requirements 
and benchmarks, but do not involve fee for service in the conventional sense. These services lack the 
character of buying and selling between the organisation and the funding agency, and are often 
provided gratuitously to the public and are considered to be an end in themselves. That is, the 
purpose of the service is not to generate income but rather, to provide the service itself.  
These types of services are not considered to be trading: see E v Red Cross Society [1991] FCA 20. The 
Commission, in looking at the government funding given to PSS, found only one potential fee for service 
provision, an amount of $2000 from Worksafe Victoria. All the other services offered by PSS were free of 
charge. The Commission said that (at [50]): 
The DaHCSIA agreement and the associated activities fit squarely into the category of non-trading 
activities. There is no fee for services rendered to the funding body and the application for grant 
funds was not the equivalent of a competitive tender process. This also applies to the great majority 
of the DoH service agreement. All of these services and the associated arrangements lack the 
character of buying and selling, even when considered in the broadest sense. 
The funding that was provided through tender processes was relatively minor in the scheme of the whole of 
the activities of PSS, being about $82,000 (out of $2.8 million) in the 2012–13 financial year. Therefore, the 
Commission found that (at [58]): 
The assessment of the nature of the corporation is one of fact and degree. When assessed in context, 
the income from trading activities, and those that might be considered to be trading activities, is not 
significant in either relative or absolute terms. Rather, those activities in the overall circumstances 
evident at PSS can be categorised as being insignificant, peripheral and incidental in the sense 
contemplated by the authorities. 
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This being so, PSS was not a trading corporation. Since it was not a trading corporation, it did not fall within 
the relevant provisions of the Act, and the Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the bullying matter 
before it. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.fwc.gov.au/decisionssigned/html/2014FWC1395.htm#P196_12097 
Implications of this case 
The main point of this case was to determine whether PSS, as a nonprofit incorporated association, fell within 
the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) as to bullying: see Part 6-4B. It did not, since it was not a 
constitutionally covered business within the meaning of section 789FD of the Act. To fit within the section, it 
would have to have been a constitutional corporation (see section 789FD (3)(a)(i)) within the meaning of 
section 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution, and only a trading corporation could have been applicable. 
However, this case found that the PSS was not a trading corporation, because it essentially provided services 
to clients for free, under a government subsidy – it did not operate on a fee for service basis. The Act did not 
apply. The Commission said that, as a result, the bullying issue would have to be dealt with ‘in the context of 
the party’s ongoing employment relationship’ (at [61]). 
 
2.3.2 McINNES [2014] FWCFB 1440 (FAIR WORK COMMISSION FULL BENCH, ROSS J 
(PRESIDENT), HAMPTON (VICE-PRESIDENT), COMMISSIONER HAMPTON, 6 MARCH 
2014)  
This was an application by McInnes (the applicant) under section 789FC of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the 
Act) for an order to stop bullying at work. The application alleged that the applicant was subjected to bullying 
behaviour over a six year period commencing in November 2007 and ending in May 2013. The respondents to 
the application were Peninsula Support Services Inc t/as Peninsula Support Services (PSS), the Australian 
Industry Group and the Australian Council of Trade Unions.  
The relevant part of the Act is Part 6-4B which commenced operation on 1 January 2014. The issue for 
determination was whether the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) had jurisdiction to hear and 
determine an application involving alleged bullying conduct which occurred prior to the commencement of 
Part 6-4B of the Act. Part 6-4B, consisting of sections 789FA to 789FL, was inserted into the Act by the Fair 
Work Amendment Act 2013 (Cth) (the 2013 Amendment Act). Section 789FC(1) sets out who may apply to the 
Commission for an order under section 789FF to prevent a worker from being bullied at work: 
s.789FC(1) A worker who reasonably believes he or she has been bullied at work may apply to the 
FWC for an order under section 789FF. [emphasis added] 
Section 789FD explains when a worker is ‘bullied at work’: 
(1) A worker is bullied at work if: 
(a) while the worker is at work in a constitutionally covered business: 
(i) an individual; or 
(ii) a group of individuals;  
repeatedly behaves unreasonably towards the worker, or a group of workers of which the 
worker is a member; and 
(b) that behaviour creates a risk to health and safety. 
(2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) does not apply to reasonable management action carried out in a 
reasonable manner. [emphasis added] 
 57 
 
The Commission began by rejecting the contention of PSS that the bullying would have had to take place on or 
after 1 January 2014. The Commission held that the applicant would, in the first instance, be covered by the 
provision because she had been bullied at work, although this had occurred at a previous time. The 
Commission said that section 789FF operated prospectively and was directed at preventing future bullying at 
work – it was ‘legislation basing future action on past events’ and so was not to be characterised as 
retrospective (at [20]).  The Commission said that (at [20]–[21]): 
Three requirements must be met before the Commission’s discretion to make an order to stop 
bullying is enlivened: 
(i) a worker (who reasonably believes they have been bullied at work) must have made an 
application under s.789FC (hence the jurisdiction cannot be exercised on the Commission’s 
own motion); and 
(ii) the Commission must be satisfied that the worker ‘has been bullied at work by an individual 
or group of individuals’; and 
(iii) the Commission must be satisfied that there is a risk that the worker will continue to be 
bullied at work by the individual or group. 
The second requirement is clearly based on past events – as is apparent from the use of the 
expression ‘has been’. The enactment of Part 6-4B does not attach any adverse consequence to past 
bullying conduct [e.g. damages cannot be awarded]. Such conduct merely provides the basis for a 
prospective order to stop future bullying conduct. 
The case was remitted to Commissioner Hampton for further consideration. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.fwc.gov.au/decisionssigned/html/2014FWCFB1440.htm 
Implications of this decision 
This part of the case dealt with whether the Fair Work Commission had jurisdiction to hear an application for 
an order to stop bullying at work when the alleged bullying occurred before the commencement of the 
relevant part of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). The Full Bench agreed that the Commission did have 
jurisdiction since there was nothing in the Act that pointed to retrospective operation per se. The relevant 
provisions dealt rather with stopping bullying which is already alleged to have occurred at work, i.e. it operates 
prospectively. 
 
2.3.3 POPPY V SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED [2014] FCA 656 (FEDERAL 
COURT OF AUSTRALIA, WHITE J, 20 JUNE 2014) 
The applicant was employed by the respondent, Service to Youth Council Incorporated (SYC), from 6 June 2006 
until 23 July 2010. SYC is a nonprofit association providing training, employment, accommodation and ‘well-
being’ services to youth. The majority of its income comes from grants from the Commonwealth and State 
governments. The applicant’s employment was terminated by SYC on the stated ground of redundancy. The 
termination of her employment occurred while she was on maternity leave. 
The applicant alleged that SYC and several of its senior officers ‘targeted’ her for dismissal as a consequence of 
her pregnancy, the birth of her child, and her maternity leave, and that the ‘targeting’ commenced after she 
informed SYC of her pregnancy in August 2009. She contended that SYC determined to make her redundant 
and otherwise to treat her less favourably because she was pregnant, had the right to take maternity leave 
and to request flexible working arrangements, and because it assumed that she would not be able to render 
service in the same way as she had before her pregnancy. In these circumstances, the applicant claimed that 
SYC contravened section 14(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (the SD Act) which proscribes 
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discrimination by an employer against an employee on the grounds, amongst other things, of the employee’s 
sex, pregnancy or family responsibilities. In addition, the applicant alleged three contraventions by SYC of the 
National Employment Standards established by Part 2-2 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act), namely, 
contraventions of sections 65, 83 and 84 of the FW Act. 
Based on these claims by the applicant, the question to be considered first was whether SYC, in contravention 
of section 7 of the SD Act, treated the applicant less favourably by reason of her pregnancy, maternity leave or 
family responsibilities than it would an employee who was not pregnant, had not taken maternity leave or who 
did not have family responsibilities. This required a comparison between the applicant’s treatment, on the one 
hand, and a hypothetical person in the applicant’s position but without her relevant characteristics, on the 
other. The chosen comparator in this case was a hypothetical manager of similar seniority and experience to 
that of the applicant who took approximately four months leave with SYC’s consent, and who had an 
equivalent entitlement to return to work. 
His Honour found the applicant’s evidence on the sex discrimination issue unreliable owing to her ‘strong 
sense of grievance’ (at [26]): 
...much of her evidence was coloured by her sense of grievance. In particular, she has come, 
retrospectively and perhaps unconsciously, to construe past events with sinister overtones in order to 
advance her claim for vindication. In a number of instances, that sense of grievance led the applicant 
to maintain implausible positions and to make exaggerated claims. 
There had been a bona fide restructuring at SYC during her absence. The various claims made by the applicant 
as to discrimination were not credible. Accordingly, His Honour held (at [136]–[138]): 
On that basis, the applicant does not, in my opinion, establish discrimination of the proscribed kind. 
There is no basis upon which it can be concluded that the applicant was treated less favourably 
because her leave was related to her maternity or because of her family responsibilities. SYC’s 
restructure of its marketing department was for reasons entirely unrelated to the applicant’s 
pregnancy. The restructure and the change in marketing focus which underpinned it resulted in SYC 
having only a reduced need for the applicant’s skills. Based on its experience during the applicant’s 
absence, SYC decided that it could manage satisfactorily without her employment. It remains to refer 
to the applicant’s submission based on a ‘but for’ analysis, that is, that but for the applicant having 
taken maternity leave her roles would not have been absorbed by others, and on that basis the 
requisite causal relationship was established. For the reasons already given, an analysis along these 
lines does not establish discrimination of the proscribed kind. Accordingly, I consider that the 
contraventions of the SD Act claimed by the applicant fail and that that part of her application must 
be dismissed. 
However, were there proper claims under the FW Act? Chapter 2, Part 2-2 of the FW Act establishes a number 
of National Employment Standards. Section 44 of the FW Act makes it unlawful for an employer to contravene 
one of these Standards. Subject to two confined exceptions, a civil penalty may be imposed in respect of any 
breach of the National Employment Standards.  
Section 65 of the FW Act contains one such standard. It permits certain employees, including the parent of a 
young child, to request a change in their working arrangements to make them more flexible and obliges the 
employer to respond to the request within 21 days. This did not occur in this case. The applicant had 
submitted a relevant email on 19 May 2010, and it was not responded to within the requisite 21 days (by 9 
June 2010), but rather on 15 June 2010. SYC argued that the email did not contain the reasons for the 
applicant’s request as it should have under the FW Act, and His Honour held that this was true. However, 
section 65 of the FW Act was a ‘beneficial provision’ (at [147]–[148]): 
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I am unable to discern any legislative intention that a failure by an employee to give reasons for a 
request for flexible work arrangements will, in all cases, preclude the request from being a request for 
the purposes of s 65. The circumstances in which employees may make a request pursuant to s 65 are 
diverse. They are not confined to parents returning from parental leave, or parents with child care 
responsibilities. In some circumstances, the reasons for the request are likely to be obvious. The 
present case, when considered objectively, seems to be an example of this kind. However, in other 
cases, the reasons will be less obvious. This diversity of circumstances makes it unlikely, in my 
opinion, that the legislature intended that in all cases an omission by an employee to give reasons 
will, without more, relieve an employer from responding to the request. It is to be expected that s 65 
will be invoked by persons without legal training or advice and with a degree of informality. Many 
employees may know of their entitlement to make the request, but not the precise terms of the 
statute creating that entitlement. This too suggests that s 65 should not be construed with an eye 
attuned to technicality. It is reasonable to suggest that the legislature intended that employers should 
not be able to avoid compliance with s 65 on the basis of some technical deficiency in the way in 
which a request is framed, at least when they can be taken to know both the nature and purpose of 
the request. 
Therefore, section 65 (specifically, sub-section 65(4)) was construed in the applicant’s favour, and SYC’s 
defence based on the lack of properly stated reasons in her email failed. The other claims by the applicant 
based on the FW Act were unsuccessful. SYC was ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty of $2500. This penalty 
was ordered to be paid to the applicant. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2014/656.html 
Implications of this case 
Although there was no discrimination in this case based on the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), there was 
one breach of the National Employment Standards in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The relevant section 
(section 65(4)) was construed beneficially in favour of the applicant. Breaches of the National Employment 
Standards can incur a pecuniary penalty (a sort of fine, but not involving any criminal liability). In this case, the 
defendant was ordered to pay the penalty to the applicant. The SYC subsequently brought a claim for its costs 
of the failed application, but this claim was rejected because, pursuant to section 570 of the FW Act, the Court 
did not have power to make an order for costs in these proceedings: see Poppy v Service to Youth Council 
Incorporated (No 2) [2014] FCA 721 (4 July 2014). 
 
2.4 DISSOLUTION, WINDING UP AND INSOLVENCY 
2.4.1 ASCOT COMMUNITY SPORTS CLUB INCORPORATED, RE (IN LIQUIDATION) [2014] QSC 
258 (SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, ALAN WILSON J, 2 OCTOBER 2014) 
The Ascot Community Sports Club Inc (the Club) was voluntarily wound up in August 2013. Two liquidators 
were appointed. The Club was, at the time of its voluntary winding up, an incorporated association under the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld). Under section 91 of that Act, the process of voluntary winding up is 
to be conducted under Parts 5.5 and 5.6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In Part 5.6, section 553 provides 
that the debts or claims which are provable in a winding up include claims which are present or future, certain 
or contingent, ascertained, or sounding only in damages. 
Homma Pty Ltd (Homma), which claimed to be a creditor, applied on 14 May 2014 for an order for the removal 
of the appointed liquidators and replacement with different liquidators. After that application was brought 
another creditor, Nottingham Properties Pty Ltd (Nottingham), challenged Homma’s claims to be a lawful 
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creditor. At the hearing of this matter Homma also sought to review the adjudication of its proof of debt by 
the liquidators. 
Homma alleged that, pursuant to an agreement with the Club, it provided management services in the period 
June to December 2011, but that on 12 December 2011 the Club unlawfully terminated that agreement and 
Homma suffered losses. Homma made a written demand upon the Club for $47,428.98. The demand was not 
met. In March 2012, Homma commenced proceedings in the District Court claiming damages for breach of 
contract, comprised of various sums for moneys it claimed to have spent under the agreement on capital 
improvements and chattels. Homma also claimed the return of its property and money which allegedly had 
been unlawfully retained by the Club, and for loss of profits in the sum of $740,318. The Club filed a defence 
and counterclaim in April 2012, and Homma filed a reply in answer in June of that year. However, the case was 
not finally determined. Homma’s proof of debt was rejected by the liquidators in the first instance on the basis 
that its claim against the Club was not determined. Later, the liquidators acknowledged a possible contingent 
claim, and admitted a proof of debt for $1. As such, Homma had standing to bring this action. 
The court has a wide discretion to remove liquidators under section 503 of the Corporations Act. The 
discretion involved has been expressed in terms of a question: whether removal can be seen to be for the 
better conduct of the liquidation, or to the general advantage of those interested in the assets of the 
company. The cases show that it is not necessary for an applicant to establish anything adverse or detrimental 
to the current liquidators. In any event, no such claims were made by any party to this action about the 
liquidators appointed at first instance. 
The liquidator proposed by Homma was opposed by Nottingham on the ground of conflict of interest. 
Nottingham’s claim was that the proposed new liquidator had close ties to Homma. His Honour agreed there 
was the potential for a conflict (at [19]–[20]): 
Evidence of a fairly close involvement between [Homma] and the proposed new liquidators does give 
rise, at least, to a perception of a possible lack of impartiality.... While Nottingham may not, itself, be 
entirely impartial, the concerns it raises have some obvious substance in light of what seem to have 
been close dealings between [Homma] and the new liquidators’ firm.... The appointment of a person 
apparently unconnected with the Club, the parties, or any of those dealings is, in those circumstances, 
attractive. Apparently anticipating that view Homma proposed, during the hearing, the appointment 
of quite a different liquidator – Mr Blair Pleash, of Hall Chadwick. Nothing in the material suggests any 
earlier involvement on Mr Pleash’s part, or contact between him, and any of the actual or potential 
creditors, which might cast any pall over the question of his independence. His appointment would, it 
appears, appropriately allay the concerns raised by Nottingham.  
Therefore, a new liquidator was appointed and the existing liquidators were removed from the liquidation 
under the discretion given by section 503 of the Corporations Act. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2014/258.html 
Implications of this case 
The removed liquidators also claimed their costs of $70,000 in this action, to which they are properly entitled 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Club had very little money remaining upon its voluntary 
liquidation, and the court indicated that the new liquidator had several matters to investigate (at [12]), which 
would also involve costs.   
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2.4.2 ASSOCIATION FOR VISUAL IMPAIRMENT THE HOMELESS AND THE DESTITUTE INC. 
(IN LIQUIDATION), RE (NO 2) [2014] VSC 183 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, 
FERGUSON J, 29 APRIL 2014) 
The Association for Visual Impairment the Homeless and the Destitute Inc (the Association) was purportedly 
set up as a charitable organisation. The purported objects of the Association included promoting the welfare of 
persons who experienced blindness.  The Association was also to use the net proceeds from any subdivision of 
land acquired, or part of such land, to provide shelter or occupation for homeless or destitute persons as a 
refuge. 
On 29 June 1999, Ms Lois Stewart agreed to transfer two properties at Niddrie (the Niddrie land) to the 
Association for $450,000. However, no money was paid to Ms Stewart at any stage. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Ms Stewart was entitled to repurchase the Niddrie land for $450,000 within 10 years. Other land 
was purchased by the Association at Bacchus Marsh, and a scheme for subdivision and sale of 109 lots off the 
plan was instigated. In mid-2006, freezing orders were made against the Association on the application of the 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and another person. The Association was wound up in mid-2007 and 
liquidators appointed. The liquidators disclaimed 31 land contracts in the subdivision plan. Those aggrieved by 
the disclaimer have lodged proofs of debt in accordance with the usual practice.  
The liquidators had previously sought directions pursuant to section 479(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
in relation to two matters: 
1. whether they were entitled to reject the lodged proofs of debt, or whether they would be justified in 
conducting the winding up of the Association by rejecting one such lodged proof of debt; 
2. whether the Association held the Niddrie land on a presumed resulting trust for Ms Stewart as the 
sole beneficiary of the trust, or would be justified in conducting the winding up of the Association on 
the basis that such a trust existed. 
Directions were given in relation to the first matter. Her Honour held that it was clear, on the basis of 
authority, that the court had power to make the directions sought by the liquidators on the second matter. 
The question was rather whether the Court ought to exercise that power as a matter of discretion. Her Honour 
declined to do so, but left open the possibility of directions being given in the future: see Re Association for 
Visual Impairment The Homeless and The Destitute Inc. (in liquidation) [2013] VSC 673. 
However, in this case Ms Stewart made application herself. She sought a declaration that the Association holds 
and has always held the Niddrie properties on trust for her, pursuant to a resulting or, alternatively, a 
constructive trust. She also sought an order that the liquidators transfer the titles to the Niddrie properties 
back to her unencumbered and at no cost to her. 
Was there a resulting or constructive trust? If the Niddrie properties were held on trust for Ms Stewart then 
they would not otherwise be available to the creditors of the Association. The liquidators contended that the 
properties were not held on trust. However, Her Honour held that (at [22]–[23]): 
Taking into account all of the circumstances, it seems to me that there was never any intention that 
Ms Stewart, as the transferor, would part with the beneficial interest in the Niddrie properties. She 
received no payment for them. It follows that the Niddrie properties were held on a resulting trust by 
the Association for Ms Stewart. If I am wrong about that, I would nevertheless find that the Niddrie 
properties were held upon a constructive trust for Ms Stewart. When property is acquired in 
circumstances where, in good conscience, the recipient cannot keep the beneficial interest, equity 
intervenes by means of a constructive trust. The circumstances are construed as the recipient holding 
the property on trust. Here, good conscience would prevent the Association from retaining the 
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Niddrie properties because of the circumstances [which referred to the actions of certain parties 
which led to Ms Stewart’s disposal of the properties].... 
Ms Stewart had signed a settlement deed in relation to other proceedings arising from the alleged Association 
in February 2011. Did this settlement deed release her interest in the Niddrie properties? Was the trust 
extinguished? The settlement deed referred to the Bacchus Marsh properties and no claim was made as to the 
Niddrie properties. Therefore, although Ms Stewart was a party to the settlement deed it had no effect on her 
rights to the Niddrie properties under a trust (at [35]–[36]): 
...there was no dispute between the parties about the beneficial ownership of the Niddrie properties. 
Consequently, in my view, the general words of the release in paragraph (iii) did not effect a release 
of the claim by Ms Stewart to the Niddrie properties, nor did it extinguish the trust. On the proper 
construction of the settlement deed, Ms Stewart’s claim to full ownership of the Niddrie properties 
was not released by her, nor was the trust extinguished. 
Thus, the Niddrie properties were held on trust for Ms Stewart by the Association, and were not available to 
the liquidators for payment of creditors of the Association in the winding up. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/183.html 
Implications of this case 
The Association in this case was wound up pursuant to section 34 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic). Part 5.4B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) applies to the winding up of a Victorian association, 
originally by virtue of section 36D(2) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic), and following repeal of 
that legislation, by section 150 of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic). A resulting trust arises 
when property is placed in the hands of someone who has not paid consideration (or given value) for the 
property – the person is presumed only to hold the property on trust for the person who paid consideration 
for it because the latter is presumed never to have intended to part with the beneficial ownership 
 
2.4.3 CLIFTON & HALL V THE BERRI CLUB INCORPORATED [2014] SASC 170 (SUPREME 
COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, WITHERS J, 14 NOVEMBER 2014) 
The Berri Club Incorporated (the Club) is an association that was incorporated on 29 August 1967 (and is now 
incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA)). Its objects, set out in paragraph 1.2 of its 
Constitution, are as follows: 
The Objects of the Club shall be: 
a. To provide facilities and entertainment for Members and Members’ guests. 
b. To support local institutions and bodies in a manner decided by the Board. 
The Club has 185 members. The case concerned voluntary administration of the Club and the use of section 
447A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA). The Constitution of the Club required five Board members to be 
present for a quorum in order to take a resolution to enter into voluntary administration. However, in the 
circumstances there were only four members of the managing committee available. Of those, one was in 
hospital with advanced cancer, and one had Alzheimer’s disease and was incapacitated. 
However, a meeting was convened at the hospital bed of the member with advanced cancer, with the two 
other members with capacity attending by telephone. These three Board members resolved to place the Club 
into voluntary administration on the basis of insolvency. Despite the procedural irregularity, Hall and Clifton 
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(the plaintiffs) were appointed as the administrators. Their appointment was ratified by creditors at the first 
meeting of creditors, as is usual. They determined that the Club should cease trading during the 
administration. Again in the usual fashion, at the second meeting of creditors consideration was given as to 
whether or not the Club should enter into a Deed of Association Arrangement to be proposed by members of 
the Club. At a reconvened second meeting on 23 May 2013, consideration was given to a Deed of Association 
Arrangement put forward by a number of people, including a Mr Ranford, who in the initial stages opposed the 
application subsequently made by the plaintiffs in these proceedings. At that second meeting the proposed 
Deed was tabled and the creditors unanimously resolved pursuant to section 435C of the CA that the Club 
execute the proposed Deed and that Mr Hall and Mr Clifton be appointed as joint and several deed 
administrators. A final version of the Deed was executed on 23 May 2013. The consortium that executed the 
Deed included Mr Ranford, despite his earlier objections. 
Nevertheless, the appointment of the administrators was irregular under the CA (owing to the lack of a 
quorum). Thus, the administrators sought legal advice and decided to apply to the court in order to cure the 
irregularity.  This is done under section 447A of the CA which provides that the court has broad discretion to 
make orders as it sees fit under Part 5.3A of the CA. Section 447A(1) of the CA provides: 
The Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relation 
to a particular company. 
Given the weight of authority on the court’s discretion that already exists, His Honour had no doubt as to the 
outcome (at [27]–[29]): 
In my view, it is clear that the Court has power to make the orders sought by the plaintiffs validating 
their appointment…. There is no suggestion of any inappropriate conduct by the administrators in the 
obtaining of the appointment of administration. The administration appears to have been entirely 
routine. In all the circumstances it is appropriate that an order should be made pursuant to s 447A 
validating the original appointment. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs were successful in having their appointment as administrators of the Club validated. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2014/170.html 
Implications of this case 
Although the appointment of the administrators in this case was validated under section 447A of the CA, and 
this outcome was entirely in line with authority, it is always best to ensure that any appointment of 
administrators by a Board under Part 5.3A of the CA is carried out strictly in accordance with section 436A of 
the CA. In this case, a quorum could not be obtained because of the particular and unfortunate circumstance 
which applied, and this did not affect the validity of the administration and the Deed made under it, because 
of the use of section 447A of the CA. 
 
2.4.4 KEENE AND ANOR (AS TRUSTEES OF THE GRAPHIC REPRODUCTION FEDERATION) V 
WELLCOM LONDON LTD AND ORS [2014] EWHC 134(CH) (HIGH COURT OF ENGLAND 
AND WALES (CHANCERY DIVISION), SMITH J, 30 JANUARY 2014) 
This case concerned the dissolution of an unincorporated association of employers in England. The Graphic 
Reproduction Federation (the Federation) was an unincorporated association formed in about 1916 to further 
the interests of employers engaged in the graphic reproduction trade, to promote fair trading within the 
industry and to negotiate national agreements with trade unions. It is governed by a set of rules the most 
recent of which was dated 1985 (the Rules). 
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The Federation applied to the court for a declaration that it had been spontaneously dissolved at some time 
between 1987 and the present day. Alternatively, it applied for an order dissolving the Federation pursuant to 
the Court's inherent jurisdiction and for directions as to how and to whom the Federation's assets should be 
distributed. 
The Federation contended that it had spontaneously dissolved in 1987. This was based on the facts that its 
administrative records had not been kept up to date since then, no subscriptions had been called for or paid 
since 1986, there had been no Annual General Meetings since 1985 and the Management Committee had not 
met since 29 November 1987. It had managed its assets however, and they were currently valued at 
£590,683.98. 
Although most members of the Federation had resigned or been expelled by 1987, five members had paid 
their 1986 subscriptions, and were currently still in business. These were the five respondents, who were 
joined by the Treasury Solicitor as the sixth respondent in the case.  
There was no disagreement that the Federation should be dissolved, if it was not already. The Trustees’ 
primary submission was the spontaneous dissolution. They also submitted that the assets should be 
distributed to a printing charity to serve the underlying spirit and purpose of the Federation. However, clause 
51 of the Rules provided that upon dissolution, the assets should be distributed amongst the members existing 
at the date of the passing of the relevant resolution in general meeting. 
His Honour held that the Federation had not been dissolved in 1987, or at any date since then (at [20]): 
In my view it has not yet been dissolved. It is true that the activity is minimal. However it is quite clear 
that inactivity of itself is not enough.... With the decline of the nature of the printing industry there 
has been very little for the Federation to do but it still has assets and the Trustees continue to manage 
the assets. Whilst it sleeps it is not dead in my view. 
Some members who had paid subscriptions in 1986 had been wound up or dissolved. It was His Honour’s view 
that if they had gone into liquidation, but not been dissolved, they were still entitled to be members unless 
they were expelled. If they had been dissolved, they ceased to be members in the same way as if they had 
resigned or been expelled. 
The Treasury Solicitor argued that section 1012 of the Companies Act was relevant. If the member companies 
had been dissolved, their property was bona vacantia (unclaimed property). As such it became the property of 
the Crown, the Duchy of Lancaster, or the Duke of Cornwall under section 1012(1). If those companies could 
participate in any distribution from the assets of the Federation, their share of that distribution would fall to 
the Crown. 
His Honour said that the dissolved companies could not be members of the Federation. Membership was 
personal, and the companies would have to be extant. He then dissolved the Federation as at the date of this 
judgement. The assets of the Federation were to be distributed to the five members as per clause 51 of the 
Rules. Since none of the dissolved former members were current members, nothing from the dissolution of 
the Federation would become Crown property. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/134.html 
Implications of this case 
Bona vacantia is the Crown’s statutory right to property where no owner can be identified. In Australia, it 
usually applies to deceased estates with no claimants, so property will pass to the relevant State or Territory. 
Bona vacantia assets have been suggested as a possible source of funds for charities: see for example section 
137 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). 
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For an association, the dissolution of a registrable body other than a company in Australia is governed by 
section 588 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The recipients of the property are the persons to whom it is 
due under the relevant law of the place of registration, then the Commonwealth, if the property is held on 
trust, or (otherwise) the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC): section 588 (2).  
 
2.5 MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICE 
2.5.1 GARIEPY V THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 254 (CANLII) (TAX COURT OF CANADA, BOYLE J, 19 
AUGUST 2014) 
This Canadian case dealt with the liability of directors for remittance of various taxation deductions to the 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). Liability of directors continues for two years after resignation as a director. 
Under Canadian tax law, an employer is generally required to remit to the CRA the source of deductions it has 
withheld from its employees’ salaries and wages for income tax, and other deductions. A business is also 
generally required to remit the amount of GST it collected from its customers, net of the GST the business paid 
on its purchases, supplies and inputs.   
Section 227.1 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) and section 323 of the Excise Tax Act (ETA) provide that the directors 
of a corporation will be personally liable for a corporation’s failure to remit employee withholdings and GST as 
required by law. Directors are not generally liable for a corporation’s own income tax. The potential liability of 
directors reflects the degree of management and control directors have over a corporation’s management and 
its affairs. Sections 227.1(3) of the ITA and 323(3) of the ETA each provide that a director will not be liable for 
the corporation’s failure to remit such amounts as required by law if the director exercised a degree of care, 
diligence and skill to prevent the failure that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable 
circumstances. 
In this case the wives of two businessmen were made directors of a corporation for an intended period of two 
years. This role was not exercised by them with any actual involvement in the corporation’s affairs. They 
claimed to have resigned as directors after the two year period had elapsed.  However, the evidence relating to 
the resignations was incomplete, partly because of some incompetence by the lawyers involved in 
documenting the resignations. Nevertheless, the court found that the resignations, which had taken place in 
2001 were effective despite not being signed by the two women.  They were, however, made in writing as 
required by section 108(2) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act. The latter Act does not require actual 
signature. 
This meant that the two wives (as directors) were not liable under assessments made for failure to forward 
deductions in 2008.  This was clearly after the relevant two year period had elapsed. Therefore, the appeal 
against the assessments was allowed.  
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc254/2014tcc254.html 
Implications of this case 
The Income Tax Act (Canada) (the Act) provides that directors of a corporation, including a nonprofit 
corporation, are liable for income tax, employer contributions, interest, penalties, and certain other amounts 
that the corporation may owe to the Canada Revenue Agency where the corporation, for whatever reason, 
does not pay. Directors are normally liable for such amounts that become due while they are directors. 
However, the Act also provides that the CRA can legally pursue directors for the purpose of recovering such 
amounts for a period of two years after a director resigns from a corporation. This decision demonstrated the 
importance of documenting a director’s resignation properly in order to ensure that the clock starts running on 
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the relevant two-year period during which a director remains liable for amounts even after he or she resigns 
from the corporation. 
 
2.5.2 PETAR, HIS EMINENCE, THE DIOCESAN BISHOP OF THE MACEDONIAN ORTHODOX 
DIOCESE OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND V KOTEVICH [2014] NSWSC 1215 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, STEVENSON J, 2 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This proceeding was part of very long running litigation involving the internal affairs of the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church of St Petka in Rockdale, Sydney. The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc 
(the Association) was incorporated in April 1992 pursuant to the (then) Associations Incorporation Act 1984 
(NSW). The plaintiffs in this case were His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Australia 
and New Zealand Diocese of the Church (the Diocese) and the Very Reverend Father Mitrev, the parish priest 
of the St Petka parish.  
The case commenced in 1997. Previous decisions of the court in 1997, 2009 and 2012 (including an appeal in 
the NSW Court of Appeal) resulted in the finding that since its incorporation in 1992, the Association has acted, 
and continues to act as trustee of the trust found to exist in those decisions (the Trust). The Trust was declared 
by the court to be a charitable trust to permit the trust property to be used by the Association as a site for a 
church of the Macedonian Orthodox Religion, and for other buildings and activities concerned with or ancillary 
to the encouragement, practice and promotion of the Macedonian Orthodox Religion. 
The defendant in this case, Mr Kotevich, is the secretary and public officer of the Association. He claimed to 
have been a member of the Association since 2003, and as such, was not a party to the 1997 proceedings. He 
contended that he was not bound by the declarations and orders made in the 1997 proceedings and that the 
plaintiffs have not otherwise established the existence of the Trust in these proceedings. 
The plaintiffs claimed that Mr Kotevich was not a valid member of the Association, and that there were other 
‘ineligible members’ of the Association. Mr Kotevich had been appointed by the court as a representative 
member for these other ‘ineligible members’ on 27 February 2014. The plaintiffs’ claim rested entirely on the 
fact that the ineligible members’ names did not appear on the Parish Register (referred to as the Current 
Domovnik). Were the alleged ‘ineligible members’ in fact members of the Association? His Honour said on this 
point (at [77]–[80]): 
The declarations and orders in the 1997 Proceedings concern the status of the Association as a 
trustee, and the terms of the Trust so far as they concern admission to membership to the 
Association. The Association resisted the making of those declarations and orders, but was 
unsuccessful. The Association is, of course, now bound by those declarations and orders and thus 
bound to admit to membership those who satisfy the relevant terms of the Trust, and not to admit 
those who do not. Persons purporting to be members of the Association make their claim subject to 
the terms of the constitution of the Association (which makes particular provision in that regard). 
However, their claims are also subject to what this Court has now declared to be the Association's 
status as trustee of the Church’s property in the St Petka Parish and the terms of that trust so far as 
they concern membership of the Association. That is because the Association is bound by both its 
constitution and the outcome of the 1997 Proceedings. In those circumstances, such rights as Mr 
Kotevich and the Represented Persons have to membership of the Association are in my opinion 
‘under and through’ the Association. Accordingly, so far as concerns the declarations and orders made 
in the 1997 Proceedings, they are privies of the Association and bound by those declarations and 
orders. It would be extraordinary if this were not so. In that event the Association would be bound to 
admit members in accordance with the outcome of the 1997 Proceedings but members of the 
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Association who were not parties to the 1997 Proceedings could seek to compel the Association to act 
contrary to that outcome. 
Therefore, the defendants were bound by previous decisions of the court.  Did they otherwise meet the 
requirements for membership of the Association? His Honour examined relevant Articles of the Constitution of 
the Association.  These appeared to be contradictory in parts. Article 77 dealt with membership of the parish. 
It provided that ‘any baptised orthodox christian [sic] is a member of the parish’ if that the person, first, is a 
‘congregant of a parish church’, second, is ‘enrolled in the register of the parish priest’ (that is, the parish 
domovnik); and third, annually donates $1 to the Diocese. On the issue of entry into the domovnik, His Honour 
said (at [138]–[139]): 
However, so far as concerns entry in the domovnik, the conclusion to which I have come is that, on 
the proper construction of the Statute, read in light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, Art 
77 does not have the effect of elevating entry in the relevant domovnik to a condition precedent to 
parish membership. It is true that Art 77 states that if a person is ‘enrolled’ in the domovnik (and 
satisfies the other two conditions in Art 77), then that person ‘is a member of the parish’. Article 77 
does not however say, in terms, that a person cannot be a parish member unless enrolled in the 
relevant domovnik. If it did, it would contradict...Art 119 of the Constitution that, in effect says the 
opposite; namely that a priest must record in the domovnik a person who is a parish member. 
Thus, entry into the parish domovnik was not crucial to membership. If the parish priest maintained a 
domovnik in accordance with Art 119 of the Constitution, then entry of a person’s name in the domovnik 
would be one of the factors showing that such a person was a member of the parish. However, a person's 
status as a parish member did not depend on entry of that person's name in the domovnik. This conclusion 
meant that the plaintiffs’ case must fail (at [143]) ‘because...it must follow that entry in the domovnik is not a 
condition precedent to membership of the Parish Assembly (nor the Association)’. 
His Honour found that there were four conditions for membership of the Association (at [152]): 
First, the person must be a member of the parish. Second, that parishioner must be an adult. Third, 
that adult parishioner must be Macedonian or of Macedonian descent. Fourth, that adult Macedonian 
parishioner must fulfil ‘the religious, moral and material obligations towards the Church and its 
institutions’. 
Whilst there may be good reason for members to be entered into the parish domovnik (such as to vote in the 
parish assembly), membership did not depend on it. His Honour’s final declaration (at [168]) was that to be 
members of the Parish Assembly, and thus the Association, a person must: 
(1) be a believer of the Orthodox Christian faith (Art 104 of the Constitution); 
(2) reside within a specified territory (Art 104); 
(3) be under the spiritual leadership of a parish priest (Art 104); 
(4) attend a Macedonian Orthodox Church (Art 65 of the Statute); 
(5) be a congregant and a member of the Macedonian Orthodox Church Community or ‘Parish’ (Art 69 
of the Statute); 
(6) be an adult (Art 122 of the Constitution); 
(7) be Macedonian or of Macedonian Descent (Art 82 of the Statute); and 
(8) fulfil the faithful, moral and material duties and responsibilities towards the Church and its 
institutions (Art 122 of the Constitution and Art 82 of the Statute). 
His Honour said that he could not know if Mr Kotevich and the other members he represented fulfilled these 
conditions (at [170]–[171]): 
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I do not know, and doubt that I could ever determine, whether Mr Kotevich (let alone each of the 
Represented Persons) satisfies these requirements. The answer to that question would involve a 
determination of, amongst other things, whether those persons meet their ‘spiritual, moral and 
material obligations’ to the Church. I doubt that such matters are justiciable. What is clear, in my 
opinion, is that I should not declare that Mr Kotevich or the Represented Persons are not, and are not 
entitled to be, members of the Association. Nor should I grant an injunction restraining those persons 
from voting on any resolution at a general meeting of the Association or from nominating for 
membership of the executive of the Association. 
The plaintiffs’ case was dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/1215.html 
 
2.5.3 PENINSULA KINGSWOOD COUNTRY GOLF CLUB, RE [2014] VSC 437 (SUPREME 
COURT OF VICTORIA, ROBSON J, 3 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This case concerned oppression proceedings under section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). 
The Kingswood Golf Club Ltd (Kingswood), a company limited by guarantee, was located at Dingley in Victoria. 
The club had an 18 hole golf course on land that it had owned since the 1930s. In 2013, its land was valued at 
approximately $52 million, and if re-zoned as residential, could be valued at $71 million. As at 30 June 2013, 
Kingswood had approximately 900 members. The Peninsula Country Golf Club (Peninsula), an incorporated 
association, was located at Frankston. It had two 18 hole courses. In 2013, its land was valued at 
approximately $54 million, and if re-zoned residential, could be worth approximately $72 million. In 2013, 
Peninsula had about 1705 members.  
At a general meeting of Kingswood held on 17 September 2013, the members voted to proceed with a merger 
with Peninsula, by a margin of 63 per cent in favour and 27 per cent against. The merger was achieved by the 
members of Peninsula becoming members of Kingswood. The plaintiff, Mr Falkingham, strongly opposed the 
merger. The plaintiff was a member of Kingswood for more than 30 years, and is currently a member of the 
merged club. Although there was opposition at Kingston, and some support for the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
brought these proceedings in his own name, and not as a representative of any protest group. 
On 26 August 2013, an information booklet was circulated to the Kingswood members which explained details 
of the proposed merger and notified members of a special general meeting to be held on 17 September 2013. 
The information booklet outlined the current and likely financial position of each club if each continued 
without merging. That information showed each club experiencing falling membership numbers and running 
into significant financial losses in the future. The information booklet also outlined the financial benefits of a 
merger. The key feature of the merger was the sale of the Kingswood golf course and the use of the proceeds 
to pay debts at Peninsula and to establish a ‘future fund’. The proceeds from the sale of the golf course at 
Dingley were estimated to yield a net amount of $65 million. It was forecast that after certain outlays about 
$39 million would be available for the future fund. It was proposed to invest those moneys and use a portion 
of the earnings from the future fund to meet expenses of the merged club. Based on an average 6 per cent per 
annum return it was forecast that the future fund would grow to over $50 million by the year 2023.  
Thus, the merger vehicle was the Kingswood Golf Club Limited, and the merged entity was also a company 
limited by guarantee. The plaintiff’s application relied on alleged oppression of the plaintiff by the Peninsula 
Kingswood Country Golf Club Ltd and, by inference, oppression of other members who opposed the merger. 
The alleged oppression consisted in admitting the members of Peninsula to membership of Kingswood. 
Admission of members was dealt with in clause 8 of the constitution of Kingswood. 
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His Honour agreed with the plaintiff that the admission of the Peninsula members was not permissible under 
clause 8. His Honour said that the purpose of giving the board power to admit new members could only be 
exercised for the purpose for which it was given (at [80], [87]): 
In this case, I find that the substantial object of the board in admitting new members was to give 
effect to the merger agreement.... 
The directors’ power to admit new members under clause 8 of constitution of the company was a 
fiduciary power. Accordingly, although the exercise of the power may have been formally valid, it may 
be attacked on grounds that it was not exercised for the purpose for which it was given. 
There were two possible purposes for the admission of the Peninsula members: to add to the membership for 
the benefit of the club and the existing members; and to give effect to the merger of Kingswood with 
Peninsula. His Honour said that the operative question was which was the substantial purpose? The High Court 
in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotels Ltd [1987] HCA 11 said that the relevant question to be asked is whether, but 
for the purpose’s existence, would the power have been exercised? On this point, His Honour said (at [93]–
[94]): 
I have no doubt that but for the intention of the board to achieve the merger, the power to admit the 
members would not have been exercised. The Peninsula members would not have applied to become 
members but for the merger.  
Applying those principles, I find that the substantial purpose of admitting the 1000 odd new members 
was to give effect to the merger. The board had no power under the constitution to effect a merger 
that involved the admission of 1000 odd new members from another club, and to sell the existing golf 
course at Dingley to play at another course in Frankston. The constitution did not envisage a merger 
of that sort with another club.  
There should have been a special resolution requiring a majority of 75% to effect the merger with Kingswood, 
rather than the ordinary resolution (50%). This was so even though the members of Kingswood had voted by 
majority (63%) for the merger (at [95]–[96]): 
What, however, of the resolution of the members directing the directors to effect the merger, 
including by admitting the Peninsula members to membership of Kingswood? The members, by 
ordinary resolution, did not have the power to amend the member admitting power of the 
constitution of the club. Their resolution to the board directing the board to act contrary to the 
constitution was invalid or ineffective to authorise the conduct of the board in admitting the 
Peninsula members.  
Great weight was given during the submissions to the will of the majority of the members of 
Kingswood. One purpose of company constitutions is to check the unfettered power of the majority. 
Constitutions protect the rights of the minority, not only those in majority. The fact that the members 
in the general meeting approved the merger does not alter the constitutional obligation [of] the 
board to only exercise their powers for the purposes for which they were given. 
Section 232 of the Act requires the action complained of to be unfair to the member complaining as a 
member. His Honour found that this was so (at [98]): 
In my opinion, the actions of the board in depriving Mr Falkingham of the protection of a 
constitutional amendment to effect the merger, was unfair. He has lost the use of the golf club he has 
been a member of for many years and uses practically on a daily basis. The oppression must also be 
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continuing at the time of the application. In my opinion, the presence of the Peninsula members as 
members of the club satisfies that requirement. 
Thus, the actions of the board were voidable because of oppression, though not void. 
The defendant club pleaded laches, acquiescence and delay. This is a defence which requires that a defendant 
can successfully resist an equitable (although not a legal) claim made against him if he can demonstrate that 
the plaintiff, by delaying the institution of prosecution of his case, has either: (a) acquiesced in the defendant’s 
conduct; or (b) caused the defendant to alter his position in reasonable reliance on the plaintiff's acceptance of 
the status quo, or otherwise permitted a situation to arise which it would be unjust to disturb. 
The admission of new members from Peninsula took place in October 2013. The plaintiff did not retain 
solicitors until March 2014, and did not institute proceedings until August 2014. The board was due to make its 
decision as the successful bidder for the Dingley land on 24 August 2014. Although there had not, objectively, 
been a long delay on the part of the plaintiff, the potential for damage to the defendant club, and the potential 
buyers of the land was substantial (at [111]): 
...I should weigh up the delay against the potential damage to Peninsula Kingswood and third parties. 
Although the delay has not been great, the damages may be significant. In my opinion, the plaintiff 
has by his inaction and standing by, placed the defendant and third parties in a situation in which it 
would be inequitable and unreasonable to place them if the remedy of setting aside the merger 
[were] afterwards to be asserted. 
Therefore, although oppression was held to exist, no remedy was forthcoming because of the delay of the 
plaintiff in bringing his action, and the consequent potential for damage to be suffered by the defendant and 
third parties. The plaintiff’s application was dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/437.html 
Implications of this case 
His Honour found that since the equitable jurisdiction of the court had been enlivened, an equitable remedy 
had to be considered.  However, on balance, the remedy was not available. His Honour went on to say that he 
would not have considered a statutory remedy under section 233 of the Act either (at [113]–[114]): 
If I am wrong as to the application of laches and acquiescence or delay to the statutory oppression 
claim, then in any event, in my discretion under s 233 of the Act, I would not make orders undoing the 
merger as sought by the plaintiff. I have to balance the harm done to the members of the company as 
it now stands with the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. There is no doubt that laches applies as a 
defence to the equitable claim to invalidate the decision of the company to admit new members from 
the Peninsula Golf Club. In the circumstances where the clubs have been merged for almost a year, I 
consider the relief sought by the plaintiff to be unwarranted, bearing in mind the inconvenience and 
prejudice that would be caused to the members of the Peninsula Kingswood Club today. 
 
2.6 NEGLIGENCE 
2.6.1 CHAINA V PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (NSW) PROPERTY TRUST (NO. 25) [2014] NSWSC 
518 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, DAVIES J, 23 MAY 2014) 
This was a decision in long-running litigation relating to negligence and personal shock claims. Nathan Chaina, 
a 15 year old student at Scots College (the school), Sydney, was drowned while on a school hike in the Morton 
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National Park, New South Wales, in October 1999. Proceedings were commenced by four members of his 
family (his parents and two of his brothers) for damages for nervous shock. The defendant was the 
Presbyterian Church Property Trust which operates the school. Duty of care and breach of duty were not in 
issue, and were admitted by the school during the course of the litigation. Therefore, this case was to 
determine if damages for nervous shock were payable to the remaining plaintiffs. 
The hike was to be undertaken as a parent-student exercise.  However, Mr Chaina was not available on the 
weekend in question. In place of Mr Chaina, the school requested that Matthew Chaina, whose class was going 
on the hike, be accompanied by his brother Nathan. This was contrary to school policy as Nathan was only 15 
years old. The weekend was very wet, and the Bureau of Meteorology issued increasingly urgent flood 
warnings for the area of the hike, which bordered a creek. The Chaina group had become lost overnight, and it 
eventually became known that Nathan had been drowned. 
The proceedings commenced in 2002. Since that time there had been twenty-five court decisions relating to 
the case, including this one. The plaintiffs have been represented by six or more firms of solicitors and many 
more barristers, both senior and junior counsel. Ultimately, the plaintiffs ceased to have any lawyers acting for 
them and conducted the proceedings themselves. As His Honour commented, this had resulted in 
‘considerable problems for the conduct of the case’ (at [31]). Adding to the complications in the case, the 
Chaina parents had two companies which were also plaintiffs in the litigation, making a claim for damages for 
loss of the services of Mr and Mrs Chaina as principals, directors and managers of their businesses (a per quod 
servitium amisit claim).  
Various matters arose during the litigation which affected the outcome of the case. These included: 
 The evidence of Mr Chaina was found by His Honour to be ‘dishonest’ in relation to the per quod 
claim (at [107]); 
 The matters in which Mr Chaina was dishonest were numerous, and included his qualifications and 
many other matters relating to his business (at [110]–[179]); 
 Mrs Chaina made many false statements in her evidence and in relation to her business activity (at 
[188]–[195]); 
 Mrs Chaina made false statements about her son Jean-Pierre (one of the plaintiffs) (at [196]–[199]); 
All these matters reflected on the credit of the plaintiffs. Moreover, Mrs Chaina ‘had longstanding psychiatric 
conditions which persisted with greater or less intensity until at least the month before Nathan's death’ (at 
[249]). Mr Chaina had also suffered some ill-health (including the possibility of a major psychiatric illness), and 
been involved in various incidents of aggression (at [250]–[287]. However, as His Honour said (at [288]): 
What must be determined, therefore, is the mental state of each of Mr and Mrs Chaina after Nathan's 
death and whether any mental harm they suffered resulted from the Defendant's breach of duty. 
The medical evidence post-October 1999 revealed that although both the Chaina parents had significant 
psychiatric illness before their son’s death, and this continued afterwards, they had both suffered further harm 
because of his death. This entitled them, and one of their companies, to damages from the defendant, as 
follows: 
(1) Judgment for the Second Plaintiff (Mr Chaina) for $202,486; 
(2) Judgment for the Third Plaintiff (Mrs Chaina) for $138,887; 
(3) Judgment for the Second and Third Plaintiffs jointly of $95,000; 
(4) Judgment for the Fourth Plaintiff (Proton Technology Pty Ltd) of $56,000; 
(5) Judgment for the Defendant against the Fifth Plaintiff (Deluxe Technology Pty Ltd). 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/518.html 
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Implications of this case 
This was a case involving damages for nervous shock (pure psychiatric injury, unrelated to physical injury). 
Nervous shock is a recognised category of damages which can be awarded following an incident of negligence. 
However, there is no liability to pay damages for pure mental harm resulting from negligence unless the harm 
consists of a recognised psychiatric illness: see section 31 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). There is a 
distinction between normal mental distress (such as grief) caused by an incident and psychiatric illness. It must 
be reasonably foreseeable that pure psychiatric injury will be caused by the negligent breach, so if psychiatric 
illness was present before the incident, as in this case, the evidence must show that further harm ensued 
because of the negligence. The school had a duty of care towards its students, and in this situation the breach 
of that duty was clear, but it also had a duty to avoid psychiatric injury to persons who would reasonably 
foreseeably be harmed. The school admitted its liability, so the matters ultimately before the court revolved 
around whether recognised psychiatric illness was caused by the breach and the amount of damages to be 
awarded. 
 
2.6.2 LIVERPOOL CATHOLIC CLUB LTD V MOOR [2014] NSWCA 394 (NEW SOUTH WALES 
COURT OF APPEAL, MEAGHER JA, EMMETT JA, TOBIAS AJA, 18 NOVEMBER 2014) 
This was an appeal from Moor v Liverpool Catholic Club Ltd [2013] NSWDC 93. In the case at first instance, the 
plaintiff was injured at the premises of the defendant, Liverpool Catholic Club Ltd (the club). He sustained a 
fracture to his right ankle after losing his footing, slipping and falling whilst descending a set of stairs. At the 
time of his fall, the plaintiff was wearing ice skating boots and was descending the stairs in order to access an 
ice skating rink on the premises. The plaintiff claimed that the fall, and his resultant injury, was due to 
negligence on the part of the defendant, for which he claimed damages. 
The plaintiff was aged 19 at the time of the incident. He attended the club with his family to go ice-skating.  He 
put on his skates prior to going on to the ice rink. He then proceeded to the head of a flight of stairs in order to 
descend to the ice rink, which was at a level about 2 metres below the head of the stairs. The plaintiff said, and 
the judge at first instance accepted, that he did not recall seeing any warning signage on the entry doors to the 
premises or in the premises. There was no evidence that anyone had directed his attention to any such signs 
from the time he had entered the premises until the time that he had fallen. 
The plaintiff used the edge of the skate blades to walk down the stairs, and slipped on a wet patch on the 
stairs. The floor area in the vicinity of the stairs, including the treads of the stairs, was covered in a 
reconstituted or recycled rubber carpet type compound that was clearly intended to be soft, waterproof, with 
a non-slip characteristic. The nosing of each step comprised a grooved edge strip which was yellow, and made 
of a non-slip, flexible polypropylene or rubber-like compound. There was CCTV footage of the incident, and the 
judge accepted the plaintiff’s version of events throughout. Apart from the physical damage to the plaintiff, he 
was unable to work for some time after the incident, which occurred in 2009. 
On the question of duty of care to the plaintiff, the club argued that the plaintiff had been generally warned of 
the risk of engaging in ice skating, through signs in the premises making those warnings. The club therefore 
contended that it did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care: section 5M of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the 
Act). The content of the relevant separate signs was as follows: 
(a) NO RESPONSIBILITY 
The Activities provided in this centre have a certain amount of risk attached. By entering the Centre 
our patrons and their guardians accept that there is a degree of risk and release the Centre from any 
responsibility or legal liability in an activity or actions of other patrons present or participating in 
[indistinct word] activity.  
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[This sign was in red on a black background.] 
(b) ARE YOU A BEGINNER SKATER? 
Assistance available during some public skating times, Please ask at Cashier Counter. 
[This sign was in yellow on a black background}. 
(c) NO SKATES BEYOND THIS POINT  
[This sign was in black on a green background] 
(d) Ice skating is a dangerous sport. All patrons are requested to read and understand the Conditions 
of Entry and the No Responsibility signage before entering the Ice Rink. Please skate carefully at all 
times’  
[This sign was in black on a white background; the words underlined were printed in red and 
the underlining was in red.] 
Did these signs have any effect on the liability of the club? The significance of these signs, and the intention 
behind them were matters requiring construction from the viewpoint of whether a reasonable person entering 
and using the premises for whatever purpose would have regarded the signs as warnings to which the 
exclusionary provisions of section 5M of the Act would apply. The plaintiff himself had difficulty ‘reading and 
pronouncing big words’ (at [106] of the District Court judgement), but did not suffer from any vision problems. 
He could not recall seeing any signs on the premises before his fall. He was not a beginner skater however, and 
had skated at the club before. Nevertheless, taking all the evidence into account, the judge at first instance 
concluded that (at [117] of the District Court judgement): 
...the risk warnings contained within those signs were not likely to have the result of alerting the 
plaintiff of the risk of falling whilst negotiating the stairs within the premises, irrespective of the type 
of footwear that was being worn: s 5M(3) of the CL Act. The warnings inherent in the signs related to 
the recreational activity of ice skating, not other actions taken in preparation for ice skating, such as 
negotiating stairs within the premises in order to gain access to the ice rink for the purposes of 
engaging in the contemplated recreational activity of ice skating. 
Thus, the signs were not ‘of sufficient specificity’ (at [120]). Slipping on a wet step in skates was held to be 
entirely foreseeable in this situation. Thus, a duty of care was owed.  
The plaintiff claimed that as the occupier of the ice rink, the club owed him, as a customer entrant onto the 
premises, a general duty of care to take reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury. The duty of an 
occupier of premises extends not only to a static condition of premises, but also to activities conducted upon 
the premises (in this case, skating and activities connected with skating, such as going down the stairs to enter 
the ice rink). The scope of such a duty of care is to be considered in conjunction with the expectation of the 
occupier that entrants onto the premises will exercise reasonable care for their own safety, but also envisages 
the possibility that entrants may at times be inattentive or negligent. In appropriate cases, the duty may be 
taken to extend to take into account, or allow for, the thoughtless, inadvertent, careless or misjudged actions 
of customers.  
The judge at first instance held that there was a duty of care by the club as the occupier of the premises. Was 
that duty breached? The judge said that it was. Section 5B(1) and (2) of the Act applied: 
 the defendant clearly knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that a person using the 
stairs might slip and come to harm, thereby satisfying the requirement of forseeability: section 
5B(1)(a). 
 the risk of falling on stairs was not insignificant in the circumstances: section 5B(1)(b). 
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 in the light of those matters, and on a common sense analysis, a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant would have taken precautions to seek to avoid the risk of harm to persons who 
might fall on the stairs: section 5B(1)(c). 
 there was a high probability that harm would occur if care were not taken: section 5B(2)(a). 
 the likely seriousness of the harm that might occur in the event that precautions were not taken was 
not insignificant, as there was a likelihood of a range of limb and head injuries that might ensue: 
section 5B(2)(b). 
 the extent of the burden faced by the defendant if the contended precautions ( e.g. better, wider 
steps, a warning sign not to wear skates on the steps, a diagrammatic warning sign as well as one in 
written form) for avoiding harm were required to be taken was not overly high: section 5B(2)(c). 
Therefore, all the conditions for a breach of the relevant duty of care were met. 
On the question of causation, section 5D of the Act applied. This contains a ‘but for’ test. In this case, the 
plaintiff was held likely not to have sustained his injury if the club had had the appropriate safety measures in 
place – ‘but for’ the club’s negligence, there would have been no injury. 
The club pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Should the plaintiff have held on to the 
hand rail provided at all times, and watched where he put his feet? Did he fail to take reasonable care in the 
face of an obvious risk? The judge at first instance held that there was no contributory negligence (at [185]). 
The plaintiff's description of the events in his oral evidence and the CCTV footage did not demonstrate that the 
plaintiff had either acted unreasonably or that he ought to have been aware of specific obvious risks whilst 
wearing ice skating boots and descending the stairs in question. Moreover, there was no inherent risk – the 
action of descending the stairs to enter the ice rink was not itself a dangerous activity: section 5K of the Act. 
The club was held to be liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries, and his damages were assessed at 
$148,343 plus costs. 
The appeal decision 
The issues for determination on appeal were: 
(i) Whether the primary judge erroneously proceeded on the basis that the duty of care imposed 
required that the appellant avoid, as distinct from take reasonable care to avoid, foreseeable risks of 
harm; 
(ii) Whether the risk of harm which materialised was an ‘obvious risk’ within section 5F of the the Act; 
(iii) Whether the duty of care contended for by the respondent was to warn him of an obvious risk 
within the meaning of section 5H(1) of the Act; 
(iv) Whether a reasonable person in the appellant's position would have taken the precaution of 
warning patrons not to put on their ice skates before descending the stairs or warned them of the 
risks involved in their doing so and as to how they might do so, taking account of those risks;  
(v) Whether the activity of walking down the stairs was part of the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ of 
ice skating; 
(vi) Whether the warning sign headed ‘No Responsibility’ contained a warning in relation to the risks 
involved in descending the stairs or as to the risks involved in activities which included that activity; 
and 
(vii) Whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. 
The appeal was upheld, with the following findings by the Court of Appeal per Meagher JA (Tobias AJA 
agreeing) and Emmett JA: 
 75 
 
(i) A duty of care imposes an obligation to exercise reasonable care. That principle informs section 
5B of the Act which provides that a person is not negligent in failing to take a precaution against a 
risk of harm unless a reasonable person in that person's position would have taken that 
precaution. The primary judge did not misdirect himself as to the distinction between taking 
reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks and taking steps to prevent harm which the taking of 
reasonable care might not avoid. The precautions which his Honour held that the appellant 
negligently failed to take were ones required by the exercise of reasonable care: Meagher JA at 
[20]–[22]. 
(ii) The primary judge proceeded upon the basis that the risk in question was not only that of 
slipping or falling when descending the stairs whilst wearing ice skating boots, but also involved 
the uneven dimensions of the stairs and the fact that they were wet. The evidence did not justify 
a conclusion that the uneven dimensions of the stairs contributed in any material respect to the 
respondent's slipping and falling. The primary judge's conclusion that it had not been shown that 
the respondent ought to have been aware that the stairs were wet or likely to be wet, implying 
that a reasonable person in the respondent's position would not have appreciated that 
likelihood, also was not justified on the evidence. Therefore, the primary judge erred in not 
finding that the risk of harm was ‘obvious’ within the meaning of section 5F. The risk of harm 
which materialised and caused the respondent's injury was that of slipping and falling whilst 
descending the stairs in skate boots. On the evidence, two circumstances gave rise to that risk. 
The first was that the activity of descending stairs carries an ever-present risk of falling because 
of overstepping or losing balance. The second was that the respondent was wearing ice skating 
boots. The difficulties in descending the stairs in those boots would have been readily apparent 
to a person in the respondent's position: Meagher JA at [41]. 
(iii) A warning about a risk of harm may be given by describing the risk in general terms or describing 
the circumstances that give rise to it and in doing so, perhaps, by identifying what might be done 
to avoid or minimise the risk. It may also be given by prohibiting the conduct which gives rise to 
or involves the risk. Each of the two ‘warnings’, the giving of which the primary judge held would 
have been sufficient to discharge the appellant’s duty of care, was directed to alerting patrons to 
a risk of harm, which they should either avoid or take steps to minimise. Accordingly, they were 
forms of warning of the risk of injury in descending the stairs with skating boots on. That risk was 
an obvious risk within section 5F(1). The effect of section 5H(1) is that the appellant did not owe 
that duty of care to the respondent: Meagher JA at [52]; Emmett JA at [73]. 
(iv) The primary judge did not err in concluding that, if section 5H had not applied to provide that 
there was no duty of care to warn of an obvious risk, in the circumstances a reasonable person 
would have given a warning of the risk of slipping and falling whilst descending the stairs in skate 
boots. Although the risk of harm was readily apparent, a reasonable occupier in the appellant’s 
position would take account of the fact that its patrons may not always be careful in identifying 
that risk including because they are distracted or not familiar with the activity of ice skating: 
Meagher JA at [54]. 
(v) The primary judge was correct to find that the activity of descending the stairs was not a 
dangerous recreational activity. The activity of walking in skating boots down the stairs at the 
appellant's sporting complex was not ice skating. Nor was it a necessary incident of ice skating, 
either at those premises or more generally: Meagher JA at [59]; Emmett JA at [75]. 
(vi) The warning given by the ‘No Responsibility’ notice did not address the risk of walking down the 
stairs with skating boots on. 
(vii) The primary judge’s finding that the respondent did not fail to make adequate use of the central 
hand rail was available on the evidence. The basis for interfering with the finding as to 
contributory negligence was therefore not made out: Meagher JA at [60]–[61]. 
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In summary, because of the finding by the Court of Appeal that the risk involved was an obvious risk, the 
appellant club did not owe a duty of care to the respondent. The appellant therefore owed no liability to the 
respondent in the circumstances.  The appeal was allowed with costs. 
This appeal may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2014/394.html 
The case in the District Court may be viewed at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWDC/2013/93.html 
Implications of this case 
The case at first instance found that the Club did owe the plaintiff (respondent in the appeal) a duty of care, 
and that the risk involved was not an obvious one. Section 5F(1) defines an ‘obvious risk’ as a ‘risk that, in the 
circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person’ – the ‘person’ 
in this case being the respondent (plaintiff). But the Court of Appeal decided the risk should have been clearly 
apparent to a reasonable person in his position. Since the risk was an obvious one, the appellant Club, did not 
owe him a duty of care regarding that risk.  
 
2.6.3 REID V COMMERCIAL CLUB (ALBURY) LTD [2014] NSWCA 98 (COURT OF APPEAL OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES, EMMETT, GLEESON JJA, TOBIAS AJA, 3 APRIL 2014)  
This was an appeal in a personal injuries case against the respondent club. The appellant (Reid) failed at first 
instance to establish any breach of duty by the respondent club, and had costs awarded against her. Her 
Honour in the District Court had said that if the appellant had been successful, her damages would have been 
$54,399. The appellant appealed the findings made by the primary judge that there was no breach of duty and 
no causal connection between the breach and the damage suffered by her. She also challenged the 
hypothetical quantification of damages made by the primary judge, and the order for indemnity costs made 
against her. The appellant also alleged actual bias by the primary judge during the hearing, or actual or 
apprehended bias in Her Honour's judgments. 
The appellant was injured when she attended an awards night function at the respondent's premises in Albury 
on 18 June 2010. The appellant suffered a fractured ankle and foot when, while walking to the dance floor in 
the auditorium in which the function was held, she missed the step down to the dance floor and fell. The 
appellant sued the respondent, who was the owner and occupier of the premises known as the Commercial 
Club Albury, alleging that the respondent had breached a duty of care owed to her. 
Although the facts revealed that the dance floor was below the level of the floor itself (surrounded by 
balustrading), and that the lights had been dimmed after the awards presentation for the purpose of dancing, 
Her Honour at first instance found that there was no breach of duty by the respondent club. She held that the 
appellant had fallen because she was not looking where she was going. She had been sitting at the edge of the 
dance floor for two hours at that point, and the lights had been dimmed for 30 minutes before she got up to 
walk to the dance floor. The appellant submitted that there were insufficient visual cues for the edge of the 
dance floor which should have been indicated by a metal edging strip. Expert evidence was taken, but did not 
support the appellant’s contentions. Her Honour at first instance concluded that the club could not eliminate 
all risks. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal dealt first with actual and apprehended bias on the part of the trial judge. Case 
authority requires that an allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved, that such a 
finding should not be made lightly, and that cogent evidence is required. An allegation of apprehended bias 
requires an objective assessment of the connection between the facts and circumstances said to give rise to 
the apprehension and the asserted conclusion that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to bear upon 
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the issues that are to be decided. The question is not whether the judge had in fact prejudged an issue. The 
Court of Appeal could find no actual or apprehended bias. On apprehended bias, the Court said (at [78]): 
It is necessary to keep in mind that claims of apprehension of bias are to be considered in the context 
of ordinary judicial practice. Active case management, as part of modern litigation, often requires that 
trial judges intervene in the conduct of cases. Judges are not expected to wait until the end of the 
case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and 
arguments are presented. Accordingly, the expression of tentative views, which reflect a certain 
tendency of mind of the judge, are not on that account alone to be taken to indicate prejudgment. 
Moreover, counsel are usually assisted by hearing the judges' tentative opinions on matters in issue 
and being given an opportunity to deal with them... 
Thus, the basis for apprehended bias was most definitely not made out. On actual bias, again the Court of 
Appeal could find none, but nevertheless were inclined to be critical of Her Honour below (at [84], [117]): 
...while the conduct of the primary judge exhibited error and, at times, wrong-headedness in certain 
procedural rulings, and some of her Honour's remarks were inappropriate and regrettable, this does 
not translate into a finding of actual bias….  
Such display of impatience, irritation, and rudeness fell well short of desirable standards of judicial 
conduct. That however does not establish actual bias. Loss of impartiality and neutrality would not be 
made out from a short and emotional exchange at the end of a long trial and weighed in isolation....  
Despite these criticisms, the Court of Appeal could find no fault in the reasoning applied by Her Honour under 
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the Act). In particular, Her Honour correctly identified the relevant harm 
under section 5B(1)(a) of the Act, which was stumbling on the dance floor. There was no appeal as to whether 
the risk was ‘not insignificant’ under section 5B(1)(b). However, the Court of Appeal said that, if they had been 
asked to decide, it was ‘not insignificant’. As to whether the respondent had taken reasonable precautions to 
prevent the risk (section 5B(1)(c)), the Court of Appeal could find no fault with Her Honour’s analysis (at [160]): 
As the primary judge correctly noted, the present case turned on its own facts (Judgment at 4). The 
findings by the primary judge that the appellant was not paying attention and was not looking where 
she was walking were uncontroversial. It was open to her Honour to give weight to both the 
obviousness of the risk, and the reasonableness of an expectation that the appellant would take care 
for her own safety. There was no error in her Honour's approach. 
There was no misconception of the appellant’s factual case by Her Honour (at [170]): 
The critical issue for determination raised by the appellant was whether there were sufficient visual 
cues drawing attention to the step. Her Honour addressed each of the suggested precautions 
advanced by the appellant. It cannot be said that her Honour misconceived the appellant's case. 
Nor was there any difficulty with Her Honour’s findings on causation (section 5D of the Act), or costs generally. 
However, there was one small technical point on costs with which the Court of Appeal disagreed. Therefore, 
the appeal failed on all grounds other than in two limited technical issues, neither of which interfered with the 
primary findings. The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2014/98.html 
Implications of this case 
This was a case concerning occupier’s liability. The duty of an occupier of premises to entrants on its premises 
is a duty to take reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury to entrants, bearing in mind that what is 
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reasonable ‘will vary with the circumstances of the plaintiff's entry upon the premises’: Australian Safeway 
Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7. The scope of the occupier's duty of care is marked out by the 
relationship between the occupier and users exercising reasonable care for their own safety. The weight to be 
given to an expectation that potential plaintiffs will exercise reasonable care for their own safety is a general 
matter in the assessment of breach in every case. This involves a factual judgment which may depend on the 
circumstances of the case. The appellant in this case complained that the primary judge gave too much weight 
to the reasonableness of an expectation that other people will take care for their own safety. However, the 
Court of Appeal said that it was open to Her Honour to give weight to both the obviousness of the risk, and the 
reasonableness of an expectation that the appellant would take care for her own safety.  
 
2.7 NONPROFIT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
2.7.1 ADAMS V YINDJIBARNDI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION RNTBC [2014] WASC 467 
(SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, KENNETH MARTIN J, 9 DECEMBER 
2014) 
This case concerned the validity of the calling of a meeting of the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation (YAC) by 
two directors who were the plaintiffs in this case. It was held that the meeting was called validly. Of most 
interest were the remarks of the court on the relevant legislation governing Aboriginal corporations, the 
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (CATSI). His Honour said in this respect (at 
[9]–[11]): 
There can be no doubt the provisions of the CATSI Act, in large measure, display very strong parallels 
to provisions found within the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The conceptual notions of a corporation 
holding a separate legal personality, with governance by a board of directors that are accountable to 
the corporation's members (analogous to shareholders) are seen to be replicated in the CATSI Act. 
Judges have commented upon similarities between the Corporations Act and the CATSI Act and they 
have accordingly interpreted provisions of the CATSI Act by reference to case law applicable to the 
regulation of companies under the Corporations Act. By example, therefore, the provisions found in 
the CATSI Act, in terms of the obligations and duties of a director, bear strong textual parallels to 
provisions from the corporations legislation. There are also very close textual similarities between the 
Corporations Act and provisions in the CATSI Act relating to the convening of general meetings of 
members of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation. 
In Part 2G.2, div 2 of the Corporations Act, under a heading ‘Who may call meetings of members’, sections 
249C and 249CA(1) (applicable to listed public companies) provide: ‘A director may call a meeting of the 
company's members’. Similarly, section 201-1 of the CATSI Act (a replaceable rule) states that: 
A director of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation may call a general meeting of the 
corporation. 
This replaceable rule was not replaced by the defendant corporation, since Rule 4.3 of its rule book states, 
under a heading ‘General meetings’: ‘A director can call a general meeting’. Thus there could be no 
controversy that the general meeting in question was called validly by the two directors, but the question also 
arose whether it was called for a valid purpose, as required under section 201-55 of the CATSI Act. Section 
265-5 also states that: 
(1) A director or other officer of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation must exercise his 
or her powers and discharge his or her duties: 
(a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and 
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(b) for a proper purpose.  
Thus the question in the case became one of good faith and an alleged improper purpose of the plaintiff 
directors. His Honour could find no evidence of lack of good faith. As to improper purpose, His Honour 
considered relevant case law under the Corporations Act, but found that it went ‘all one way and against the 
position of the defendant’ (at [80]). There was no apparent real controversy. 
However, the defendant contended an additional factor to be considered, one which affected Aboriginal 
corporations only, was the need for underlying consensus in decision making. His Honour said on this issue (at 
[82]–[83]): 
The underlying contention would appear to be that, because of the particular characteristics of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations, and then regulated by a rule book of the character 
as is seen manifested here for this defendant corporation, the theme of ‘consensus’ is highly 
important. It is argued that this notion effectively means that before any director exercises their 
(undoubted) power to call a general meeting of members, the director first needs to meet and satisfy 
certain (unwritten) preconditions. Such preconditions argued for seem to include telling other 
directors of the receipt of requests (for a meeting) by other members, then participating in 
discussions with the other current directors over whether or not it really is actually in the best 
interests of the corporation for a general meeting to be called by the director (where resolutions are 
to be put to remove most of the existing directors). 
Both ‘consensus’ and ‘law and customs’ were defined in the defendant’s Rule Book:  
consensus means general agreement among the members present as to a particular matter whereby 
differing points of view, if any, have been considered and reconciled and any decision is generally 
agreed upon in accordance with law and custom. For the avoidance of doubt, a decision made by 
consensus in accordance with law and custom, does not necessarily require that the decision be 
agreed upon unanimously. 
law and customs means the body of traditions, laws, customs and beliefs recognised and held in 
common by the common law holders, and includes those traditions, laws, customs and beliefs 
exercised in relation to a particular area of land and waters, traditionally accessed resources, and 
persons. 
His Honour said that the definition of ‘consensus’ suffered from ‘lack of clarity’ (at [88]) and that the definition 
of ‘law and customs’ was ‘porous’ (at [91]). They were difficult to apply (at [91]–[93]): 
So a ‘consensus’ is defined and must be applied to accord with that given definition of law and 
custom. But that explanation of ‘law and custom’ is porous. By its very character it seems to be, for 
any external curial body, an intangible and, so, very much capable of generating debates over 
whether or not some unwritten feature or notion or concept is actually a law or a custom or not. In a 
context of a need to find a consensus, applying that ill-defined law and custom touchstone presents 
as vague and potentially problematic. Moreover, that threshold of consensus finds itself without any 
express support in the CATSI Act. It is a notion found as used in the rule book (or constitution) of this 
particular defendant. 
Whilst His Honour saw the advantages of seeking consensus in corporate boards in the general sense, 
practicality was key (at [97]): 
Consensus applied to decisions of general meetings may prove difficult to follow in practice. It may be 
some issues at a general meeting may lend themselves to being resolved by ascertaining a broad level 
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of support, rather than by a divided vote. However, a contested board election, needing to be 
resolved as between potentially hundreds of voting members would, in the ordinary course of events, 
throw up great difficulties in attempting to find consensus – if no-one can be elected except by 
applying an indeterminate notion of consensus at a general meeting.  
The plaintiffs’ purpose in calling the general meeting was held to be proper. The power to call such a meeting 
should not be lightly interfered with by the court, whether the corporation was an Aboriginal one or not (at 
[106]–[107]): 
A director’s power to call a meeting is one with which a court ought not lightly interfere. This 
fundamental aspect of corporate governance protection as between a corporation constituted by 
shareholders is the same governance protection that is made applicable in respect of the 
responsibilities of a board of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation to its members. 
There must be a proper accountability to members and there must, as well, exist the underlying 
confidence in a board of directors from the majority of the corporation’s members. It is not a court’s 
role to inhibit a corporation’s members from exercising a democratic right to choose the board of 
directors. In the present case, no injunction is sought seeking to restrain the general meeting that has 
been convened. 
In addition, as there had been no procedural irregularity, the general meeting in question was properly called 
under a clear provision of the relevant legislation. Therefore, His Honour made declarations that the general 
meeting was properly called for proper purposes. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2014/467.html 
Implications of this case 
Since the provisions of the CATSI Act mirror those of the Corporations Act in respect of the powers of 
directors, the court was clear that the provisions of both Acts should be interpreted in the same way. 
 
2.7.2 DURRI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION MEDICAL SERVICE V REGISTRAR OF 
INDIGENOUS CORPORATIONS [2014] FCA 1439 (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 
WIGNEY J, 23 DECEMBER 2014) 
The applicant in this matter, Durri Aboriginal Corporation Medical Service (Durri), is a corporation registered 
under the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (the Act). The Registrar of 
Indigenous Corporations (the Registrar) is appointed and has duties and responsibilities under the Act in 
relation to corporations registered under the Act (ATI corporations). In this application, Durri sought injunctive 
relief to restrain the Registrar from doing three things:  
1. requiring Durri to produce a list of names of members of Durri by 23 December 2014;  
2. issuing a notice of an annual general meeting (AGM) to members of Durri; and  
3. holding an AGM of Durri by the end of January 2015. 
Section 180-1 of the Act provides that an ATI corporation is required to set up and maintain a register of 
members, and it commits an offence if it does not do so: section 180-1(2). Under section 180-25, any person 
has a right to inspect an ATI corporation’s register. If a person asks for a copy of the register and pays any fee 
required by the corporation, the corporation must provide a copy within seven days, failing which it commits 
an offence. In addition, under section 453-5 of the Act the Registrar may, by notice in writing, require an ATI 
corporation to provide books of the corporation to the Registrar. A person who fails to comply with such a 
notice commits an offence: section 453-5(5).  
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On 8 December 2014, the Registrar served a notice on Durri requiring it to produce its current register of 
members within 14 days. Therefore, by this application Durri was effectively seeking to restrain the Registrar 
from acting on that notice. The only reason or basis put forward by Durri for challenging the Registrar’s 
exercise of power was that the requirement to produce the register was related to the Registrar’s calling of an 
AGM of Durri, which Durri did not want to be held. On this point, His Honour found that even if there was 
some basis for restraining the meeting, which there was not (see below), this would still provide no reason for 
restraining the Registrar’s exercise of power and discretion under the Act to require production of Durri’s 
register. 
Section 201-150 of the Act provides that a corporation must hold an AGM within five months after the end of 
its financial year. Durri’s rule book, which had been formulated and accepted by the Registrar under the Act, 
provides that Durri’s AGM must be held before 30 November each year. Durri did not hold an AGM before 30 
November 2014. A meeting was apparently convened, but was adjourned before any of the business which the 
rule book required to be conducted (under Rule 4.2) was in fact conducted. 
Section 439-15(1) of the Act provides that the Registrar may call and arrange to hold an AGM of an Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander corporation if the corporation has not held the meeting as required by section 201-
150 or 201-155. Thus, on 8 December 2014, the Registrar wrote to Durri and advised that he intended to call 
an AGM of Durri. This was the subject of further correspondence between the Registrar and Durri, the result of 
which was that by mid-December 2014 the Registrar confirmed his intention to call such a meeting.  
The basis upon which Durri sought to restrain the issuing of a meeting notice by the Registrar (which had, in 
fact, already occurred) and the holding of an AGM, was that, in its submission, a special administrator should 
be appointed to Durri. Under section 487-1 of the Act, the Registrar may put an ATI corporation under special 
administration. Section 487-5 provides the grounds for determining if that should be done. In this application 
Durri relied on section 487-1(1)(h), which provides that a ground for appointing a special administrator is that 
a majority of the corporation’s directors have requested the Registrar in writing to appoint a special 
administrator. On this point, His Honour said (at [16]–[18]): 
The problem for Durri is that it has not satisfied s 487-1(1)(h). A majority of Durri’s directors have not 
requested in writing that the Registrar appoint a special administrator. This was pointed out to Durri 
by the Registrar, both by public announcement and in private correspondence. It has not been 
suggested to the Registrar that there are any other grounds for appointing a special administrator. In 
any event, even if there were grounds to appoint a special administrator, the appointment is a matter 
for the discretion of the Registrar. The Registrar here has obviously decided not to appoint a special 
administrator. No basis for intervening in the exercise of that discretion has been shown by Durri. 
Even if there were grounds for appointing a special administrator, that would not in any event provide 
a basis for restraining the Registrar from acting pursuant to the Act to require the holding of an AGM. 
The holding of an AGM is both mandatory under the Act and important. 
His Honour concluded that no reason had been shown for disturbing the Registrar’s exercise of power or 
discretion to call an AGM of Durri. Since the business to be conducted at an AGM included considering and 
approving annual reports and financial statements and the appointment of directors, it would be a matter of 
legitimate concern to the Registrar if an ATI corporation failed to hold an AGM.  
Although Durri had, in its evidence and submissions, drawn attention to various complaints or disputes, or 
apparent disputes, between various directors and members of the corporation, which were said to explain 
why the proposed AGM in November was adjourned and why a special administrator should be appointed, 
those matters did not provide a proper basis for disturbing the Registrar’s exercise of power to call the AGM. 
Therefore, there was no basis for restraining the Registrar from doing any of things opposed by Durri.  Durri’s 
application was dismissed with costs. 
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The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2014/1439.html 
 
2.7.3 LIVERPOOL TOUCH FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION V NEW SOUTH WALES TOUCH 
ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED [2014] NSWSC 1553 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 23 OCTOBER 2014) 
The plaintiff participated in a touch football competition run in Sydney known as the Vawdon Cup. The 
competition was managed by the defendant. There was an internal dispute about the running of the 
competition, which affected the plaintiff’s position in the finals. The plaintiff sought an urgent hearing of what 
was essentially a claim for final relief to set aside the decisions of the board of the defendant. In particular, it 
sought an order from the Court to determine which were the proper teams to play in the preliminary and 
grand finals of Division Three of the touch football competition. The issue became whether this could be 
adjudicated upon by the court. His Honour applied the well-established and long-held principles from Cameron 
v Hogan [1934] HCA 24; (1934) CLR 358, and Rush v WA Amateur Football League (Inc) [2007] WASCA 190 to 
decide that the matter was not justiciable.  
In Cameron v Hogan, Starke J said (at 384): 
As a general rule the Courts do not interfere in the contentions and quarrels of political parties, or 
indeed, in the internal affairs of any voluntary association, society or club.  
Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ said (at 370): 
Judicial statements of authority are to be found to the effect that, except to enforce or establish some 
right of a proprietary nature, a member who complains that he has been unjustifiably excluded from 
the voluntary association, or that some breach of its rules has been committed, cannot maintain any 
action directly founded upon that complaint ... 
In Rush, the court said (at [37] of that case): 
In the particular circumstances of this case, in the absence of any property, income or reputational 
interests, this Court has no jurisdiction to decide issues arising out of the consensual but non-
contractual relationship between the parties." 
Thus, in this case, the line of authority being clear, His Honour said that (at [12]–[13]): 
The evidence does not show any contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Nor am I satisfied, despite the best efforts of counsel for the plaintiff, that the decision to declare the 
plaintiff's win in the semi-final forfeited affects any person's reputation in any relevant sense. 
Doubtless, the issue is one about which those playing in the team and associated with the club feel 
strongly. That is not a sufficient reason for the dispute to be justiciable. I think this case illustrates 
very clearly the policy behind the rule laid down in Cameron v Hogan. There is no reason the Supreme 
Court should be asked to rule on the legality of decisions concerning the running of the competition. 
Therefore, the plaintiff club could not proceed further. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/1553.html 
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2.7.4 MANNIX V MANNIX, 2014 ABQB 602 (CANLII) (COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH OF 
ALBERTA, ERB J, 2 OCTOBER 2014) 
In 1997, the respondent, Mr Mannix, established the Norlien Foundation (the Foundation) as a private 
charitable foundation under the terms of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5
th
 Supp). The Foundation was 
incorporated pursuant to the Canada Corporations Act, RSC 1970, c C-32 for the purpose of enhancing the 
quality of life for all Canadians. The Foundation has funded initiatives in early childhood development, 
addictions, music, the arts, disadvantaged children, and the environment in Alberta and, to a lesser extent, 
elsewhere in Canada. Mr. Mannix was its first Patron. In 2004, the applicant, Ms Mannix (the respondent’s 
spouse), became Patron, Moderator and Chair of the Board of Directors. However, in September 2012, the 
applicant and the respondent separated under a separation agreement. There are currently four members of 
the Foundation including the applicant and the respondent. In addition, the Foundation has a seven-member 
Board of Directors chaired by the applicant. In this application, the applicant sought an order to compel the 
respondent, now her former spouse, to vote in favour of new bylaws for the Foundation. 
The case had its genesis in a legislative change affecting the Foundation. In an effort to modernise the 
legislative regime applicable to nonprofit organisations, the Canadian federal government enacted the Canada 
Not-for-profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23 (the NFP Act). The NFP Act was passed in June 2009 and came 
into effect in October 2011. Nonprofit corporations that had not been continued under the NFP Act by 17 
October 2014 would be subject to dissolution, although it is possible that because of notice and other 
requirements, formal dissolution might not occur until February 2015. Dissolution would risk revocation of the 
Foundation’s charitable registration, resulting in significant tax consequences. Therefore, it became essential 
that the Foundation be continued under the NFP Act.  
The dispute between the parties arose because continuation under the NFP Act would have a significant 
impact on the Foundation’s current bylaws, which had not been changed since 2004. One of these impacts 
concerned the role and powers of the applicant as Patron and Moderator. If the Foundation was continued 
under the NFP Act without an amendment to its current bylaws, all members would be deemed to have equal 
voting rights. This meant that the Patron and Moderator position would lose some of its existing powers, 
including power to have a deciding vote and the ability to designate members as not in good standing. The 
applicant wanted to have new bylaws under the NFP Act which maintained her position and powers. She 
contended that the terms of the separation agreement between the parties meant that the respondent had to 
support the new bylaws she proposed to introduce at the meeting on 7 October 2014. The respondent resisted 
this contention on the basis that there was no urgency involved, since dissolution would not occur until 
February 2015, and that there was no reason for the court to involve itself in the business judgment of the 
Foundation.  The respondent argued that matters of corporate governance were best left to the members and 
directors. 
The crux of the case was that the applicant was arguing for specific performance of the terms of the separation 
agreement. The respondent took the position that the terms of the separation agreement could not be 
interpreted to require him to agree to the proposed bylaws put forth by the applicant. The respondent said 
that there was no agreement with respect to maintaining the current governance structure (giving the 
applicant wide powers) and that, in any event, the proposed new bylaws went further than the current 
structure, giving the applicant the ability effectively to dismiss other members, and to govern the Foundation 
entirely on her own. 
It is accepted law that there is a three-part test for granting specific performance: 
(i) Is there a sufficient definition of what has to be done in order to comply with the 
order of the court? 
(ii) Will enforcing compliance involve superintendence by the court to an unacceptable 
degree? 
 84 
 
(iii) What are the respective prejudices or hardships that will be suffered by the parties 
if the order is made or not made? 
The separation agreement provided that the respondent should ‘help and support’ the applicant in her role 
within the Foundation.  Her Honour said that this did not provide a sufficient basis for an order of specific 
performance (at [23]–[26]): 
The boundaries of ‘help and support’ could be defined expansively. Mr. Mannix could provide help 
and support in a number of ways, including donating further funds to the Foundation or, perhaps, 
resigning as a member. But the question here is not whether voting in favour of the proposed 
amended bylaws could fall within the term ‘help and support’ but whether it necessarily does so such 
that Mr. Mannix is contractually obligated to vote in such a way. I cannot find this to be the case.  An 
order of this Court requiring Mr. Mannix to vote for the specific bylaw amendments proposed by Ms. 
Mannix arguably means the Court would be making a bargain for the parties which they did not make 
for themselves. But anything less than that specificity leaves Mr. Mannix without enough direction to 
know if he is complying with this Court’s order. Certainly, an order requiring him to ‘help and support’ 
Ms. Mannix would be unacceptably vague. If the parties had, for example, agreed to amended bylaws 
and incorporated the agreed terms into the Separation Agreement, they would have provided a 
concrete obligation that could have formed the basis for an order for specific performance. That, 
however, is not what occurred. Consequently, I find that I am unable to craft an order for specific 
performance that is neither overbroad nor impermissibly vague and I therefore decline to do so. 
Thus, the respondent was not ordered to comply with the applicant’s request to agree to the proposed new 
bylaws. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2014/2014abqb602/2014abqb602.html 
Implications of this case 
Given the outcome of this application, the possible result will be dissolution of the Foundation, with 
consequent loss of charitable status and taxation implications, unless appropriate continuation can be agreed 
between the parties. Her Honour was somewhat scathing in her remarks about the parties, characterising the 
case as a ‘power struggle’ between the former spouses, and their behaviour as ‘consistent with the 
unfortunate reality of matrimonial disputes, [where] neither party provides a better example of acceptable 
conduct than the other’ (at [27]). She also noted that it was ‘significant’ (at [13]) that the Foundation itself was 
not a party to the application, so that its best interests were not represented. 
 
2.7.5 MEDICAL STAFF OF AVERA MARSHALL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER ON ITS OWN 
BEHALF AND IN ITS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY FOR ITS MEMBERS, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS, VS. AVERA MARSHALL D/B/A AVERA MARSHALL REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, ET AL., RESPONDENT (SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA, PAGE J (FOR THE 
3 PERSON MAJORITY), GILDEA CJ AND ANDERSON J (DISSENTING), 31 DECEMBER 
2014) 
In 2012, the governing board of respondent, Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center (AM), a nonprofit 
hospital in Marshall, Minnesota, announced a plan to repeal the hospital’s medical staff bylaws and replace 
them with revised bylaws. AM’s Medical Staff, its Chief of Staff, and Chief of Staff-elect commenced an action 
seeking a declaration that the Medical Staff had standing to sue AM and that the medical staff bylaws were an 
enforceable contract between AM and the Medical Staff. The District Court of Minnesota entered judgment 
for AM and dismissed the case after concluding that the Medical Staff lacked the capacity to sue AM and that 
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the medical staff bylaws did not constitute an enforceable contract between AM and the Medical Staff. The 
court of appeals affirmed the District Court. This was the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota. 
AM is owned and operated by Avera Health and is incorporated under the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation 
Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 317A (2012). Under AM’s articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws, AM’s board of 
directors (the board) is vested with the general responsibility for management of AM. The corporate bylaws 
require the board to ‘organize the physicians and appropriate other persons granted practice privileges in the 
hospital ... into a medical-dental staff under medical-dental staff bylaws approved by the [board]’.  
The appellants included two individual physicians and Avera Marshall’s Medical Staff as a whole. The medical 
staff is composed of practitioners, primarily doctors (physicians) with admitting and clinical privileges to care 
for patients at the hospital. The Medical Staff is subject to medical staff bylaws originally enacted by the board 
in 1995. The 2012 by-laws were unilaterally introduced to staff in January 2012, and took effect from 1 May 
2012 without the opportunity of full feedback being provided. Two individual physicians and the Medical Staff 
as a whole objected, eventually filing a lawsuit against the hospital. There were two important governance 
issues for nonprofit hospitals within the lawsuit: 
1. did the Medical Staff, as an unincorporated association, have the legal capacity to sue?  
2. did the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between the hospital and the Medical 
Staff?  
With respect to the first question, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the common law rule in Minnesota is 
that unincorporated associations are not legally distinct from their members and so do not have legal capacity 
to sue or be sued in their own right. However, the court found that the Minnesota legislature had overridden 
this rule when it enacted Minnesota Statute section 540.151 (2012), which the court interpreted as granting 
the capacity to sue and to be sued to any unincorporated associations which met the statutory criteria. Those 
criteria are having two or more persons associate, and acting under a common name, criteria that the court 
found the hospital's ‘Medical Staff’ satisfied (at page 10): 
We conclude that, under its plain language, Minn. Stat. § 540.151 grants to an unincorporated 
association the right to sue and be sued if it meets the statutory criteria. The statute states that 
people who associate under a common name “may sue in or be sued by such common name”… Here, 
the Medical Staff is composed of two or more physicians who associate and act together for the 
purpose of ensuring proper patient care at the hospital under the common name “Medical Staff.” 
Therefore, because the Medical Staff satisfies the statutory criteria of section 540.151, we hold that it 
has the capacity to sue and be sued under Minnesota law. 
With respect to the second question, the Supreme Court concluded that even though the hospital had a legal 
obligation under Minnesota administrative rules and the hospital’s corporate bylaws to adopt medical staff 
bylaws, both sides still provided consideration. More specifically, the hospital granted privileges at the hospital 
in exchange for the prospective Medical Staff member agreeing to abide by the bylaws. The court therefore 
concluded that there was a bargained-for exchange of promises and mutual consent to the exchange, creating 
an enforceable contract. The court therefore remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims that 
the repeal and replacement of the medical staff bylaws violated the terms of that contract (at pages 16–17): 
The record in this case indicates that Avera Marshall formed a contractual relationship with each 
member of the Medical Staff upon appointment Avera Marshall offered privileges to each member of 
the Medical Staff, so long as the Medical Staff member agreed to be bound by the medical staff 
bylaws as a condition of appointment. Each member of the Medical Staff who accepted Avera 
Marshall’s offer of appointment agreed to be bound by the bylaws. Thus, there was a bargained-for 
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exchange of promises and mutual consent to the exchange. Importantly, there was also 
consideration. Both Avera Marshall and the members of its Medical Staff voluntarily assumed 
obligations on the condition of an act or forebearance on the part of the other. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the courts below, and remitted the case to the District 
Court of Minnesota for rehearing. 
The case may be viewed at: http://mn.gov/lawlib/archive/supct/2014/OPA122117-123114.pdf 
Implications of this case 
The result in this US case, which may be significant to many hospitals in that country, both for-profit and 
nonprofit, was not a foregone conclusion as both the state trial court and the state appellate court had 
concluded the opposite on both questions. Indeed, in this case, two of the five justices of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court dissented from the majority's opinion. However, the decision is of note in that it granted an 
unincorporated body of persons the right to sue because there had been statutory interference with the usual 
common law rule. 
 
2.8 TAXATION 
2.8.1 CANADA V BERG, 2014 FCA 25 (CANLII) (CANADIAN FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL, 
SHARLOW, STRATAS, NEAR JJA, 31 JANUARY 2014) 
This was an appeal against a judgement which had partially allowed Berg’s appeal in a taxation matter: see 
Berg v R, 2012 TCC 406. The decision below had applied to the 2002, 2003, and 2004 taxation years pursuant to 
the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5
th
 Supp.) (the Act). 
In 2002 and 2003, Berg (the respondent) had participated in a fraudulent charitable donation scheme from which 
he received inflated tax receipts. The scheme involved a series of transactions that included the purchase and 
subsequent transfer of timeshare units located on Young Island in St. Vincent and the Grenadines that were 
transferred soon afterward to a registered charity. As part of the same series of transactions, the participants 
received (false) documents designed to enable the participants to receive tax credits based on a falsely inflated 
value of the timeshare units.  
Participating in the scheme involved entering into a series of transactions with Young Island Timeshare Inc. (a 
British Virgin Islands corporation) and SVG Bancorp Inc. (represented as a St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
corporation). Young Island Timeshare Inc. sold the timeshare units to participants including the respondent, and 
SVG Bancorp Inc. provided participants, including the respondent, with false documents that were intended to 
deceive the relevant Minister into believing that the respondent’s cost of the timeshare units was far in excess of 
what was actually paid. 
On 19 November 2002, the respondent purchased 68 timeshare units with a fair market value (FMV) of $242,000. 
He paid $242,000 for them. The promoters provided the respondent with false documents, the most important of 
which was a document purporting to be a promissory note proving that the respondent still owed $2,178,000 for 
the purchase of the timeshare units. The respondent paid a fee of $508,200 to the scheme promoters. 
On 6 December 2002, the respondent transferred the timeshare units to Cheder Chabad which was a registered 
charity under the Act. Cheder Chabad issued him with a charitable gift receipt for $2,420,000 (ten times the FMV of 
the timeshare units and equal to the money the respondent paid for the units plus the face amount of the 
purported promissory note). On his 2002 tax return, the respondent claimed a tax credit based on the $2,420,000 
receipt. 
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In 2003, the respondent again participated in the charitable donation scheme, which differed from his 2002 
participation only in the dollar amounts of the transaction. In the 2003 year, the FMV of the time share units 
purchased, and the amount paid by the respondent, was $133,950. The promoters provided him with false 
documents, including a document purporting to be a promissory note showing that the respondent still owed 
$1,652,050 for the timeshare units. The promoters were paid a fee of $366,130. On 14 February 2003, the 
respondent transferred these timeshare units to Cheder Chabad (the charity). The charity provided him with a 
charitable tax receipt in the amount of $1,786,000, on the basis of which he claimed tax credits on his 2003 and 
2004 tax returns ($1,067,620 in 2003 and $718,380 in 2004). The respondent anticipated a net cash return of 
$684,480 for the 2002 and 2003 transactions, assuming his claims for tax credits based on the inflated charitable 
donation receipts had been allowed in full. 
Ultimately, the evidence disclosed the existence of documents executed contemporaneously with the 2002 and 
2003 timeshare purchases that discharged the respondent from any liability under the purported promissory notes 
for $2,178,000 and $1,652,050. Thus, the $684,480 anticipated return from the scheme was pure profit for the 
respondent. 
The claims in the respondent’s tax returns for the relevant years were initially allowed. However, on 19 June 2009 
a notice of reassessment for the 2002 tax year was issued, disallowing the entire amount claimed. The respondent 
was partially successful in his appeal to the Tax Court of Canada in 2012. The issue in that case was whether the 
bogus nature of the scheme engaged in by the respondent had vitiated any donative intent towards the charity. 
His Honour at first instance decided that Berg had not gained any benefit from his participation in the scheme 
except for the inflated tax receipts. The judge held that Berg was entitled to claim a charitable tax credit to the 
extent that he was actually impoverished by his purchase and subsequent transfer of the timeshare units (at [47]–
[48]). Even though Berg was ‘not motivated overwhelmingly and perhaps only marginally by donative intent’, he 
was held to be entitled to charitable tax credits of $242,000 and $133,950 (the amounts actually paid for the 
timeshare units transferred to the charity) in each of the relevant tax years. The Crown appealed this finding. 
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether there was in fact a gift under section 118.1 of the Act. 
The facts were not in dispute, and the Court said that the respondent had only one motive – to receive inflated tax 
receipts and claim false tax credits. His Honour below had found that there was no benefit to the respondent since 
the false documents (referred to as the ‘pretence documents’ in this case) which had been provided to him were in 
fact valueless. He had paid the FMV for the timeshare units, and however egregious his motives, he had 
transferred these to the charity. 
The Federal Court of Appeal did not agree (at [28]–[29]): 
...it was not open to the judge to conclude that the pretence documents were ‘of no value’ at the time 
that Mr. Berg consummated the ‘deal.’ They clearly had value to Mr. Berg – he paid a substantial fee at 
that time, well in excess of the value of the timeshare units – and it is clear that the pretence documents 
were part of the package he received in return. Mr. Berg intended to rely on the pretence documents as 
though they were genuine, and he did so. He used them to support his initial claim for inflated tax credits. 
He continued to rely on them throughout the audit and objection, and even to the end of examinations 
for discovery. The fact that his position became untenable upon discovery of the discharge documents 
does not change the fact that the pretence documents had value when they were delivered to Mr. Berg....  
The Crown is entitled to succeed for a further reason. In my view, it was not open to the judge on this 
record to conclude that, at the time of the transfer of the timeshare units to Cheder Chabad, Mr. Berg 
had the requisite donative intent for the purposes of section 118.1 of the Act. In my view, Mr. Berg did 
not intend to impoverish himself by transferring the timeshare units to Cheder Chabad. On the contrary, 
he intended to enrich himself by making use of falsely inflated charitable gift receipts to profit from 
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inflated tax credit claims. He consummated the ‘deal’ solely with that objective, and he acted from 
beginning to end in a manner intended to achieve that result. 
Therefore, the appeal was allowed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2014/2014fca25/2014fca25.html 
Implications of this case 
The decision in this case made it clear that enrichment under a charity tax fraud scheme was not permitted in 
Canada. This decision was partially applied in David v The Queen, 2014 TCC 117, a decision of the Tax Court of 
Canada in April 2014. The central question in David was whether an expectation of an inflated tax credit based 
on an inflated donation receipt was a benefit that negated any charitable gift (it was). Berg held that the 
receipt of a benefit negated a gift to charity, although that benefit was not the receipt itself, but the provision 
of bogus documentation relied on by Berg until evidence emerged (the release documents) that entirely 
undermined his position. David took this decision one step further. 
 
2.8.2 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION V HUNGER PROJECT AUSTRALIA [2014] FCAFC 69 
(FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, EDMONDS, PAGONE, WIGNEY JJ, 13 
JUNE 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of Perram J in The Hunger Project Australia v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2013] FCA 693. The Hunger Project Australia (HPA) is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee which is 
part of a global network of entities that operate under the name ‘The Hunger Project’. The principal objective 
of The Hunger Project is the relief of global hunger. The activities of HPA are mainly directed at raising funds 
which are then disseminated to Hunger Project members in the developing world. It is those entities that 
directly perform charitable acts to relieve hunger rather than HPA itself. 
The question raised by this appeal was whether HPA was a ‘public benevolent institution’ within the meaning 
of section 57A(1) of the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) (FBTA Act). The Commissioner of 
Taxation (the Commissioner) contended that an entity that merely engaged in fundraising activities and did 
not materially perform charitable works directly for the benefit of the public was not a public benevolent 
institution. At first instance the primary judge rejected the Commissioner’s contention and found that HPA was 
a public benevolent institution even though it was predominately engaged in fundraising. This finding was 
upheld on appeal. 
The decision at first instance  
At first instance there were two principal issues: 
(i) to what extent did HPA perform charitable activities directly; and 
(ii) could an organisation which carries out charitable activities indirectly as a fund-raiser qualify as a 
‘public benevolent institution’ within the meaning of section 57A(1) of the Fringe Benefits Tax 
Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) (the FBTA Act). 
The characterisation as a ‘public benevolent institution’ was crucial because if HPA was a ‘public benevolent 
institution’ within the meaning of section 57A(1) of the FBTA Act, then the provision of a benefit to one of its 
employees would be an exempt benefit for the purposes of the legislation and not taxable.  
The factual background  
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HPA is a company limited by guarantee originally incorporated as such under the former Companies (New 
South Wales) Code 1981 (NSW). Clause 2(a) of its Memorandum of Association (the Memorandum) evidences 
that it is a nonprofit company whose exclusive object is: 
The relief of poverty, sickness, suffering, distress, destitution and helplessness with a particular 
emphasis on directly aiding and developing those suffering from chronic and persistent hunger in 
certified developing countries as approved by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs from time to 
time. 
Subordinate objects include the soliciting of donations (clause 2(p)), the raising of funds (clause 2(d)) for the 
purpose of making donations for charitable purposes (clause 2(b)), and co-operating with other entities having 
similar objects (clause 2(c)). Clause 3 of the Memorandum prohibits the distribution of money to members or 
directors, a necessary object for a nonprofit company. 
HPA has a board of directors, a chief executive officer, and three or four employees. These employees work on 
three broad activities: raising funds in Australia; co-operating with other partner countries to support 
programs in developing countries; and involvement in the implementation of these programs through co-
operation with other Hunger Project entities in program countries. The main activity of HPA is fundraising, 
through which it generates $1.6–2.5 million per year. There were two kinds of fundraising conducted in the 
relevant tax period. The first kind of funds raised was called ‘unrestricted funds’ because the money donated 
could be used for any purpose within The Hunger Project. The second, which was called ‘restricted,’ was 
designated by an individual donor either for expenditure in a particular program country or, more 
proscriptively, on particular activities in a specified program country. 
In addition to fundraising activities, there was also evidence of HPA’s ad hoc involvement in various programs 
run by The Hunger Project in project countries, including Bangladesh, Uganda, and Malawi. Some of the 
employees travelled to these program countries, but His Honour found that this did not involve direct 
charitable work, except for a seed program in Malawi (at [35]). The CEO and one of the employees were also 
members of the Global Coordinating Committee of the Hunger Project. However, again His Honour did not see 
this involvement as direct charitable work (at [38]). In addition, the CEO travelled several times per year with 
existing or potential donors as part of her duties in encouraging new or continuing donations. His Honour held 
that, however much ‘utility’ these trips might have, they did not involve direct charitable work (at [41]).  
Having found only one instance of direct charitable work on the evidence, His Honour concluded (at [44] of the 
first instance decision): 
I do not find, therefore, that the applicant is substantially engaged in the direct provision of charitable 
works. The correct characterisation of its activities is that it is predominantly engaged in fund raising 
and to a lesser extent in providing strategic guidance. Its direct charitable activities are negligible 
when viewed in the overall scheme of its operations. 
Without direct provision of assistance was HPA a public benevolent institution? 
The term public benevolent institution is not defined in the FBTA Act. However, section 57A(1) of the FBTA Act 
provides: 
(1) Where the employer of an employee is a public benevolent institution endorsed under 
subsection 123C(1) or (5), a benefit provided in respect of the employment of the employee is an 
exempt benefit. 
His Honour reviewed the authorities on the meaning of public benevolent institution but held that he was not 
bound by any that existed (at [90]). However, he was persuaded by HPA’s argument that its situation was 
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analogous to that of the charity in Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments [2008] HCA 55 (Word 
Investments). Word Investments was founded by persons closely associated with a charitable organisation 
which conducted missionary and bible translation activities overseas. There was no dispute that those 
activities were charitable. Word Investments accepted deposits from the public paying little or no interest 
upon them and used those inexpensive funds to earn profits which were then given to the charitable 
organisation. The Commissioner’s contention was that whilst it was an object of Word Investments to proclaim 
the Christian religion it did not, in fact, do so. All it did was to ‘raise money from commercial activities and 
hand it over to other bodies so that they could proclaim the Christian religion’ (at [36] of Word Investments). 
The High Court did not accept that this prevented Word Investments from being classified as a charitable 
institution. Insofar as the law of charities was concerned, it found nothing which would prevent such a 
fundraising entity from being characterised as being for charitable purposes. More importantly for HPA’s 
position, the High Court had observed that a consequence of the Commissioner’s argument was that if a 
charitable institution had arranged its affairs in such a way that it had two divisions, one engaged in charitable 
activities and the other in fundraising, then the organisation would be exempt, but if it were to be split into 
two organisations then the fundraising entity would lose its exempt status (at [37] of Word Investments). 
In this case at first instance, His Honour said that (at [119], [122]): 
I do not find compelling, therefore, any of the reasons put forward by the Commissioner for why the 
suggested limitation to direct activities should be discerned in the expression public benevolent 
institution. On the other hand there is at least one good reason not to do so and that is the High 
Court’s decision in Word Investments. That case was concerned with ‘charitable institutions’ rather 
than public benevolent institutions...[but] [t]he applicant submits that this powerfully supports its 
position for precisely the same argument can be made not only in the case of public benevolent 
institutions in general but in the case of the applicant in particular. 
The Commissioner submitted that Word Investments provided no guidance in this case. It was concerned with 
the law of charities rather than with tax law. The use of the expression ‘public benevolent institution’ in earlier 
relevant tax law was an effort to move away from the technical complexities of the concept of charitable 
purposes in laws relating to tax. Further, the statutory history of the two concepts was quite different, making 
any analogy between them difficult. In this last respect, the Commissioner argued strongly that there was a 
legislative history that prevented HPA from being regarded as a public benevolent institution owing to its not 
providing direct charitable relief. There were two reasons advanced by the Commissioner: 
1. Previous legislation and case law supported the notion that directness of assistance was a necessary 
characteristic of a public benevolent institution; and 
2. The explanatory memorandum to the FBTA Act referred to a public benevolent institution as one 
which was involved in dispensing direct aid to those in need. 
His Honour did not agree with these contentions, but rather agreed with HPA’s overall argument on this point 
(at [124]–[126]): 
I do not accept that either of these matters provides a good reason to distinguish Word Investments 
from the present situation. It is true that it was concerned with charitable institutions rather than 
with public benevolent institutions but the High Court’s reasoning...did not turn on any of those 
technical matters. It was instead simply the observation that it was difficult to discern the redeeming 
features of an approach which focussed entirely on the form an organisation took rather than its 
substance. If the law is affronted by the proposition that a charitable institution might lose its exempt 
status for its fund raising activities if they be devolved into a separate entity (and Word Investments 
holds that it is) I cannot see why it would be any less affronted if a public benevolent institution lost 
exempt status for its fund raising activities by doing the same thing. There is no relevant difference. 
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Nor does the difference in statutory history provide any reason to depart from that conclusion. If it 
were correct to say that the history and text of the...[previous legislation]...showed that the concept 
of a public benevolent institution included a requirement of direct provision I might be disposed to 
see some force in the Commissioner’s contention...Whilst I accept that the statutory histories are 
different, without more, I do not discern any reason not to conclude that the reasoning in Word 
Investments is equally applicable to public benevolent institutions. For those reasons, I do not accept 
that it is a requirement that a public benevolent institution engage directly in the activities making up 
the object of its benevolence. 
Therefore, HPA was held to be a public benevolent institution even if it did not engage in the direct alleviation 
of hunger, but only in fundraising for others to undertake that purpose.   
The appeal decision 
On appeal, the Commissioner advanced four arguments for his contention that HPA was not a public 
benevolent institution: 
1. The ordinary meaning of the composite expression ‘public benevolent institution’ is an institution that 
gives or provides relief directly to those in need; 
2. Contextual considerations support a construction of the expression which requires the direct 
provision of relief; 
3. A number of case authorities support this contention in relation to the requirement of the direct 
provision of aid; and, most importantly, 
4. The primary judge erred in relying on Word Investments in rejecting the Commissioner’s construction 
and upholding HPA’s case. The Commissioner maintained the position that Word Investments is 
distinguishable because it concerns a different statutory expression in different legislation. The 
Commissioner pointed in particular to the fact that the expression ‘charitable institution’ has a 
technical legal meaning which is not directed or controlled by the scope or purpose of the statute in 
which it is contained. However, the expression ‘public benevolent institution’ has no technical legal 
meaning and must be given its ordinary meaning.  
The ordinary meaning issue 
Case law from past years supports the notion that in ordinary English usage a public benevolent institution 
means an institution organised for the relief of poverty, sickness, destitution or helplessness: see Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 45 CLR 224 at 232 per Starke J (Perpetual).  
Moreover, this relief is to be given freely: per Evatt J at 235 of Perpetual. The Commissioner relied on the word 
‘given’ to indicate the aid must be direct. However the Federal Court of Appeal was not persuaded by this 
reliance on Perpetual (at [37]–[39]): 
There is a further difficulty with the Commissioner’s reliance on what was said in the various 
judgments in Perpetual. Even if there could be divined from the various judgments a single expression 
of the common understanding of public benevolent institution, the Commissioner’s approach 
suggests that the common understanding in 1931, when Perpetual was decided, must forever fix the 
common understanding or meaning of the expression. We doubt that is the correct approach. Whilst 
past judicial statements concerning the ordinary meaning of a word or expression can often assist in 
divining the meaning of the word or expression, the common understanding of the meaning of an 
expression may change over time depending on the particular expression in question. When the 
question is whether a particular institution is a public benevolent institution, the answer depends on 
the common or ordinary understanding of the expression at the relevant time. The question is not to 
be approached as a legal question to be dealt with by the mechanical application of past authority, 
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irrespective of the present current understanding of the expression in the currently spoken English 
language....  
There is much to be said for the proposition that the common understanding or usage of the 
expression in question here has expanded or changed since Perpetual was decided.... 
It is unlikely that global aid networks comprising separate fundraising entities such as the Hunger 
Project were prevalent when Perpetual was decided. Even if it was the case that the common 
understanding of a public benevolent institution in 1931 involved the institution directly dispensing 
relief, we can see no reason why that common understanding may not have changed over time to 
encompass organisations that may be structured in ways that separate fund raising entities from 
entities that dispense relief or aid using those funds.  
The statutory context issue 
The appeal court described the Commissioner’s contentions in this regard as ‘at best unpersuasive and at 
worst misconceived’ (at [40]). The point being made by the Commissioner here was related to the one above 
on ordinary meaning, and relied on words used in the Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914-1928 (Cth) (the EDA 
Act). The appeal court was underwhelmed (at [41]): 
As for the reliance on s 8(5) of the EDA Act, it is difficult to see how the terms of a different Act 
dealing with a different taxation regime can assist in divining the common or ordinary meaning of the 
expression public benevolent institution in the FBTA Act. The fact that in 1928 the legislature chose to 
separately exempt from estate duty, inter alia, a ‘public benevolent institution’ and a ‘fund 
established and maintained for providing money for the use of such institutions’ does not mean that 
the common understanding of a public benevolent institution over eighty years later cannot include 
an institution that is primarily involved in fund raising. In our opinion the terms of s 8(5) of the EDA 
Act do not provide a relevant contextual consideration in working out the contemporary 
understanding of the meaning of a public benevolent institution as that expression is used in the FBTA 
Act. 
The wording and surrounding circumstances of the FBTA Act also did not offer any assistance to the 
Commissioner (at [43], [45]): 
The terms of s 57A(3)(b) of the FBTA Act also provide no assistance in determining whether an 
institution which primarily raises funds for benevolent purposes can be a public benevolent 
institution.... 
We should add that we do not consider that it is correct to approach the issue of the ordinary 
meaning or common understanding of an expression used in a statute as if the answer can necessarily 
be gleaned from the apparent intention of Parliament in the statute, or other statutes that may use 
the expression. 
The prior authority issue 
The Commissioner relied primarily on the decisions of Rath J at first instance and Street CJ on appeal in 
Australian Council of Social Service Inc v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1985) 1 NSWLR 567 (ACOSS). The 
Federal Court of Appeal was not persuaded that this decision, or any other that the Commissioner relied on, 
was of any assistance to the Commissioner’s case. 
In ACOSS, the relevant institution, the Australian Council of Social Service, was an umbrella organisation the 
primary objective of which was to promote the social welfare of all Australians, with particular reference to 
poor and disadvantaged persons. It did so by providing services to its member organisations, conducting 
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research into areas of concern and publishing materials on topics related to social welfare. Rath J held that 
ACOSS was not a public benevolent institution for the main reason that it was a body which was merely 
organised to promote, as opposed to administer, aid and comfort, and so could not fall within the ordinary 
English meaning of the expression public benevolent institution. This reasoning was based on that in 
Perpetual. Since the Federal Court of Appeal had already rejected the basis of Perpetual, this had no 
persuasive effect on the Court’s decision. The part of the appeal decision of Street CJ in ACOSS relied on by the 
Commissioner was obiter (not part of the decision itself, but observations aside from it). Again this was not 
persuasive (at [59]–[60]): 
We do not consider that the judgment of Rath J at first instance and Street CJ on appeal provide a 
persuasive basis for upholding the Commissioner’s contention that an institution cannot be a public 
benevolent institution if it does not dispense aid directly. Nor are we persuaded that the other 
authorities relied on by the Commissioner support his contention. 
The effect of the Word Investments case 
His Honour at first instance said that an approach to determining whether a particular institution is a public 
benevolent institution which focused on the form or structure of the organisation, as opposed to the 
substance of its objectives and activities, would be erroneous. The Federal Court of Appeal said that there was 
no error involved in that reasoning (at [63]–[65]): 
We do not consider that the primary judge erred in any way in relying on aspects of the reasoning of 
the High Court in Word Investments. There is no doubt that his Honour was conscious that Word 
Investments was concerned with the technical concept of charitable purposes or a charitable 
institution. His Honour accepted (at [123]) that the expression ‘public benevolent institution’ was 
introduced in s 8(5) of the EDA Act to ‘move away from the technical complexities of the concept of 
charitable purposes’. His Honour found, however, that the High Court’s reasoning concerning the 
unredeeming nature of an approach which focused on the structure of an organisation rather than its 
substance ‘did not turn on any of these technical matters’. We agree. The point his Honour was 
making was that, by parity of reasoning, an approach to determining whether a particular institution 
is a public benevolent institution which focused on the structure of the organisation, as opposed to 
the substance of its objectives and activities, would be erroneous. His Honour’s reasoning was 
directed to determining the ordinary meaning of the relevant expression and whether HPA fell within 
that ordinary meaning. We see no error involved in that reasoning. Contrary to the Commissioner’s 
submissions, the primary judge was not in any respects equating the different meanings or concepts 
of a charitable institution and a public benevolent institution. Nor was he doing anything other than 
construing the expression public benevolent institution as used in the FBTA Act in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning. The Commissioner’s submission that in adopting this reasoning his Honour 
somehow exceeded the Court’s proper judicial function has no merit and is rejected.  
What is a ‘public benevolent institution’ in 2014? 
Has the ordinary meaning of a public benevolent institution changed over time? The court said that it had (at 
[66]–[67]): 
In our opinion, whilst there is no single or irrefutable test or definition, the ordinary meaning or 
common understanding of a public benevolent institution includes...an institution which is organised, 
or conducted for, or promotes the relief of poverty or distress. To adapt the words of Priestley JA in 
ACOSS, such an institution conducts itself in a public way towards those in need of benevolence, 
however that exercise of benevolence may be manifested. The ordinary contemporary meaning or 
understanding of a public benevolent institution is broad enough to encompass an institution, like 
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HPA, which raises funds for provision to associated entities for use in programs for the relief of 
hunger in the developing world. The fact that such an institution does not itself directly give or 
provide that relief, but does so via related or associated entities, is no bar to it being a public 
benevolent institution. Such an institution is capable of being considered to be an institution 
organised or conducted for the relief of poverty, sickness, destitution and helplessness.  
Therefore, The Hunger Project Inc was a public benevolent institution for taxation purposes and the 
Commissioner’s appeal was dismissed. 
The case at first instance may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2013/693.html 
This appeal decision may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2014/69.html 
Implications of this case 
This case has important implications for the meaning of ‘public benevolent institution’ in taxation law. The 
contemporary ordinary meaning of a public benevolent institution is not a narrow one, and is not constrained 
by previous case law on the matter. There is ‘no single or irrefutable test or definition’ that fits all situations, 
but certainly there is no requirement of direct aid or assistance being given, as was previously the case. 
 
O COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED V CLARENCE VALLEY COUNCIL [2014] NSWLEC 193 
(NEW SOUTH WALES LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT, HARRISON J, 23 DECEMBER 
2014) 
See Charities and Charitable Status, case note 2.1.2, above 
 
2.8.3 DAVID V THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 117 (CANLII) (TAX COURT OF CANADA, WOODS J, 15 
APRIL 2014) 
This case dealt with six appeals relating to the disallowance of a tax credit for a purported charitable gift to 
CanAfrica International Foundation (CanAfrica). The appellants had purportedly donated between $2500 and 
$20,000 to CanAfrica and been issued with receipts by the then registered charity. However, for the relevant 
tax year (2006), the amounts were disallowed for tax credit purposes in their entirety. 
In 2007 CanAfrica was deregistered as a charity in Canada, and subsequently its director pleaded guilty to 
selling false donation receipts for the 2005 and prior tax years. Although the appellants now accepted that the 
donation receipts were false, their case was that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) bore some responsibility 
in the matter because it had listed CanAfrica as a registered charity on its website in 2006 without any warning 
of the concerns that CRA had in relation to the charity. If the CRA had issued a warning, the appellants 
suggested, they would not have entered into these transactions. The appellants sought to have at least a 
portion of their tax credit allowed, as well as a waiver of interest and penalties. 
Her Honour first considered what actual amounts were donated. It was evident that the donation receipts had 
been inflated, because the scheme engaged in by the appellants (via their tax preparer) was that they would 
pay 10% of the face value of the receipt, plus a commission to their tax preparer. The appellants had no 
documentary evidence of even a 10% donation. As Her Honour pointed out, all their evidence was ‘self-
interested’ (at [14]–[16]). They claimed that they had given 10% to 16% of the face value of the receipts plus 
household goods as donations. Her Honour ultimately found that each had given only 10% of the face value of 
the donation receipt. 
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Pursuant to subsection 118.1(3) of the (federal) Income Tax Act, a Canadian individual may claim a tax credit 
with respect to a gift made to a registered charity. The amount of the tax credit is determined by the amount 
of the gift. Some of the appellants contended that they should be allowed the face value of the receipts 
because of the lack of warning about CanAfrica by CRA, but Her Honour said that this was clearly ruled out by 
the legislation. The central question to be determined was whether an expectation of an inflated tax credit 
based on an inflated donation receipt was a benefit that negated any charitable gift. It was Canadian law that 
the receipt of a benefit negated a gift to charity: see Canada v Berg, 2014 FCA 25. However, that decision did 
not deal with the question of whether an inflated tax receipt was such a benefit. Her Honour turned to The 
Queen v Doubinin, 2005 FCA 298 for guidance. Although the facts of that case were very different, the issue of 
an inflated tax receipt was specifically dealt with by the court, which concluded that the issuance of an inflated 
tax receipt would not normally be described as a benefit. 
Her Honour took this as her starting point, and then looked for any particular circumstances which would 
negate this conclusion (at [63]–[65]): 
Are there particular circumstances in these appeals that would justify a conclusion that the inflated 
tax receipts are a benefit that negates the gifts? In my view there are no such circumstances. Unlike 
many of the cases dealing with so-called leveraged charitable donations, the transactions in these 
appeals are not complex and do not involve a series of inter-related transactions to which the cash is 
connected. The appellants simply paid cash, and perhaps household goods, as a donation to CanAfrica 
and received greatly inflated tax receipts. The appellants likely knew that they were claiming inflated 
tax credits, but this is not a sufficient reason to deny the tax credits altogether. In my view, on the 
facts of these appeals the appellants did not receive a benefit that negates the gifts. 
Therefore, the result in all the appeals was that the appellants were allowed a charitable tax credit with 
respect to 10 percent of the face value of the tax receipts, and any penalties imposed were deleted. The court 
did not deal with the issue of waiver of interest, since it did not have jurisdiction to do so. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc117/2014tcc117.html 
Implications of this case 
This case dealt with ‘low-level’ charitable tax fraud. The appellants had ‘likely known’ they were engaging in an 
‘inflated receipt’ scheme at the suggestion of their tax preparer. However, Her Honour distinguished this type 
of situation from that of the very complex fraudulent leveraged donation schemes which had operated in 
Canada for some years. Since the appellants had not received a ‘benefit’ from their participation in the 
donation scheme, they were permitted a tax credit for the actual amount they had donated to an organisation 
which was a registered charity at the time of the donations. 
 
2.8.4  GREEN V THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS 
[2014] UKFTT 396 (TC) (FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL, TAX CHAMBER, GAMMIE J AND R. 
THOMAS, 28 APRIL 2014) 
This was an appeal concerning a claim for tax relief for charitable donations of shares. Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) disallowed the appellant’s claim in part, for relief in respect of two gifts of 118,750 
shares of 0.1p each (the gifted shares) in Chartersea Limited (Chartersea) to each of the National Eczema 
Society and the Alzheimer’s Society, on 4 April 2008. The appellant had claimed relief under section 431 of the 
Income Tax Act 2007 (ITA) of £237,500 based on a market value of £1.00 per gifted share. HMRC did not 
accept this market value, considering their market value was only 30p per gifted share. The appellant’s claim 
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for relief was reduced to £71,250 (a disallowance of £166,250). The question for determination in the appeal 
was what was the market value of the gifted shares on 4 April 2008. 
Chartersea was incorporated on 6 November 2007 with an authorised share capital of £1000 divided into 1000 
shares of £1 each. Chartersea was a corporate vehicle for the acquisition of another business, Warwick 
Development (Northwest) Limited (WDL), which manufactured uPVC windows, doors and conservatories. On 1 
February 2008 the authorised capital of Chartersea was increased to £25,000 with the creation of 24,000,000 
shares of 0.1p each. Various share offerings were made, with the appellant subscribing for 279,412 ordinary 
shares of 0.1p each for a total consideration of £2,794 (i.e. he paid 1p each). On 28 March 2008 a rights issue 
was made at £1 per share, with the appellant receiving a further 92,206 shares for a consideration of £92,206 
(i.e. he paid £1 each). The appellant therefore held 371,618 shares (3.85% of the total share capital) for which 
he had paid a total of £95,000. The average price of a Chartersea share paid by shareholders throughout the 
issuing and rights process was 25.6p per share. Chartersea’s shares were subsequently listed on the Channel 
Islands Stock Exchange (CISX) on 4 April 2008 at a bid price 95p per share and an ask price of £1.05 per share. 
There were two trades on that day at around £1, which might or might not have been ‘window-dressing’. On 
the same date the appellant made his gifts of shares to the two charities. 
HMRC’s objection to the claimed tax relief was that the appellant claimed tax relief on the basis that shares in 
Chartersea for which he paid £60,714 (£95,000 x 237,500 (number of shares gifted) / 371,618 (number of 
shares subscribed)) in March 2008 were worth £237,500 in April 2008 following listing on the CISX. HMRC 
accepted that the appellant’s shares were a ‘qualifying investment’ for the purposes of section 432(1)(a) of the 
ITA. He had disposed of his beneficial interest in the shares by way of a gift to two recognised charities as 
required by section 431 of the ITA. The only issue therefore was the correct market value to be determined 
under section 272 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (TCGA). Section 272 defines market value as 
being that which can reasonably be expected to be obtained on the open market: section 272(1). 
What was this price? The Tribunal said that the question was easy to ask, but not to answer (at [116]). The 
Tribunal reframed the question as: ‘how much would a prudent purchaser have paid for the gifted shares on 4 
April 2008 if the appellant had offered 237,000 Chartersea shares for sale on the CISX on that day rather than 
donating that number of shares to charity (or, alternatively, if the two charities had immediately sought to sell 
the gifted shares)?’ (at [139]). 
There were two expert reports on valuation presented in evidence. The Tribunal, whilst pointing to flaws in 
both the reports, nevertheless ultimately accepted the valuation methodology presented by the appellant’s 
expert, and the valuation figures presented by HMRC’s expert. The valuation decided was 35p per share (at 
[162]): 
We accordingly determine the market value of the Gifted Shares on 4 April 2008 as 35p per share. The 
‘relievable amount’ allowable under section 434 ITA is £83,125 (and not £71,250 as stated in the 
Closure Notice) and in accordance with section 50(7A) TMA we allow Mr Green’s appeal to the extent 
that we amend the  amount of disallowance of relief from £166,250 to £154,375. 
Therefore, HMRC was successful in disallowing the appellant’s claim for relief, but the appellant was partially 
successful in having the amount of the disallowance reduced to £154,375, i.e. he had to pay this amount in tax. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j7731/TC03525.pdf 
Implications of this case 
There was no suggestion in this case that the two charities were involved in any taxation avoidance scheme.  
Indeed, as the Tribunal pointed out at [118] the issue of tax avoidance was ‘irrelevant’ to the case. If the 
market value of the shares had been £237,000 as claimed by the appellant, the Tribunal said that: 
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...it is of no consequence whether or not the arrangement was devised and Mr Green entered into it 
with the tax advantage exclusively or mainly in mind. It is difficult to understand what relevance (even 
as general background) an avoidance motive has to the question that we must answer.  
The question to be answered was solely concerned with the correct valuation of the shares. Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the case will allow HMRC to stop avoidance of taxation through the use of ‘tax relief schemes’ 
similar to the one in this case, which, though not directly involving charities, could damage their reputations by 
implication. 
 
2.8.5 HASSAN V R, 2014 TCC 144 (TAX COURT OF CANADA, BOYLE J, 9 APRIL 2014) 
This Canadian case involved an appeal by a taxpayer (Hassan) who claimed a $25,000 donation to a charity 
called Operation Save Canada’s Teenagers. In fact, he’d only donated $300. That amount was paid in 2009 and 
the remainder was said by the appellant to be pledged for payment in 2010, although claimed for tax relief in 
2009. The appellant said he then paid the remainder of his pledged $25,000 in cash during 2010, taking the 
amounts to the charity in person. 
There was no supporting proof of these payments, and indeed, the appellant had little or no knowledge of the 
alleged charity’s activities, or even the location of its head office, although he said that he drove there twenty 
times during 2010 to deliver his cash donations. Nevertheless, he obtained a donation receipt for $25,000 for 
tax purposes in 2009. The receipt did not meet the requirements of Canadian tax law as to the information it 
contained. As His Honour said, in an ex tempore judgement (at [9]): 
Among other things, the wrong name appears; there is no identification of the location of where the 
gift was made, at least not one that is clear; it is in the wrong amount; and may also have at least one 
wrong date or missing date. In fact, one of the typos on the form is in the charity's name. 
His Honour said that this was clearly a fraud in the Canadian tax system, and indeed, on the Canadian public (at 
[12]): 
A [Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)] charity auditor testified. The charity's registration was since 
revoked, mainly for filing falsified documents on both donations received and charitable and other 
expenditures made. No records turned up to support any donations were given to CRA, or located by 
CRA on further investigation. Criminal charges were laid against the principal, who has since fled 
Canada.  The alleged fraud involved over $6 million in donations...All donors have been reassessed by 
CRA. 
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at:  
http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/71778/index.do 
Implications of this decision 
Under Canadian tax law, a pledge or promise to make a gift to a charity is not in itself a gift for which an official 
donation receipt can be issued. However, if the pledge or promise is later honoured, a receipt can be issued at 
the time the donation is actually made. The taxpayer in this case could provide no evidence that he had 
honoured the pledge, despite having already claimed a tax deduction. 
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2.8.6 HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS V LONGRIDGE ON THE THAMES [2014] UKUT 504 (TCC) 
(UPPER TRIBUNAL, TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER, ROSE J, 13 NOVEMBER 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the First Tier Tribunal made on 23 February 2013. The case concerned 
the value added tax (VAT), a consumption tax levied in the UK. At first instance, Longridge on the Thames 
(Longridge), a charity, appealed a decision of The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) that the supplies made to it in relation to the construction of a building on its premises were not zero-
rated supplies.  
Longridge is a company limited by guarantee and a registered charity. Its objects are: 
(1) To safeguard and promote Longridge as a centre of excellence for the advancement of education 
in water, outdoor and indoor activities for young people generally, and for purposes related thereto 
such as coaching, leadership and training in water and other activities; and 
(2) To promote the development of young people in achieving their full physical, intellectual, social 
and spiritual potential as individuals, as responsible citizens and as members of their local, national 
and international communities. 
Longridge carries out its charitable purposes by the provision of boating and other water-based courses, 
activities and facilities for young people at its premises on the banks of the River Thames. Certain of those 
courses, activities and facilities are also provided to adults. During 2010, in order to improve its facilities, 
Longridge engaged a contractor to build on its site a building (the Training Centre) comprising, on the ground 
floor, toilet, changing and shower facilities, and on the upper floor, an area to be used primarily for training 
courses and meetings.  
Longridge’s contention was that the supplies made by the contractor in constructing the Training Centre 
should be zero-rated (in terms of VAT) under Items 2 and 4 of Group 5 of Schedule 8 to the Value Added Tax 
Act 1994 (VATA), on the grounds that the building was intended for use solely for relevant charitable purposes 
within the meaning of Note 6 to Group 5, and asked HMRC for confirmation that such was the case to enable 
Longridge to issue the necessary zero-rating certificate to the contractor. HMRC took the view that Longridge’s 
activities were such as to amount, in whole or in part, to business activities, and that accordingly the Training 
Centre was not intended for use solely for relevant charitable purposes (that is, it was not intended to be used 
otherwise than in the course or furtherance of a business).  
The case at first instance in the First Tier Tribunal 
The grounds of the appeal at first instance were that the Training Centre was used in the fulfilment of the 
charity’s core objects, and that although it charged fees for the courses and other facilities it provided in 
pursuing those objects, such courses and facilities were substantially subsidised by donation income received 
by Longridge, and also by the time and skills provided to Longridge by the large volunteer body which supports 
it. The issue before the Tribunal was whether or not, at the time when the relevant supplies were made in the 
course of the construction of the Training Centre, the building was intended for use solely for a relevant 
charitable purpose, and thus could be zero-rated for VAT purposes. The disputed amount of VAT involved was 
about £135,000. 
The Tribunal reviewed the relevant legislation, which enacted a European Directive (European Community 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC), on the issue. Section 94(1) VATA provides that: ‘In this Act “business” includes 
any trade profession or vocation’. Section 30 provides that certain supplies by a taxable person are to be 
taxable at the zero rate. Schedule 8 specifies such supplies, and Group 5 of Schedule 8, headed ‘Construction 
of Buildings, etc’, was relevant for this appeal. Items 2 and 4 of that part of Schedule 8 include as zero-rated: 
2 The supply in the course of the construction of— 
 99 
 
(a) a building ... intended for use solely for ... a relevant charitable purpose; or 
(b) ... , 
of any services related to the construction other than the services of an architect, surveyor or any 
person acting as a consultant or in a supervisory capacity. 
……… 
4 The supply of building materials to a person to whom the supplier is supplying services within item 2 
... of this Group which include the incorporation of the materials into the building (or its site) in 
question. 
The Notes to Group 5 of Schedule 8 include Note 6: 
(6) Use for a relevant charitable purpose means use by a charity in either or both the following ways, 
namely— 
(a) otherwise than in the course or furtherance of a business; 
(b) as a village hall or similarly in providing social or recreational facilities for a local community. 
The evidence showed that the trustees’ intention in relation to the upper floor of the new building was to 
provide a training space for the young people who took part in its boating activities. However, the space had 
also been advertised on Longridge’s website as a space for corporate events following a single booking for 
such an event in 2011. Few other bookings had been received, and the space was almost fully utilised for 
Longridge’s charitable activities. Some adults, however, undertook activities there as ‘corporate teams’. 
The cost of the new building (£760,000) was entirely met by donations and grants, since the trustees were 
clear that they did not want to increase any fees for the activities provided by the charity. Among a great many 
activities, Longridge offered fee-paying courses, packages of courses, and training for adults as coaches. The 
fees charged were similar to, or slightly lower than, those charged by local authorities and commercial 
organisations. A substantial number of volunteers contributed their time and skills to Longridge for the 
purposes of the courses and activities it provided. The volunteers mainly acted as instructors (Longridge also 
engaged paid full-time instructors), but some volunteers assisted with maintenance of premises and 
equipment, and administration and financial accounting. 
Longridge’s financial statements showed that for each year from and including 2006–07, it had shown a deficit 
on its operating activities, ranging from £95,400 in 2007–08 to £16,630 in 2010–11 (in some years depreciation 
of capital assets and the costs of redundancies had increased the deficit on all activities further). In each year, 
donated income for ongoing activities (that is, disregarding donations for capital projects) had at least equalled 
the deficit accruing on activities. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s financial statements for 2010–11 as 
an example. They showed that total income from all its subsidised activities (that is, all young people’s 
activities, family activities, and those adults for whom a discount on the published price was given) was 
£580,883, and that the cost of providing those activities (disregarding the value of volunteer time, which was 
not accounted for) was £655,498. The analysis also showed that the total income from activities provided to all 
other adults (including those participating in ‘corporate teams’) was £61,998 and that the cost of providing 
those activities was £53,476. This figure also disregarded the value of volunteer time – the evidence showed 
that activities provided for adults utilised a higher proportion of paid instructor/training input, and where 
volunteers were used, they would be the more experienced volunteers. 
In looking at the range of activities and courses provided by Longridge during the period from 1 January 2012 
to 25 November 2012, the Tribunal found that 27,119 individuals took part, of whom 17,895 were young 
people who paid no charge or a charge discounted by 20% or more; 7,786 were young people who paid a 
charge discounted by up to 20%; 1,111 were adults who paid a discounted charge, and 327 (1.21%) were 
adults who paid a charge without any discount. As to the specific use of the Training Centre, a schedule of 
users of the upper floor for the period from 16 October 2010 to 26 June 2012 showed that during that period 
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5,806 persons used the upper floor, of whom 240 were persons comprising ‘corporate teams’ (4.13% of total 
users). All other users were individuals or groups whose activities were subsidised by Longridge, being youth 
groups, school groups, volunteers supporting Longridge, and, on five occasions, family groups. The use by 
volunteers ranged from use for training purposes to use for social activities. There were only three occasions 
when the upper floor space was used for corporate events, for which the total charges were £380. Total 
charges for the upper floor during the period examined were £2,455, most at the nominal charge of £50. 
Was the appellant carrying on a business? The Tribunal held that the appellant was engaged in economic 
activity (at [96]). It ran its affairs in a professional and ‘business-like’ manner. However, almost all its activities 
were carried out in pursuit of it charitable objects. The fees charged were deemed (at [99]–[100]) appropriate 
to a charity of its size. The Tribunal went on to say that the ‘most significant’ aspect of the appellant’s activities 
was the use of volunteers (at [101]). Taking all the factors into account, it was clear that the appellant was not 
carrying on a business (at [102]). Its ‘intrinsic nature’ was the furtherance of its charitable objects, 
notwithstanding that it provided some courses and activities for adults (at [104]).  
As to the use of the Training Centre, its lower floor was held to be used solely for Longridge’s charitable 
purposes. The position in relation to the upper floor was ‘more complex’ (at [117]), but the evidence showed 
(see above) that on an actual use basis, and having regard to the de minimis rule (minimal use for other 
purposes), the upper floor had been used solely for a charitable purpose within the relevant VAT provisions (at 
[119]). 
Therefore, Longridge was successful at first instance. However, HMRC had recently brought several cases 
against charities in pursuit of VAT on construction. All were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, HMRC took the view 
that not being liable for VAT on construction was not useful for charities because then they were unable to 
recover VAT on their inputs, making their construction costs higher overall. Therefore, HMRC appealed to the 
Upper Tribunal in this case. 
The decision on appeal to the Upper Tribunal 
On appeal to the Upper Tribunal, HMRC was again unsuccessful. HMRC submitted that the First Tier Tribunal 
erred in law by focusing on the prices that Longridge charged and the fact that the prices charged in most 
cases did not cover the costs of providing the service. HMRC submitted that this was an error because it 
amounted to treating the activity as not being an economic activity because it is not profit-making and not 
designed to be profit-making. HMRC criticised the decision of the Tribunal because it referred to the 
‘predominant concern’ of Longridge being to pursue its charitable objectives by carrying on the activities at the 
site. At paragraph 103 of the decision, the Tribunal applied the six indicia from the Lord Fisher case, including 
the fifth criterion, that the activity is predominantly concerned with the making of taxable supplies to 
consumers for a consideration. Instead of considering the predominant concern of the activity, HMRC 
contended that the Tribunal considered the predominant concern of Longridge. This was argued to tip over 
impermissibly into considering the purpose for which the activities were carried on. On this point, the Upper 
Tribunal said (at [43]–[44]): 
The fact that the activities are carried on for the purpose of fulfilling Longridge’s charitable objectives 
is not relevant because Article 9 [of the relevant European Directive] makes clear that the ‘purpose or 
results’ of the activity are to be disregarded. Although some of the wording of the Decision may have 
been imprecise, I do not consider that the Tribunal in fact fell into error here. Looking at the Decision 
as a whole, it is clear that the Tribunal understood that the charitable purpose of Longridge was not 
relevant to its consideration. The test that the Tribunal applied, as set out in paragraph 93 of the 
Decision cited earlier was the correct one…. 
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On articles 132 and 133 of the Principal Directive (enacted into UK legislation) on permissible exemptions to 
VAT, Her Honour held that (at [46]–[47]): 
Article 133 then permits a Member State to make such exemption subject to certain specified 
conditions including a condition that the body must not systematically aim to make a profit or as to 
the level of prices that it must charge, or that the exemption must not distort competition. HMRC 
rel[ies] on the existence of these exemptions as showing that charitable activities which are not 
pursued for profit and which charge lower prices than commercial enterprises are still to be regarded 
as economic activity – otherwise they would not need to be exempted. On this point I agree with the 
conclusion of the Tribunal that the question whether Longridge’s activities are economic activity is 
necessarily anterior to the question whether it can benefit from any exemption implemented in the 
United Kingdom. The existence of the exemption shows that some non-profit supplies of educational 
or sports services to young people are economic activities and may therefore seek to rely on the 
exemption. But it does not mean that every organisation meeting that description is carrying on an 
economic activity. 
Her Honour concluded that the First Tier Tribunal had not erred in any way in its decision (at [48]): 
In my judgment the First-tier Tribunal applied the correct test in evaluating the facts as it found them. 
There are no grounds for disturbing its conclusion that Longridge does not carry on an economic 
activity at the site. 
This decision in the Upper Tribunal may be viewed at: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/TCC/2014/504.html 
The decision in the First Tier Tribunal may be viewed at: 
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j7076/TC02574.pdf 
 
2.8.7 IZKENDAR V THE QUEEN 2014 TCC 344 (TAX COURT OF CANADA, HOGAN J, 18 
NOVEMBER 2014) 
The appellant, Martin Izkendar, appealed a reassessment of his 2007 taxation year by which the Minister of 
National Revenue (the Minister) disallowed his claim for a charitable donation of $7,315 made to the Mehfuz 
Children Welfare Trust (the Mehfuz Trust). It emerged in evidence that the appellant had no connection with 
the Mehfuz Trust. 
The Minister alleged that the appellant purchased a false charitable donation receipt from his accountant, 
Saheem Raza, who, together with his brother, Fareed Raza (the Raza Brothers), offered tax and accounting 
services under the trade names Fareed Raza & Co. Inc. and F & A Accounting Corporation. After an 
investigation by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Raza Brothers were charged with fraud for making 
false statements on income tax returns prepared by them for their clients. It emerged that the Raza Brothers 
had forged donation receipts totalling approximately $12,000,000. It was estimated that this scheme resulted 
in a loss of tax revenue to Canada of approximately $4,700,000. 
The evidence showed that the appellant had an income in the relevant year of only $28,471.50.  His Honour 
did not accept that with that income, it was possible that the donation claimed could have been made since it 
represented 25.7% of his income for the year. The alleged gift was also inconsistent with the appellant’s prior 
donation history. The evidence showed that from 2000 to 2013, other than the alleged donation in dispute in 
this appeal, the appellant had made only one donation (in 2006) of $385. His Honour said that it was 
implausible that the appellant would have given Mr. Raza $7,315 in cash to donate to a charity that he had 
only just learned about for the first time from Mr. Raza. 
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His Honour concluded that (at [22]): 
After considering all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the Appellant knowingly purchased a false 
donation receipt from the Raza Brothers in 2008 for a fraction of the amount shown on the receipt. 
Therefore, the Appellant made a false representation in respect of the donation claim disallowed by 
the Minister for his 2007 taxation year. Consequently, the Minister was justified in reassessing the 
Appellant beyond the normal reassessment period. 
The case may be viewed at: https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc344/2014tcc344.html 
Implications of this case 
This case was one of several all involving the same scheme to defraud the revenue in Canada. For the other 
cases, which are all very similar, and were all decided on 18 November 2014, see:  
 Rasuli v The Queen 2014 TCC 346: 
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc346/2014tcc346.html 
 Vekkal v The Queen 2014 TC 
341https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc341/2014tcc341.html 
 Bani v The Queen 2014 TCC 
340https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc340/2014tcc340.html 
 Abootaleby-Pour v The Queen 2014 TCC 343 
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc343/2014tcc343.html 
 
2.8.8 JOHNSON V THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 84 (CANLII) (TAX COURT OF CANADA, MILLER J, 
18 MARCH 2014) 
This appeal in the Tax Court of Canada related to the 2002 and 2003 taxation years in which the appellant claimed 
non-refundable tax credits for charitable donations he allegedly made to Canadian Foundation for Child 
Development (CFCD) in the amounts of $18,550 and $15,500 respectively. 
The appellant’s evidence was that he donated about $350 to CFCD in cash every two weeks or so. He had no 
records of his own to support this contention, but tendered in evidence two alleged receipts from CFCD for the 
amounts of $18,550 (for 2002) and $15,500 (for 2003). The appellant said that he had previously donated $15,400 
in 2001 and claimed this amount on his 2001 income tax return. In July 2002, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 
requested that he provide proof of his 2001 donation. He sent a charitable donation receipt to the CRA which was 
accepted. No adjustment was made to his return for that year. He believed that his charitable donations for 2002 
and 2003 were also accepted because he was not reassessed for these years until 7 December 2009. It was his 
contention that he was misled by the CRA. 
The appellant claimed at different times that his sister prepared his 2002 return, that he paper-filed at least one of 
them, and that one was prepared by ADD Accounting services (ADD). The CRA records showed that both relevant 
returns were e-filed by ADD. The CRA was already investigating ADD and its connection with the charity CanAfrica, 
which was also being investigated. It emerged that Ambrose Danso-Dapaah was the president of CanAfrica and the 
sole proprietor of ADD. He was also the director of CFCD. In its investigation of Danso-Dapaah, the CRA seized his 
computer hard drives which contained the appellant’s returns for 2002 and 2003 with the amounts of $18,500 and 
$15,000 shown as being donated to CanAfrica. There was also a receipt for an actual charitable donation of $1550. 
Subsequently Danso-Dapaah was charged with one count of fraud over $5,000. He entered a plea of guilty to 
selling false charitable donation receipts. He charged his clients a fee of 10% of the false donation for the charitable 
receipts. The total amount of false donation receipts provided to taxpayers by Danso-Dapaah was $21,400,000, 
which equated to $6,200,000 in false non-refundable tax credits. 
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The issues in this appeal therefore became: 
(1) whether the appellant made a donation to a charity in 2002 and 2003 which would entitle him to 
claim non-refundable tax credits pursuant to section 118.1 of the Income Tax Act (the Act);  
(2) whether the receipts issued by CFCD were in the prescribed form in accordance with subsection 
118.1(2) of the Act and sections 3500 and 3501 of the Income Tax Regulations (the Regulations); and  
(3) whether the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) was entitled to reassess the appellant after 
the normal reassessment period. 
Her Honour held that the appellant did not make any donations at all to CFCD in 2002 or 2003. Rather he 
purchased the charitable donation receipts for 10% of their face value from Danso-Dapaah through ADD. Her 
Honour said that the appellant’s evidence was not credible. He changed his evidence several times as to how 
the returns were filed, how he heard about the alleged charity, how he paid the donations to the charity, and 
even as to the rent he paid (or rather did not pay), to his parents, though the rent was claimed on his tax 
returns. Moreover, his earnings in the relevant years were only $39,336.88 and $32,412.24 respectively. This 
made his claimed donations totally implausible. 
Her Honour also held that the alleged receipts did not conform to the requirements of the relevant section of the 
Act or with the Regulations, and that the Minister was entitled to reassess the appellant after the normal period 
for reassessment had passed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc84/2014tcc84.html 
Implications of this case 
This case is part of series of investigations and convictions arising from charitable donation fraud in Canada. Apart 
from the false claim issue, this case also dealt with the proper form of charitable receipts in Canada. Subsection 
118.1(2) of the Income Tax Act provides that proof of a charitable gift shall be made by filing an official receipt 
which contains prescribed information. Section 3501 of the Income Tax Regulations prescribes detailed 
information that is required. As Her Honour said (at [[27]): 
The requirements in section 3501 are not frivolous but are absolutely necessary for ensuring that a gift 
was actually made. The purpose of the requirements is to prevent abuses of any kind.... 
 
2.8.9 LAPOINTE V HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 356 (TAX COURT OF CANADA, 
FAVREAU J, 5 DECEMBER 2014) 
The was an appeal from a reassessment made by the Canadian Minister of National Revenue under the Income 
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the Act) on 26 November 2012 for the 2011 taxation year. The issue was 
whether the Minister was justified in disallowing an amount of $6,909 claimed by the appellant as a charitable 
donations credit in the calculation of non-refundable tax credits for the 2011 taxation year. 
The appellant claimed the tax credit for charitable donations to Action Canadienne Internationale de 
Bienfaisance (ACIB) for the amount of $6,909, stating that most of this amount had been paid in cash. She was 
unable to prove that the amount had been paid, with the few receipts submitted by her to support amounts 
paid to the ACIB not containing all of the required information.  
ACIB is a charitable organization registered with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). ACIB’s charitable activities 
focus solely on the mission of the École Mixte de la Foi de Montrouis in Haiti, a school for 300 children. The 
appellant and her partner had formed an association with ACIB in 2010. They donated money for school 
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uniforms, supplies, food and books, but were not issued with receipts covering the amount they had spent. 
The receipts that were issued were defective. 
Subsection 118.1(2) of the Act provides that, for an eligible amount of a gift that is not a Crown, cultural or 
ecological gift to be included in total charitable donations, proof is required: 
an eligible amount of a gift shall not be included in the total charitable gifts, total Crown gifts, total 
cultural gifts or total ecological gifts of an individual unless the making of the gift is evidenced by filing 
with the Minister: 
(a) a receipt for the gift that contains prescribed information; 
The information required under subsection 118.1(2) of the Act is set out in sections 3500 and 3501 (see below) 
of the Income Tax Regulations (the Regulations). In this case, the receipts that were issued failed to meet 
those requirements because they did not include, inter alia, that they were an official receipt for income tax 
purposes and did not indicate the registration number assigned to the organization by the Minister. His 
Honour had no doubt that the appellant and her partner were sincere in giving humanitarian aid to ACIB. 
However, that was not enough for tax purposes (at [17]–[19]): 
I have no doubt whatever that the appellant and her spouse visited Haiti from May 25, 2011, to June 
15, 2011, for humanitarian purposes. The airline tickets, receipts for accommodation and 
transportation in Haiti, calling card invoices and photographs taken at the Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
Airport demonstrate this beyond any doubt. The appellant and her spouse appear to be sincere, and I 
have every reason to believe that they actually did incur the expenses claimed for charitable 
purposes. That is not where the problem lies. The problem lies in the fact that the appellant did not 
provide any “official receipt” containing the information required under section 3501 of the 
Regulations. The purpose of the requirements set out in the Regulations is to avoid abuses of any 
kind. They are the minimum requirements for defining the authenticity of a gift that can qualify the 
taxpayer making it for a tax deduction. The Court has no discretion to disregard the requirements of 
the Regulations. 
In this case, as the appellant had not proven that the receipts met the minimal requirements of sections 3500 
and 3501 of the Regulations, she was not entitled to the donation tax credit at issue. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc356/2014tcc356.html 
Implications of this case 
The requirements of proof for receipts for donations under the relevant Income Tax Regulations in Canada are 
quite detailed and explicit. These are contained in Regulation 3501(1): 
3501. (1) Every official receipt issued by a registered organization shall contain a statement that it is 
an official receipt for income tax purposes and shall show clearly in such a manner that it cannot 
readily be altered, 
(a) the name and address in Canada of the organization as recorded with the Minister; 
(b) the registration number assigned by the Minister to the organization; 
(c) the serial number of the receipt; 
(d) the place or locality where the receipt was issued; 
(e) where the gift is a cash gift, the date on which or the year during which the gift was received; 
(e.1) where the gift is of property other than cash: 
(i) the date on which the gift was received, 
(ii) a brief description of the property, and 
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(iii) the name and address of the appraiser of the property if an appraisal is done;  
(f) the date on which the receipt was issued; 
(g) the name and address of the donor including, in the case of an individual, the individual’s first 
name and initial; 
(h) the amount that is 
(i) the amount of a cash gift, or 
(ii) if the gift is of property other than cash, the amount that is the fair market value of the 
property at the time that the gift is made; 
(h.1) a description of the advantage, if any, in respect of the gift and the amount of that advantage; 
(h.2) the eligible amount of the gift; 
(i) the signature, as provided in subsection (2) or (3), of a responsible individual who has been 
authorized by the organization to acknowledge gifts; and 
(j) the name and Internet website of the Canada Revenue Agency. 
 
2.8.10 LINCHPINS OF LIBERTY V UNITED STATES (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WALTON J, 23 OCTOBER 2014) 
This was one of two cases involving the categorisation of organisations as charities by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) of the United States. The plaintiffs were forty-one organisations who had sought tax exempt 
status as charities under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) or 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) between 2009 and 2012. This status had 
been denied by the IRS. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, and breaches of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2012), the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief and 
monetary damages. 
The plaintiff organisations alleged that, beginning in 2010, the IRS had begun asking for additional information 
from organisations seeking charitable status which had ‘conservative sounding names’. The IRS had also issued 
a ‘Be on the Lookout’ (BOLO) list for its employees asking them to notice names of the sort identified. The 
plaintiffs alleged that there was no such instruction involving organisations with ‘progressive or liberal’ 
sounding names. The allegations included that the IRS had delayed applications from identified organisations, 
harassed them for information, and denied them their ability to engage in the work for which they were 
formed. This pattern of behaviour was referred to as the ‘IRS scheme’. After the plaintiffs had commenced this 
action, the IRS announced that the scheme had been suspended on 20 June 2013. 
The claims for monetary relief against individual IRS employees were dismissed for lack of a recognised claim 
under Federal law. The claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were also denied as being no longer relevant 
(at page 12): 
Here, the Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged conduct will recur, 
as the defendants have not only suspended the conduct, but have also taken remedial measures to 
ensure that the conduct is not repeated.... Accordingly, counts four through seven no longer warrant 
the Court’s attention and further use of its resources.... The Court will, therefore, dismiss counts four 
through seven for want of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(2) as to all of the plaintiffs. 
This meant that the claims were moot. 
The plaintiff organisations also claimed monetary relief for the way in which information was obtained from 
them and ‘inspected, handled and disclosed’. Was this in some way unconstitutional? There was no statement 
in the law as to the manner in which the IRS could obtain tax information. The court held that it was not 
unconstitutional and dismissed the claim for want of proper grounds under Federal law. 
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The IRS had ultimately granted tax exempt status to the plaintiff organisations outside the court process. Thus, 
the case was dismissed as being unnecessary to decide further and moot. 
The case may be viewed at: https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0777-96 
Implications of this case 
Although this case was moot because the organisations had obtained the status they wanted outside the court 
process, the implications are that the IRS has few options for determining the nature of possibly dubious 
applicants for charitable tax-exempt status. The determination of such status on the basis of the names of 
organisations was clearly not appropriate, as evidenced by the withdrawal of this option by the IRS itself. 
 
2.8.11 MCCALLA V THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 199 CANLII (TAX COURT OF CANADA, BOCOCK J, 
18 JUNE 2014) 
Mr and Mrs McCalla (the appellants) appealed the disallowance of charitable tax credits for donations to the 
Jesus Healing Centre in 2007 and 2008. The Jesus Healing Centre was a church and, at the time of the 
donations, a registered charity. When the charity was investigated by the Charities Audit group of the Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA), it was found that it was not even certain where the premises of the church were – at 
best they were located in a suburban wholesale commercial mall. 
The evidence of the CRA Charities Audit team indicated that the Jesus Healing Centre had failed to keep any 
meaningful books and records. It had issued $3 million in donation receipts in just over 2 years, but only 
deposited some $18,000 into its bank accounts during the same period. The pastors of the Jesus Healing 
Centre admitted that no sum ever approaching the $3 million was received and that charitable donation 
receipts were fabricated. Although some donations were received, the amounts were a small fraction (less 
than 7%) of the amounts receipted. No donation envelopes, receipt records or other evidence of any 
donations were ever produced or revealed during the CRA Audit. None of the 400 purported donors to the 
Jesus Healing Centre could provide collaborative or supporting proof of their donations. The Jesus Healing 
Centre was subsequently deregistered as a charity in Canada. 
The appellants’ evidence was that their donations were made in cash in the amounts of $8050 for Mrs McCalla 
(over 2007–08), and $2150 for Mr McCalla (in 2007 only). There were receipts given. However, the receipts 
were defective (in terms of section 3501(1) of the Income Tax Regulation) in various ways: 
 each spelled the charity’s name incorrectly: Center as opposed to Centre (its official name 
registered with the Minister) (section 3501(1)(a)); 
 the date of issuance for the receipt was missing (section 3501(1)(f)); 
 the locality or place of issuance for the receipt was missing (section 3501(1)(e)); 
 no middle initial was used, though Mr McCalla testified that he had one (section 3501(1) (g)); and 
 in 2007 only, there was no statement that the receipt was an official receipt for Income Tax Act 
purposes (section 3501(1)). 
The appellants’ case was that the fact that the Jesus Healing Centre was a discredited and deregistered 
organisation run by a dishonest person should not be the responsibility of the appellants who had obtained 
official donation receipts. 
His Honour said that this was not a valid proposition. There were numerous decisions of the Tax Court of 
Canada which had held unequivocally that deficiencies relating to the items detailed above rendered the 
donation receipt invalid for the purposes of subsection 118.1(2) of the Income Tax Act and under the 
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prescribed information required under the Income Tax Regulation (the Regulation), which information must 
appear in the donation receipt (at [14]). Thus, the requirements in the Regulation were mandatory. Since they 
were mandatory requirements which had not been met in this case, the appellants’ case had to be dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc199/2014tcc199.html 
Implications of this case 
This is another of the numerous tax fraud cases involving charities in Canada in recent times. In many of these 
cases, the taxpayers claimed to have paid their donations in cash. This is not illegal: see section 3501(1)(e) of 
the Income Tax Regulation. However, the taxpayer must have some means of identifying an otherwise 
untraceable transaction, such as ATM slips, bank statements, copies of cash cheques, donation logs or 
donation envelopes. None of these could be produced by the appellants in this case (see at [16]), and the 
‘receipts’ were not issued in accordance with the tax regulations. 
 
2.8.12 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED V CHARITIES 
REGISTRATION BOARD [2014] NZHC 3200 (HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, DOBSON 
J, 12 DECEMBER 2014) 
The National Council of Women of New Zealand Incorporated (NCWNZ) is a charitable organisation established 
in New Zealand in 1896.  On 4 June 2009, following the enactment of the Charities Act 2005 (the Charities Act), 
NCWNZ was registered as a charitable entity by the Charities Commission as at 30 June 2008 (the Registration 
Decision). On 22 July 2010, the Charities Commission revoked the registration with effect from 19 August 2010 
(the Deregistration Decision). 
On 10 September 2012, NCWNZ applied to the respondent, the Charities Registration Board (the CRB), the 
successor to the Charities Commission, for reregistration as a charitable entity. The NCWNZ requested that it 
be reregistered as at 19 August 2010, in order to avoid any potential exposure to income tax during the period 
of its deregistration. 
On 15 April 2013, the CRB granted the NCWNZ’s reregistration application, but with effect from 10 September 
2012, not 19 August 2010 (the Reregistration Decision). The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the 
Commissioner) subsequently assessed NCWNZ for income tax for the period that NCWNZ was not registered as 
a charitable entity, namely 19 August 2010 to 10 September 2012 (the Deregistration Period). In this appeal, 
NCWNZ challenged both the Deregistration Period, and the assessment of income tax for that period. 
Prior to the enactment of the Charities Act, the Commissioner granted charitable status for tax purposes. 
There was no other regulation of charitable entities in New Zealand at that time. The Charities Act now 
provides for the regulation of charities generally, including for the registration of societies, institutions and 
trusts as charitable entities. Section 13 of the Charities Act sets out the essential requirements an entity must 
meet to qualify for registration.  
Section CW41 of the Income Tax Act 2007 exempts income derived by a charitable entity from income tax 
provided that entity is a tax charity. A tax charity is a charitable entity registered as such under the Charities 
Act. The NCWNZ was a properly registered tax charity until it was deregistered by the Charities Commission in 
the Deregistration Decision. The reason for deregistration was that the Charities Commission had concluded 
after investigation that a main purpose of NCWNZ was to advocate for changes in law, policy or decisions of 
central government, which was not a charitable purpose. NCWNZ was therefore deregistered on the basis that 
it did not have exclusively charitable purposes as required under NZ law. NCWNZ did not appeal the 
Deregistration Decision. 
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Later, after discussions with the Charities Commission (and its successor the CRB), the NCWNZ was 
reregistered. During the Deregistration Period NCWNZ had become liable for income tax, had filed tax returns, 
and had been assessed for and paid income tax with respect to the 2011 and 2012 tax years. Should the 
reregistration of the NCWNZ have been backdated to 19 August 2010? Section 20(2)(b) of the Charities Act 
was argued by the CRB in its decision of 15 April 2013 (the Reregistration Decision) which stated: 
Pursuant to section 20 of the Act, the Board may direct that an entity be given an effective 
registration date that is before the time at which the entity became registered as a charity. Section 
20(2)(b) clearly states that an effective registration date must not be ‘earlier than the time that the 
chief executive received a properly completed application for registration of the entity as a charitable 
entity’. The Board therefore directs that the effective registration date be the date of the NCWNZ’s 
present application for registration, i.e. 10 September 2012. 
The first ground of appeal therefore became the power of the CRB to backdate a registration decision under 
section 20 of the Charities Act. The NCWNZ contended that the power was a wide one, and that since they had 
submitted a properly completed application for registration on 28 May 2008, the CRB could have registered it 
at any time after that date. However, the CRB naturally took a narrower view – that it could only consider 
applications that were actually before it after it became the relevant registration entity. His Honour agreed 
with the narrower view (at [37]–[38]): 
If the backdating power is seen as enabling the CRB to relieve a registrable charity of the adverse 
consequences of the CRB taking some time to process an application, then it is to authorise the CRB 
to give credit to the charitable entity for the period of time during which the CRB is responsible for 
reaching a positive decision on the application. On that basis, in the anomalous circumstances here, 
the period between the deregistration decision and NCW’s second application is certainly not a delay 
caused by the CRB in the same way as the period between the lodging of an application and the CRB 
arriving at its decision in respect of it. Plainly, the discretion provided for by the transitional provision 
was not intended to provide relief for the period between a deregistration decision (following an 
initial application and acceptance as a charitable entity) and a second application to the CRB.  
His Honour described the position of the NCWNZ as perhaps ‘genuinely anomalous’ (at [25]), but nevertheless 
agreed with the CRB that the wider view of section 20(2)(b) was not correct (at [41]). However, could another 
power be used by the court?  His Honour thought that it could, describing the section 20(2)(b) argument as 
unnecessary (at [41]) in the light of the court’s powers on appeal under section 61 of the Charities Act. In 
particular, section 61(4) states that the High Court can make any order it sees fit on appeal (at [50]–[52]): 
Section 61(4) is not confined to the Court making any other order the CRB could have made, but 
rather any other order that the Court thinks fit. It has been treated as: 
… designed to allow the Court the widest possible scope to do what is necessary in light of 
the substantive conclusions reached in the appeal before the Court.  
Consistent with that observation, s 61(4) appears to free the Court from being limited to orders that 
could have been made by the CRB. I am satisfied that this is a provision affording wider powers to the 
Court on appeal than those granted by the Act to the original decision-maker. Once that point is 
reached, I am persuaded of the merits of the alternative argument for NCW.  
His Honour agreed that the work of the NCWNZ had continued in the same manner over time (at [53]–[55]: 
It is a situation in which a robust approach to the scope of the Court’s powers is warranted. The Act is 
to be applied to facilitate charitable works, not frustrate them…The consequence is that, on the view 
of the law applying to the permitted scope of charitable purposes since at least the reregistration 
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decision, NCW was entitled to be registered throughout. The adverse consequences of being deprived 
of that include a liability for income tax, and the taint on its status which deponents on its behalf 
contend has continued, and has been substantial. Given the overall purpose of the Act to encourage 
and promote the effective use of charitable resources, an order extending the CRB’s backdating order 
is justified. Accordingly, I order that NCW is to be registered as a charity from 19 August 2010.  
In respect of the tax challenge, the outcome of the registration appeal also disposed of the tax appeal. An 
order in the appeal effecting a backdating of registration to coincide with the deregistration was sufficient to 
resolve the tax issue. In those circumstances, the Commissioner acknowledged that the basis for the 
assessment had fallen away and the tax paid by NCWNZ was to be refunded, together with an amount 
calculated under the relevant statutory provisions for use of money interest.  
Despite this clear outcome, His Honour went on to consider the tax question in a separate part of the 
judgement. The Commissioner had taken the view that during the period of deregistration, the NCWNZ had 
not been a tax charity within the meaning of the Charities Act. His Honour agreed with this view (at [72]). 
Moreover, His Honour held that there was no discretion that the Commissioner could have used to avoid the 
obligation to collect the tax from the NCWNZ as it had done (at [77]).  Therefore, if the registration decision 
had not gone as it did for the NCWNZ, then its liability for tax would have been upheld. Therefore, the appeal 
by the NCWNZ was successful in that its registration as a charity was backdated to 19 August 2010, and it had 
no liability for tax during the period it should have been registered. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/3200.html 
 
2.8.13 NATURE CONSERVANCY OF CANADA V WATERTON LAND TRUST LTD, 2014 ABQB 
303 (CANLII) (COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH OF ALBERTA, JEFFREY J, 16 MAY 2014) 
This was a Canadian case which dealt with issues of property law, contract law, and environmental law 
amongst others.  However, amongst these many issues, there was the question of the timeliness of issuing a 
receipt for a charitable donation (the tax receipt). The defendant, Thomas Olson, bought from the plaintiff, the 
Nature Conservancy of Canada (NCC), a large cattle ranch on which he planned to run wild bison. The 
defendant acquired the property from the NCC in 2004 at a significant premium to fair market value, the 
excess understood to be his charitable donation to the NCC. However, no tax receipt was issued to Olson until 
2009. 
The NCC is a private non-profit corporation extra-provincially registered in Alberta. It is a national registered 
charity dedicated to conserving Canada’s natural heritage through land conservation. It partners with 
individuals, corporations, foundations and governments to achieve the protection of ecologically significant 
land, including plants and wildlife. It does this by protecting what it considers to be important natural habitats 
in Canada, through donation, purchase or conservation easement. Among its many initiatives the NCC invites 
landowners along wildlife migration corridors to permit conservation easements upon their lands, to ensure 
permanent continued access to those corridors by the wildlife.  
The ranch property lay on the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains, close to Waterton Lakes National Park, 
and within the migratory corridors of a wide range of wild species. The NCC believed that the area in which the 
property was located was strategically important for the movement of wildlife in Alberta, being within the last 
half of one percent just east of the mountains. The NCC described the strip of land as the ‘North American 
Serengeti’. A conservation easement was part of the purchase agreement, which became the subject of later 
argument and litigation. 
Amongst a wide array of issues for consideration in this case, was the question: did the NCC issue the donation 
tax receipt in a timely manner and, if not, was it liable in damages to the defendant? The parties acknowledged 
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that the purchase agreement required the NCC to issue a charitable donation receipt to Olson, for tax 
purposes, if the amount he paid for the property (approximately $3 million) sufficiently exceeded its fair 
market value. The defendant pleaded that the NCC’s failure to issue the tax receipt until December 2009 
breached an express or implied term of the purchase agreement requiring it to issue the tax receipt in a timely 
fashion. The defendant argued further that the NCC breached an implied duty of good faith, and that it 
breached the fiduciary duty it owed to him.  
The NCC responded that its only obligation to the defendant with respect to the tax receipt was to issue it to 
him in a reasonable time in the circumstances, arguing that it did so by issuing the tax receipt in December 
2009 and, in any event, the defendant failed to mitigate by not applying for taxpayer relief within the time 
allowed by law.  
There was no express term in the purchase agreement on the timing of the issue of the tax receipt. Therefore, 
the court had to look for an implied term. There is a presumption at law against implied contractual terms, 
except on certain bases. However, common law courts (such as this Alberta court) have for a long time implied 
terms requiring contracts without express deadlines to be performed within a reasonable time in the 
circumstances. The NCC accepted that this was the relevant law. The determination of a reasonable time 
depends on the circumstances of the case. The court said that the (Federal) Income Tax Act and its regulations 
did not set any timeline that charities are required to follow in issuing a tax receipt. The Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) had suggested charities issue tax receipts by ‘at least the last day of February following the year 
during which the gift was made’: Interpretation Bulletin IT-110R3, Gifts and Official Donation Receipts, at 
paragraph 21. Although Interpretation Bulletins are not law and therefore are not legally binding, it was 
agreed by the parties that charities generally follow this practice. However, the NCC argued that post-purchase 
disagreement with the defendant about the conservation easement justified its delay in issuing the tax receipt. 
The court said that this was not a reasonable basis to withhold the tax receipt. The tax receipt was due to the 
defendant because of his charitable gift, and not conditional on, or revocable for, any post-gift conduct (at 
[487]).  
Canadian taxpayers can only use a charitable donation receipt to obtain tax credits in the taxation year in 
which the gift was made, and any of the subsequent five taxation years. Thus, the longer a charity takes to 
issue a charitable donation receipt to the taxpayer, the less flexibility and control the taxpayer has over 
determining which available taxation year(s) to use the tax receipt in. Taking all the circumstances into 
account, the court said on this point (at [492]–[493], [496]): 
A delay in issuing a tax receipt reduces its monetary value, based on the time value of money... 
Therefore the sooner a taxpayer receives a charitable donation receipt, the greater its economic 
value. I find a reasonable time in these circumstances would have been the end of February in the 
year following the gift... 
In these circumstances I find the last day the NCC could render the Tax Receipt in compliance with the 
implied term of the Penny Ranch Purchase Agreement was August 31, 2005. The NCC did not issue 
the Tax Receipt to Olson within a reasonable time in the circumstances and therefore breached its 
implied obligation to Olson.  
Therefore, there was a breach of an implied term in the purchase agreement, but was there also a breach of 
an implied term of good faith? The court said not, as this was a commercial agreement, and there was no 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties. As to a breach of fiduciary duty in not issuing the tax 
receipt in a timely fashion, the court said that this was not a situation that gave rise to a fiduciary duty, which 
had recognised categories in law. The defendant was not vulnerable, and was sufficiently protected by the 
implied term as to timeliness in the contract itself.  
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The defendant had suffered a loss by the failure of the NCC to issue the tax receipt in a timely fashion. But 
should he have mitigated his loss? The defendant was a tax lawyer who was based in Utah, though he also 
worked in Canada. He was familiar with schemes of tax minimisation and avoidance, and was well-known to 
the CRA. He claimed that he had not sought the usual taxpayer relief (for extension of time to make a 
charitable donation claim) from the CRA because of his circumstances. The court did not accept that this claim 
had legal merit or was objectively reasonable (at [567]). Nevertheless, the court agreed that the defendant did 
not have a duty to mitigate in the particular circumstance of the case. There was still ongoing litigation relating 
to the property, and it was reasonable to delay his application in that situation. 
The defendant claimed $702,000 in damages because of the late issue of the tax receipt. This was calculated 
by subtracting the tax savings he obtained as a result of his actual use of the tax receipt from the optimal tax 
savings he could have obtained had he received the tax receipt in 2006. Naturally, the NCC disputed this 
amount. However, the court agreed with the defendant (at [578]): 
If Olson had received the Tax Receipt within a reasonable time in the circumstances, he would have 
paid $1,895,407.75 less in taxes. In contrast, after receiving the Tax Receipt in December 2009, 
Olson’s tax savings were limited to $1,193,594.22. [His] damages claim is therefore the difference 
between these two numbers: $701,813.53. I award that amount.  
Therefore, the defendant was awarded $701,813.53 plus interest for the late issue of a tax receipt for a 
charitable donation. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2014/2014abqb303/2014abqb303.html 
 
2.8.14 NEWSPACE CENTER FOR PHOTOGRAPHY V MULTNOMAH COUNTY ASSESSOR 
(OREGON TAX COURT, MAGISTRATE DIVISION, 15 JULY 2014) 
The plaintiff in this case from Oregon in the US challenged the denial of its application for tax exemption for 
the 2013–14 year. On the morning of the trial, the parties agreed that the plaintiff was a section 501(c)(3) IRC 
organization, and that its articles and bylaws were accurate and valid. This meant that it would qualify for 
income tax exemption under the US Internal Revenue Code, and that its bylaw stating that it was established 
exclusively for charitable and educational purposes was accepted as true. 
The bylaws of the plaintiff also stated that its ‘primary purpose shall be to offer fine art photography 
education, support the arts community, and enhance public awareness of fine art photography through gallery 
exhibits, receptions, lectures, projects with other arts organizations, artists-in-residence, events for patrons, 
facilities used by students and renters, and programs for youth and the community’. At its leased facility, 
which was the tax object in dispute, the plaintiff offered rotating photography exhibitions featuring local and 
well-known photographers, totally free of charge to members of the public in Portland. There were also fee-
paying photography classes (with limited scholarship places), free lectures and free guided tours. 
Property taxes are a major source of revenue at the state level in the US. The law provided that generally all 
property in Oregon was taxable. The plaintiff leased the property and thus qualified for tax exemption if it fell 
within the category of an ‘institution, organization, or public body’ which qualified for tax exemption under 
Oregon law ORS 307.130. This law provides for exemption from tax for a ‘charitable’ institution or 
organization, as well as for bodies with literary, benevolent, or scientific purposes. The plaintiff argued that it 
was a qualified nonprofit, charitable institution, with the subject property exclusively used for its charitable 
purposes. The taxing authority argued that the leased premises were not used exclusively for charitable 
purposes, and that the plaintiff did not meet the charity test in Oregon. 
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The charity test under Oregon law is a three-part test, first enunciated in SW Oregon Pub. Def. Services v. Dept. 
of Rev. (SW Oregon Pub Def Serv’s), 312 Or 82, 89, 817 P2d 1292 (1991). All three conditions must be met to 
qualify as a charitable institution within the meaning of ORS 307.130. The conditions are: 
(1) the organization must have charity as its primary, if not sole, object;  
(2) the organization must be performing in a manner that furthers its charitable object; and  
(3) the organization’s performance must involve a gift or giving.  
The court said it was difficult to find a clear element of charity in the plaintiff’s stated purpose (at pages 11–
12): 
Photography education and public awareness are culturally enriching, but not necessarily charitable. 
Plaintiff has a building with a gallery that displays photography, classrooms for photography classes, 
darkrooms, and digital photography laboratories. The public is free to stroll through the gallery 
looking at pictures on the walls and attend several lectures each year free of charge. However 
photography classes are taught for a fee and the public must pay to use Plaintiff’s photography 
laboratories, darkrooms, and studio...Plaintiff’s activities are, indeed, worthwhile and beneficial, but 
they do not strike the court as ‘charitable’ as that term is commonly understood.   
On this point the court quoted Oregon Country Fair v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR 200, 204-05 (1986) in which the 
Oregon County Fair organization was found not to be charitable:  
Looking first to that part of the meaning of charitable which relates to the benefiting of mankind, it is 
clear that the statute is not intended in the broad sense of the word. That is, while various cultural 
events, historical societies or other organizations may benefit mankind, they are not charitable within 
the strict meaning of that term. For purposes of ORS 307.130, the term ‘charitable’ must be applied in 
its narrow and traditional sense of relieving pain, alleviating disease or removing constraints.... In this 
sense, plaintiff is not a ‘charitable’ organization. Its purposes are to promote the arts and crafts, the 
exchange of ideas, the establishment of a community feeling of unity and enhance an earth-life 
harmony philosophy. All of these are unquestionably worthwhile and beneficial. Yet they cannot be 
said to be ‘charitable’ as that term is used in the statute. 
This finding was determinative of the outcome of the case. The plaintiff was not a charitable institution or 
organization so was not exempt from tax. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff failed the other two parts 
of the three part charity test. On the third part, the court said that the evidence showed that the majority of 
the plaintiff’s income came from its fee-paying activities. For 2013, gifts constituted only 15.27% of its income, 
and its contribution to the community was valued at only 2.27% of its income. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was not charitable and was not entitled to a tax exemption on its property taxes. 
The case may be viewed at: http://statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/oregon/tax-court-magistrate-
division/2014-tc-md-130545c.pdf?ts=1405452122 
 
2.8.15 OFORI-DARKO V THE QUEEN, 2014 TCC 54 (CANLII) (TAX COURT OF CANADA, PARIS 
J, 17 FEBRUARY 2014) 
In this Canadian case, the appellants were appealing the disallowance of tax credits for charitable donations they 
claimed in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 taxation years. Mr Ofori-Darko claimed donations to the Redemption Faith 
Ministries/Church (Redemption) of $3645, $4516, and $4102 for those years respectively.  Ms Ofori-Darko claimed 
donations of $10,815, $10,195 and $10,648 to the same organisation for those years respectively. 
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Redemption was a registered charity at the time in question. It operated a house of worship in Etobicoke and 
according to the appellant was engaged in charitable activities in Canada as well as in Ghana. Mr. Ofori-Darko was 
the founder and pastor of Redemption, and was also a director. Ms. Ofori-Darko was an assistant pastor and a 
director. The charitable registration of Redemption was revoked in 2010 because the Minister of National Revenue 
(the Minister) could not confirm its charitable activities. Investigation by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 
revealed that in 2005 Redemption issued receipts for donations totalling over $121,000. However, only $4234 was 
deposited in Redemption’s bank account that year. In 2006, Redemption issued donation receipts for over 
$677,000, but only $7876 was deposited into its bank account.  
The Minister disallowed the appellants’ claimed credits on the basis that neither appellant made any donations to 
Redemption in any of the relevant years and also because the charitable donation receipts issued to them by 
Redemption did not contain the information necessary to prove the gift required by Regulation 3501 of the Income 
Tax Regulations (ITR). Under paragraph 118.1(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act (ITA), a receipt setting out the prescribed 
information is necessary in order to claim a tax credit for a charitable donation. 
The appellants’ evidence was that they gave some cash (in the form of tithes) to Redemption in the relevant years, 
consisting of (for Mr Ofori-Darko) $2047 in 2006, $2738 in 2007 and $2346 in 2008, and for Ms Ofori-Darko of 
$3550 in 2006, $4740 in 2007 and $5240 in 2008. The remainder of Mr Ofori-Darko’s donations allegedly consisted 
of gifts in kind to Redemption, in the form of new and used clothing and shoes which Redemption shipped to 
Ghana and distributed to needy individuals. Ms Ofori-Darko also said she made donations in kind, gave food for 
church activities, paid parking fees while making hospital visits, and made additional cash contributions beyond the 
tithes shown in the tithe record book. However, no records of any of the gifts in kind, expenses or other cash 
donations were produced. 
His Honour found that on the balance of probabilities no donations were made in the relevant years. There was 
insufficient evidence produced to support any other conclusion. The tithe books produced were held to be not 
reliable, and the bank records did not support the contention made by the appellants that they had banked all the 
tithes received in each year. Although His Honour was satisfied that the appellants had made no donations at all to 
Redemption, he went on to consider the receipt question. He held that the receipts issued did not comply with the 
ITR in any way – they were incomplete and self-issued by Mr Ofori-Darko for Ms Ofori-Darko. 
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2014/2014tcc54/2014tcc54.html 
Implications of this case 
Receipts issued for charitable donations in Canada must comply with subsection 3501(1) of the (federal) Income 
tax Regulations (ITR). In particular, they must provide a breakdown of the donation between cash and gift in kind 
and a description of any gifts in kind that were allegedly donated. The court was not persuaded that any donations 
had been made as alleged, but His Honour also held that the receipts did not show this information, nor did they 
show when the claimed gifts in kind were received by Redemption, the fair market value of the gifts at that time, 
or the locality or place of issuance of the receipt. As the information listed in subsection 3501(1) of the ITR is 
mandatory for charitable donation receipts, the receipts in these appeals were insufficient to prove the making of 
a gift as provided for in paragraph 118.1(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.  
 
2.8.16 TRUE THE VOTE, INC V INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WALTON J, 23 OCTOBER 2014) 
This US case was decided on 23 October 2014 in conjunction with Linchpins of Liberty v United States. The 
plaintiff organisation, a Texas-based nonprofit, had applied to the Internal Revenue Servic (IRS) for tax-exempt 
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status as a charity. Its application was long-delayed, allegedly due to a scheme by the IRS to investigate 
organisations with ‘conservative names’. The plaintiff had connections to the so-called Tea Party, a 
conservative offshoot of the Republican Party. Because of its treatment by the IRS, the plaintiff alleged 
violations of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and breaches of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2012), and the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 
6103 (2012). The plaintiff also sought declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. 
The IRS scheme to investigate certain applicants for tax-exempt status was suspended on 20 June 2013, and 
the plaintiff organisation was subsequently granted tax-exempt status. Thus, there was, at the time of this 
hearing, no ongoing dispute. The court found that the case was therefore moot. The plaintiff’s claims for 
monetary compensation and for declaratory and injunctive relief were dismissed for want of appropriate 
Federal jurisdiction. 
The case may be viewed at: https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0734-103 
Implications of this case 
Although the IRS, in its own internal and external communications, recognised that the scheme for identifying 
possibly suspect applicants for charitable status by name was inappropriate as a means of investigation, the 
court did not grant any compensation or other relief to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff had obtained the tax-exempt 
status that it had originally applied for. Therefore, the case was ‘moot’, which meant that it should not have 
remained on the court’s list. 
 
2.8.17 UNITED GRAND LODGE OF ENGLAND V THE COMMISSIONERS OF HER MAJESTY’S 
REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2014] UKFTT 164 (TC) (HELLIER J, JULIAN STAFFORD, 3 
FEBRUARY 2014) 
This was a case concerning liability for Value Added Tax (VAT) in England. The United Grand Lodge of England 
(UGLE) is an unincorporated nonprofit association which draws together those practising Freemasonry in a 
manner recognised by its rules. It was established in 1717, and administers four large charities: the Grand 
Charity, the Royal Masonic Trust for Girls and Boys, the Royal Masonic Benevolent Institution, and the Masonic 
Samaritan fund. There are also several smaller charities under its control. 
Only European law was argued in this case. Article 132(1)(l) of the European Union’s Principal VAT Directive 
(2006/112) provides for exemptions from VAT for certain public interest groups that have a religious, 
philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature, amongst others. The question before the court was whether UGLE 
had aims of a philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature. If it did then the supplies it made to its members in 
return for their subscriptions would be exempt from VAT. The court also considered whether UGLE had aims of 
a religious nature. 
UGLE operates under a Book of Constitutions. This contains short chapters on the charges to be read to a local 
Lodge Master on his installation, the Aims and Relationships of the Craft, and the basic principles of the Grand 
Lodge’s recognition of other national Lodges. It also contains an extensive chapter of Regulations for the 
government of Freemasonry and the trust deed for the Masons’ Grand Charity. The Regulations provide for: 
the organisation and governance of the Grand Lodge; the appointment of officers of the Grand Lodge, 
Provincial Lodges and of local Lodges; the Constitution of committees of the Grand Lodge; precedence in rank 
among officers; the payment of subscriptions to UGLE and contributions to the Grand Charity by each Lodge in 
respect of its members; detailed rules on the design of Masonic regalia; and appeals from certain decisions. 
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The chapter of the Book of Constitutions on Aims and Relationships, dating from 1938 (reaffirmed in 1949), 
was said by the Tribunal to say ‘more about what Freemasonry is not’ rather than what it stands for (at [47]). 
However, the tribunal concluded (at [50]): 
From this written material, whose force was not dispelled by any of the evidence of what UGLE 
actually did, we conclude that a condition of Freemasonry is belief in a Supreme Being, and that it 
encourages the due obedience of Freemasons to the law. 
The evidence was that Freemasonry in England had become somewhat secretive at about the time of World 
War II, but had tried to become more open and engaged since the millennium: ‘There was a move to bring 
Freemasonry into the 21st century: to review process, to cut out administration and to make time for masons 
to be involved with their local communities’: at [50]. Central to this effort was engagement with charity. 
The Tribunal considered the ritual aspects of Freemasonry (at [61]): 
The ritual ceremonies undertaken at Lodge meetings are to a modern ear archaic. We were told that 
for many years they had belonged to an oral tradition but in more recent years had been written 
down (like Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey). Those shown to us included the forms used for the first 
ceremony of initiation and the second and third ceremonies of promotion of initiates to Master 
Mason after becoming Freemasons. They contain precise stage directions, catechisms and invocations 
of the Supreme Being. The language is reminiscent of the 1662 Church of England prayerbook and 
shares many of its phrases. There could be hymns at the start and end of the ceremony. 
Other aspects of practice included lectures with references to the Old Testament. However, there was no 
requirement to believe in a particular God so long as one believed in a Supreme Being. Masons included 
Christians, Muslims and Jews. The ritual included prayers addressed to a supreme being but the evidence was 
clear that this was not worship. Sacred texts were laid open during ceremonies but their presence and 
invocation of the supreme being were ways of making obligations more serious and of reinforcing the proper 
conduct of masons. The Tribunal concluded that (at [67]): 
Our impression of the rituals we were shown did not indicate that they were a form of worship; whilst 
there were prayers for the confirmation of undertakings and for blessing, there was no form of 
adulation or veneration. 
Further evidence was that there are three Grand Principles of Masonry: brotherly love (including tolerance, 
respect for others, kindness and understanding); relief (embracing charity towards the community, charitable 
giving and volunteering); and truth (including practising high moral standards). Through promulgating these at 
lectures featuring symbolic allegories, masons advocated virtuous behaviour: loyalty, the keeping of 
confidence, truthfulness, wisdom, strength in adversity, beauty, perseverance etc.  
There was no doubt that Freemasons engaged in substantial charitable giving. The combined charitable 
spending of the masonic charities in 2010 was £82 million, second only to the national lottery in the UK. Of this 
£82 million, £20 million was paid for the benefit of masons, £46 million for the benefit of their dependants, 
and £17 million for the benefit of others with no masonic connection. All the funds are raised from within 
Freemasonry – none of the charities seeks donations from outside the Craft. 
In addition to the internal charities, all freemasons engage in other charitable fundraising for ‘outside’ 
charities. The Tribunal said of this effort (at [90]–[91]): 
We concluded that a significant part of the outward and visible manifestation of the practice of 
Freemasonry was the donation of significant time and effort to charitable causes benefitting the wider 
community, and that a material part of the work of UGLE was concerned with the promotion of these 
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activities. We find that work in the community – the donation of effort and time – was not principally 
linked to the benefit of those who were masons or who had Masonic connections, but that monetary 
giving was mainly for the benefit of those who were masons or had Masonic connections. We conclude 
that the aims of Freemasonry include the practice of such charity. 
The claim in this case was for VAT rebates on subscriptions paid by members since 1977 when a predecessor 
version of Article 132 was first promulgated. Therefore, UGLE had to show that it had the aims of an exempt 
organisation since that year. HMRC argued that there was little evidence available before 2000. Moreover, 
UGLE was really an administrative (umbrella) organisation. Its aims were not those of its charities. It did not 
raise charity funds itself, but rather provided an administrative framework for Lodges and members to do so. 
Its aims were ones of administration, regulation and preservation of the society and its ritual, and not of a 
philosophy, or of a philanthropic or civic nature. This conclusion emerged even if the evidence moved from the 
constitutional documents to the actual activities of the organisation. 
Counsel for UGLE replied that the documentary evidence showed that UGLE’s object was to inspire and 
motivate its members. The purpose of its regulation was to encourage good and charitable deeds of 
Freemasons. UGLE's aim was the outward looking good charitable deeds of its members. Its philosophy and 
philanthropy were intertwined such that UGLE’s philosophical aim was the creation of a better society, while 
its philanthropic aim was the service of that society through charity. 
Neither of the parties argued that Freemasonry was a religion. However, the Tribunal wanted to consider this 
issue and asked for submissions on it. The Tribunal’s conclusions were strongly drawn from the High Court of 
Australia’s decision in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll tax (Victoria) [1983] 154 CLR 120, 
recently cited with approval in the UK Supreme Court’s decision in R ex parte Hodkin and the Church of 
Scientology v Registrar General of Births and Deaths [2013] UKSC 17 (at [125]–[130]): 
The Grand Principles of Freemasonry are intelligible and concern important matters. They are taught 
in the language of allegory and metaphor. There is belief in the supernatural.... But if one tests 
Freemasonry against Mason ACJ’s and Brennan J’s criteria: belief in a supernatural being and the 
acceptance of conduct to give effect to that belief, it seems that Freemasonry – just – falls short. That 
is because (i) as we understand those criteria the supernatural being is the same for all adherents, 
whereas the nature of the supernatural being accepted by Freemasons may differ according to their 
particular faith; and (ii) the canons of conduct promoted by Freemasonry are freestanding and not 
adopted to give effect to the belief. We say “just” because if religion does not demand a belief in a 
superior being the lack of belief in a single being, and the lack of purpose for the canons of behaviour 
cannot disqualify a system of belief from being a religion. Of the indicia adopted by Wilson, Murphy 
and Deane JJ, Freemasonry possesses many, but notably does not possess the quality of proclaiming 
itself a religion, indeed the opposite. Freemasonry also seems to us to fall just short of Lord Toulson’s 
description of a religion. Whilst Freemasonry requires belief in a supreme being and teaches its 
adherents how to live their lives, that rule of life did not, on the evidence before us, arise in 
conformity with a spiritual understanding, but by reason, in part through ritual, of a code of 
behaviour. Its moral system did not arise from and was not adequately connected with a non secular 
or spiritual understanding of man’s relationship with the universe. We conclude, with some hesitation 
and on balance... but no doubt to the relief of both parties, that the aims of UGLE do not include any 
significant aims of a religious nature. 
On the issue of aims of a philosophical nature, the Tribunal said (at [143]–[144]): 
We concluded that the aims of UGLE included aims of a philosophical nature. If we have 
misinterpreted the meaning of “philosophical” we would have found that “religious” was wide 
enough to encompass the tenets of Freemasonry. Whilst greater emphasis may have been placed on 
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the charitable aspect of its philosophy in recent years we detected no change in the relative 
importance of UGLE’s aim of promoting the teachings of Freemasonry over the period since 1977. If 
anything it had been displaced somewhat by the aim of promoting charitable actions.  
With regard to aims of a philanthropic nature, the Tribunal concluded that not all of UGLE’s promotion of 
charitable giving could be treated as having a philanthropic aim. This was because much of it was directed 
inwardly to masons only (25%), or to dependants of masons (50%). Only about 25% was directed to non-
masons. On this distribution, the Tribunal said (at [151]): 
Whilst it has been accepted that the objects of UGLE’s charities were such as to make them charitable 
at law, we had some concern that, because of the actual distribution of funds by the charities, the 
objects of Masonic contribution to the charities, and UGLE’s administration of them, might display – 
at least to some extent – a principal purpose of benefitting fellow masons or the dependents of fellow 
masons and thus not to that extent indicate goodwill towards mankind in general, but to a particular 
subset of mankind. The intimate involvement of UGLE’s officers in the direction of the charities 
indicated that UGLE’s aim was to encourage charitable donation for the purposes in which the 
charities’ funds were expended. And if the object of the contributions was not wholly for the general 
benefit, the object of UGLE in promoting those contributions might not be wholly philanthropic. 
Likewise, its civic aims were limited (at [161]–[162]): 
It seems to us that neither Freemasonry nor UGLE’s activities have any substantial aim which relates 
to the relationship between the citizen and the state. The charitable activities of Freemasons were 
largely unrelated to any relationship of citizens with the state, the fellowship and ritual enjoyed by 
Freemasons had nothing to do with the state, and acceptance of, and living by, the three Grand 
Principles touched only slightly on a person’s relationship with the state. UGLE’s coordination, 
regulation, encouragement and promotion of these activities involved or affected no separate 
relationship of citizens with the state. The closest any of the evidence came to showing a civic aim 
was the statement in the Aims and Relationships enjoining obedience to the law and loyalty.... 
The Tribunal said that it detected other aims of Freemasonry as being social aims and aims of self-
improvement for members. Its practices in these respects were inward-looking and not for the public benefit. 
Therefore, UGLE’s aims included those of a philosophical, philanthropic, and to a small extent, civic nature. 
However, it had other aims in addition to these ‘qualifying’ (for tax exemption) aims. Were these other aims 
merely minor or ancillary to the qualifying aims? The Tribunal said (at [172]–[174]): 
It seems to us that in the period before 2000 they were not. In that period it appeared that Freemasonry 
had been more inward-looking and more concerned therefore with mutual benefit and mutual society. 
The evidence was not sufficient to conclude that the pursuit of those concerns was not a minor aim. In 
the period after 2000 there was evidence that Freemasonry became more outward looking. We have 
described the evidence which indicated that Freemasonry was more open and willing to communicate its 
practices to the world at large and to reach out into the communities in a way it had not done before. But 
the evidence did not satisfy us that the aims of the encouragement of fraternity, self improvement and 
mutual care had become merely incidental or ancillary to the philanthropic, philosophical and civic aims 
of UGLE. We therefore conclude that UGLE had a variety of different aims, some of which came within 
Article 132 and some of which did not. In our opinion, the aims which did not fall within the exemption 
were not insignificant and were of sufficient magnitude to cause UGLE to fall outside the words of the 
exemption in Article 132.  
Therefore, as UGLE did not qualify for tax exemption under Article 132(1)(l) of the EU VAT Directive, the appeal 
was dismissed. 
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The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2014/TC03302.html 
Implications of this case 
This case concerns some important matters concerning definitions of religion, philosophy, philanthropy, and 
civic duty as well as implications for tax law in the UK, and is likely to lead to an appeal. 
 
2.8.18 YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF GREATER TORONTO V MUNICIPAL 
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT CORPORATION, 2014 ONSC 3657 (CANLII) (ONTARIO 
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, PERELL J, 16 JUNE 2014) 
This case dealt with the liability of the Young Men’s Christian Association of Greater Toronto (YMCA) for 
municipal rates on four properties it leased in Toronto. The case turned on the statutory interpretation of the 
word ‘of’ in the relevant legislation. 
The YMCA was established pursuant to the Act to Incorporate the Toronto Young Men’s Christian Association 
1923 (YMCA Act), an Act which had not been amended since its enactment. The YMCA is a registered charity 
under the Income Tax Act of Canada and a non-profit corporation which focuses on community support in the 
Greater Toronto area. The mission of the YMCA is to provide individuals in the community with opportunities 
for personal growth, community involvement, and leadership. The three primary areas in which the YMCA now 
carries on its programs to achieve its purposes are: (1) employment preparation and training; (2) 
daycare/after-school care; and (3) promotion and protection of health.  
Section 10 of the YMCA Act provides an exemption from property taxation as follows:  
The buildings, lands, equipment and undertaking of the said association so long as and to 
extent to which they are occupied by, used and carried on for the purposes of the said 
association are declared to be exempted from taxation except for local improvements. 
The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC), which assesses rates in the City of Toronto, 
contended that the YMCA’s properties were only exempt if the properties were both occupied by the YMCA 
and ‘owned’ by the YMCA., i.e. MPAC’s position was that the exemption found in section 10 of the YMCA Act 
was only available for properties for which the YMCA was the owner of the title of the property in fee simple. 
The YMCA maintained that section 10 provided an exemption for properties both owned and leased by the 
YMCA. 
The court said this question was a matter of statutory interpretation, which involved determining the intention 
of the legislature. The Assessment Act R.S.O. 1990, A. 31 provided that ‘land’, ‘real property’ and ‘real estate’ 
were assessable for rates. His Honour said that therefore there was no dispute that the four leased properties 
would be assessable for rates unless the exemption in section 10 of the YMCA Act applied. 
His Honour said that there was no doubt either that the four leased premises were ‘occupied by, used and 
carried on for the purposes of the YMCA’ and thus the issue to be decided in the case was whether the YMCA’s 
four leased premises were caught by the words ‘buildings, lands, equipment, and undertaking of the said 
association’ in section 10 of the YMCA Act. On the interpretation of this clause, His Honour narrowed the issue 
further (at [20]–[22]): 
...a lease is not ‘the equipment of the YMCA,’ and literally speaking, a lease is not an ‘undertaking of 
the YMCA’. Literally speaking, a ‘building’ can be leased, but a lease is not ‘a building of the YMCA.’ 
Thus, the interpretative issue is narrowed further to become whether the YMCA’s four leases are 
‘land of the YMCA.’ There are two questions here: (1) Are leases ‘land’? and (2) Are the YMCA’s leases 
‘land of the YMCA’? The answer to the first question is ‘yes’. As a matter of real property law, a lease 
is ‘land’; i.e., a property interest recognized by the law of real property....  
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Thus, the question then became were the leases ‘land of the said association (i.e. the YMCA)’? The key word 
here was ‘of’. His Honour took a literal view (at [27]): 
...I would interpret ‘land of the YMCA’ in s. 10 of the YMCA Act to mean the same as the ‘YMCA’s land’ 
and I would interpret ‘land of the YMCA’ to mean ‘land owned by YMCA.’ The reason for this last 
conclusion, which is the crucial step in the interpretative analysis, is that to lease land is not to own 
the land. To lease land is to own a leasehold interest in the land, but that is something different from 
owing the land. This meaning of leasing land is its common, literal, and everyday meaning.... This 
brings me to the ultimate conclusion of the interpretative analysis, which is to conclude that the 
YMCA’s four leases, while technically ‘land’ are not ‘land of the YMCA.’ Therefore, the YMCA’s leases 
do not qualify for the exemption found in s. 10 of the YMCA Act.  
His Honour distinguished Kitchener-Waterloo Young Men’s Christian Assn v Municipal Property Assessment 
Corp [2007] O.J. No. 3176 (S.C.J.), which had been relied upon by the YMCA, because it was based on different 
legislation (The Kitchener-Waterloo YMCA Act, 1928) with different wording. Therefore, as the four leased 
properties were not ‘owned’ by the YMCA they were not exempt from municipal rates. The YMCA’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc3657/2014onsc3657.html 
Implications of this case 
This case involved statutory interpretation.  The approaches to this topic are similar in Australia and Canada. 
As the court said in this case (at [15]): 
When a court is called upon to interpret a statute, its task is to discover the intention of the legislator 
as expressed in the language of the statute. The court’s approach to interpretation is teleological or 
purposeful, and to interpret a statute, the words of the statute are to be read in their entire context 
and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the statute, the object 
of the statute, and the intention of the legislator. The court’s role is to interpret the statute not enact 
it; if the sense of the words of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret the 
words literally and in accordance with their plain meaning even if the consequences are absurd or 
unjust. Recognition of the proper roles of the legislature and the judiciary requires that courts give 
effect to the plain meaning of the words of a duly enacted statute, and a court should not interfere 
merely because it does not approve of the result produced by the statute in a particular case. 
The court in this case kept exactly to this proposition, interpreting the 1923 legislation literally. The message 
from the court appears to be that it might be time to amend the legislation to include both owned and leased 
(i.e. occupied) premises under the exemption, as in the Kitchener-Waterloo YMCA case. 
 
2.9 TRUSTS AND WILLS 
2.9.1 BACIC V MILLENNIUM EDUCATIONAL & RESEARCH CHARITABLE FOUNDATION, 2014 
ONSC 5875 (CANLII) (ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, KANE J, 17 OCTOBER 
2014) 
This was an appeal concerning the estate of the late of Thomas C. Assaly (TCA or the Estate) and the Thomas C. 
Assaly Charitable Foundation (the Foundation). On 6 July 1989, TCA caused the incorporation of the Thomas C. 
Assaly Charitable Foundation. The applicants for incorporation were TCA, his two lawyers and his four children. 
Supplementary Letters Patent were issued on 20 September 2007 changing the name of the Foundation to 
Millennium Educational and Research Charitable Foundation. The parties in this case agreed that TCA was the 
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Foundation’s sole settlor, causing a transfer of assets, having an estimated value of $5 million, to the 
Foundation. However, there was no evidence whether some or all of that $5 million came from TCA personally 
or via corporations he controlled. The issue before the Court was whether TCA or his Estate was entitled to the 
assets in the Foundation.  
The applicants in this case, who were creditors, had numerous potential claims against the Foundation which 
included misappropriation and conversion of their money. The respondent corporations, all associated with 
TCA, were bankrupt. The Estate submitted that based on section 135 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended (the BIA), the gifts and settlements made by the late Thomas C. Assaly to 
create the Foundation and advance its stated objects failed and must therefore be returned in first priority to 
his Estate. This return was argued to be in priority to the Foundation’s creditors and other claimants.  
The Estate’s claim to the assets of the Foundation  
The Estate claimed that it had a first priority claim to the assets, funds and receipts of the Foundation, to the 
extent of its claim of $3,813,507, in priority to the claims of the applicants and other creditors of the 
Foundation. His Honour disagreed. He said that although there was no doubt that TCA caused the money to 
come into the Foundation in 1989, there was no evidence as to where it came from (at [88]–[92]): 
The directing mind of a charity cannot improperly divert monies belonging to others into a charity and 
thereupon use the [Charities Accounting Act, RSO 1990, c C.10 (CAA)] as a shield to defeat creditors 
who can trace the misappropriation of their investment into a charity. A substantial portion of the 
assets in the Foundation are monies misappropriated from the Applicant investors or the assets they 
invested in. The assets of a charitable corporation are not held by it as trustee for its charitable 
objects but rather are owned by that corporation beneficially, to be used in a fashion consistent with 
its objects. It is now generally accepted that unrestricted property of a charitable corporation is not to 
be construed as trust property held by a charitable corporation. As such, a charity may use an 
unrestricted gift to the full extent of its charitable objects based upon its corporate authority as a 
legal entity without the involvement of a charitable purpose trust.... The Estate is incorrect in 
asserting that it has a priority to the remaining assets presently located within the Foundation in 
priority to the claims of the Applicant creditors. The Appellants are not entitled to money 
misappropriated from others because the wrongdoer deposited it in a charity. TCA and the Estate 
have no claim or priority to the assets in the Foundation. 
Was there a trust? 
The evidence revealed that the charity had operated at least since 2006 as a means of funding the lifestyle of 
TCA’s son (Thomas G Assaly), his son’s wife and his son’s children. There had been fraud and personal benefit 
arising. Moreover, if the assets were returned to the Estate, TCA’s two sons would be the beneficiaries.  
His Honour said that a charity is not immune from liability to those who have suffered under it. Assets of a 
charity, owned beneficially or in trust, are available to respond to those liabilities. The Estate argued that TCA 
intended by his donations to create a trust. However, the Receiver in the bankruptcy of the respondent 
corporations determined that no tax returns were ever filed on behalf of any alleged trust. Nor were there any 
documents created that showed that a trust was ever intended (at [97]–[99]): 
The Appellants have failed to establish an error by the Receiver based on trust law. The Estate is not a 
simple creditor. The deceased caused or donated to the Foundation. The deceased acknowledged the 
irrevocable nature of the 1998 second donation seven years later in September of 2005. The Estate is 
not a creditor of the Foundation or other corporate respondents. It has no equal right to share in the 
consolidated remaining assets in the Foundation. 
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Was consolidation of assets in the bankruptcy proceedings appropriate? 
His Honour was clear that the evidence showed that the Foundation’s business was not separate and distinct 
from the business activities of the other respondent corporations since 2006. They operated as part of one 
business enterprise which misappropriated investors’ money and was indebted to the applicants in an amount 
which far exceeded the best realizable value of the amalgamated assets of the whole enterprise. Therefore, 
substantive consolidation of the assets of the bankrupt Estate, including those of the Foundation, was 
authorized. 
Therefore, the Estate’s appeal was disallowed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc5875/2014onsc5875.html 
 
2.9.2 BARTLEY V CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (FIRST TIER 
TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, HOLBROOK J, MR DUGAL, 
MR REYNOLDS, 21 JULY 2014)  
Alan Bartley appealed to the Tribunal against an order of the Charity Commission (the Commission) dated 14 
November 2013 by which the Commission made a scheme (the Scheme) under section 69(1) of the Charities 
Act 2011 (the Act). The Scheme related to two charities, Westminster Chapel (Unincorporated) Charity and 
Westminster Chapel Manse Trust. In this appeal, the Tribunal upheld that Commission’s approval of the 
Scheme. 
The Westminster Chapel Charity relates to the land and buildings which comprise Westminster Chapel on 
Buckingham Gate in London (the Chapel). The Chapel land and buildings are held on the trusts declared in a 
deed dated 23 December 1842 (the Chapel Trust Deed), under which the Chapel is held upon trust for use as a 
place of worship by “such persons being Protestant Dissenters of the Independent Denomination as shall for 
the time being be desirous of attending Divine service”. Ministers of the Chapel must belong to this 
denomination and must “profess and preach the religious doctrines held by the Congregational Union of 
England and Wales”. The Westminster Chapel Manse Trust relates to residential properties purchased to 
provide accommodation for the Chapel’s Minister(s). These properties are held on trusts for that purpose 
declared in a deed dated 22 September 1969 (the Manse Trust Deed). 
The Scheme originally proposed a company limited by guarantee (Westminster Chapel Ltd) to act as trustee of 
the two trusts described above, in addition to joint administration (under the Westminster Chapel Property 
Trust) and a change of objects. All of these measures were approved by the Commission. The objects to be 
changed were in the Chapel Trust Deed. In agreeing to amend the objects, the Commission accepted the 
trustees’ view that a cy-près occasion had arisen because: 
 the expression “Protestant Dissenters of the Independent Denomination” had ceased to be suitable in 
the modern day; and  
 it was unclear as to what was meant by “the religious doctrines held by the Congregational Union of 
England and Wales” since that body no longer existed and there was no single successor body.  
The trustees therefore considered that the original purposes could not be carried out, or at least not according 
to the directions given, or in the spirit of the gift, and had therefore ceased to provide a suitable and effective 
method of using the trust property. 
The Scheme was published for consultation on 5 January 2012. Various objections to it were raised by Bartley 
and others, mainly based on the nature of the congregation currently worshipping at the Chapel. In Bartley’s 
view the congregation were not “Protestant Dissenters of the Independent Denomination” since they did not 
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practice infant baptism. The objections were investigated by the Commission, which concluded that they were 
based on doctrinal considerations, but that it would not be appropriate to issue a cy-près scheme. Thus, the 
reference to “Protestant Dissenters of the Independent Denomination” remained in the objects, and the 
objects were not changed. Nevertheless, an amended scheme was published on 14 November 2013 which 
provided for a corporate trustee and joint administration of the two trusts. Bartley lodged an appeal against 
the amended scheme on 24 December 2013. 
The Tribunal held that the amended Scheme was entirely administrative in nature (at [23]), setting up as it did 
a corporate trustee and seeking to administer the two trusts jointly. The Tribunal agreed that the infant 
baptism question was doctrinal in nature and not relevant to the determination of this appeal (at [41]): 
The Scheme made by the Commission has no bearing on Mr Bartley’s underlying concern about 
matters of doctrine. This is because the Scheme is wholly administrative in nature and provides that 
the trust property continues to be held on trust for the original purposes. Had the Commission wished 
to proceed with a scheme in the form of the original consultation draft, then Mr Bartley’s concerns 
about the reformulation of the objects in the Chapel Trust Deed may well have been such that the 
matter would have been more fit to be adjudicated on by the court. However, having listened to 
those concerns, the Commission decided not to proceed with that scheme, but instead to make a 
scheme simply to facilitate the administration of the charities. In our view, this was an appropriate 
response to Mr Bartley’s concerns, and one which demonstrates the potential of the Commission’s 
decision review process to safeguard the quality of its decisions. 
The Tribunal concluded that it was expedient to make the Scheme because the appointment of a corporate 
trustee would facilitate the administration of the trust property, bringing the protection of limited liability and 
ensuring transparency in governance arrangements within the charities in question. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/Alan-Bartley-decision-
21-July-2014.pdf 
 
2.9.3 CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES V FRAMJEE [2014] EWHC 2507 
(CH) (ENGLAND AND WALES HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION), HENDERSON J, 22 
JULY 2014) 
In this case, the Charity Commission for England and Wales (the Commission) sought declarations and 
directions in relation to a fund comprising donations paid by members of the public to an unincorporated 
charity called the Dove Trust. The Dove Trust (the trust) was established on 16 June 1983 by a declaration of 
trust made between the settlor, the late Thomas Arthur Colman, and two individual trustees, one of whom 
was his son Keith Thomas Colman (Mr Colman). The trust was registered as a charity by the Commission on 12 
July 1983. The defendants in the case were the trust’s interim manager (Framjee) and four present or former 
trustees of the trust. The interim manager was appointed to manage the trust after its bank accounts were 
frozen by the Commission on 6 June 2013. The reason for this action was that the Commission had concerns 
about the trust’s governance and financial management. 
In 2004, the trust established a website for charitable giving called www.charitygiving.co.uk (the website). The 
purpose of the website was to facilitate charitable giving by members of the public by inviting them to make 
donations to the Dove Trust for the benefit of other charities or good causes of their choice. The donations 
would normally be paid by credit or debit card, and the Dove Trust would then augment them by gift aid which 
it would claim on eligible donations from individual UK taxpayers, subject to charging an administration fee of 
3.99%. Therefore, the Dove Trust took its fee from the tax reclaimed from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC). 
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From 2004, the operation of the website became the main activity of the trust. There was no suggestion that 
the website was not used in good faith by its many donors, and charities certainly benefited from its 
collections. However, the website was poorly administered by the trust. As His Honour explained (at [10]): 
… a situation developed where the trust regularly found itself obliged to have recourse to incoming 
donations in a later month in order to fund the payment to ultimate recipients of donations made in a 
previous month – a process apparently known in some quarters as "teeming and lading", …, although 
the phenomenon has a generic similarity to the typical method of operation of a pyramid or Ponzi 
scheme. Furthermore, there were long delays in the filing of the trustees' annual reports and financial 
statements (even now, the latest filed accounts are for the year ended 5 April 2009); complaints 
began to be received from members of the public that donations made through the Website had not 
reached the intended beneficiaries; and concerns were raised that apparently improper loans had 
been made, without independent advice and without proper procedures being followed, to 
companies connected with Mr Colman. 
On 25 August 2011 the Commission established a statutory inquiry into the Dove Trust pursuant to section 8 of 
the Charities Act 1993 (now section 46 of the Charities Act 2011). The grounds of concern were set out in a 
letter from the Commission to Mr Colman. They included serious failures of governance, serious breaches of 
trust, and financial mismanagement. At the time of writing, that inquiry is still in progress. On 11 July 2012 Mr 
Colman signed off the trustees’ reports and financial statements for the Dove Trust for the years ending 5 April 
2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. The auditors, Price Bailey LLP, qualified their reports for the three years 
with a statement that they were unable to form an opinion whether they gave a true and fair view of the 
trust’s affairs.  
On 27 June 2013 the interim manager made an urgent report to the Commission that there was a substantial 
shortfall between the restricted cash balances available and the amount of associated donations received but 
not yet paid to the ultimate recipients. The shortfall was in the region of £1,000,000, and there was an obvious 
risk that the charity was insolvent. The total number of specified charities and good causes to be paid was 
1,812, and they were owed £1,680,231 inclusive of gift aid which had been claimed but not yet paid by HMRC. 
This case was to determine how to lawfully distribute the funds remaining. The issues were:  
(a) Did the arrangements under which the website was operated give rise to a trust or trusts, and (if 
so) of what nature? 
(b) Did the arrangements give rise to contracts between the donors and the Dove Trust, and (if so) 
what were the terms? 
(c) How should the remaining funds in the Dove Trust which are referable to donations made through 
the website for specified charities or good causes be distributed among the recipients nominated by 
the donors? In particular, should the distribution be made:  
(i) on a ‘first in, first out’ basis; 
(ii) on a rateable basis, under which all the unpaid beneficiaries share pari passu; or 
(iii) in accordance with a simplified version of the rolling charge, or North American method, 
whereby two pools of assets would be created depending on whether the donations were 
made before or after 6 June 2013, and each pool would then be divided pro rata between 
the recipients entitled to share in it? 
Was there a trust? 
His Honour had no doubt that there was a trust involved in the website donations. This was a kind of sub-trust 
under the Dove Trust itself. Moreover, each donor was a settler under the sub-trust (at [38]–[40]): 
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On the other hand, it seems equally clear to me that the donations, once received by the Dove Trust, 
were subject to a trust, and were not merely the subject of contractual obligations.... The trustees 
came under a fiduciary duty to ensure that each donation would be used only for the purpose 
specified by the donor, because those were the terms on which the donation had been solicited. 
Furthermore, the trusts on which the donations were held were in my view clearly separate from the 
general charitable objects of the Dove Trust. The obligations were, in short, to ensure that the 
donations were passed on to the nominated recipients, together with gift aid where applicable, and 
without deduction of any charges apart from 3.99% of the net gift where gift aid could be claimed but 
not otherwise. The idea that the trustees should retain any general discretion as to the destination of 
the donations would in my view be wholly contrary to the way in which the scheme was presented to 
intending donors. The need to ensure no breach of the Dove Trust's own charitable objectives was 
largely catered for by the requirement that donors should either choose from a list of charities 
provided by the Dove Trust or provide the name and registration number of any other chosen charity. 
To the extent that the trustees had any discretion at all, it can in my view only have been in relation 
to the relatively rare cases where the chosen recipient was not in fact a charity under English law, or 
where there was good reason to question the credentials of the recipient.... Taking all the 
circumstances into account, I feel no real doubt that the donations were impressed with a trust of the 
general nature which I have described. Although it may not make much practical difference, I prefer 
to view that trust as a global sub-trust established by the trustees under the aegis of the Dove Trust 
itself, and not as an arrangement which gave rise to literally thousands of wholly separate trusts. On 
any view, however, each donor was a separate settlor in relation to the funds which originated from 
him, and those funds had to be dealt with by the trustees in a way that ensured they reached their 
specified destination, subject only to a possible residual discretion where for one reason or another 
that could not be achieved.  
Was there a contract? 
There is no reason in law why a single transaction cannot give rise to both a trust and a contract. His Honour 
certainly had no doubt that this was so in this case (at [43]–[44]): 
In my view, there can be little doubt that the terms of the Website constituted an offer by the 
trustees to enter into legal relations with potential donors, which matured into a concluded contract 
as and when a donor made a payment to the Dove Trust in accordance with the specified machinery, 
thereby accepting by conduct the offer made on the Website. The service offered by the Dove Trust 
was one of convenience and value to users of the Website, and it was one for which the Dove Trust 
made a charge if the donation qualified for gift aid. The terms and conditions section of the Website 
was framed in legal language, and clearly evinced an intention on the part of the trust to enter into 
legal relations with donors. The governing law clause even refers to "this agreement". From the point 
of view of donors, they were parting with their money on the understanding that it would be dealt 
with in accordance with the specified procedure for the benefit of the nominated charity or good 
cause; and even if the donation was one which was processed free of charge, the donor would in my 
judgment reasonably have expected to be entitled to hold the trustees to proper performance of the 
terms on which the gift had been solicited. Even if it is wrong to regard the Website as containing an 
offer to potential donors, it was at the very least an invitation to treat, and I am satisfied that a 
contract would have come into existence at the latest when the trustees by their conduct accepted a 
donation and took steps to process it.  
The existence of a contract was not affected by what His Honour referred to as ‘the ill-focused disclaimers of 
liability in the terms and conditions’ which he said were not directed at legal matters but rather at technical 
(computer) issues connected with internet giving. 
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How were the available funds to be distributed? 
The Commission proposed a distribution pari passu (in equal shares pro rata).  This resulted in a distribution of 
33p in the £ to the charities owed money from the website donations. After consideration of the other 
possible methods of distribution, His Honour agreed that the pari passu method should be adopted. The ‘first 
in first out’ method was rejected as too arbitrary and the rolling funds method as inequitable.  
Therefore, the charity giving website gave rise to both a trust and a contract. Distribution of the available 
funds was to be pari passu at 33p in the £. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/2507.html 
Implications of this case  
There are other charity giving websites in the UK. However, His Honour made a clear distinction between 
these others and CharityGiving (the Dove Trust site). CharityGiving accepted donations as principal, rather than 
as agent. The other sites were clearly acting as agents for charities. Moreover the CharityGiving website did 
not make clear the legal relationship between donors and the Dove Trust.  On this latter point, His Honour said 
(at [8]): 
In this last respect, the position differs significantly from that of superficially similar arrangements 
made by well-known charities such as the Charities Aid Foundation ("CAF"), where the legal 
relationship with donors is clearly spelt out in the terms and conditions which apply to a donor's 
account with the charity. The position is also different from that of some other websites which 
facilitate charitable giving, e.g. www.virginmoneygiving.com and www.justgiving.co.uk, where it is 
made clear to donors that the operator of the website acts only as an agent for the charity nominated 
by the donor. 
 
2.9.4 CONNERY V WILLIAMS BUSINESS COLLEGE LIMITED & ANOR [2014] NSWSC 154 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SLATTERY J, 28 FEBRUARY 2014) 
The applicant was the trustee of the Dora Isherwood Trust (the Trust).  He applied to the court for an opinion 
and advice under section 63 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) as to whether he would be justified in paying the 
funds of the Trust either to the June Dally-Watkins Business Finishing College, or to Sydney Stepping Stone Inc. 
Dora Isherwood died on 17 April 1998 leaving her will dated 13 April 1998 (the Will), naming Margaret 
McEwan as her executor and the residuary beneficiary. The Will provided in clause 7: 
I give and bequeath my policy...from Westpac Income Plan to be used as a grant for students with 
financial difficulties enabling them to do the course to be overseen by Wilfred Hauser and Margaret 
McEwan. 
This was apparently a reference to the Williams Business College (the College) where Ms Isherwood had been 
a teacher for over 50 years. Wilfred Hauser Williams was one of the principals at the College. However, despite 
the terms of clause 7, the Trustee’s evidence was that Margaret McEwan was not a teacher at the College, nor 
had she ever taught at the College. Indeed Ms McEwan was not a teacher at all and had never taught at, 
overseen at, or had any contact with the College. 
Ms McEwan received legal advice from Senior Counsel that clause 7 was likely to be void for uncertainty, and 
that she would be the residuary beneficiary of the money involved. However, Ms McEwan wanted to carry out 
Ms Isherwood’s wishes and set up the Trust in order to do so. No applications to any court were made in this 
process.  
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The Trust Deed contained the following provision in clause 10: 
In the event that the Williams Business College ceases to exist or if, in the opinion of the trustee, the 
administration or the execution of the trust created by this deed becomes inconvenient or 
impracticable, the Trustee shall pay the Fund to such charitable body whose purposes, in the opinion 
of the Trustee, most closely approximate those of the Williams Business College, and so that the 
moneys forming the Fund shall be held upon trusts similar to those created by this deed. If, in the 
opinion of the Trustee, there is no such body, or payment to any such body is inconvenient or 
impracticable, the Fund shall be paid to Sydney Stepping Stone Inc of 227 Wardell Road, Dulwich Hill, 
NSW. 
To fulfil the purposes of the Trust, the Trustee entered into an administration agreement with the College (the 
College-Trust Agreement) on 11 September 2002. The effect of the College-Trust Agreement was that: (1) the 
tuition fees of some of the College's students in financial difficulties would be paid by the Trust and accepted 
by the College at a discounted rate of 80 per cent; (2) over time those students would repay the full amount of 
their fees to the Trust, through the College. The scheme was thus designed to provide the Trust with a self-
replenishing fund of money as it only had to pay 20 per cent less to the College than students would return to 
the fund over time. 
In 2012, the Trustee eventually noticed that the College had not been returning the funds as it had done 
previously. It emerged that the original College had been deregistered in 2007, and unknown to the Trustee at 
the time, another entity, also styling itself the ‘Williams Business College’ arose in its place. The new College 
took over all the assets and liabilities of the former College, but the new College was less reliable in honouring 
the College-Trust Agreement. 
After some correspondence, the College provided the Trustee with a reconciliation in December 2012, which 
suggested: (1) that the last annual payment from the College to the Trust had been made in September 2009; 
(2) that between September 2009 and December 2011 the College had received repayments of over $53,000 
from students whose tuition fees were paid by the Trust; and (3) the College's reconciliation for 2012 was not 
yet available. After further legal manoeuvring, the College repaid the moneys owing. 
On the basis of this situation being ‘inconvenient or impracticable’, the Trustee formed the view that clause 10 
of the Trust Deed should be invoked. The trust’s assets were not large. As at September 2013, they consisted 
of: 
 $79,291.20 in cash held in a Westpac Bank account; 
 $30,347.34 to be paid by the College to the Trust for repayment by the College of fees already received 
from students; and 
 future funds that the College might receive from students under a College-Student Agreement, which 
were not anticipated to exceed $25,115.36. 
In searching for a suitable replacement recipient of the Trust funds, the Trustee contacted four similar 
colleges.  Three were not interested or had gone out of business. Only the June Dally-Watkins Business 
Finishing College eventually showed interest. However, this College wanted the student subsidy to be 100% of 
fees. This was not acceptable to the Trust as it would mean that the Trust would no longer be self-replenishing. 
Sydney Stepping Stone Inc, which operates through a corporate entity and a trust, manages a house for 
homeless adolescents. The objectives of Sydney Stepping Stone Inc, set out in its Mission Statement, include 
providing ‘adolescents with a stable and secure nurturing environment which encourages personal growth and 
development with the aim of empowering the individual to achieve responsible independence’. In September 
2013 it provided accommodation to 12 young people and maintained a mentoring program for 25 ex-
residents. 
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The Trustee is, and was when the Deed was executed, the Chair and Founder of Sydney Stepping Stone Inc, the 
potential default recipient of the Trust funds under clause 10. This meant that there was a potential conflict of 
interest and duty in clause 10 of the Trust Deed. In addition, Margaret McEwan, the executor of Ms 
Isherwood's will and a party to the Trust Deed, was also for some years on the committee of Sydney Stepping 
Stone Inc. 
The Attorney General of New South Wales was a joint defendant in this case. The Attorney-General contended 
that the Trust was a charitable trust and that therefore these were charitable trust proceedings within section 
5 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW). The term ‘Charitable trusts proceedings’ is defined in section 5(1) to 
mean proceedings brought in the Court ‘whether by any trustee of a charitable trust or by any other person 
under the Court’s statutory or general jurisdiction with respect to any breach or supposed breach of a 
charitable trust, or with respect to the administration of charitable trusts’. Section 5(2) provides for a number 
of exclusions from this definition but His Honour held that none of the exclusions applied in this case (at [5]).  
Section 3 of the Charitable Trusts Act defines ‘charitable trust’ as ‘any trust established for charitable purposes 
and subject to the control of the Court in the exercise of the Court's general jurisdiction with respect to 
charitable trusts’. All parties conceded and this judgment confirmed that the Trust was a charitable trust and 
therefore that these were charitable trust proceedings.  
The question of the validity of the will had never been put to the court. The Trust had been operating for 15 
years without any legal underpinning. Therefore, the issues before the court were: 
(1) Was clause 7 of the Will void for uncertainty? 
(2) If the answer to question 1 was in the negative, whether clause 7 exhibited a general charitable 
intent; 
(3) If the answer to question 1 was yes, whether the Trustee would be justified in either paying the 
fund to June Dally-Watkins Business Finishing College or to another charitable body, or alternatively 
to Sydney Stepping Stone. 
His Honour was clear that clause 7 of the Will was void for uncertainty (at [52]–[53]): 
...it is difficult to resist the conclusion that clause 7 is incapable of any clear meaning. First, the 
Trustee now cannot establish (and could not at the time of the Trust Deed) that there were any 
courses taught at the College that were or were "to be" "overseen" by Mr Hauser and Mrs McEwan. 
All that can be said is that the testator, Ms Isherwood was a teacher at the College for 50 years. But 
Mrs McEwan's participation in the execution of the Trust Deed in December 1999, reciting as it did 
Counsel's advice that clause 7 of the Will was uncertain, is compelling evidence that there was no 
extrinsic evidence available at the time of Ms Isherwood's death to give sensible meaning to these 
words. Secondly, there is no evidence of communication between Ms Isherwood and Mrs McEwan 
about any proposed course. In short the problem with clause 7 is that it describes a grant of funds to 
students of a non-existent course to be taught by two persons who were given no instructions about 
the course and had no identified plans for such a course themselves. Therefore, aside from issues of 
general charitable intention, I agree with Senior Counsel's [original] opinion that clause 7 would be 
void for uncertainty.  
Was there a general charitable intention demonstrated by clause 7? The Attorney-General submitted that the 
court could conclude that clause 7 of the Will exhibited a general charitable intention to establish a trust for 
the advancement of education and/or for the relief of the poor. The Trustee disagreed with this on the basis of 
whether a trust was intended at all and whether the clause benefited the community as a whole or a section of 
the community. 
In this respect, His Honour said (at [56]): 
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Clause 7 clearly indicates a general purpose of charity. First its language echoes charitable concepts: 
the policy was to be used "as a grant for students" [emphasis added]. Secondly, the relief of poverty is 
clearly implied by the description of the students of those "with financial difficulties"; and, a purpose 
may qualify for the relief of poverty even though the persons who may benefit may not be completely 
destitute.... Thirdly, the advancement of education is inferred from the testator's use in clause 7 of 
the words "enabling them to do the course" and describing them as "students". This is a matter of 
assessment and impression upon reading the Will, but a powerful factor in this case is the testator's 
identification and blending of the two heads of charitable purpose, the relief of poverty and the 
advancement of education. 
The third question posed to the court was not answered. The need for a cy-pres scheme had arisen shortly 
after Ms Isherwood's death. However, the executor did not then approach the court about the validity of 
clause 7 of the Will or the implementation of a cy-près scheme as she should have done. Instead the Trust 
Deed was executed following the receipt of legal advice only. His Honour said that the Trustee had sought to 
initiate an informal cy-près scheme with respect to funds gifted under clause 7 at this point (at [66]). 
His Honour accepted the submission of the Attorney-General that there should not be a finding of a breach of 
trust in this case despite the inappropriate dealing with the moneys under the will, but had to grapple with the 
past and present trust issues the case presented (at [70]–[71]): 
What is to be done about the past? I accept the Attorney General's submission that the Court should 
make an order approving a cy-pres scheme in accordance with the operative provision of the Trust 
Deed but excluding the recitals in clause 10 with effect from 2 December 1999. Such an order would 
include specific approval of the operative provisions of the Trust Deed as the mechanism by which the 
scheme is implemented.... The Trustee has no interest in opposing the validation of his past conduct.  
But what about the future? The Attorney General seeks either the approval of clause 10 of the Trust 
Deed as part of the cy-pres scheme but subject to (i) a requirement that the Trustee obtain approval 
of the Attorney General before gifting the monies to another comparable educational institution, and 
(ii) the removal of reference to Sydney Stepping Stone Inc. because its objects are not those of an 
educational institution.  
The Attorney General's alternative submission was that the court should make an order for a scheme under 
section 13(2) of Part 4 of the Charitable Trusts Act. His Honour agreed with this submission, making the point 
that the Trustee would have opportunity for input into such a scheme (at [76]).  
This meant that there should be a cy-près scheme covering the period between December 1999 and the 
present by reference to the terms of the Trust Deed minus clause 10. For the future, the court made an order 
under section 13(2) of the Charitable Trusts Act for the Attorney General to establish a scheme for the fund of 
money involved. The recipient of the scheme was not nominated by the court. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/154.html 
Implications of this case 
This case demonstrates how difficulties can arise when insufficient notice is taken of legal requirements. The 
matters involved in the establishment of this trust had required court applications. However, the Attorney-
General for New South Wales did not suggest that the trustee's failure to approach the court and to instead 
administer the Trust by means of the Trust Deed was a breach of trust. In any event, His Honour said that the 
court would have excused any breach of trust under section 85 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) (at [68]). 
Nevertheless, for a trust with funds of less than $100,000, court applications had become necessary and costs 
were incurred. Moreover, despite the persistent submissions of the trustee to have clause 10 of the Trust 
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Deed direct the remaining funds to Sydney Stepping Stone Inc, the court ordered that clause 10 did not 
operate and that the Attorney-General should control the disposition of the funds. 
 
2.9.5 COULSON, RE [2014] VSC 353 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, MCMILLAN J, 1 
AUGUST 2014) 
This Victorian case concerned an ambiguous clause in a will.  The application was by State Trustees Limited 
(the plaintiff) and was unopposed. The will of Christine Coulson (the deceased) contained clause 4 which 
named as beneficiaries Aglow Australia Pty Ltd (Aglow), and Abundant Life Family Church (Abundant Life). It 
was found that neither organisation ever existed. Although the plaintiff was unable to locate any organisation 
with the name Aglow as specified in clause 4 of the will, it found an organisation formerly known as Aglow 
Australia Inc, now named Aglow International Australia Ltd (Aglow International). The plaintiff was also unable 
to locate any organisation named Abundant Life but found that there had once been an organisation known as 
Spirit of Life Family Church, formerly located at the address nominated in the will. However, it had ceased to 
exist. 
By originating motion filed 13 August 2013, the plaintiff asked the court for answers to the following 
questions: 
a) Is the reference to Aglow in clause 4 of the will a reference to Aglow International?  
b) Is the reference to Abundant Life in clause 4 of the will a reference to Spirit of Life Family Church?  
c) If yes, does the gift to Spirit of Life Family Church create a valid charitable trust?  
d) Has the purported gift to Abundant Life in clause 4 of the will failed? 
What was the identity of the intended beneficiary Aglow? The entity named in the will had never existed.  
However, there was extrinsic evidence that the deceased had had dealings with an organisation named Aglow 
Australia Inc (QLD), which until 2005 had an address at 243 Edward Street, Brisbane, the address nominated in 
the will.  The deceased had made at least one gift to the organisation, and had in her possession various 
leaflets published by the organisation. Her Honour had no difficulty in finding that the deceased had intended 
to benefit Aglow Australia Inc (QLD). Complication set in however, in that Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) had been 
wound up after the making of the will, but before the deceased’s death in 2011. It was then reincarnated 
twice, firstly as (again) Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) and secondly as Aglow International.  Had the gift lapsed? Her 
Honour said that the entity was a charity (at [26]): 
I accept that Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) was a charity...it was an organisation devoted to the 
advancement of religion, and its activities, which were open to the public, provided a public benefit to 
its members and the public generally. Although not determinative of the status of Aglow Australia Inc 
(QLD) as a charity, it is relevant to note that the register of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission (‘ACNC’) records Aglow Australia Inc (WA) and Aglow International as charities. 
A gift lapses when a named beneficiary has ceased to exist at the time of the deceased’s death. But had Aglow 
Australia Inc (QLD) truly ceased to exist? Her Honour traced the history of the organisations in question, and 
found that Aglow Australia Inc (QLD), Aglow Australia Inc (WA) and Aglow International were identical 
organisations (at [45]–[53]): 
Originally, Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) was an association incorporated on 12 January 1984 in 
Queensland as Women’s Aglow Fellowship of Australia Inc. On 20 May 1996 it changed to Aglow 
Australia Inc. By letter to the Office of Fair Trading dated 8 August 2005, the Queensland association 
sought its own cancellation as an association incorporated in Queensland, because Aglow Australia 
Inc had incorporated in Western Australia as a new association. …. Aglow Australia Inc (WA) became 
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an incorporated association in Western Australia on 12 August 2005. Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) was 
deregistered on 21 November 2006. Unsigned minutes of a special general meeting of Aglow Australia 
Inc (QLD), dated 12 July 2005, record the passing of a motion to wind up Aglow Australia Inc (QLD), 
and to transfer assets to Aglow Australia Inc (WA). The resolution also noted that the national office 
and new national board were in the process of being established in Perth...The ACNC register states 
that Aglow Australia Inc (WA) was established on 1 January 1984. .... The ABN register details of 
Aglow Australia Inc (WA) reveal that it was registered as a charitable institution from 1 July 2004 to 1 
July 2013. Minutes of the annual general meeting of Aglow Australia Inc (WA), dated 2 February 2011, 
record the passing of a motion to wind up Aglow Australia Inc (WA) and transfer surplus assets to 
Aglow International, a company incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)...A current and 
historical company extract of Aglow International shows that the company was incorporated on 3 
March 2011 and the ACNC register states that it benefits Aborigines or Torres Straight Islanders. Since 
3 December 2012, it has been registered as a charity, subtype advancement of religion/advancing 
religion...It is therefore apparent that Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) did not, in fact, cease to exist; but 
rather it metamorphosed into Aglow International.  
Upon analysis, Her Honour held that Aglow International continued the work of Aglow Australia Inc (WA), 
which continued the work of Aglow Australia Inc (QLD). Therefore (at [65]–[67]): 
In the circumstances, Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) has not ceased to exist. It is merely the mechanics by 
which the organisation operates that have changed. This does not have the effect that the charity has 
ceased to exist. The gift therefore does not lapse. …. In my view, the intended beneficiary is Aglow 
Australia Inc (QLD). …. The gift to Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) takes effect in favour of Aglow 
International. There is no need for a cy-près scheme in this case. 
Her Honour concluded that even if Aglow Australia Inc (QLD) had ceased to exist, there was a general 
charitable intention in the will, and a cy-près scheme could have been applied in favour of Aglow International 
Ltd. 
As to the gift directed to Abundant Life, the plaintiff submitted that this part of the will should be administered 
in intestacy. However, the court ordered further investigation before this hearing. This resulted in finding an 
organisation known as Spirit of Life Ministries Ltd, which was formerly known as Abundant Life Ministries Ltd 
until 22 September 1998 (before the deceased’s death in 2011). Spirit of Life Ministries Ltd is currently 
registered with the ACNC as a charity for the advancement of religion. It emerged from extrinsic evidence that 
the deceased had attended the Spirit of Life Ministries during her lifetime. Again, Her Honour had no difficulty 
in identifying the recipient of the gift (at [86]–[89]): 
Spirit of Life Ministries Ltd is the successor of Abundant Life Ministries Ltd with the main purpose of 
establishing a church for the worship of God and to promote and disseminate the teachings of the 
Christian faith. Both organisations operated from 40 Beecher Street Preston between 1992 until 2001. 
The deceased was a member of the church operated by the company and enrolled in a course 
conducted by the company. Abundant Life Ministries Ltd has not ceased to exist, but its name has 
changed to Spirit of Life Ministries Ltd. In my view, in respect of the deceased’s gift to Abundant Life 
in cl 4 of her will, the intended beneficiary is Spirit of Life Ministries Limited 
Therefore, the gifts in the will to Aglow and Abundant Life were directed to Aglow International Ltd and Spirit 
of Life Ministries Ltd. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/353.html 
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Implications of this case 
Both the beneficiaries named in this will had ceased to operate before the deceased’s death. However, she 
had not updated her will accordingly. This resulted in an application to the court to determine if the gifts had 
lapsed. However, they were held not to have lapsed, but rather to be able to be redirected to successor bodies 
to the two named beneficiaries. Costs were borne by the estate which had no serious effect in this case, but 
could have in other circumstances where the estate is limited, and there are family beneficiaries as well. 
 
2.9.6 GILES V THE ROYAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE BLIND [2014] EWHC (ENGLAND 
AND WALES HIGH COURT, BARLING J, 2 MAY 2014) 
This was a claim brought under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules (England and Wales) for rectification of a 
deed of variation dated 24 November 2007 (the Deed of Variation) which purported to alter the provisions of 
the will of Hilda Elsie Bolton with a view to reducing the incidence of inheritance tax, pursuant to section 142 
of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (the Act). Giles, a solicitor, was the administrator of the will in question, and 
executor of the will of Hilda Bolton’s sister, Ellen Bolton. 
There was a question of interaction between the two wills. Hilda died on 6 February 2006, and Ellen on 11 
September 2007.  Ellen benefited from her sister’s will as the recipient of the gift of her house (the property), 
and as the residuary beneficiary of her estate. Clause 7 of Hilda’s will stated that any inheritance tax payable 
should be paid out of her residuary estate. The inheritance tax due on Hilda's estate was calculated at 
£254,595 on an initial basis as at March 2007, taking account of the then nil rate band of £275,000. This meant 
that there was very little residuary estate left. 
Ellen’s will left the residue of her estate to four charities in equal shares: the Royal National Institute for the 
Blind (RNIB), the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Cats Protection League and the 
Peoples Dispensary for Sick Animals (the Charities). 
Under section 142 of the Act a deed of variation would take effect for inheritance tax purposes as at the date 
of death. The claimant in this case was aware that if such a deed of variation were used to redirect all of Ellen's 
entitlement under Hilda's Will to the Charities, there would be no inheritance tax at all to pay on Hilda's estate, 
since the total of chargeable transfers arising from Hilda's death would be less than Hilda's then available nil 
rate band of £275,000, and the redirected gifts of the property and the residue would enjoy relief under 
section 23 of the Act. In effect, the sums otherwise due by way of inheritance tax would accrue to the Charities 
under Hilda's Will (as deemed to be amended by the deed of variation), and her estate would be totally 
exempt from inheritance tax. 
Three of the Charities indicated that they supported the Deed of Variation, but the RNIB did not reply to the 
solicitor’s formal letter of intent. The relevant Deed of Variation was executed on 24 November 2007 (after the 
deaths of both the sisters). On 5 December 2007 the claimant, as administrator of Hilda's estate, signed four 
Memoranda of Appropriation (the Memoranda) purporting to appropriate the property to the Charities in part 
satisfaction of what was described in the Memoranda as their respective quarter shares in the residue of 
Hilda's estate. The Memoranda expressly refer to Hilda's Will as ‘varied by the Deed of Variation’. 
However, the Deed of Variation as drawn up was not effective to achieve its purpose of totally negating 
inheritance tax. The solicitor did not realise that she had not redirected the gifts appropriately. In particular, 
she did not redirect the gift of the house, and so inheritance tax of exactly the same amount as calculated 
previously was payable on its sale value. She also wrongly referred to the clause numbers in the will, and 
referred to the Inheritance Act 1979 as the governing Act when no such Act existed. The claimant asked the 
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court to rectify all these errors. The claim for rectification was not opposed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC). His Honour had no difficulty in finding that the rectification was appropriate (at [34]): 
Here the effect of the Deed of Variation did not reflect the clear intention of the Claimant (and 
beneficiaries), namely to redirect the entirety of Ellen's entitlement under Hilda's Will to the Four 
Charities, rather than just her entitlement in respect of the residue. In these circumstances it is no bar 
to rectification that in executing the Deed of Variation it was undoubtedly an objective of the 
Claimant to relieve the Four Charities of the indirect burden of inheritance tax. 
His Honour ordered that the Deed be varied to reflect the true intention of the parties, thus providing the four 
Charities with the full benefit of the gifts under the sisters’ wills. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1373.html 
Implications of this case 
The inheritance tax on the estate had already been paid in this case, so that the decision to vary the will by 
Deed triggered a repayment of tax from HMRC.  There was no objection to this repayment from HMRC 
because four charities were benefiting from the money returned. 
 
2.9.7 GREAT CHRISTCHURCH BUILDINGS TRUST, THE V THE CHURCH PROPERTY 
TRUSTEES AND CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY AUTHORITY; THE CHURCH 
PROPERTY TRUSTEES V ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND THE GREAT CHRISTCHURCH 
BUILDINGS TRUST [2014] NZHC 1182 (HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, PANCKHURST 
J, 30 MAY 2014) 
This was a further hearing in a series of cases concerning the deconstruction and mooted reconstruction of 
Christchurch Cathedral (the Cathedral) after the 2011 earthquake. Two proceedings were consolidated into 
one hearing: 
1. The first was a judicial review of a decision by Chisholm J which ordered a stay on deconstruction of 
the Cathedral to a height of two to three metres so that it no longer constituted a public hazard. The 
Great Christchurch Buildings Trust (GCBT) had asserted that the Church Property Trustees’ (the CPT) 
decision to deconstruct the Cathedral was in breach of trust because the CPT held the Cathedral land 
and buildings on trust and were bound to restore the Cathedral to its pre-earthquake condition. 
Chisholm J held that the CPT did hold the Cathedral land and buildings on trust, but decided that the 
terms of the trust were such that there was only a requirement to build a cathedral (of some kind) on 
the site, and not to maintain and restore the gothic revival Cathedral to its original condition: see at 
The Great Christchurch Buildings Trust v Church Property Trustees [2012] NZHC 3045. 
2. The second proceeding was brought by the CPT. They sought directions confirming that insurance 
monies received for the earthquake damage to the Cathedral could be applied in part to the 
construction of a transitional cathedral at another site, which had already been commenced. 
Panckhurst J had originally decided that the insurance money had been applied in breach of trust to 
commence the building of the transitional cathedral, but had not decided the issue of personal 
liability for breach of trust: see Church Property Trustees v Attorney-General and the Great 
Christchurch Buildings Trust [2013] NZHC 678. In this hearing, the CPT at first sought relief against 
personal liability for the breach, if the application of the money for the transitional cathedral was in 
breach of trust. The CPT then applied to amend their Statement of Claim to abandon the application 
for relief against personal liability, arguing that it was no longer required. 
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The parties 
1. The CPT has the form of a corporate trustee, recognised by statute: see the Anglican (Diocese of 
Christchurch) Church Property Trust Act 2003. The CPT owns much of the church property in the 
Anglican diocese of Canterbury, New Zealand. They hold the land, and the now damaged Cathedral, 
upon the terms of the Cathedral Trust.  
2. The GCBT was formed in August 2012 as an incorporated charitable trust. A group of prominent 
Christchurch citizens established the GCBT with the principal objective of promoting the preservation 
of heritage buildings damaged in the earthquakes. Their particular concern has been the restoration 
of the Cathedral. 
The decision of Chisholm J in 2012 
Chisholm J first had to consider the history of the Cathedral to determine the extent of the trust on which it 
was held. The area around Christchurch was purchased by the Canterbury Association under Letters Patent 
dated 1849. The Cathedral was conceived by the Canterbury Association in 1849, and Cathedral Square was 
included as part of the initial town plan for Christchurch in 1850. Land was acquired in 1851, and the 
Canterbury Association declared by a deed dated 9 September 1851 that specified lands, including Cathedral 
Square, were reserved and appropriated: 
...to the intent and purport that the same may be used for the establishment and maintenance of 
Ecclesiastical and Educational Institutions in connection with the Church of England...to the intent 
that such Lands may be held by the said Association in trust for the said Ecclesiastical and Educational 
purposes with such power of Sale alienation Mortgage charge or any other disposition and of general 
management as the said Association are by the said Letters Patent declared capable of having and 
enjoying. 
The Canterbury Provincial Council (which succeeded the Canterbury Association) passed the Church Property 
Trust Ordinance 1854(C) which established the CPT as a body corporate with perpetual succession. Subject to 
later statutory recognition in the Church Property Trust (Canterbury) Act 1879 (repealed 2003), and the 
Anglican (Diocese of Christchurch) Church Property Trust Act 2003, the CPT has existed ever since. The lands 
held by the Canterbury Association for ecclesiastical and educational purposes (including the land in Cathedral 
Square) were transferred to the Canterbury Provincial Council on trust for those purposes by section 6 of the 
Canterbury Association Ordinance 1855. The trust was therefore passed unaffected from one body to the 
other. 
Building of the main body of the Cathedral, which was in the Gothic Revival style, occurred between 1864 and 
1904 using significant public donations. Since its completion, only small additions have been made to the 
building, such as the visitors’ centre and seismic strengthening works. The Cathedral is registered as a Category 
1 heritage building by the New Zealand Historic Places Trust. Category 1 is the highest listing available, 
described in section 22(3) of the Historic Places Act 1993 as: ‘... Places of special or outstanding historical or 
cultural heritage significance or value’. 
The building is also listed as a Group 1 building in the Christchurch City Council’s District Plan. This listing 
recognises the significance of the Cathedral to the Christchurch community.  
Options for reconstruction 
The Christchurch Earthquake Reconstruction Authority was concerned that the Cathedral was unsafe, 
particularly as it continued to be damaged as further earthquakes occurred during 2011. CPT’s advisers 
considered various options for ‘make-safe’ procedures. These were: 
 Option 1: to retain the outer walls in full (cost estimate: $100 million excluding GST) 
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 Option 2: to deconstruct the building to sill level, and reconstruct at some point (cost estimate: $66–
76 million excluding GST) 
 Option 3: to stabilise the eastern end of the building and to deconstruct or demolish the western end. 
Insurance moneys due were estimated at $28 million. CPT chose option 2 in so far as it related to 
deconstruction. GCBT complained that CPT as trustee was obliged to use the insurance moneys received to 
repair and reinstate the Cathedral to its original form. In June 2012, a review panel commissioned by GCBT 
considered the options, and concluded that the Cathedral could be rebuilt following retention of the outer 
walls under option1 (above). 
Legislative provisions applicable 
In terms of the applicable legislation, Chisholm J said that section 5 of the Church Property Trust (Canterbury) 
Act 1879 (the 1879 Act) provided that all the powers and authorities conferred on the CPT by various 
Ordinances (including the Church Property Trust Ordinance 1854(C)) remained in full force and effect to the 
extent that they were not ‘affected, altered, or amended’ by the Act. The most significant change brought 
about by the 1879 Act was the termination of all trusts relating to lands specified in Schedule A (the Bishopric 
Estate) and Schedule B (the Dean and Chapter Estate): section 6. The Cathedral land was not included in those 
estates. 
The purpose of the Anglican (Diocese of Christchurch) Church Property Trust Act 2003 (the 2003 Act) was 
stated in section 3 to: 
...(a) consolidate and amend the Church Property Trust Ordinance 1854 (C) and the Church Property 
Trust (Canterbury) Act 1879 and their amendments; and 
(b) widen the investment powers of trustees who hold real and personal property on trusts relating to 
the Anglican Diocese of Christchurch; and 
(c) apply the variation of trusts provisions in the Anglican Church Trusts Act 1981 to trusts under this 
Act. 
Historical ordinances and legislation, including both the Church Property Trust Ordinance 1854(C) and the 
1879 Act, were repealed by the 2003 Act. The relevant sections of the 2003 Act were sections 5 to 7 and 9. 
Section 5 provides: 
(1) There continues to be a body called the Church Property Trustees. 
(2) The Church Property Trustees continues to be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a 
common seal. 
(3) The Church Property Trustees is the same body of that name existing immediately before the 
commencement of this Act under the Church Property Trust Ordinance 1854(C). 
Thus, it is clear from the 2003 Act that the statutory body created by the Act was a continuation of the body 
that originally came into existence in 1854. The function of the CPT ‘to hold and administer trust property in 
accordance with this Act’ is described in section 6 of the 2003 Act. His Honour was clear that the trust property 
referred to was the Cathedral land (at [55]). The powers available to the CPT when carrying out its section 6 
function are described in section 7 of the 2003 Act: 
(1) For the purpose of carrying out its function, the Church Property Trustees may exercise the 
powers set out in Schedule 1 and in the Trustee Act 1956. 
(2) The Church Property Trustees must exercise its powers subject to any authorisations that this Act 
requires to be given by the Synod or other body or person. 
His Honour said (at [56] of the 2012 decision): 
 135 
 
While the powers in the Trustee Act are of no immediate significance, there are two powers in 
Schedule 1 that are potentially relevant: the power to ‘build on or develop any property whatsoever’ 
[at clause 14] and the power to ‘enter into such contracts and do or perform such things as in the 
opinion of the [CPT] will be for the benefit of any trust administered by it’ [at clause 17]. 
Section 9 of the 2003 Act directs that in carrying out its function, the CPT must comply with all canon and 
ecclesiastical laws and regulations that, under the authority of the Synod, apply to the administration of trust 
property. Apart from a requirement for a consecrated cathedral to be debt free, no such laws appeared to be 
relevant to this case. 
Part 3 of the Act contains detailed provisions relating to the Bishopric Estate, Dean and Chapter Estate, and 
local endowments. The provisions in the 1879 Act are carried forward in relation to those matters. In the case 
of the Dean and Chapter Estate there are the following secondary trusts listed in section 19: 
The secondary trusts are to hold the capital and the income of the Dean and Chapter estate on trust— 
 (e) to keep the Cathedral and its precincts in good repair:… 
 (h) to maintain and repair the Cathedral:…. 
In relation to the legislation applicable, GCBT contended that the Cathedral was held on the terms of the 2003 
Act only. CPT considered that the 2003 Act did not alter the terms of the Trust on which the Cathedral was 
held, namely, ‘maintaining the ecclesiastical institution’. 
What were the terms of the trust? 
GCBT contended that the Cathedral is held by the CPT upon a trust to preserve and maintain the Cathedral as 
it was built. CPT’s position was that ‘first and foremost, the trust on which the Cathedral is held is for the 
advancement of religion rather than for the advancement of a building’. The 1851 deed declared that specified 
lands, including Cathedral Square, were to be held on trust for the establishment and maintenance of 
ecclesiastical and educational institutions. His Honour agreed that the trust created by the 1851 deed was for 
the broad purpose of establishing and maintaining ecclesiastical and educational institutions, not for particular 
buildings. However, he held that the trust created in 1851 did not reflect ‘the trust on which the Cathedral is 
held by the CPT today’ (at [102]). 
The Cathedral Square Ordinance 1858 was of more importance. Clause 4 of that instrument recorded that the 
Cathedral site was reserved by the Provincial Council: 
... as a site for the erection of a Cathedral in connection with the Church of England, which site shall 
be conveyed to the Bishop of Christchurch and his Successors, to be held, in trust, for the uses as 
aforesaid, of the Church of England in the said province: and the said Superintendant, upon 
commencement of the said Cathedral, is hereby empowered and required to convey the aforesaid 
site accordingly... 
His Honour said that this meant that ‘the trust was to be for “the erection of a Cathedral” in the sense of bricks 
and mortar (subject, of course, to a spiritual dimension)’ (at [105], [emphasis added]). The Cathedral Square 
Ordinance 1864 dispelled all doubt in this respect. That Ordinance repeated that the land was to be held by 
the Superintendent of the Province and his successors: 
... as a site for the erection of a Cathedral ... and upon trust as soon as the building of the said 
cathedral shall be commenced to convey the fee simple and inheritance in the same by deed unto the 
then Bishop of Christchurch and his successors to be held in trust for the purpose aforesaid. 
[emphasis added] 
His Honour concluded that (at [106] of the 2012 decision): 
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Thus it is clear that the grantor of the trust (the Provincial Council) contemplated that a Cathedral, in 
the sense of bricks and mortar (with a spiritual dimension), would be erected on the land. 
Therefore, an express trust was created in 1858 and confirmed in 1864 by the successive Ordinances. The 
purpose of the trust was certain: the erection of a Cathedral on the land designated for that purpose. The trust 
was complete when the land was transferred to the Bishop (synonymous with the transfer to the CPT). It was 
inherent in the arrangement that the land was to be held by the CPT on that trust indefinitely.  
Thus, the CPT’s proposition that the Cathedral land was held in trust in the present day for ecclesiastical 
purposes failed to take proper account of the express trust established in 1858. While the Cathedral Square 
land was originally part of a wider trust for ecclesiastical and educational purposes (as described in the 1851 
deed), that trust was overtaken in relation to the Cathedral Square land by the express trust declared in 1858. 
What was the trust for? 
It is a valid purpose of a charitable trust that buildings for worship be provided. The trust in question in this 
case was for the erection of ‘a Cathedral’. The Cathedral did not have to be of any particular type (at [112]): 
No term requiring a particular style, for example Gothic, was imposed on the trustee. Had there been 
such a requirement it might be expected that this requirement would have been spelled out in the 
Ordinance creating the trust or at least in some other instrument produced by the grantor around the 
time the trust was being created. Certainly there was an opportunity to specify a particular style when 
the Provincial Council revisited the Cathedral issue in 1864. 
GCBT’s contention was that the trust was for ‘the Cathedral’. But was it for the magnificent Gothic cathedral as 
built, or for just ‘a Cathedral’? His Honour returned to a legislative analysis, concluding that: 
...the 2003 Act does not alter the fundamental terms of the Cathedral trust; in particular it does not 
reflect a legislative intention that the Cathedral as it stood before the earthquakes must be preserved 
indefinitely; nor does it authorise deconstruction of the Cathedral other than for the purpose of repair 
or rebuilding. 
Overall, His Honour held that (at [146]–[148] of the 2012 decision [emphasis added]): 
What happens in the situation that has arisen where the Cathedral has been severely damaged? The 
answer is that unless the terms of the Cathedral trust are varied, either the structure that remains will 
have to be repaired or it will have to be replaced by another Cathedral. In the absence of one of those 
steps the whole purpose of the trust would be defeated. Any necessary deconstruction and/or 
demolition would come within the terms of the trust provided such deconstruction or demolition is 
for the purpose of repairing or replacing the existing structure. While the timeframe for repair or 
replacement would be for the CPT to determine, its obligations as trustee require it to honour the 
spirit of the trust. Thus it would not be in the spirit of the trust for the repair or reconstruction to be 
unnecessarily deferred. When determining the timeframe the CPT would be entitled to take into 
account the practical realities of the situation it faces...the terms of the Cathedral trust do not 
require a replacement Cathedral (if that is the option decided upon) to be identical to the Cathedral 
that existed before the earthquakes occurred. But the structure would, of course, have to qualify as 
‘a Cathedral’ in terms of the trust. 
Was the decision of the CPT valid? 
The CPT decided on partial deconstruction of the Cathedral (option 2 on the list above). His Honour said (at 
[163]): 
It seems to me that the decision made by the CPT on 1 March 2012 is susceptible to two possible 
interpretations. One is that it defeats the central purpose of the trust, constitutes a breach of trust 
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accordingly, and is thereby unlawful. The other is that it would be premature to reach that conclusion 
because the CPT intends to rebuild the Cathedral on the same site. Had it not been for [counsel’s] 
indication from the bar that the CPT intends to rebuild the Cathedral I would probably have adopted 
the first interpretation. However, given the indication from the bar, I have concluded that the better 
interpretation at this juncture is that the decision is incomplete. 
The CPT had really operated on a misapprehension about the purpose, in legal terms, of the Cathedral trust. 
The CPT proceeded on the basis that the purpose of the trust was the advancement of religion and the 
maintenance of the ecclesiastical institution related to the Cathedral site, not of particular buildings. His 
Honour said that while ‘it is not for the Court to become involved in the merits of the decision, it has a 
responsibility to ensure that the purposes of the trust are honoured’ (at [171]). Therefore, the application for 
judicial review was granted and the decision of the CPT made on 1 March 2012 was stayed until further order 
of the Court. In addition there was a declaration made that while there must be a Cathedral on the site, it did 
not necessarily have to replicate the Cathedral as it stood before the earthquakes occurred. 
The reconstruction decision taken by the CPT 
On 5 September 2013, the CPT took the decision to build a cathedral in a modern, contemporary style on the 
original site of the gothic revival Cathedral. This would involve further deconstruction of the damaged original 
Cathedral. This decision raised considerable opposition from the CGBT and some public controversy. However, 
His Honour in this case was not concerned with the nature of the building proposed. He said that this involved 
a discretionary power (at [40]): 
In making decisions concerning the Cathedral the Trustees exercised a discretionary power. The 
obligations to which trustees generally are subject are well settled. In 1851 they were outlined as 
follows:  
… it is to the discretion of the trustees that the execution of the trust is confided, that 
discretion being exercised with an entire absence of indirect motive, with honesty of 
intention, and with a fair consideration of the subject. The duty of supervision on the part of 
this court would thus be confined to the question of honesty, integrity, and fairness with 
which the deliberation has been conducted, and will not be extended to the accuracy of the 
conclusion arrived at, except in particular cases.  
Hence, decisions must be reached with an absence of indirect motive, with honesty of intention and 
with a fair consideration of the issues, including knowledge of the matters relevant to the decision. It 
is not for this Court to endeavour to evaluate the correctness, or merit, of the decision reached. 
The lifting of the stay on deconstruction 
The court concluded that the stay on deconstruction should be lifted, because: 
1. The CPT had now committed to the construction of a new cathedral on the original site and therefore 
the stay was no longer required (at [45]–[46]); 
2. The CPT had given fair consideration to all relevant issues before reaching its decision to deconstruct 
and build a new contemporary cathedral (at [47]–[48]); 
3. There was no evidence that improper motive, dishonest intention or conflict of interest affected the 
CPT’s decision (at [53]); 
4. The merits of the decision to rebuild a cathedral in a contemporary design was a matter for the CPT, 
and not for the court. The court’s role was limited to ensuring that the decision was reached after fair 
consideration of all the relevant issues, and not for any improper reasons. This test had been met, and 
so there were no grounds for judicial review of the CPT’s decision (at [40]). 
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The liability issue 
The application of $4 million of insurance money received by CPT to the erection of the transitional cathedral 
on another site was, in His Honour’s words, a mistake (at [53]). Did liability attach to the CPT for this decision, 
made in breach of trust? His Honour reserved his decision on this matter to a later date, as further evidence 
was required. He was clear that the claim relating to liability should not be abandoned, and the Attorney-
General agreed. His Honour said (at [61]): 
In any event I am not comfortable with the notion that restoration of the Cathedral Trust is an 
automatic and complete answer to the original breach of trust. This matter needs to be viewed in its 
particular context. The claim for relief is part-heard and already in the public domain. As noted, issues 
relating to the Cathedral are of intense public interest in the city. It is, therefore, appropriate for the 
claim to be resolved in open Court – even if the outcome proves to be straightforward as CPT 
anticipates.  
Therefore, the stay on deconstruction was ordered to be lifted. The court made it clear that it was for the 
GCBT to establish any grounds which justified retention of the stay, which may indicate that future steps in this 
litigation may be expected. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/1182.html 
The 2012 decision of Chisholm J may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2012/3045.html 
The 2013 decision of Panckhurst J may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2013/678.html 
Implications of this case 
The part of this case reserved for a later decision relates to deciding if the CPT is liable for breach of trust for 
building the transitional cathedral on another site. The Attorney-General submitted that even if the CPT should 
be held not liable, since they had restored the $4 million spent in breach of trust back into the trust, it was 
better to have this decision made in open court for the benefit of any future enquiry which might arise into the 
events surrounding the Cathedral’s affairs. 
 
2.9.8 HEALY (DECEASED), IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [2014] VSC 257 (SUPREME 
COURT OF VICTORIA, DALY ASJ, 21 AUGUST 2014) 
This Victorian case involved a charitable trust. Martin Healy (the testator) died in 1958. In his will, made a few 
years before his death, he provided for various life interests in the income from a Trust established by the will, 
including a life interest in favour of his daughter, Dorothy Quinn. Dorothy, the last surviving life interest 
holder, died on 14 August 2011. Her death triggered the operation of clause 7(c) of the will which provided: 
From and after the death of the last survivor of my aforesaid sisters and the said Dorothy Kathleen 
Quinn and the said Adelaide May Langlands I DIRECT my trustees to pay and apply the income of my 
trust funds equally between the St. Augustine’s Boys’ Orphanage at Geelong and the St. Vincent de 
Paul’s Boys’ Orphanage at South - - Melbourne it being my desire that the said Orphanages shall as far 
as possible use such income to further the education by scholarship or otherwise of such boys as the 
Principal of such Orphanages may select AND I DECLARE that if either or both of such Orphanages 
shall have ceased to function at the date of my death or thereafter shall cease to function my trustees 
shall request the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne for the time being to nominate some 
other orphanage in the place of the Orphanage or Orphanages and the orphanage so nominated shall 
stand in the place of the Orphanage which has ceased to function as aforesaid and shall be entitled to 
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receive the share of the income of my trust funds which the Orphanage so ceasing to function would 
have received... 
Both the St Augustine’s Boys’ Orphanage in Geelong and the St Vincent de Paul’s Boys’ Orphanage in South 
Melbourne ceased to exist in 1997, when their activities were taken over by MacKillop Family Services 
(MacKillop). MacKillop was founded in 1992 to take over the services which were until then provided by the 
Christian Brothers, the Sisters of Mercy, and the Sisters of St Joseph. 
The plaintiff in the case was The Trust Company (Australia) Limited (the Trustee). This Trustee was the 
successor in title to the Burns Philp Trust Company Limited, the original trustee nominated under the Will. The 
first defendant was Susan Edwards, Dorothy Quinn’s daughter (representing the descendants of the testator), 
and the second defendant was the Attorney-General of Victoria, in his role as protector of charities. 
There was agreement among the parties that clause 7(c) of the will demonstrated a general charitable 
intention, and that it was appropriate that the matter be dealt with as a cy-près occasion. However, the 
Trustee and Ms Edwards proposed differing cy-près schemes to the court for its consideration. A third scheme 
was proposed by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne when he was consulted by the Solicitor 
General for Victoria. 
Her Honour agreed that there was a general charitable intention in clause 7(c) of the will. However, there are 
no longer any orphanages in existence in Victoria. The Trustee proposed to pay the income from the Trust to 
MacKillop for its general educational purposes.  The Trustee’s position was that this would be consistent with 
the principle that a gift to a charitable institution which has ceased to exist should take effect in favour of an 
institution which has taken over the work previously carried on by the named institution and which can 
properly be regarded as the successor to the institution named in the will. MacKillop’s programs include foster 
care and residential care, disability services, youth support, education and training, family support, refugee 
services and support to women and men who, as children, were in the care of its founding agencies.  
Both Ms Edwards and the Attorney-General opposed the disposition to MacKillop for general educational 
purposes. The Attorney-General’s position was that MacKillop was not the successor body to the orphanages 
named in the will because there were no successor bodies. Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that 
the testator’s intention, as set out in the will, was to provide scholarships and other financial aid for 
underprivileged young people, and not to provide additional income for a large charitable institution such as 
MacKillop, which had net assets of approximately $40 million and an annual income of approximately 
$50 million. Further, while MacKillop provided some educational services for vulnerable and traumatised 
young people in its care, these services were limited to children and young people with special needs. Its 
formal education facilities were geographically restricted. Such a limitation on potential beneficiaries would 
not have been within the contemplation of the testator (at [38]). 
Senior counsel for Ms Edwards submitted that MacKillop provided services, mostly of a non-educational 
nature, for persons and families of all ages, rather than just children. Ms Edwards also objected to the income 
from the Trust being given to a professedly Catholic organisation such as MacKillop, when her evidence 
demonstrated that the testator did not profess or follow the Catholic faith or observe Catholic rituals and 
traditions. This submission was the critical point of distinction between the submissions of Ms Edwards and 
the Attorney-General, in that the latter’s proposed scheme was based upon a submission that the terms of the 
will demonstrated that the testator intended to benefit Catholic institutions. 
Her Honour did not agree with the Ms Edwards’s contention, considering MacKillop was the appropriate 
recipient (at [50]–[52]): 
First, it is clearly the successor organisation to the Orphanages, and the governance arrangements of 
MacKillop reflect its institutional heritage. Indeed, and while this is of course not determinative, its 
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administrative headquarters occupy the site previously occupied by the St Vincent de Paul’s Boys’ 
Orphanage in South Melbourne. It was the intention of the Will, as represented by the terms of clause 
7(c), that the distribution of the income of the Trust was to be at the discretion of the Principals of the 
Orphanages, who were almost certainly members of the orders … who are now represented on the 
MacKillop Board of Management. The fact that MacKillop is a large charitable organisation with 
substantial assets does not detract from either its status as the successor organisation of the 
Orphanages or its capacity or appropriateness for administering the income from the Trust according 
to its terms. The evidence is that it does, in fact, offer and administer scholarships. I also do not 
accept that because MacKillop only provides education services to children and young people with 
special needs, and only operates two schools, that the class of children and young people would be 
confined to a much narrower group than the group that was in the contemplation of the testator 
when he made his Will. Indeed, both the Attorney-General and Ms Edwards propose, in some 
respects at least, a substantial broadening of the access of persons likely to be eligible for assistance 
from the income of the Trust, that is, to financially disadvantaged children and young people 
generally. True it is that MacKillop offers a range of support services, not just residential care, to 
adults as well as families and young people. However, in my view, to the extent that MacKillop 
provides residential care and support services to children and young people, including young people 
in foster care placements, its client base is still fundamentally the same class of children and young 
people living in the Orphanages: that is, those children and young people who, for whatever reason, 
cannot live with and be supported by their own families. The reasons why that might be the case, and 
the models of service delivery, have changed since the 1950s. But the target group of the Orphanages 
and the recipients of the residential and allied services provided by MacKillop appear to be 
substantially similar.  
Thus, MacKillop was the appropriate successor to the orphanages named in the will. However, how should the 
income of the Trust be applied? Her Honour said that it was not sufficient to supply the income to MacKillop to 
apply as it saw fit. Rather, it should only be used to provide scholarships (at [57]): 
...it seems to me that the income from the Trust should be provided to MacKillop to offer 
scholarships, and other financial assistance for educational purposes, to individual children and young 
people for whom it has the responsibility for providing residential care and support, including those 
children and young people it supports in foster care placements. The latter qualification is intended to 
reflect that the testator intended to benefit those who did not have families or for whatever reason, 
could not live with their families, recognising that foster care is an established alternative to care in 
facilities directly operated by charitable and other organisations. 
Her Honour did not agree with the Archbishop of Melbourne’s proposal that the scholarships should be limited 
to assistance for attendance at Catholic schools. Nor did she agree with various other limitations in the 
proposed schemes of Ms Edwards and the Attorney-General (at [63]–[64]): 
In my view, the best formulation to adopt for eligibility for the scheme would be to define the class of 
potential beneficiaries as those children and young people who are in receipt of supported residential 
care or like services provided by MacKillop who are engaged in primary and secondary education, 
irrespective of whether the young people concerned had attained the age of 18. Accordingly, while I 
accept in general terms the scheme proposed by the Trustee, in that the income from the Trust be 
provided to MacKillop to administer and allocate, I consider that the terms of the Will require the 
terms upon which the income is to be allocated to be more closely prescribed than that contended 
for by the Trustee. In particular, in order to adhere to the principle that a cy-près scheme must, as 
best as possible, give effect to the intentions of the testator, the funds must be used to provide direct 
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financial assistance to individual children and young people, and not to augment the moneys available 
to MacKillop to fund its schools and educational programs.  
Thus, the scheme proposed by the Trustee was accepted, with refinements, as the appropriate application cy-
près, of the funds under the Trust. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/257.html 
Implications of this case 
There was no dispute in this case that a cy-près scheme was appropriate. The descendants of the testator 
were keen to continue to provide assistance to beneficiaries under the Trust. In those circumstances, the court 
was obliged to order or sanction a scheme which applied the gift in a manner as close as possible to the 
testator’s original general intention, but framed in a contemporary context. Her Honour did this by deciding on 
a successor body to administer the funds provided under the trust, but ordered that they be applied in a 
particular way to reflect what might have been the testator’s intentions in the 21
st
 century. 
 
2.9.9 HICKIN V CARROLL & ORS (NO 2) [2014] NSWSC 1059 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES, KUNC J, 6 AUGUST 2014) 
This case concerned a condition placed on gifts in the will of Patrick Carroll (the testator) who died on 16 April 
2012. The issue was the proper construction and effect of gifts to Mr Carroll's children of portions of his 
residuary estate made conditional upon them becoming Roman Catholics within three months of his death. 
The Court concluded that the requirement for each of them to become a Roman Catholic was a condition 
precedent which was not void for uncertainty, impossible or contrary to public policy. Since none of them 
became a Roman Catholic within three months of Mr Carroll's death, what would otherwise have been their 
respective shares in his residuary estate fell to be divided among the other residuary beneficiaries named in 
the will. 
The facts of the case were not controversial. The four adult children concerned were those of the testator and 
his first wife.  All had been baptised as Jehovah’s Witnesses in the 1960s and remained active in their faith to 
date. The testator had taken objection to the conversion of both his first wife (at around the time of their 
separation) and their children, and required in his 2011 will that they both attend his funeral and becoming 
baptised as Roman Catholics within three months of his death.  The children all attended their father’s funeral, 
but did not carry out the other condition in the will. 
The expert evidence was that baptism was the means by which a person became a Roman Catholic. Those 
already baptised in some Christian faiths (such as Anglicans) cannot be rebaptised as Catholics because 
Anglican baptism is already recognised as baptism by the Roman Catholic Church.  However, baptism as a 
Jehovah’s Witness is not recognised for this purpose by the Catholic Church, so a Jehovah’s Witness could be 
baptised as a Roman Catholic. 
As to the three months condition, a non-Catholic adult generally becomes a member of the Roman Catholic 
Church by participating in the Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults (RCIA) which involves a period of study, 
reflection, prayer and participation in various ceremonies culminating in the reception of the Roman Catholic 
sacraments of Baptism (if that person has not previously undergone a baptism valid according to the Roman 
Catholic Church), Confirmation and Eucharist (also known as Communion) at an Easter Vigil Mass. The process 
generally takes many months (sometimes 12 months or more).  However, there is no specified time period, 
and no minimum time period involved. Therefore, a non-Catholic adult can receive the Roman Catholic 
sacraments of Baptism (if necessary), Confirmation and Eucharist outside the context of the formal RCIA 
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process and so be validly initiated as a member of the Roman Catholic Church in a period of less than three 
months from when that person first expressed the wish to become a Roman Catholic.  
The court ruled that there were two conditions: the attendance condition (which was fulfilled by the four 
children); and the baptism condition (which was not). Were these conditions precedent or subsequent? The 
court said (at [71]): 
Whether the Baptism and Attendance Conditions are precedent or subsequent is a critical issue in 
these proceedings, not least because different tests apply for uncertainty depending on the nature of 
the conditions. If they are conditions precedent and not uncertain then the Gifts will never have 
vested in the Children, whose non-satisfaction of the Baptism Condition will then mean that their 
portions go to the other residuary beneficiaries pursuant to the Alternate Gifts. If the conditions are 
conditions subsequent then the Gifts will have vested in the Children subject to divesting or 
defeasance for non-satisfaction of the conditions. If the conditions subsequent are uncertain, and 
therefore void, then their portions will remain vested in the Children. 
The court was clear that the conditions were conditions precedent (at [78]), but this conclusion was not 
determinative in any event (at [89]): 
In any event, because the Court is satisfied that the conditions, whether conditions precedent or 
subsequent, are not void for uncertainty, the practical outcome of these proceedings does not 
depend upon the correctness of my view that they are conditions precedent. In circumstances where, 
on any view, the Children have failed to comply with the Baptism Condition, their portions, if the 
conditions were precedent, never vested in them or, if the conditions were subsequent, vested in 
them but were divested or defeated upon their non-satisfaction of the conditions within the specified 
time. 
The conditions were not void for uncertainty. All parties accepted that the attendance condition was certain. 
As to the baptism condition, this was a matter of interpreting the words used in the will in plain English terms. 
There were precedents that made clear that on its proper construction the reference to ‘being baptised into 
the Catholic Church’ meant ‘being ritually initiated into the Roman Catholic Church’. There could be no doubt 
as to the meaning intended.  His Honour in this case referred particularly to the Queensland case of Re 
Williams, deceased; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Williams [1950] St R Q 148, where then Chief Justice Macrossan 
said (at pages 198–199, Philp J agreeing at page 204): 
Whether a man professes the Roman Catholic religion cannot, in my opinion, be a question of degree. 
A man professes the Roman Catholic religion who overtly by words and/or conduct expresses his 
adherence to it. This involves the profession of acceptance of all the articles of belief which the 
Roman Catholic Church requires its members to accept and the rejection of anything which is 
inconsistent therewith. Anything else is not a profession of the Roman Catholic religion whatever else 
it may be. No question arises of ascertaining the genuineness of the profession. The profession of a 
religion is not established by a mere inward belief in it. It involves an overt expression of belief. On 
the other hand, the genuineness or otherwise of the profession is irrelevant to the inquiry necessary 
to determine whether the disqualification prescribed by the testator has been incurred. It would, I 
think, startle the authors of The Act of Settlement and of the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1829, 10 Geo. 
IV, c. 7, to be told that there was any uncertainty about the phrase "professing the Roman Catholic 
religion." In the latter Act the phrases "a person professing the Roman Catholic religion" and "Peer 
professing the Roman Catholic religion" are used about a score  
The court in this case was happy to adopt this position on the certainty of the condition of baptism in the will.  
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Was the condition of baptism impossible? On this issue, the court said that it was not impossible for three of 
the children to receive baptism within three months of the will. The fourth child had originally been baptised 
as an Anglican so could not be baptised as a Catholic, but could have received the other sacraments 
(Confirmation and Eucharist) as required for adult conversion (at [110]–[112]): 
It was not impossible "in the nature of things" for [the three daughters of the testator] to receive the 
Roman Catholic sacrament of Baptism within a period of three months from Mr Carroll's death...the 
case of [the son] is different. The Court is satisfied that it was impossible "in the nature of things" for 
[the son] to be "baptised into the Catholic Church" insofar as [the son] could not, as a matter of 
Roman Catholic canon law, be baptised again after his childhood baptism into the Anglican Church. 
However, by reason of what the Court has found to be the proper construction of the expression 
"baptised into the Catholic Church"... on the basis of the findings I have made concerning Roman 
Catholic doctrine and practice ... it cannot be said that it is impossible "in the nature of things" for 
[the son] to have been ritually initiated into the Roman Catholic Church by receiving the Roman 
Catholic sacraments of Confirmation and Eucharist within the period of three months from Mr 
Carroll's death. The Baptism Condition is not void for impossibility. 
Thus, the condition as to baptism was neither uncertain nor impossible. Were there any public policy issues 
arising? The four children submitted that, in the modern Australian society of 2014, a clause such as the 
baptism condition was either void per se as a matter of public policy or, if not, contemporary circumstances 
gave rise to a hitherto unrecognised principle of public policy which overcame Mr Carroll's freedom of 
testation. In relation to freedom of testation, the court in this case was bound by the High Court decision in In 
re Cuming; Nicholls v Public Trustee (South Australia) [1945] HCA 32 (at [127]–[128]): 
It is trite law that as a judge sitting at first instance, I am bound to apply the principles of law laid 
down by courts higher in the appellate hierarchy. In this case that means decisions of the NSW Court 
of Appeal and the High Court of Australia. A court lower in the appellate hierarchy is bound by the 
ratio decidendi of a decision in a higher court in that hierarchy. The ratio is a rule of law expressly or 
impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step to reaching his or her conclusion.... The affirmation 
of the validity of a condition in restraint of religion is an expressly necessary step in the Court's 
conclusion in Cuming. That proposition was the starting point of each judge's chain of reasoning. The 
clause in question in Cuming was a gift to a grand-daughter "provided she shall have renounced the 
Roman Catholic religion within three calendar months of my decease". The premise for the decision, 
relevantly, was that the condition was valid unless, owing to the facts in that case, it was contrary to 
public policy as an interference with the parental right to bring up a child in a particular faith. 
The High Court concluded that no public policy principle was breached by the condition in Cuming. The 
baptism condition in this case was therefore valid. There could be no question of the condition being void per 
se. But was it invalid on some other public policy ground? It was not (at [132]–[134]): 
I am unable to discern from the legislation, treaties and other considerations referred to by the 
Children a public policy of the kind for which they contend that would overcome the longstanding 
significance which the law has accorded to freedom of testation. Insofar as they invoke religious 
discrimination, the various anti-discrimination statutes to which they referred do not prevent 
discrimination on the grounds of religion generally.... The conditions, in particular the Baptism 
Condition, do not impinge upon whatever right to the free exercise of their religion the law now 
accords the Children. The Gifts do not compel the Children to do anything. If they had chosen to do 
so, they could have complied with the Baptism Condition. They have maintained their adherence to 
the Jehovah's Witness faith. That choice is to be accorded every respect but does not relieve them 
from the consequences of that choice on their eligibility under the Gifts.  
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Therefore, the baptism condition was neither uncertain, impossible nor contrary to public policy. The gifts to 
the children were void, and fell into the residuary to be distributed to the remaining beneficiaries. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/1059.html 
Implications of this case 
As His Honour said in this case (at [136]):  
It is an unfortunate fact that many testamentary gifts perpetuate or create family disharmony, 
whether or not the testator intended that to occur. The fact that a testamentary gift has had such an 
unfortunate effect (even where that effect was obviously intended) has never been a basis upon 
which the law has acted to declare that gift void as contrary to public policy. 
This case thus upheld that public policy principle of freedom of testation. 
 
2.9.10  JENSEN V JENSEN [2014] VSC 432; KEATING V JENSEN [2014] VSC 433 (SUPREME 
COURT OF VICTORIA, DERHAM ASJ, 9 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
These two cases concerned applications for family provision under Part IV of the Administration and Probate 
Act 1958 (Vic) (the Act). The plaintiffs were, respectively, two great-nephews, and a nephew and his son, of the 
deceased, Dorothy Gilmore. The deceased left an estate of $1,925,000 out of which she gave specific legacies 
totalling $60,000. The residuary of the estate was left to two charities, the former Williamstown Hospital (now 
under the auspices of Western Health) and the Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria (now known as Cancer Council 
Victoria). 
The plaintiffs applied for further and better provision from the estate. The two great-nephews are blood 
relations of the deceased. The nephew and his son are descendants of the deceased’s husband, and not 
related by blood to the deceased. In both cases, His Honour ordered a full trial on the basis that he was not 
satisfied that the plaintiffs had no real prospects of success in their claims. If successful, any further and better 
provision from the estate would come from the residuary of the estate, and thus adversely affect the charities 
involved. 
The defendants are the executors of the estate. The case law revealed only one decided case in which a niece 
or nephew has been successful in obtaining further provision in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Leaving aside 
claims by spouses, domestic partners, children and step-children of a deceased, all of the successful claimants 
in Part IV cases in the Supreme Court of Victoria since 1997 appeared to have established that they had a 
relationship to the deceased akin to that of a partner or child, that they were carers of the deceased, or that 
they had contributed to the deceased’s estate in a measurable way, whether directly or indirectly. Even those 
few claims by grandchildren that were successful required significantly more than just the relationship itself, 
even where there was a very good relationship between the deceased and the claimant. 
Therefore, the responsibility of the deceased to make provision for the plaintiffs could only be a moral 
responsibility, and was to be judged by reference to the provision a wise and just testator would have thought 
it her moral duty to make in their interests. The court had to place itself in the position of the deceased and 
consider what she ought to have done in all the circumstances of the case, treating her for that purpose as 
wise and just, and not as fond and foolish. His Honour said that there were several factors in these 
proceedings ‘that affect my consideration of whether the wise and just testatrix in the position of [the 
deceased] had a responsibility to make further provision for the proper maintenance and support of the 
plaintiffs’ (at [45]).  These were: 
 145 
 
Dorothy’s appreciation of the value of the estate 
On this point His Honour said (at [48]): 
During her life, Dorothy gave what she apparently considered to be generous gifts of money to her 
nieces and nephews and great-nieces and great-nephews. By any modern standard they were small 
indeed. The legacies that she left her nieces and nephews are, in the context of the size of her estate, 
small. For these reasons, it is a fair inference that she did not appreciate the value of her assets – and 
thus the size of her estate – when she made her will. 
The size of the estate 
His Honour described the estate as ‘more than modest’.  In this context, it was appropriate to consider its 
distribution (at [49]): 
This is particularly so where the legacies are definitely small, and the residuary estate is to be divided 
between two charities about which there is no information of relevance. 
The competing claims 
The competing claims were from two charities. His Honour said (at [50]-[51]): 
Dorothy left what turns out to be a very large proportion of her estate to two charities.  Little or 
nothing is known of the claims that those charities had upon her bounty...The combination of 
Dorothy’s lack of appreciation of the value of her estate and the very large proportion of the estate 
that now must go to the charities under the Will, leads me to conclude that there is a matter to be 
investigated at a trial, or a question to be tried. That is, whether Dorothy had a responsibility or moral 
duty to make further provision for the proper maintenance and support of the plaintiffs.  
The plaintiffs’ needs 
Evidence was given of the plaintiffs’ various needs. These were mainly financial. His Honour said: ‘Suffice it to 
say that both plaintiffs’ financial position discloses an arguable case for need’ (at [53]). Although His Honour 
referred to the plaintiffs’ case as ‘weak’ (at [52]), he was not satisfied that they had no real prospects of 
success.  He therefore ordered a full trial for both sets of plaintiffs. 
Keating v Jensen may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/433.html 
Jensen v Jensen may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/432.html 
Implications of this decision 
This case is yet to go to trial. Section 91(1) of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) provides that: 
Despite anything in this Act to the contrary, the Court may order that provision be made out of the 
estate of a deceased person for the proper maintenance and support of a person for whom the 
deceased had responsibility to make provision. 
This seems to throw a very wide net as to who can apply. However, the case law shows that successful 
applicants for family provision are usually closely connected with the deceased. 
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2.9.11 KING V DUBREY [2014] EWHC 2083 (CH); [2014] CN 1206 (ENGLAND AND WALES HIGH 
COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION, HOLLANDER J, 1 JULY 2014) 
In this English case, seven charities were the residuary beneficiaries of the will of the deceased, June 
Fairbrother, who died in April 2011. The claimant in the case was her nephew. The nephew claimed that the 
deceased had made a donatio mortis causa (a gift in contemplation of death) of her property (a home valued 
at £350,000 in Hertfordshire) to him, between four and six months before her death, by handing him the 
deeds of the property, and saying words to the effect: ‘This will be yours when I go’.  
When made, a donatio mortis causa is a present gift which remains conditional until the donor dies. It can be 
revoked until that time. Until death, the gift is inchoate, and gives rise to a constructive trust. If the donor 
effectively transfers title to the donee, the gift will become unconditional on the donor's death. This was the 
apparent situation in this case, since the deceased handed over the deeds to her house. The defendant 
charities (Blue Cross, the Peoples’ Dispensary for Sick Animals, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, the 
Donkey Sanctuary, World Animal Protection, Redwings and the Chilterns Dog Rescue Society) contended that 
the deceased had not had the mental capacity to make such a gift at the time she was alleged to have made it. 
His Honour allowed the claim, relying on In re Beaney [1978] 1 WLR 770, at 774. His Honour said that the 
evidence did not come ‘anywhere near’ justifying the conclusion that the deceased had not had the mental 
capacity to make the gift, when she acted in a manner relied on by her nephew. The facts were such that there 
was a valid donatio mortis causa made by the deceased at a time when she was increasingly concerned about 
her impending death. Thus, there had been a valid gift in contemplation of death. This being so, the provisions 
of her will did not apply, and the charities were not beneficiaries under her will. 
This case is not reported online. 
Implications of this case 
The charities in this case were particularly concerned with the outcome. Since a valid deathbed gift had been 
found, the provisions of the deceased’s otherwise valid will were overturned. The legal doctrine of donatio 
mortis causa has its origins in Roman law and is little used in English law today. The conditions for its 
application are: 
1. the gift must be made in contemplation of, although not necessarily in expectation of, impending 
death;  
2. the gift must be made upon the condition that it is to be absolute and perfected only on the donor's 
death, being revocable until that event occurs;  
3. there must be a delivery of the subject matter of the gift, or the essential indicia of title to the gift, 
which amounts to a parting with dominion over, and not mere physical possession of, the subject 
matter of the gift. 
All of these conditions were held to have been present in this case. 
 
2.9.12 LINCU V KRNJULAC [2014] NSWSC 532 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
LINDSAY J, 28 MAY 2014) 
This case concerned the affairs of The Apostolic Christian Church Nazarene – Sydney. The plaintiffs sought to 
recover land for the charitable purposes of a small congregation of Christians. The land is the site of a church 
building, which was purchased in the names of five trustees (including the two plaintiffs) in 1978. In 2004, it 
was transferred out of the five original trustees’ names into the names of one of the original trustees (the first 
defendant), and his two adult sons (the second and third defendants), for their own purposes. 
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The Apostolic Christian Church Nazarene – Sydney (the Church) is an unincorporated voluntary association in 
New South Wales which apparently had always operated without a formal written constitution. However, 
there was a common understanding that business undertaken by members of the association in pursuit of 
their common purpose was ordinarily decided by a process which, in a secular context, would be recognised as 
a form of democracy, bound by conventions grounded in custom, and informed by shared beliefs. Thus, the 
Church was of a congregational nature, rather than hierarchical. 
The trust deed upon which the plaintiffs founded their claim could not be located. However, His Honour 
accepted secondary evidence of its existence because it was used as part of the documentation for a mortgage 
from the then Bank of New South Wales in 1978. The mortgage was discharged in 1982, having been paid for 
by gifts and donations from members of the Church. 
Two of the original trustees had died in the interim, and one (who was the second plaintiff in this case) had 
moved to a like-minded congregation in Melbourne. In May 2004, after the deaths of the two trustees, the 
first defendant procured (by trickery or fraud) the transfer of the property to himself and his two adult sons as 
joint tenants. He claimed that the property was his own asset in his banking arrangements from that date, and 
mortgaged the property. He had also paid the expenses related to the land and building after that time. There 
was evidence that he was now having financial difficulties. If that were so, it was possible that the mortgagee 
would take possession of the land and building, so that its purpose as a church would be lost. 
The defendants contended that the fact that the government of the Church took a democratic, congregational 
form meant that the terms of a trust upon which property was held for the Church could be varied, or the 
identity of the trustees could be changed, by a popular vote of the members of the Church in its guise as a 
voluntary association. However, His Honour held that unless the terms of the trust were proven to include a 
power of amendment, or a power to appoint and remove trustees, it was not open to the members of the 
Church to change the trust for the charitable, religious purposes of the Church. The land, having been acquired 
in 1978, remained impressed with a trust for the charitable, religious purposes of the Church. 
The land was purchased, and the mortgage paid off, for the purpose of public worship according to the system 
of belief of this particular Christian church community. Even though membership of the unincorporated 
voluntary association associated with that community might have had special meaning, and the nature of an 
attendant's participation in a worship service might have varied according to a variety of considerations, 
including membership of the association, services have always been open to the public. 
His Honour concluded that (at [18]–[19]): 
I am satisfied that the land was purchased on trust for the advancement of religion, not for the 
benefit of particular individuals, and that its purchase was directed to the benefit of the public. In 
short, I am satisfied that the land was purchased on trust for, and dedicated to, charitable 
purposes...A trust for the advancement of religion falls squarely within the meaning of the word 
‘charity’ under the general law: The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel 
[1891] UKHL 1... 
There was nothing in the facts that changed this outcome. In particular, the fact that the congregation was 
very small did not affect its charitable character.  
His Honour held that the three defendants were obliged in equity to restore to the Church the property they 
had taken from it. A series of orders was made by the court which made it clear that the three defendants held 
the property as constructive trustees for the Church. These included (at [147]): 
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(a) A declaration that, subject to these orders, each of the first plaintiff, the second plaintiff and the 
first defendant remains in office as a trustee, for ‘The Apostolic Christian Church Nazarene – Sydney’, 
of the Church land and an incidental right to recover that land for the Church; 
(b) An order that the first defendant be removed from office as a trustee of the Church land and the 
incidental right to recover it, without prejudice to his obligations under these orders to account for his 
use and enjoyment of the title to that land; 
(c) A declaration that the Church land is dedicated to the charitable, religious purposes of ‘The 
Apostolic Christian Church Nazarene – Sydney’, subject to such, if any, rights as the proprietor of [any 
registered mortgage] may have; 
(d) A declaration that the first, second and third defendants hold the Church land as constructive 
trustees for ‘The Apostolic Christian Church Nazarene – Sydney’ and, as such, are liable to account for 
it to the plaintiffs (or such other persons as may be duly appointed) as trustees of the Church land; 
(e) A declaration that the plaintiffs (or such other persons as may be duly appointed) as trustees of 
the Church land are entitled (as against the first, second and third defendants) to an estate in fee 
simple in the Church land, unencumbered by the mortgage; 
(f) An order that the first, second and third defendants forthwith deliver up possession of the Church 
land to the plaintiffs (or such other persons as may be duly appointed) as trustees of the Church land; 
(g) An order that the first, second and third defendants account to the plaintiffs (or such other 
persons as may be duly appointed) as trustees of the Church land for their use of title to the Church 
land; 
(h) An order that the first, second and third defendants indemnify the plaintiffs (or such other persons 
as may be duly appointed) as trustees of the Church land against all claims that may be made against 
the Church land by the proprietor of the mortgage. 
Several more difficult questions were reserved for determination, such as the question of the vesting of the 
legal title to the land in the trustees, and the possibility of equitable compensation. The defendants had to pay 
the costs of the proceeding. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/532.html 
Implications of this case 
A trust for the erection or maintenance of a church building in which believers in the tenets of a religious 
community may worship and find spiritual edification is a religious, charitable trust. In this case, the original 
trust property was somehow subverted to the private use of one of the original trustees. The decision in this 
case returns the trust to its original position, with the remaining original trustees in place. Despite the fact that 
the first defendant had mortgaged the property for his own purposes, His Honour held that the property had 
to be returned to the trustees free of mortgage. This was to be achieved by the return of the property subject 
to the rights of the mortgagee, but with an indemnification of the plaintiffs as trustees of the Church land 
against all claims that might be made against the Church land by the proprietor of the mortgage.  
 
2.9.13 McCAW LEWIS TRUSTEES (NO.4) LIMITED, RE [2014] NZHC 2627 (NEW ZEALAND HIGH 
COURT, FAIRE J, 28 OCTOBER 2014)  
The applicants in this case were the trustees of the LJ Reynolds No 2 Trust (the Trust). They sought a 
declaration that it was lawful for the trustees to make a distribution/s of income or capital, both interim 
and/or final, to the Mahi-a-Ngakau Trust. The Mahi- a-Ngakau Trust is a charitable trust in New Zealand. A 
distribution can only be made to such a trust if it comes within the definition of ‘public charitable institution’, 
which is referred to as a class of discretionary beneficiaries under the Trust’s deed. 
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The settlor of the Trust was the late Leonard John Reynolds. The Mahi-a-Ngakau Trust was settled by the late 
Leonard John Reynolds one year after the Trust. It was originally called the LJ Reynolds Charitable Trust. It was 
registered under the Charities Act 2005 on 27 January 2011, and incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 
1957 on 16 July 2012. 
The relevant charities named in the original Trust were: 
Either the MISSION TO LEPERS (N.Z.) at Auckland, or THE LEPERS’ TRUST BOARD INCORPORATED at 
Christchurch. 
THE WAIKATO BRANCH OF THE NEW ZEALAND CRIPPLED CHILDREN SOCIETY INC, at Hamilton 
THE SALVATION ARMY for the general purposes of “THE NEST” at Hamilton or such other purposes as 
the Salvation Army may determine 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND for the purpose of Child Sponsorship Plan or such similar 
project as the Church may from time to time determine, 
OR any other public charitable institution which the Trustees at their absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion may decide. [this para emphasis added] 
The charities’ submission was that they should be the beneficiaries of any distributions from the Trust, as they 
were front line service providers, rather than a non-front line organisation without a public profile, which 
counsel for the charities named a ‘private charitable trust’ rather than a public charitable trust. 
His Honour treated the case as one of strict interpretation of the trust deed. He said (at [23]–[24]): 
I turn to look specifically at the Trust Deed. I accept the applicant’s submissions that the term ‘public 
charitable institution’ should be interpreted in its entirety and in a commonsense manner. When I 
asked [counsel for the charities] if he could provide a set of condition precedents which might 
distinguish charities which did not fall within the classification ‘public charitable institution’ he 
properly acknowledged that he could not give such a detailed description. He also acknowledged that 
he could find no authority which distinguished charitable trusts on the one hand as being ‘public’ and 
on the other as being ‘private’. That is not surprising. The reasons are well put by the learned authors 
of Garrow & Kelly Law of Trusts and Trustees as follows: 
All charitable trusts must have some ‘public’ as distinct from ‘private’ purpose. Thus, a gift 
for a ‘private charity’ would not be a charitable trust although, of course, it might be quite 
valid as a private trust if the object to be benefited were certain and it otherwise complied 
with the requirements for private declared trusts.  
I therefore reach the conclusion, on the basis that there has been no contest at all as to the status of 
the Mahi-a-Ngakau Trust as being a charity, that trust falls within the category of potential 
beneficiaries as defined in cl 1(a) of the Trust’s deed [see wording above]. It follows that the 
applicants are entitled to the declaration they seek. 
Therefore, it was lawful for the applicants, as trustees of the LJ Reynolds (No. 2) Trust to make a distribution/s 
of income or capital (interim and/or final) to the Mahi-a-Ngakau Trust. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/2627.html 
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Implications of this case 
Similar principles apply to the construction of trust deeds as apply to the construction of contracts. His Honour 
did not consider any extrinsic evidence as relevant to his analysis in this case, but rather interpreted the words 
of the trust deed in their common meaning. The meaning was plain and was interpreted as such. 
 
2.9.14 MELBA SUPPORT SERVICES INC V BELL [2014] VSC 425 (SUPREME COURT OF 
VICTORIA, MCMILLAN J, 9 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This was another will case where a residuary clause of a will was directed to a charity which had apparently 
ceased to exist. Alice Hall died in 1982. Under her will she left half of the residuary of her estate to her 
husband, and half as provided in clause 4(b) of the will as follows: 
To invest the other equal part or share and to pay such part of the income and such part of the capital 
at such times and in such amounts as my Trustees in their absolute discretion think fit to the 
Treasurer for the time being of The Melba Centre of Silvan Road, Mt Evelyn so long as my daughter 
HEATHER MARY BELL is a resident of the ROSINE NURSING HOME of The Crescent Mt Evelyn. If my 
daughter HEATHER MARY BELL is not a resident of the said ROSINE NURSING HOME then I EMPOWER 
my Trustees to use the said income and capital at such times and in such amounts as my Trustees in 
their absolute discretion think fit for the care and welfare of my daughter HEATHER MARY BELL. If at 
the date of death of my daughter HEATHER MARY BELL she is a resident of the ROSINE NURSING 
HOME then I DIRECT that any undistributed income and capital shall be paid to the Treasurer for the 
time being of the Melba Centre to be used by The Melba Centre for such charitable and other 
purposes as it in its absolute discretion thinks fit. If at the date of death of my daughter HEATHER 
MARY BELL she is not a resident of the ROSINE NURSING HOME then I DIRECT that any undistributed 
capital and income shall be paid to my son REX JAMES BELL PROVIDED THAT if my son REX JAMES 
BELL should predecease my daughter HEATHER MARY BELL then I DIRECT that any undistributed 
capital and income shall be paid to the child or children of my son REX JAMES BELL living at the death 
of my daughter HEATHER MARY BELL and if more than one as tenants in common in equal shares. 
The deceased’s daughter, Heather Bell, lived at the Rosine Nursing Home in Mt Evelyn from 26 May 1981 until 
October 1997. In 1997, Heather (who was profoundly disabled) was moved to De Felice Place in Mooroolbark, 
where she remained until she died on 17 March 2013. Rex Bell died on 26 November 2013 (i.e. he did not 
predecease his sister). The amount held by the trustees under clause 4(b) as at 7 May 2014 was $38,186.07. 
This proceeding concerned how that sum ought to be distributed.  
The plaintiff in this proceeding was Melba Support Services Inc (Melba), an organisation that provides support 
services to individuals with severe and profound disabilities. The plaintiff, and predecessor institutions to the 
plaintiff, previously ran the Rosine Nursing Home and continue to operate De Felice Place. The trustees under 
the will applied to the Attorney-General of Victoria for directions under section 4(1) of the Charities Act 1978 
(Vic) for sanction of a scheme to disburse the remaining money in the will trust to Melba.  The Attorney-
General replied that no sanction would be given as the terms of the will were plain, and the money ought to 
be distributed to the estate of Rex Bell. Melba then initiated this action. 
Was Melba the successor recipient under the will? Her Honour traced its history and agreed that the ‘Melba 
Centre’ existed at all material times, despite name changes and other alterations to its structure (at [44]): 
In this case, the purposes of the plaintiff are the same as the purposes of Melba Centre Inc, namely, 
providing support services and assistance for individuals with disabilities, and the work of Melba 
Centre Inc and the plaintiff continue along the same lines. In the circumstances, Melba Centre Inc has 
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not ceased to exist as it is only the mechanics by which the organisation operates that have changed, 
seemingly caused in this case by changes in government policy and the financial circumstances at the 
time of the change of name of the incorporated entity. 
It was also accepted that Melba had at all times been a charity. Was a cy-près order therefore available? The 
important part of the will for the purposes of this case was that part of clause 4(b) which referred to what 
should happen after Heather Bell’s death. Her Honour said that the gift under clause 4(b) was not a charitable 
gift to the plaintiff. During Heather’s lifetime, the deceased had only intended to benefit Heather. There was 
no gift to Melba. After Heather’s death there was again no gift to Melba on a strict reading of the will (at [56]): 
On the death of Heather, the deceased provided that any gift to the plaintiff is conditional on Heather 
being a resident of the Rosine Nursing Home when she died. If not, the deceased has provided for a 
gift over to her remaining child, Rex. The gift over supports the finding that the deceased’s intention 
to make any gift to the plaintiff was only in circumstances where Heather was a resident of Rosine 
Nursing Home when she died, that is, the gift to the plaintiff was conditional. As Heather was not a 
resident of the Rosine Nursing Home when she died, the undistributed income and capital should be 
paid to the estate of Rex, who survived Heather. 
The doctrine of cy-près applies where a charitable trust cannot be performed, so that the funds held on trust 
would otherwise fail. However, the donor must have placed the gift under trust with a general charitable 
intention, not an intention to achieve a specific purpose; where a gift fails and there is a valid gift over that can 
be applied on the terms of the trust, there is no need to consider a cy-près order (the gift over indicates the 
donor did not have a general charitable intention). Therefore, no cy-près order was appropriate in this case, 
and the money remaining in the trust was ordered to be distributed to the estate of Rex Bell. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/425.html 
Implications of this case 
Her Honour had recently decided Re Coulson [2014] VSC 353 (1 August 2014). This case was distinguished from 
that decision. In Re Coulson, the plaintiff sought orders by way of cy-près where the two charities described in 
the will, Aglow International and Spirit of Life Church, did not exist. However, the evidence indicated that Spirit 
of Life Church did exist under another name, and Aglow International had also previously existed under 
another name, Aglow Australia, and continued to exist by way of a successor incorporated association that had 
inherited the assets and purposes of the original organisation. In drawing a distinction between the two 
decisions, Her Honour said (at [63]): 
In that case, I also considered that, even if Aglow Australia had not survived by way of a successor 
institution, then it was appropriate that the nominal successor institution take the benefit of the gift 
by way of a cy-près order. In Re Coulson, there was no valid gift over, and if the gift was not recovered 
by way of the order made, it would have been distributed on an intestacy basis. 
As there was a specific and valid gift over in this case, there was no cy-près order available to benefit Melba. 
 
2.9.15 NATIONAL HEART FOUNDATION OF NEW ZEALAND V PALMER [2014] NZHC 1740 
(HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, KATZ J, 24 JULY 2014) 
This New Zealand case concerned testamentary promises. At stake, were gifts in equal shares of an entire 
estate. The beneficiaries were three charities, including the appellant. Eric Burton and Elsie Burton-Whiting 
were in their 80s when they met in 2005. Mrs Burton-Whiting moved into Mr Burton’s home shortly 
afterwards. She took with her various household chattels including her collections of pottery, china and 
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crystal. The couple married in January 2007, and then moved to another home, the purchase price of which 
was funded by Mr Burton. However, most of Mrs Burton-Whiting’s chattels were retained at the new home. 
The transfer of title was registered on 7 December 2007, but Mrs Burton-Whiting died on 12 December 2007. 
Mr Burton died in March 2012. His will of 20 February 2012 left his estate in approximately equal shares to 
three charities including the appellant, the National Heart Foundation of New Zealand.  
The respondent, Neil Palmer, is Mrs Burton-Whiting’s son by her first marriage. He is the executor and 
residuary beneficiary of his mother’s estate. Although his mother’s will did not expressly refer to any chattels, 
Mr Palmer’s belief was that the chattels she had taken with her when she moved in with Mr Burton remained 
her separate property and therefore formed part of her residuary estate. Mr Palmer’s evidence was that, 
following his mother’s death, he offered to let Mr Burton (who was then in his late 80s) continue using the 
chattels for the remainder of his life. Mr Burton’s response was said to be that after his death Mr and Mrs 
Palmer, who live in Australia, would be getting all the chattels anyway, together with his house and motor 
vehicle. 
Mr and Mrs Palmer were not aware of Mr Burton’s death until about nine months after it had occurred. Mr 
and Mrs Palmer then discovered that they were not beneficiaries under Mr Burton’s will. By this time, all of 
the chattels in the Burton home (including chattels brought by both parties to their marriage and chattels 
purchased by Mr Burton after his wife’s death) had been sold. The total sale proceeds were $11,542.12.  
After seeking legal advice, Mr and Mrs Palmer decided to bring a claim for the house and motor vehicle under 
the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 (LRTPA). The LRTPA provides for enforcement of a 
testamentary promise where services are provided or work is performed in return for that promise, i.e., a 
claim may be made by a person who has provided services to the deceased, if the deceased has then not 
honoured a promise to reward that person for those services in his or her will. The promise does not have to 
be contractually binding. However, the Palmers were out of time to bring such a claim and accordingly sought 
an extension of time from the court. This was granted in a judgment dated 20 December 2013.
 
The appellants 
appealed that decision in this case.  
The issue at the heart of the appeal was ownership of the relevant chattels. The appellants said that they were 
relationship property that passed into Mr Burton’s sole ownership on his wife’s death. If so, Mr and Mrs 
Palmer provided no relevant “service” by allowing Mr Burton to continue to use his own chattels. In that event 
an extension of time should not have been allowed, as any claim under the LRTPA was doomed to failure. Mr 
and Mrs Palmer submitted that it was at least arguable that some of the chattels were separate property. Even 
if they were not, however, the fact that the parties were mistaken as to ownership could give rise to an 
arguable LRTPA claim. 
The relevant law was contained in section 3 of the LRTPA. A claim under section 3 requires proof of four main 
elements: 
a) the claimant must have rendered services to, or performed work for, the deceased in the 
deceased’s lifetime; 
b) there must be an express or implied promise by the deceased to reward the claimant; 
c) there must be a nexus between the services and the promise; and 
d) the deceased must have failed to make the promised testamentary provision or otherwise 
remunerate the claimant. 
Was there a section 3 situation in this case? The analysis of a testamentary promises claim usually starts with 
the issue of whether or not there is a qualifying promise. In this case, however, His Honour said that the 
appropriate starting point was to consider whether Mr and Mrs Palmer provided any services to Mr Burton. If 
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they did not, then their claim will have no “reasonable chance of success” and the application for an extension 
of time should be declined. On this point, His Honour said (at [17]–[18]): 
In my view it is not reasonably arguable that Mr and Mrs Palmer provided any services to Mr Burton. 
Mrs Burton-Whiting may well have originally owned the majority of the chattels in the Knightsbridge 
Place property. However, at the time of her death those chattels were “family chattels” as defined in 
s 2 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (“PRA”). Accordingly, by virtue of s 10(4) of the PRA, they 
were relationship property, unless designated as separate property by a contracting out agreement 
made in accordance with Part 6 of the PRA (which requires that any such agreement be in writing). No 
such agreement was entered into in this case. 
Therefore, since the relevant chattels were relationship property under the PRA, they passed to Mr Burton by 
survivorship on Mrs Burton-Whiting’s death. Mr Burton was thus the legal and beneficial owner of the chattels 
at the time of his conversation with Mr and Mrs Palmer. There was no testamentary promise because the 
chattels never formed part of Mrs Burton-Whiting’s residuary estate and Mr Palmer derived no interest in 
them as her residuary beneficiary. He therefore had no legal right or ability to lend the chattels to Mr Burton, 
since they were already Mr Burton’s property. As His Honour concluded (at [20]): 
Agreeing to [lend] a person their own property does not constitute a service sufficient to support a 
testamentary promise. 
The appeal was allowed, so that an extension of time was not available to the Palmers to pursue an interest 
under the will. The charities were thus successful in retaining their bequests. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/1740.html 
Implications of this case 
The Court’s power to extend the time for filing an application for relief under the LRTPA involves the exercise 
of discretion. Therefore, to succeed on appeal, the appellant charity in this case had to show that the judge in 
the court below made an error of law or principle, or took into account irrelevant considerations, or failed to 
take into account relevant considerations, or was plainly wrong. In this case, the appellant was successful 
because the judge below was held to be in error. Only enforceable promises could be in issue under section 3 
of the LRTPA.  There was no enforceable promise in this case (at [21], [23]): 
The Judge’s finding that it was arguable that a service had been provided in such circumstances 
appears to have been based on an erroneous view that the provisions of the LRTPA addressing the 
issue of unenforceability were potentially relevant to the analysis of whether a service had been 
provided.... 
The Judge’s analysis appears to have overlooked that the question of enforceability is linked to the 
promise, not the associated service. In other words, the LRTPA recognises promises to do something 
through a testamentary gift which might otherwise not be legally enforceable. Legal enforceability is 
not, however, a consideration when examining the issue of whether or not services have been 
provided. 
 
2.9.16 NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PLC V LUCAS [2014] EWCA CIV 1632 (COURT OF 
APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION), PATTEN, GLOSTER, BEAN LLJ, 16 DECEMBER 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the England and Wales High Court in relation to the estate of the late 
Jimmy Savile. The deceased, an English television entertainer, left the bulk of his estate of £3.3 million to the 
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Jimmy Savile Charitable Trust (the Trust). The executor of the will is the National Westminster Bank plc (the 
Bank). There were several individual beneficiaries under the will, including the deceased’s niece. 
The deceased died on 29 October 2011. On 4 October 2012, a television program was broadcast on the ITV 
network in England which dealt with the issue of Savile’s alleged perpetration of child abuse. This resulted in 
139 people coming forward to claim that they had been abused by Savile, and indicating to the Bank that they 
would be pursuing personal injuries claims against the estate (the PI claimants). The indications were that 
several other defendants would be implicated in the PI claims, including the BBC, several National Health 
Service (NHS) trusts, Barnados (a charity), and Mind (a charity) (collectively the Third Party Defendants). 
Although the PI claims were completely untested in the courts, if they were successful they might well have 
exhausted the total assets of the estate, leaving nothing for the Trust or the individual beneficiaries. 
There were two applications in the original hearing – one to replace the Bank as executor, and one to approve 
a draft Scheme to settle the claims of the PI claimants in a speedy and equitable way. The draft Scheme was 
opposed by the Trust and the individual beneficiaries. His Honour dismissed the first application, and approved 
the draft Scheme put forward by the Bank. The terms of the Scheme were negotiated between the Bank, the 
PI Claimants and the Third Party Defendants, and were supported by them as against the Trust and the 
individual beneficiaries. The Scheme was designed to facilitate the settlement of personal injury claims which 
may be brought against the estate and the Third Party Defendants, and indemnity claims by the Third Party 
Defendants against the estate. It did not oblige anyone to settle a claim under it.  
If a person with a personal injury claim against the estate (and, as may be, against a Third Party Defendant) 
chose to make an application under the Scheme, the Bank (and any relevant Third Party Defendant) would be 
required to consider the claim according to a set time-scale and procedure, and to decide whether to accept or 
reject it. The consideration of the claim would involve all relevant evidence in relation to it and would be 
referred to a barrister for review. The barrister would then produce a recommendation as to whether the 
claim should be accepted, rejected, or accepted in part. If it was accepted, the claimant would have the option 
to enter into a settlement agreement with the Bank. If it was rejected, or if the claimant chose not to settle, 
the claimant would have to decide whether to commence legal proceedings against the Bank (acting for the 
estate). 
His Honour concluded that the Scheme was (at [61] of the original decision): 
...a sensible and pragmatic attempt at a solution to the complex situation which confronts the estate. 
It seeks to strike a fair balance between the objectives of providing for reasonable objective scrutiny 
of claims made against the estate whilst minimising the costs of dispute resolution and seeking to 
maximise the scope for distributions out of the estate to those who are really entitled to it (whether 
personal injury claimants, the individual beneficiaries or the Trust). It is a feature of the Scheme that it 
provides for comparatively summary and truncated scrutiny of the merits of the personal injury 
claims under it, as compared with a Rolls-Royce type examination of those claims at trial in court 
proceedings. But the problem with Rolls-Royce trial procedures to resolve such disputes is that they 
are expensive, and are such as would be likely to exhaust the estate in payment of legal expenses if 
every claim were pursued in that way. In my view, the provisions of the Scheme allow for 
proportionate and sufficient objective scrutiny of the merits of the claims consistent with the proper 
administration of the estate. I do not accept the Trust's further criticism of the Scheme, that it is 
unfairly generous to the personal injury claimants. 
Therefore, the Bank was empowered to proceed with the Scheme and administer it according to the agreed 
terms. 
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On appeal, the Trust sought to overturn the Scheme, and the judge’s findings in relation to it. The Scheme 
contains a list of eight categories of assault, ranging from rape to indecent assault involving touching over 
clothing, and provides a tariff rate of damages for each category. The evidence was that the rates agreed 
represented a discount from the amount of damages which could be awarded by the court in such cases and 
that the figures represented the product of negotiation between the Bank, the PI claimants, the BBC and the 
Secretary of State for Health. The likelihood of the limitation period being disapplied was a matter for the Bank 
to consider in deciding whether or not to admit the claim for payment under the Scheme. Most importantly 
for the decision in this appeal, the Scheme also provided for existing PI claimants whose claims were agreed to 
receive £10,000 for their costs up to the approval of the Scheme and for further costs (for all agreed claims) to 
be paid in fixed amounts varying from £6,000 to £3,500 depending on whether a psychiatric report was 
obtained and by whom. The costs to the executor of operating the Scheme were to be paid out of the estate 
on an indemnity basis. 
As at 31 October 2014 the Bank had processed 68 claims under the Scheme and a further 131 remain to be 
considered. Of the 68 claims, eleven had been accepted at a value including costs of £353,125. A further 
eleven PI claimants had been offered reduced settlements amounting in total to £303,500. Thirty-six claims (to 
the value of £1,144,250) had been rejected, and further information had been requested in the remaining ten. 
The value of the 131 remaining claims was some £2,275,950 and their allowable costs under the Scheme 
would amount to about £1,068,500. There were also claims where MIND and the BBC were additional 
defendants which if meritorious and successful would lead to claims for contribution against the estate. 
Should the bank have been approved to make the Scheme? The Court of Appeal said that the real issue in 
relation to the approval application was whether Sales J (at first instance) was in a position to reach a properly 
informed decision on this issue. This in turn required some consideration of the alleged merits and demerits of 
the Scheme and of whether the Bank properly considered what were said to be possible alternatives to the 
Scheme before deciding to seek approval for it as its preferred means of dealing with the PI claims. The Court 
of Appeal could not accept the Trust’s contention that the Scheme should not have proceeded (at [71]–[73]): 
The estate is faced with a significant number of PI claims which, if successfully pursued in litigation, 
will undoubtedly exhaust the estate. Although a number of these claims may be exaggerated or even 
fraudulent, a significant number are undoubtedly genuine and well-founded. The estate cannot be 
fully administered until the scale of the genuine claims is determined and the claimants in question 
will be creditors of the estate who have a prior claim on the available assets in priority to the 
beneficiaries. Given that no one now suggests that the Bank should simply have contested the claims 
relying on a limitation defence, the only alternative was to devise a scheme for the scrutiny and 
assessment of the claims which was as comprehensive as possible. Neither the Bank nor the Court 
could compel the PI claimants to abandon their rights of access to the Courts but the Bank as executor 
could in practice achieve this result by obtaining the Court's approval to a distribution of the estate 
once the PI claimants had been given an opportunity of submitting their claims for consideration by 
the Bank under a suitable scheme. The Scheme negotiated with the solicitors for the PI claimants 
(admittedly at considerable expense) has the added advantage that it not only provides machinery for 
the scrutiny of claims but also fixes the levels of compensation at sums which are likely to be below 
those potentially achievable in civil litigation. One can say that the allowance for historic costs was 
over-generous and that there is no costs penalty for an unsuccessful claim but these provisions were 
the result of a process of negotiation in which there was inevitably a certain amount of give and take. 
They do not make the Scheme an impermissible one. 
On the issue of whether the Bank should have been removed as executor, the Court of Appeal said that there 
was no basis for arguing that the Bank had behaved unfairly or improperly in its role as executor. Therefore, 
there was no basis either for disagreeing with the judge on this point. Nor did any of the other possible 
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grounds for appeal against the Scheme offer any ground for alteration to its terms. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal dismissed the Trust’s appeal against the judge’s order in respect of the approval application and the 
removal application.  However, the Court of Appeal did allow the Trust’s appeal against the orders for costs 
made by Sales J. In substitution, the Court of Appeal ordered the costs of the Trust and the PI claimants of the 
approval application to be paid out of the estate on the indemnity basis, and for the Bank to take its costs out 
of the estate. The Trust was ordered to pay the Bank’s costs of the removal application on an indemnity basis 
but no order was made in respect of the costs of the PI claimants and the Secretary of State. 
This appeal decision may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/1632.html 
The original case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/653.html 
Implications of this decision 
The Trust in this case had continued to oppose the settlement Scheme on the ground that it was too costly, 
and was not fair.  The Court of Appeal found that the Scheme was fair but was not persuaded that the costs 
orders originally made were proper. The Trust had contended that the people who would gain most from the 
Scheme were the lawyers acting for the claimants.  Since the Scheme was approved to continue, the costs 
orders were altered. 
 
2.9.17 NORMAN ESTATE V WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF CANADA, 2014 
BCCA 277 (CANLII) (COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA, BAUMANN CJ, 
SMITH, MACKENZIE JJA, 8 JULY 2014) 
This was a case on appeal from Norman v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Canada, 2013 BCSC 2099. In 
that case, it was held that donations to a registered charity were inter vivos and not testamentary. The funds 
were donated under an agreement that allowed the donors to recall the donated funds at their request. After 
the donors’ deaths, any unrecalled funds were to remain with the charity.  
On appeal, the appellant submitted that the trial judge erred in finding the donors intended to transfer an 
immediate proprietary interest to the charity during their lifetimes, arguing that the control the donors 
retained until their deaths to recall the funds was inconsistent with passing an immediate proprietary interest 
to the charity. 
Lloyd Norman and Lily Norman were practising Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout their adult lives. The Normans 
made regular donations to the respondent, which is the registered charity that represents Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in Canada. In January 1997, the Normans provided a $250,000 no-interest loan to their congregation to assist 
in the construction of a local place of worship referred to as a Kingdom Hall. The Normans held a mortgage 
over the Abbotsford Kingdom Hall property as security, specifying a zero rate of interest, $500 monthly 
payments and a balance due date of 1 February 2002.  
On 17 June 1998, the Abbotsford congregation executed a promissory note stipulating three changes to the 
loan conditions: monthly payments were waived; the principal was to be repaid by 1 May 2000; and the 
congregation undertook to reassess its ability to make monthly payments once the construction project was 
completed. The promissory note made clear that in the event of the death of Lloyd or Lily Norman, the balance 
owing on the loan was to be paid to the survivor, and if both died, the balance owing would be paid to the 
estate of the survivor. 
On 5 June 2001 Lloyd Norman sent a cheque for $200,000 to the respondent. This was stipulated to be for a 
‘no-interest demand loan’. Mr Norman indicated in an accompanying letter that he understood that he could 
get the money back if needed, but that if he died it would ‘remain’ with the respondent. 
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In a letter of response dated 18 June 2001, the respondent wrote that both a no-interest loan and a 
‘conditional donation’ could be given in a way that meant that the donors could request the money, or some 
of it, back if they needed it. The difference between these was that a no-interest loan was repaid on the death 
of the donor, while the amount in a conditional donation was not. The respondent stated that Mr Norman had 
indicated that he was giving a conditional donation, and enclosed a Conditional Donation Agreement for the 
Normans to sign. The Normans returned the signed forms on 3 July 2001, and these were executed by the 
respondent.  
Between 5 June 2001 and 24 November 2009, the Normans advanced $310,000 to the respondent under the 
Conditional Donation Agreement (the Agreement), of which $60,000 was converted to outright contributions 
for which they received charitable donation receipts in the year of the conversion. Neither Mr nor Mrs Norman 
ever requested the return of any portion of the funds provided by them pursuant to the Agreement. In 
addition, between May 1987 and April 2011, the Normans made numerous outright charitable donations to 
the respondent. The respondent issued a charitable donation receipt for each of those donations in the same 
year that the donation was made. 
Lily Norman predeceased Lloyd Norman. On the date of Lloyd Norman’s death there was a balance of 
$250,000 in the Normans’ conditional donation. It is this balance that is referred to as the ‘Conditional 
Donations’. After Lloyd Norman’s death, the respondent issued a charitable donation receipt in the amount of 
$250,000. 
The first instance decision 
Her Honour at first instance held that the conditional donations were not testamentary in effect. There was 
relevant law on the issue which yielded the following principles: 
 The question of whether a disposition is or is not testamentary depends upon the intention of the 
maker; 
 The intention of the maker is a question of fact. In determining the intention, the court is not 
restricted to the wording of the document alone, but can and should consider extrinsic evidence 
relevant to the transaction; 
 If the document is not intended to have any operation until the maker’s death, it is testamentary; 
 If the document is intended to have and does have the effect of transferring some interest in the 
property or of setting up a trust thereof in praesenti, it is not testamentary; 
 The reservation of a right to revoke the transfer or bring a trust to a close does not necessarily have 
the effect of making the document testamentary; 
 Cases where documents are held to be testamentary often include the following factual elements: 1) 
no consideration passes; 2) the document has no immediate effect; 3) the document is revocable; and 
4) the position of the donor and donee does not change immediately; 
 Even where an intended disposition is revocable by the maker or where enjoyment of it is postponed 
until the death of the maker, if, at the time of its execution, the document is legally effective to pass 
some immediate interest in the property, no matter how slight, the transaction will not be classified 
as testamentary; 
 The level of control the donor exercises over the property during his or her lifetime is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether a disposition is inter vivos or testamentary and the more control 
the donor exercises, the more likely the disposition will be considered testamentary; 
 The central question is whether the maker of the document intended the document to pass some 
immediate interest or whether the maker intended the document to have no effect until his death. 
The degree of control the donor retains over the property during his or her lifetime is relevant to 
ascertaining that intention. However, if it is clear that the document is intended to have immediate 
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effect it is not testamentary even if the donor retains control, such as the ability to call for the return 
of the property during his or her lifetime. 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, Her Honour said that the Normans intended the conditional 
donations to have immediate effect.  As such, they were not testamentary in nature. Although Mr Norman 
usually referred to the donations as ‘conditional loans’, it was clear from his letter of 5 June 2001 that he 
intended that the money should ‘remain’ with the respondent after his death. The respondent thus had a 
proprietary interest in the money immediately (at [30]–[31], [33]–[34]). Thus, the conditional donations were a 
gift with a subsequent condition that created an inter vivos trust. They took immediate effect upon execution, 
and therefore could not be testamentary. 
The decision on appeal 
The appellant estate contended that the judge erred in law in concluding the donations were not testamentary 
dispositions but rather created an enforceable inter vivos trust. In particular, the appellant claimed that the 
judge erred by: 
1. finding the Agreement was legally effective to transfer an immediate proprietary interest in the 
conditional donations to the Society; and 
2. holding the Agreement met the certainty of intention required for a valid trust. 
Was the Agreement a testamentary disposition? The appeal court entirely endorsed the trial judge’s 
distillation of the relevant principles listed above, and all of her reasoning (at [34]): 
The Estate on this appeal must demonstrate that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error 
in finding the Normans’ intention, on an objective interpretation of the Agreement and in the 
surrounding circumstances, was to transfer an immediate proprietary interest in the donations to the 
Society. I am not persuaded that the judge erred in her analysis. The judge found that the Normans 
were bound by the terms of the Agreement, which they could not revoke at any point. The Normans 
did not have the unrestricted opportunity to dispose of the property as they saw fit. They could 
revoke their donations, but only in compliance with the terms of the Agreement. They could not 
revoke the Agreement itself. In the interim, the Society could spend the funds at its discretion. This 
indicated a transfer of a proprietary interest to the Society during the Normans’ lifetimes. As a result, 
the transfer was inter vivos. The Estate has not identified a basis on which to overturn that finding. 
The other main issue on appeal was the trial judge’s finding that the Agreement met the certainty of intention 
test for a valid trust. On certainty of intention the trial judge had said (at [33] of the first instance decision): 
The Conditional Donation Agreement obliges the defendant, as it explicitly states, to hold the 
funds for the defendant’s use and benefit on the condition that the donors may personally 
request in writing a refund, in which case such request must be honoured. In my view, it is 
clear that by signing the Conditional Donation Agreement, the Normans intended the 
defendant to hold the funds for the benefit of the defendant and also for their own benefit 
during their lifetime. The language of the Conditional Donation Agreement is sufficient in my 
view to establish the certainty of intention. 
The appeal court could find no error in this analysis (at [42]).  Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
The case at first instance may be viewed at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2013/2013bcsc2099/2013bcsc2099.html 
This appeal decision may be viewed at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2014/2014bcca277/2014bcca277.html 
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2.9.18 OSINSKI (DECEASED), IN THE ESTATE OF [2014] SASC 89 (SUPREME COURT OF 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA, STANLEY J, 21 JULY 2014) 
This was a case involving a handwritten will using a will kit. The will had been written by the deceased, who 
died on 3 July 2012. Probate was granted on 29 October 2012. There were two clauses of interest in the will in 
this case.  These were: 
Clause 5: General gifts: I give all my personal and household effects as follows: 
From Commonwealth Bank 7651395011063 Pensioner Security Account and Polish Community Credit 
Union Ltd Account to Lowitja O’Donoughe [sic] solely member no. 1394. 
Clause 7: Residuary Estate: I give my entire residuary estate as follows:  
And contents solely to Professor Lowitja O’Donoghue although if Professor Lowitja O’Donoghue shall 
predecease me, I give my entire residuary [sic]. 
Clause 7 was unfinished. Also in contention were the remarks made on the will kit page which provided for 
‘Additional notes for personal representative’.  These were (in part): 
My instructions to [personal representative named, with address of property concerned]...bequeath 
the whole property at the above address to be used part to rise [sic] money and part to provide 
accommodation for Aboriginal student [sic]. 
Beneath the additional notes, the testator signed his name and wrote the date 2 October 2007. The additional 
notes were not witnessed by the original witnesses to the will or subsequently by the plaintiff. However, the 
additional notes were admitted to probate, and this was not in contention in this case. 
The bank account referred to in Clause 5 of the will was one of four bank accounts held by the deceased at the 
time of his death.  Two of these were held in accounts which were the result of a merger of the Polish 
Community Credit Union with another entity in 2009. The specific Commonwealth Bank account referred to in 
Clause 5 contained $981.75, although the other three contained more than $90,000. The deceased also held 
real estate valued at $630,000. 
The beneficiary, Professor O’Donoghue, a distinguished Aboriginal Australian, was not known to the deceased. 
She first became aware of him in August 2012 on receipt of a letter from the plaintiff’s solicitor informing her 
that she was named as a beneficiary in the deceased’s will.  
This case had to determine which of the assets of the deceased’s estate fell into the residuary under Clause 7 
and which fell to be dealt with under the ‘additional notes’. In addition, it also needed to be determined 
whether there was an absolute gift to Professor O’Donoghue of any of the assets of the estate or whether a 
charitable trust of some kind had arisen. 
His Honour held that:  
 the Commonwealth Bank Pensioner Security Account and the two (former) Polish Credit Union 
accounts were the subject of specific gifts under Clause 5, and so were not part of the residuary.  
These were an unconditional gift to Professor O’Donoghue.  
 the remaining Commonwealth Bank account, containing more than $65,000, was part of the 
residuary.  
 the real estate was to be dealt with in accordance with the ‘additional notes’ and was not part of the 
residuary. 
The issue then was, did the additional notes give rise to a charitable trust?  His Honour was satisfied that they 
did (at [23]–[24]): 
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I am satisfied that the terms of the additional notes establish a charitable trust appointing the plaintiff 
as trustee. Notwithstanding the limits to the testator’s proficiency in expressing himself in written 
English, I am satisfied that his intention to create a charitable trust for the benefit of Aboriginal 
students is reasonably clear on the face of the express terms of the additional notes.... The testator’s 
intention was to provide support for the education of Aboriginal students including by way of the 
provision of accommodation to such students, for the purposes of undertaking their education and 
study. I am satisfied this is a charitable purpose. 
Specifically, His Honour said that the purpose fell within the second purpose in Pemsel’s case, the 
advancement of education. It would in any event also fall within the fourth purpose, other purposes beneficial 
to the community. 
The plaintiff also applied to vary the terms of the charitable trust created by the will to better give effect to its 
intended provisions. This was granted. The trust which arose was to be the called the Osinski-O’Donoghue 
Trust, and its terms were approved by the court and the Attorney-General of South Australia. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2014/89.html#fnB5 
Implications of this case 
This case illustrates the problems which can arise in using will kits and, in particular handwritten wills in will 
kits. The deceased’s intentions had to be interpreted by the court, and the assets of the estate divided 
accordingly. Although the charitable intentions of the deceased were exemplary, it would have been 
preferable if the deceased had taken proper advice as to the gifts he intended to give, and the charitable trust 
he had intended to create. Costs of these applications are almost always drawn out of the estate. 
 
2.9.19 OVERALL V FAMILY VOICE AUSTRALIA INCORPORATED [2014] NSWSC 736 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, DARKE J, 5 JUNE 2014) 
This was a case concerning a gift in a will. Malcolm Charles Smith (the testator) left a net estate of $700,000. 
Clause 3 in his will provided: 
I GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH to my Trustee all my real and personal estate of whatsoever nature 
and wheresoever situate UPON TRUST after payment thereout all my just debts funeral and 
testamentary expenses and all death probate and estate succession and other like duties payable in 
respect of my estate TO HOLD the balance as follows: 
(a) as to 30% thereof:  
(i) a 1/3 share for the Australian Festival of Light of 115 Liverpool Road, Enfield;  
(ii) a 1/3 share for Anglicare of 18 Parkes Street, Parramatta; and 
(iii) a 1/3 share for the Christian Democratic Party (Fred Nile Group) of Parliament House, 
Macquarie Street, Sydney,  
PROVIDED THAT if any of the organisations referred to have ceased to exist as at the date of my 
death, then such of the said organisations that remain in existence as at my death shall take the share 
or shares which otherwise would have been held for the organisation or organisations which have 
ceased to exist as aforesaid and, if more than one, in equal shares as tenants in common. 
The central question in the case was whether the organisation described as the Australian Festival of Light of 
115 Liverpool Road, Enfield, had ‘ceased to exist’ within the meaning of the proviso to clause 3(a) as at 4 June 
2010, the date of the testator’s death. Two defendants claimed to be successors to the defunct Australian 
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Festival of Light. These were Family Voice Australia Incorporated and Australian Christian Nation Association 
Incorporated. The other two defendants were Anglicare and the Christian Democratic Party (Fred Nile Group) 
as claimants of the possibly unclaimed share. 
The Festival of Light was an unincorporated association which had commenced operation in Australia in 1972 
with branches in each of the six States. It had aims which were stated in a magazine publication of January 
1975 as follows: 
1. To mobilize Australians in support of purity, love and family life; 
2. To proclaim the value of Christian standards of behaviour for family and community life; 
3. To persuade national and community leaders to strengthen the family as the basic unit of society; 
4. To resist influences that lower moral standards and threaten human dignity; 
5. To research the social implications of Biblical ethics and the effects of modern trends on family 
and community life. 
However, in 1977, after an energetic start in Australia, the National Council and the National Executive of the 
organisation ceased to operate, due to difficulties in co-ordinating the branches across Australia, and cost. 
Some of the state branches became moribund, but the South Australian and the New South Wales branches 
continued in existence. From at least 1977, the testator was actively involved in the activities of the New South 
Wales branch, and he remained involved until shortly prior to his death in 2010. 
Although the South Australian branch became incorporated, the New South Wales branch remained 
unincorporated. This body apparently had no constitution, and no stated aims other than those in the 
magazine publication of 1975. In 1979 the Australian Festival of Light in New South Wales merged with 
another organisation, the Community Standards Organisation, but the new body remained unincorporated.  
In November 2004, the unincorporated association made an application to the Office of Fair Trading to 
become incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW). The application form which was 
submitted gave 115 Liverpool Road, Enfield as the address of the unincorporated association. The application 
was successful and a body by the name of Australian Festival of Light – Community Standards Organisation 
Incorporated (FOL-CSO) came into being on 11 November 2004. In 2007, the organisation became the Festival 
of Light Australia Incorporated (FOLA). FOL-CSO Inc was subsequently wound up. In 2008 FOLA changed its 
name to Family Voice Australia Inc. FOLA was subsequently wound up in December 2008. 
Was there a valid gift in the will to the unincorporated Australian Festival of Light or its successors? His Honour 
said that there was. The gift should be construed as one for the benefit of the purposes of the unincorporated 
association (at [42]): 
...the purposes of the unincorporated association, as expressed in its objects (which I have found 
were those that were agreed upon in 1974 and set forth in the first issue of ‘Light’ [the magazine]) are 
all charitable in law. The third object does involve political activity but (in the absence of full 
argument on the point) I would not conclude that the necessary element of public benefit is lacking 
such that it should not be regarded as charitable (see Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of 
Taxation [2010] HCA 42; (2010) 241 CLR 539 at [47]–[49]). 
Did the charitable gift fail because the unincorporated association was no longer in existence at the time of the 
testator’s death in 2010? Normally, a gift in a will in these circumstances will lapse. His Honour said that it did 
not in this case.  The history of the organisation and its successors was clear, as was the testator’s intention (at 
[46]–[47]): 
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The unincorporated association (and the incorporated association which came after it) has 
undoubtedly ceased to exist as a legal entity. In that sense, the beneficiary described in the gift, and 
‘the organisation’ so referred to, has ceased to exist. However, it seems to me that, properly 
construed, clause 3(a) of the will calls for a wider view of that which must cease to exist before there 
is a lapsing of a gift. As noted earlier, the gift (indeed all of the gifts made by clause 3(a) of the will) 
should be construed as a gift, not to the described body or organisation itself, but as a gift for the 
benefit of the purposes of the described body or organisation. In those circumstances, I do not think 
that it would be in accordance with the testator’s intention to construe the clause in such a way that a 
gift would lapse merely because the described body or organisation ceased to exist. That would tend 
to cause the validity of gifts to depend not so much upon whether the objects to be benefited are 
being pursued as of the date of the testator’s death, as upon the formal organisational structures by 
which the objects to be benefited are pursued as at the date of death. In my opinion, the clause 
should be construed in such a way that there will be no lapse if, as at the date of the testator’s death, 
there is a successor organisation in existence which is carrying on activity in pursuit of the same 
purposes formerly possessed by the described organisation.  
Therefore, although the described association had ceased to exist at the time of the testator’s death, there 
was an obvious successor to receive the gift. Thus, the gift did not lapse and was valid. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/736.html 
Implications of this case 
This case again illustrates the need for keeping an updated will, especially where gifts to charity are involved. 
Charities can change their name, merge, become moribund or be wound up over time. All of these issues arose 
in this case. However, His Honour took the view that, although the original unincorporated association had 
ceased to exist, there was a clear line of succession which would allow the intention of the testator to be 
carried out. As such, the gift in the will did not lapse, and there was no need for the first defendant to apply for 
an application of the gift cy-près. 
 
2.9.20 PUBLIC TRUSTEE V ALZHEIMER’S AUSTRALIA WA LTD (NO 2) [2014] WASC 337 
(SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, PRITCHARD J, 22 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This was a case concerning the validity of a will. Robert Arthur Kittelty died on 6 October 2009 aged 73 years. 
Mr Kittelty had never married, and had no children at the time of his death. His assets at the date of his death 
consisted of a house in North Perth which was subject to a contract of sale, a modest amount of cash in a bank 
account, and some personal effects of little value. On 12 August 2009 Mr Kittelty executed a will (the August 
2009 Will), in which he left one tenth of his estate to the first defendant (Alzheimer’s Australia WA Ltd), and 
three tenths of his estate to each of the second to fourth defendants (respectively, The Princess Margaret 
Hospital for Children Foundation Inc, Association for the Blind of Western Australia Inc, and the Australian Red 
Cross Society (Western Australian Division)). Under the August 2009 Will, the Public Trustee was appointed the 
executor and trustee. 
However, in 2014 the Public Trustee located another will executed by Mr Kittelty (the June 2009 Will). The 
June 2009 Will had been drafted by an officer of the Public Trustee and sent to Mr Kittelty, under cover of a 
letter dated 8 June 2009, for his signature. The June 2009 Will was signed by Mr Kittelty on 12 June 2009 in the 
presence of two attesting witnesses. However, the June 2009 Will was then stapled to the Public Trustee's 
letter of 8 June 2009 before being returned to the Public Trustee (which potentially invalidated it). 
Consequently, an officer of the Public Trustee requested that Mr Kittelty sign a new will (the August 2009 Will) 
which was in identical terms to the June 2009 Will.  
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Mr Kittelty had made an earlier will with the Public Trustee on 8 December 1997 (the 1997 Will) in which he 
left his entire estate to the fifth and sixth defendants in this case, who were relatives. The question before the 
court was which will was valid? The relevant legislation was the Wills Act 1970 (WA) (the Act). Her Honour held 
that all the formal requirements of a valid will in section 8 of the Act were present. The August 2009 Will had 
been made without duress, but there was a question of testamentary capacity raised.  
The law relating to testamentary capacity is long-established. Testamentary capacity requires that a testator 
be of sound mind, memory and understanding when the will is made: Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 
565. Her Honour held that the evidence supported the view that Mr Kittelty had possessed the requisite 
capacity at the time of making his August 2009 Will. In particular, Her Honour said on this point (at [65]): 
...the exclusion of the fifth and sixth beneficiaries from the terms of the August 2009 Will does not of 
itself give rise to a concern as to Mr Kittelty's understanding of the effect of that document. Mr 
Kittelty had no children. There is nothing remarkable about a testator in his position choosing to leave 
his estate to charity. Although Mr Kittelty had provided for the fifth and sixth defendants in the 1997 
Will, they were not persons recognised by the law as having a claim upon Mr Kittelty's bounty, and he 
was free to decide not to make provision for them in his will. 
Since the August 2009 Will was held to be valid, there was no need to consider the validity of the June 2009 
Will, and the entire estate was validly given to the charities named in the will. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2014/337.html 
Implications of this case 
The doubt about the testamentary capacity of the will-maker in this case arose because he had been 
diagnosed with mild Alzheimer’s and was the subject of an administration order. However, Her Honour was 
not persuaded that the will-maker lacked capacity on the evidence given (at [49]): 
The fact that the August 2009 Will is properly executed, and is rational on its face, gives rise to a 
presumption that Mr Kittelty was a person of competent understanding when he executed that will. 
In the absence of any evidence adduced by the fifth or sixth defendants to cast doubt on Mr Kittelty's 
testamentary capacity at that time, it is arguable that there is no evidence to displace the prima facie 
case established by the Public Trustee, and so there is no need to examine the question of Mr 
Kittelty's testamentary capacity further. 
However, in order to satisfy the doubts raised by the Public Trustee, Her Honour considered all the indicia of 
testamentary capacity available on the evidence, and was satisfied that the will-maker had a clear wish to 
leave his estate to charity, and not to relatives who had no claim in law on his estate. 
 
2.9.21 PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF QUEENSLAND V INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 
ASSOCIATION OF QUEENSLAND AND ORS [2014] QSC 178 (SUPREME COURT OF 
QUEENSLAND, BODDICE J, 8 AUGUST 2014) 
In this case, the Public Trustee of Queensland (the applicant) made application pursuant to section 96 of the 
Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), or alternatively section 134 of the Public Trustee Act 1978 (Qld), for advice or directions 
in relation to the proper construction of the will of John Thomas Petty (the deceased). At issue was the 
distribution of the sale proceeds of residential properties owned by the deceased at the time of his death. 
The respondents were: 
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 the Intellectually Handicapped Persons Association of Queensland (the Association);  
 the executor of the will of the deceased’s wife;  
 the Public Trustee of Queensland, as administrator of the estate of the deceased’s son; and  
 the daughter of the deceased by his second wife, who was the sole beneficiary of the intestate estate 
of the deceased’s son. 
The deceased died on 16 August 1987. He was survived by his wife, his son and his daughter. His son was born 
with an intellectual disability, and was in need of care throughout his life. The deceased’s last will, dated 6 
January 1987, was homemade. The deceased appointed three individuals as his executors and trustees. Two of 
the three trustees appointed by the will died in 2005. On 23 December 2008, the remaining trustee retired as a 
trustee of trusts established by the will. The Public Trustee of Qld was appointed as trustee in his place.  
At the time of his death, the deceased owned two houses which were administered by the trustees for the 
care of the son (and others), and for the use of the deceased’s wife.  The will provided that the property 
occupied by the son was to revert to the Association, or other similar charitable body. The property for the use 
of his wife had no reversion clause attached to it, although it provided that the amount realised from its sale 
should go into a ‘benefit fund’ for the use of the son. Both properties were subsequently sold after the son 
went to live in another of the Association’s properties in 1997, and the wife moved into a nursing home in 
about 1998. The proceeds of both sales were held in trust for the son’s use until his death on 17 December 
2012. The amounts currently held in trust are $123,930.91 (first property) and $160,147.67 (second property). 
In January 2013, the Association resolved it would cease caring for intellectually disabled persons, and would 
transfer its assets to SCOPE Inc (SCOPE). The Association, which ceased all operations in disability care by 1 
April 2013, is now insolvent. It is being pursued by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) for $97,772.89 in 
unpaid tax. Any monies received by it as a consequence of this application were to be used to settle that debt. 
In accordance with its constitution, the balance of any monies remaining were to be paid to a similar charitable 
body. The Association contended in this hearing that SCOPE was the appropriate entity to receive any monies. 
His Honour said that the clauses dealing with the two properties had different effects. In dealing with a 
homemade will, greater latitude had to be shown in determining the scheme the will-maker had in mind (at 
[23]): 
Reading the Deceased’s Will as a whole, and allowing for the fact it was homemade, it is apparent the 
intention of the Deceased was to provide residences for his disabled son and his wife, with the 
proceeds of the sale of those properties to be dealt with differently upon their demise or cessation of 
any occupation of those properties during their lifetime.  
The first property was for the use of the son.  There was no absolute gift to the Association, but rather a 
remainder over (at [24]): 
Accepting that to be the scheme of the Will, and having regard to the words used in relation to Lara 
Street [the first property], the clause in respect of Lara Street is properly to be read as not making an 
absolute gift of that property outright to the Association. That clause gave the Lara Street property to 
the Deceased’s trustees, on trust for his son for life, with the remainder to the Association or a similar 
charitable body in the absolute discretion of the Deceased’s trustees. The discretion given to the 
Deceased’s trustees is properly to be understood as an absolute discretion. It is not subject to a 
limitation as to the nature of the similar charitable institution. It is for the Applicant, in his absolute 
discretion, to pay the proceeds of the investment fund relevant to Lara Street to the Association, or a 
body having similar charitable purposes.  
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The second property where the wife had lived until she moved to a nursing home was dealt with differently in 
the will. The clause in respect of that property specifically provided that proceeds of any sale of that property 
would be paid into a ‘benefit fund’ established pursuant to the deceased’s will, to be held on trust for his son 
for life. However, the will made no disposition of any funds remaining upon the death of his son. Therefore, 
His Honour held (at [27]–[28]): 
The differences in approach in respect of [the first property] and [the second property] render it 
impossible to gather, by “necessary implication” from the words of the Will, who or what entity was 
to be the beneficiary of those funds upon the death of the Deceased’s son. This conclusion renders 
inescapable a finding the proceeds of this fund must pass by way of an intestacy. It is the 
responsibility of the Applicant to distribute the funds relevant to [the second property] in accordance 
with the intestacy rules applicable as at the date of the Deceased’s death.  
Therefore, the proceeds from the first property were to go to the Association at the discretion of the applicant. 
The Public Trustee had submitted that it would pay the money from this fund to the Association, with any 
remainder to go to a body with similar charitable purposes (at its absolute discretion). The amount involved 
was $123,931.91. This was enough to discharge the Association’s debt to the ATO with the remainder to be 
distributed at the applicant’s discretion. The proceeds from the second property (currently $160,147.67) were 
to be distributed under the rules of intestacy applicable at the date of the deceased’s death. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2014/178.html 
Implications of this case 
In construing a will, it is necessary to read the will as a whole. Where possible, the court should ascertain the 
scheme the testator had in mind for dealing with his or her estate, and construe the will to give effect to that 
scheme. In doing this, the court cannot ignore words contained within the document, but may, if appropriate, 
read words into the will by necessary implication. Greater latitude is given in construing the language used by 
a will-maker in a homemade will. In such a case, the words of the will-maker may be looked at less strictly than 
in the case of a will drawn up by a skilled professional. In this case, the effect of the words chosen by the will-
maker was that the proceeds from the two properties had to be dealt with differently. 
 
2.9.22 ROUTIER V COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2014] 
EWHC 3010 (CH) (ENGLAND AND WALES HIGH COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION, ROSE J, 
18 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) as to exemption from 
inheritance tax in the UK under section 23 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (the Act). Beryl Coulter died on 9 
October 2007 and was domiciled in Jersey at the date of her death. Her will was dated 1 October 2004, and 
was stated to be governed by the law of Jersey. Probate was granted in the Probate Division of the Royal Court 
of Jersey on 25 October 2007.  
In her will Mrs Coulter left legacies to various people totalling £210,000. As to the residue, the will provided 
that it was to be given to her executors to be held on trusts (referred to as the Coulter Trust):  
To accumulate the income of the Coulter Trust and to distribute the Coulter Trust together with any 
accumulated income therefrom UNTO such incorporated body as may be set up by the Parish of St 
Ouen for the purpose of the provision of homes for the elderly of the Parish (hereinafter known as 
‘the Incorporated Body’). 
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Clause 3 of the will provided a gift in default:  
3. In the event that the Parish of St Ouen fails neglects or refuses to set up an incorporated body as 
set out above within three years of my decease, or fails or refuses to accept any of the conditions of 
my gift as set out above then in either of these events I DIRECT that my Trustees shall in place of the 
Incorporated Body, hold the Coulter Trust and distribute the same both as to income as capital UNTO 
JERSEY HOSPICE CARE to assist with capital expenditure required by Jersey Hospice Care as in their 
discretion may deem fit, and in the event that the capital expenditure is required for the construction 
of buildings for Jersey Hospice Care then this upon identical conditions as those set out in paragraph 
2(iii), 2(iv) and 2(v) hereof. 
HMRC took the position that the gift to the Coulter trust was not exempt from inheritance tax of between 
£591,724 and £633,571. Section 23 of the Act refers to exemption for gifts to charities, and provides: 
23 Gifts to charities 
(1) Transfers of value are exempt to the extent that the values transferred by them are attributable to 
property which is given to charities. 
… 
(6) For the purposes of this section property is given to charities if it becomes the property of charities 
or is held on trust for charitable purposes only, and ‘donor’ shall be construed accordingly. 
Section 272 of the Act provides that 'charity' and 'charitable' have the same meanings as in the Income Tax 
Acts. In 2007 that meaning could be found in section 989 of the Income Tax Act 2007 which defined a charity 
as 'any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only'. There was no definition of 
'charitable purposes' in the Act or the Income Tax Acts at that time so the words in this case had their English 
common law meaning. The definitions in the Charities Act 2006 only came into force on 1 April 2008, after Mrs 
Coulter's death. Therefore, the issue between the parties was whether the gift to the Coulter Trust fell within 
section 23(1) because it fell within the second limb of section 23(6), being a gift which was held on trust for 
charitable purposes only. The appellants (the executors of the will) argued that the plain words of subsection 
(6) indicate that all that is needed for the exemption to apply is that (i) there was a trust – and there was no 
doubt that the Coulter Trust was a trust – and (ii) the trust's purposes were exclusively charitable purposes 
under UK law – and HMRC accepted that that was so.  
HMRC contended, however, that there was an implied requirement in both limbs of subsection (6) that the 
body of persons or trust (in the first limb) or the trust (in the second limb) were governed by the law of some 
part of the United Kingdom. Her Honour referred to that as the body of persons or trust needing to have a 'UK 
link'. HMRC concluded that because the Coulter Trust was governed by the law of Jersey it did not qualify as a 
'trust for charitable purposes only' for the purposes of either limb.  
The appellants accepted that a UK link was required for the first limb and therefore that the Coulter Trust 
could not benefit from the exemption by falling within the first limb. But they said that there was no need for a 
UK link for the second limb to be satisfied. Her Honour could not see that there was such a difference in 
meaning between the two limbs of the subsection (at [26]): 
The Appellants have not put forward any good reason why Parliament should have intended that the 
second limb of section 23 should be so much broader than the first, encompassing trusts governed by 
foreign law but limited to charitable bodies established under UK law. 
Her Honour held that there could be no exemption.  The Coulter Trust was governed by Jersey law and not UK 
law. Thus, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the expression 'held on trust for charitable purposes' 
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in section 23(6) required not only that the charitable purposes be UK law charitable purposes but that the 
relevant trust be subject to the jurisdiction of the UK courts as well. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/3010.html 
Implications of this case 
Her Honour followed the decision of the House of Lords in Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1956] AC 39 which had held that to make the distinction argued in this case would be 
'at least awkward and artificial'.  As Her Honour explained in this case, it would lead to administrative difficulty 
(at [18]): 
...to treat the reference to charitable purposes as bearing the meaning given by United Kingdom law 
and then seek to evaluate the purposes of a body governed by non-United Kingdom law according to 
that test...the intention of Parliament in referring to a body of persons established for charitable 
purposes only must mean that the body is constituted or regulated so as to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts which can alone define and regulate those purposes. 
 
2.9.23 SAWDON ESTATE V SAWDON, 2014 ONCA 101 (CANLII) (ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL, 
HOY ACJO, GILLESE, STRATHY JJA, 5 FEBRUARY 2014) 
This was an appeal from the decision of Richetti J in Sawdon Estate, 2012 ONSC 4024. In that decision, the 
question was one of the validity of dispositions in a will. The recipient of the residuary under the will of Arthur 
Sawdon (the deceased) was The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Canada (Watch Tower), a charity and 
the corporate entity which acts as the legal arm of the religious community of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada. 
However, the Watch Tower attempted to obtain further amounts from the estate in the 2012 case.  
The deceased had formed a company in the Cayman Islands for tax reasons. He had held a 75% interest in the 
company and his five children held the remaining 25% interest. The assets in the company were administered 
by a trust company, CIBC. The case turned on the fate of joint bank accounts, amounting to $1,075,872.83, 
which had been held jointly by the deceased and two of his sons.  
The deceased’s lawyer was Mr Pole, who set up the company in the Cayman Islands for the deceased, and 
prepared his will documents. Two wills were prepared, one in 2004 and one in 2006. The 2004 will provided 
that the estate was to be divided into five parts, one part for each of his children or their issue. If one of the 
deceased’s children died without issue, that particular child’s share was to go to the Watch Tower. The 2006 
will was prepared on 5 July 2006 along with a purported Transfer and Assignment to the Watch Tower of the 
deceased’s 75% share in the Cayman Islands company. The will left substantially more of the deceased’s assets 
to the Watch Tower by not acknowledging the fact that joint bank accounts existed. Joint bank accounts would 
not have formed part of the deceased’s estate (as would be the case in Australia). 
Although by this stage Pole had been the family’s lawyer for more than 12 years, he had not disclosed to the 
deceased that he was an Elder of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he had acted as counsel for the Watch 
Tower in the past. After the signing of the Transfer and Assignment document, Pole travelled to the Cayman 
Islands with the document to effect the transfer of the assets to the Watch Tower, but the trustee refused to 
recognise or act upon the document. Pole informed the deceased that, notwithstanding this refusal, the 
residue of the estate would include his share of the Cayman Islands company. 
Some weeks after the 2006 will was executed, the deceased transferred more of his assets (about a further 
60% in total) from the Cayman Islands company into joint accounts with his sons. His Honour had already 
pointed to the plethora of evidence that indicated that the deceased clearly intended to excise the joint 
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accounts from his estate, and said that this late change further illustrated that the deceased did not want the 
transferred assets included in his estate. 
The deceased died on 27 March 2007. After his death, Pole wrote to the executor (the eldest of the deceased’s 
sons) to the effect that the Watch Tower was now the majority holder of the Cayman Islands company shares, 
on the basis that the 75% share had been transferred to the Watch Tower inter vivos (while the deceased was 
still alive). This was based on the Transfer and Assignment document which had been refused by the Cayman 
Islands company’s trustee.  He also wrote to the trustee threatening legal action if the transfer was not 
accomplished immediately. 
His Honour took a predictably dim view of Pole’s actions. As a lawyer, he should have disclosed the very clear 
conflict of interest which existed in his dealings with the deceased. His Honour found that his actions were 
biased towards the interests of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. His Honour went on to find that the deceased had 
the clear intention of creating joint bank accounts with his sons, and that he did not intend to make any inter 
vivos gift to the Watch Tower. Nor did the deceased make any gift of the interest on the accounts (as opposed 
to the accounts themselves) to the Watch Tower. As the ‘gift’ of the joint accounts to his sons was not a 
testamentary disposition, they were not included in the assets of the estate. Therefore, the Watch Tower 
failed in its bid to obtain the benefit of the joint accounts. They were entitled to the residuary of the estate 
under the will, but as most of the assets had been transferred to joint accounts, very little remained to be 
distributed. 
On appeal, there were two issues to be resolved. These were: 
1. Did the trial judge err in failing to find that the bank accounts were held on resulting trust for the 
estate; and 
2. Did the trial judge err in failing to apply the legal principles applicable to secret trusts? 
The trial judge had referred extensively to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Pecore v Pecore, 2007 
SCC 17 (CanLII) (Pecore). Pecore established that gratuitous transfers between a parent and an adult child are 
subject to the presumption of a resulting trust in favour of the deceased parent’s estate. As there had been a 
gratuitous transfer of the bank accounts in this case from the deceased into joint accounts with two of his 
sons, the trial judge then considered whether the presumption had been rebutted. He concluded that it had, 
saying that the deceased had intended to make an inter vivos gift of the beneficial interest in the bank 
accounts when they were opened. The trial judge made a key factual finding when concluding that the 
presumption had been rebutted, namely, that the deceased had transferred the bank accounts into joint 
names, with a right of survivorship, knowing, as was shown by the evidence, how the right of survivorship 
would operate on his death. This meant that there was no money to be returned to the estate, for inclusion in 
the residue to the Watch Tower. 
Were the bank accounts held on a resulting trust for the estate? 
The Court of Appeal held that the bank accounts were not held on trust for the estate (and ultimately for the 
Watch Tower). However, the Court arrived at that conclusion in a different way from the trial judge (at [67]). 
When the deceased transferred the bank accounts into joint names with two of his sons, he created a trust. 
Legal title to the bank accounts vested in the deceased and his two sons jointly, immediately upon transfer 
into their joint names. Based on the trial judge’s unassailable findings of fact, when the deceased and his two 
sons jointly became the legal owners of the bank accounts, they did so on the understanding that on the 
deceased’s death, they were to distribute the contents of the bank accounts to the five children of the 
deceased in equal shares. In legal terms, when the bank accounts were opened the deceased made an 
immediate inter vivos gift of the beneficial right of survivorship to the five children. Thus, from the time that 
the bank accounts were opened, those holding the legal title to them held the beneficial right of survivorship 
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in trust for the children in equal shares. The Court added that this change in emphasis in no way detracted 
from the correctness of the trial judge’s decision (at [72]). 
Did the principles of secret trusts apply? 
The Appeal Court made short work of the secret trust argument (at [73]–[74], [76]): 
Watch Tower says that Arthur [the deceased] created a secret trust when he asked Wayne and 
Stephen [his two sons] to distribute the funds in the Bank Accounts to the Children equally, upon his 
death. Thus, Watch Tower submits, the trial judge erred by failing to apply the legal principles relating 
to secret trusts. Based on this premise, it argues that: (1) the secret trust fails for lack of certainty of 
objects and the funds in the Bank Accounts must revert to the Estate, or (2) the beneficiaries of the 
secret trust are the beneficiaries of Arthur’s 2006 will. This is a new issue, raised for the first time on 
appeal. Accordingly, I would decline to entertain it.... 
In any event, without deciding the matter, it seems to me that the secret trusts argument is doomed 
to fail. Even if the secret trusts doctrine could apply to a situation such as this, where a parent makes 
an inter vivos gratuitous transfer to an adult child, there can be no problem with the certainty of 
objects requirement because, on the findings of the trial judge, the objects of the ‘secret trust’ are 
indisputably the Children. 
There was also an appeal issue relating to costs, which was resolved against the Watch Tower (in part) to the 
extent of $30,000. 
This case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca101/2014onca101.html 
The 2012 decision may be viewed at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc4042/2012onsc4042.html 
Implications of this case 
This case has been in the courts since 2010, when there was an initial attempt by one of the sons of the 
deceased to have the 2006 will declared invalid on the ground of the medical condition of the deceased when 
he made the will. That application was denied as the evidence pointed to the deceased’s good health at the 
time. In the same application, the Watch Tower attempted to stop distributions from the estate, and payment 
of various fees. This was in order to preserve the amount to which they might have been entitled under the 
will. The trial decision of 2012 appeared to dispose of any attempt by the charity to have more than the 
residuary from the will (reduced to almost nil at that point), which had been the deceased’s intention from the 
beginning. However, the charity continued to pursue the money given to the deceased’s five children, by this 
appeal, and again failed, with costs awarded against it. 
 
2.9.24 SPARROW, CARNE, WEPSPER V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND 
WALES AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE BATH RECREATION GROUND (FIRST TIER 
TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, 27 MARCH 2014) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Charity Commission for England and Wales (the Commission) to 
make a scheme under section 69 of the Charities Act 2011 to govern the Recreation Ground, Bath (the Charity) 
in England. The scheme was made on 12 June 2013. The First Tier Tribunal (Charity) (the Tribunal) ordered that 
the scheme should be substantially amended. 
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The Charity owns and manages a recreation ground in the centre of Bath (the Recreation Ground). On 1 
February 1956 the Recreation Ground was acquired by the Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of the City of Bath 
from the Bath and County Recreation Ground Company Ltd and was held by them on trust under the terms on 
which the Recreation Ground was conveyed (the 1956 Conveyance). There was confusion over time as to the 
status of the Recreation Ground, particularly when its control passed to Bath and North East Somerset Council 
(BANES), as successors to the Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of the City of Bath. On 31 July 2002 the England 
and Wales High Court determined that the Recreation Ground was and had been held on charitable trust (the 
Trust) and that the trustee, now BANES, was charged with maintaining the Recreation Ground as a recreational 
facility available for the benefit of the public at large: see Northeast Somerset Council v HM Attorney General 
[2002] EWCA 1623 (CH). The trust was entered on the register of charities in November 2002. In the period 
between 1956 and 2002, two developments had occurred: 
 In about 1974, an indoor sports and leisure centre and car park (the Leisure Centre) was built on the 
Recreation Ground by BANES, in its capacity as the local authority, despite the terms of the trust 
created by the 1956 Conveyance requiring BANES to ‘not use the Recreation Ground otherwise than 
as an open space’. The total area amounted to around 11,120 square metres.  
 On 23 May 1995, a 75 year lease of about 14,907 square metres of the Recreation Ground was 
granted to The Trustees of the Bath Football Club (the 1995 Lease). The 1995 Lease replaced an 
earlier lease and permitted part of the Recreation Ground to be used and occupied by the Bath 
Football Club as a rugby stadium and pitch. The terms of the trust created by the 1956 Conveyance 
not only required the land to be used for recreation purposes and preserved as an open space but 
also required that one sport should not be preferred over another. As the 1995 Lease only granted 
Bath Football Club the right to provide seating accommodation on three sides of the rugby pitch 
included in the lease, the Charity has made additional land available each year for the temporary 
provision of seating on the fourth side of the stadium. This effectively closed off the area from the 
public. 
Both of these developments were accepted to be breaches of trust. Clearly, there had been confusion as to the 
nature of the charitable trust which applied to the Recreation Ground.  Was there any way in which these 
breaches of trust could be resolved? 
After the 2002 decision, the Commission commenced an inquiry into the Charity which continued until March 
2007. On 26 June 2003 the Commission appointed receivers and managers in respect of all affairs of the 
Charity. Negotiations took place between the receivers and managers and BANES, who continued to act as 
trustee of the Charity, regarding the future of the Leisure Centre. No resolution had been achieved by the time 
the Commission closed the statutory inquiry in 2007 and the receivers and managers handed responsibility for 
management of the Charity back to BANES as trustee. BANES subsequently undertook a strategic review of the 
options for the Charity, which included a review of the use of charity land by Bath Rugby Ltd (the successors to 
Bath Football Club which had been an amateur club), which had by this time become one of the premier 
professional rugby clubs in Europe. 
In November 2012 the Commission published a draft scheme in respect of the Charity. The Commission 
proposed to use its powers under the Charities Act 2011 to amend the governance, powers and purposes of 
the Charity, where appropriate, in order to permit a resolution to be found regarding the problem of the 
Leisure Centre and Bath Rugby occupying the Recreation Ground. There was a large response to the draft 
scheme, particularly from members of the public. After consultations closed, the scheme was formally made 
on 12 June 2013. 
The appellants in this case were residents who lived near the Recreation Ground, and were therefore 
beneficiaries of the Charity. The appellants’ concerns were:  
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 whether the scheme was properly made under section 69 of the Charities Act 2011, and whether it 
was justified;  
 whether the new trustees appointed under the Scheme were appropriately constituted as a body; 
and 
 the validity of the 1995 lease and the status of the Leisure Centre. 
The Tribunal said that it was bound to follow the 2002 decision of the High Court with regard to the charitable 
status of the Charity. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the objects of the Charity prior to the making of 
the Scheme were as set out in the 1956 Conveyance with the addition of the wording, ‘to maintain the same as 
a recreational facility available for the benefit of the public at large’, which was added in the 2002 judgement. 
The Tribunal then went on to construe the objects they had nominated as those of the Charity (i.e. those in the 
1956 conveyance). These included that the Recreation Ground should not be used other than as an open 
space. A second requirement was that, although the Recreation Ground’s open air activities could include 
playing sports, it was not to favour any one particular sport, or to favour any one particular club or sporting 
body. 
The Tribunal held that the Commission did have the power to make a Scheme under section 69 of the Charities 
Act 2011.  The most contentious part of the Scheme related to the 1995 lease. The Tribunal said that this could 
be resolved by the Commission through a revamped Scheme (at [32]): 
The Commission had the experience to deal with this matter and had in place a process that would 
permit it to effect the matter in a reasoned and transparent manner. A right of appeal to this Tribunal 
existed that could be pursued by those concerned at the Commission’s decision. The complications 
arising from the dispute over the validity of the 1995 Lease could be addressed by providing the 
Trustees with power and responsibility under the terms of the Scheme and permitting some exercise 
of judgement on their part as to what was in the best interest of the Charity in determining the way 
forward in respect of the 1995 Lease and the Charity’s future dealings with the Bath Rugby. The 
Scheme does not preclude a challenge to the validity of the 1995 Lease.  
The Tribunal accepted that the Scheme was justified. It said that the Scheme was necessary because it was 
evident that the Charity had not been well-managed in the past. BANES was not wholly at fault since it had 
received written advice from the Commission in 1993 that there was no charitable trust in place, despite its 
own legal advice being to the contrary. This had preceded the granting of the 1995 lease, made with 
knowledge of a possible trust in place, but with some confusion as to its status. However, since 2002 there had 
been ‘clear... mismanagement’ according to the Tribunal (at [39]), with the potential for major conflicts of 
interest in BANES representatives being trustees, BANES owning and managing the Leisure Centre, and BANES 
having granted the 1995 lease, which itself had been mismanaged in that the rent had never been reviewed 
since the lease was granted, leaving the Charity ‘short of funds and with limited options’. This meant that, at 
least from 2002, BANES was involved in ‘long-running, extensive and serious failures as trustee’ (at [39]), 
although the Tribunal did not make any findings on breach of trust. 
New governance and powers for the Charity were clearly needed, and the Scheme was the best way to achieve 
this outcome. The Leisure Centre, a major installation, could not be removed without substantial cost to the 
Charity, in both monetary and legal terms. The Scheme had presented a solution to this issue by providing that 
the land on which the Leisure Centre stood was to be the subject of a separate charitable trust to be 
administered solely by BANES. The Tribunal agreed that the erection of the Leisure Centre represented a ‘cy-
près occasion’ (since the facilities of an indoor sports Leisure Centre could be approximated to the objects of 
the Charity), and that the Leisure Centre should only be in place for its useful life, and then should be removed 
so that the area could be returned to open space.  
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However, the Tribunal did not agree with the Scheme provisions that there should be a separate trust under 
the control of BANES. They amended the Scheme so that the trustees should be the same ones as for the rest 
of the Charity and independent from BANES per se. The Tribunal’s reason was that BANES had mismanaged 
the Charity in the past. The Tribunal further amended the Scheme to permit only one BANES representative on 
the Board of the Charity, with that person not to be chair or vice-chair (as had been the case under the Scheme 
to date), and the other trustees to be independent of BANES. 
As to the situation with Bath Rugby, the Tribunal said that enhanced powers should allow the trustees to enter 
into better negotiations with its lessee, but the terms of any settlement of the situation were yet to be 
determined (at [54]): 
The Trustees will need to ensure that any arrangements that it enters into with Bath Rugby will have 
the overall effect of enabling the Charity to further its objectives of not only providing sports and 
recreation facilities for the public but also preserving the Recreation Ground as open space and 
ensuring that no one sport or club that uses the Charities’ facilities is preferred over another. It is the 
view of the Tribunal that there is nothing in the objects of the Charity that will prevent it from 
operating on other sites in addition to the Recreation Ground and there is no reason for the Scheme 
either to prevent or to encourage such a possibility. However, the Trustees must work to ensure that 
the Recreation Ground is preserved as an open space on which a range of games and sports and 
recreational activities can take place. The existence of an elite Rugby Club and of three stands 
surrounding an open space that can be used for rugby or for other sports are not, in themselves, 
incompatible with the purposes of the Charity. It is for the Trustees to assess whether or not such 
arrangement can further the purposes of the Charity. However, the enclosure of a large area of the 
Recreation Ground by the erection of the East Stand and the restriction on entry to, or use of, this 
enclosed area by the requirement of a payment to a sports club operating as a profit making business 
raises considerable concerns about how this will assist the Charity in furthering its purposes. Any 
further grant of land for the exclusive use of Bath Rugby, over and above that provided for in the 1995 
Lease would only be permissible in so far as the Trustees were able to demonstrate that such a grant 
was made in order to further the objects of the Charity. The Tribunal takes the view that there will be 
limits upon the extent to which any such grant of land could have this effect and proposes to include 
such limits in the terms of the Scheme.  
Therefore, the original Scheme proposal to offer further or other land (in the nature of a swap) to Bath Rugby 
would become more difficult under the new Scheme terms put forward by the Tribunal. If further or other land 
was offered to the club, its offer terms would have to reflect the full commercial value of the land offered. This 
was because the club was a commercial profit-making entity. Its popularity in Bath was not to be taken into 
account by the trustees (at [54]), except as a source of resources for the Charity. In addition, the validity of the 
1995 lease was to be looked into by the trustees. 
Thus, the appeal was allowed in part, with an order that the Commission’s Scheme be amended as outlined by 
the tribunal. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/decision27mar14-
recreation-ground.pdf 
Implications of this case 
The Tribunal said that its amendments to the Charity Commission’s Scheme would (at [59]): 
1. Improve the governance of the Charity; 
2. Provide the necessary power to the trustees to ensure that the objects of the Charity were pursued 
with a degree of practicality, innovation and resolution; 
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3. Amend the purposes of the Charity to the minimum extent required in order to address the issues 
surrounding the Leisure Centre and to do so in a manner that takes account of the spirit of the gift 
and the change in economic and social circumstances since the creation of the Charity. 
The first of these was to be achieved by making the Board of Trustees almost entirely independent of the local 
Council, which had previously mismanaged the Charity. The second involved an enhancement of powers 
relating to dealing with the Charity’s property, and the third was to permit the Leisure Centre to figure as a cy-
pres application of the Charity’s objects (for the remaining time of its existence), and to allow a proper 
resolution of the lease entered into (in breach of trust) with what was now a large, professional Rugby Club on 
the site.  
 
2.9.25 SWAN, IN THE MATTER OF [2014] SASC 65 (SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 
GRAY J, 23 MAY 2014) 
This was a case concerning a gift in a will, and whether a charitable trust had been created. Dorothy Ethel 
Brown (the testator) died on 28 July 1974. The testator made her will in August 1971. In the will, she: 
 bequeathed her jewellery and personal effects to the Salvation Army (South Australia) Property Trust; 
 granted a life interest in her property, including household furniture and effects, to her son, with the 
remainder interest to the Hospitals Department of the South Australian Government; 
 gave the residue of her estate to her trustee on trust— 
o to maintain the property;  
o to maintain her son; 
o to accumulate any surplus income and, after 21 years, to stand possessed of such 
accumulated surplus income for the Department;  
o upon her son’s death, and after payment of his funeral and headstone expenses, to stand 
possessed of the entire remaining residue for the Hospitals Department. 
By clause 8 of her will, the testator provided for benefits in favour of the Hospitals Department as follows: 
I DIRECT that the benefits hereinbefore referred to in favour of the Hospitals Department of the South 
Australian Government shall be utilised by the said Department for the benefit of sufferers from 
kidney diseases or complaints in such manner as the Director General of Medical Services (or such 
other person or persons as the said Director General may from time to time appoint) may from time 
to time decide and for the guidance of the said Department and Director General (but without in any 
way limiting or restricting the discretion hereinbefore given) I desire to state that it is my wish that 
such benefits as aforesaid shall be applied in or towards kidney machines.  
At the time of the making of the will, the testator identified the Hospitals Department, a department of the 
South Australian government, and the Director General of Medical Services as being the persons to administer 
the trust. By the time of the termination of the life interest of her son, the Hospitals Department and the office 
of the Director General of Medical Services had ceased to exist. At the time of this application, the 
administration of hospitals was the responsibility of SA Health, so that the Chief Executive of SA Health (Mr 
Swan) was the plaintiff in these proceedings. 
The life interest had terminated on 1 January 2008. On 15 October 2009, the executor forwarded the residue 
of the estate, $266,435.40, to the ‘SA Health Commission’. That body, the successor to the Hospitals 
Department had also ceased to exist. The relevant body had become, and is now, ‘SA Health’. 
Had a charitable trust been created by the provisions of the will? The plaintiff contended that it had. Whilst 
the structure of hospitals administration in South Australia had changed, the plaintiff sought a declaration that 
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clause 8 of the will created a charitable trust and that the Court should exercise its inherent powers and its 
powers under section 69B of the Trustee Act 1936 (SA) to appoint the Health Services Charitable Gifts Board as 
the trustee of the charitable trust. The Court was also asked to approve a trust variation scheme under section 
69B of the Trustee Act so that trust monies could be applied for the benefit of any patient of a hospital 
incorporated under the Health Care Act 2008 (SA) suffering from a kidney disease or complaint and that the 
trust monies be expended on benefits that such patients would not normally receive or enjoy as patients of 
those hospitals. 
Failure of the gift of the residue to the Department would result in an intestacy of the residue, there being no 
gift over to any other person or entity. There were no direct relatives. There were, however, next of kin, being 
the testator’s daughter-in-law (to whom the testator’s son had left his entire estate) and her daughter-in-law’s 
sister, who would be entitled to the residue in intestacy. 
To be valid, a charitable trust requires certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter and certainty of 
object. There was no doubt about the subject matter since the money in question was held in a term deposit. 
However, the issues of certainty of intention and of object were in contention. A gift to a government 
department, even if expressed simpliciter, is unlikely to be interpreted as an absolute gift. This was so in this 
case. Rather than a benefit to the Hospital Department per se, the testator had expressed in mandatory terms 
that the residue of her estate was to be applied for a particular purpose, namely ‘the benefit of sufferers from 
kidney diseases or complaints’. This was a charitable purpose which had a public benefit. However, was there a 
general charitable intention (rather than a specific intention to achieve a particular purpose)? His Honour said 
that there was (at [35]–[36]): 
Several factors evinced a general charitable intention of the testator with respect to the application of 
the residue of her estate. There was no ‘gift over’ in the will suggesting that the testator did not 
contemplate the failure of the gift. The gift was not made to the Hospitals Department simpliciter. The 
purpose to which the residue is to be applied was stated unequivocally in clause 8 of the will.... 
Finally, the purpose in clause 8 is clear, is stated in general terms and is not attended with significant 
detail or qualification. I am satisfied that the testator evinced a general charitable intention. It is 
unlikely that the testator intended the gift of the residue to lapse in the event that the Hospitals 
Department or the Director General of Medical Services was unable to implement the purpose.  
What was the scope of the trust? His Honour agreed with the plaintiff that the trust would apply to patients in 
public hospitals operating under the present Health Care Act 2008 (SA). In addition, the purpose of the money 
was to enhance the service provided by SA Health to kidney patients, not just to fund something which the 
government was providing anyway (at [43]): 
I accept the plaintiff’s suggestion concerning the expenditure and that the trust monies should be 
expended on benefits that such patients would not normally receive or enjoy as patients of those 
hospitals. The trust monies are not to be used to simply swell the Government’s revenue. There is 
nothing in the will to suggest that the testator would not wish the residue of her estate to be applied 
in the manner suggested by the plaintiff. 
Therefore, a charitable trust had been created. But who was to be the trustee? His Honour said (at [46]–[48]): 
In requiring the residue to be applied for a charitable purpose, the testator established, by necessary 
implication, a charitable trust. The testator did not, however, expressly appoint a trustee. The 
Department, as an unincorporated body, would not have been a suitable trustee. In any event, with 
the demise of the Department, that possibility no longer exists. The Director General of Medical 
Services, a natural person with both medical qualifications and administrative responsibilities, may 
have been a suitable trustee but the office was abolished before the residue could pass into the hands 
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of an incumbent. The want of appointment of a trustee does not affect the validity of the disposition 
where a testator has otherwise established a charitable trust. The Court has the inherent power to 
appoint a trustee if satisfied that the testator’s gift of the residue is valid and a charitable trust has 
resulted. Section 21 of the Health Services Charitable Gifts Act authorises the Board to act as trustee 
in respect of a trust where the Board is named or otherwise asked to act as a trustee or co-trustee.  
Therefore, the Health Services Charitable Gifts Board was appointed to be the trustee of the charitable trust 
created by the testator’s will, and the gift in the will could take effect. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2014/65.html 
Implications of this case 
This case demonstrates the difficulty inherent when a will’s provisions stretch over time. At the time of the 
testator’s death in 1974, the parties named in the will were still in existence. Therefore, there was no lapse of 
the gift. The property now subject to the charitable trust was then subject to a life interest which stretched 
over 34 years. At the time of the determination of the residue in 2009, the structure of health administration 
in South Australia had changed several times. However, His Honour was able to discern a general charitable 
intention in the will, so that the gift under it could still be given to the applicable replacement body for the 
benefit of the kind of patients originally intended to be assisted by the testator. 
 
2.9.26 TLC THE LAND CONSERVANCY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA V THE UNIVERSITY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA, 2014 BCCA 473 (CANLII) (COURT OF APPEAL OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, TYSOE, D SMITH, BENNET JJA, 3 DECEMBER 2014) 
This appeal concerned the interpretation of the will of the widow of a renowned Canadian architect and artist, 
Bertram Charles Binning (the will), and actions taken by the executors under the will in dealing with one of the 
assets owned by the testatrix. The main issue was whether a house in West Vancouver, British Columbia, 
designed by Dr Binning, known as the Binning House, was properly transferred to the respondent, TLC The 
Land Conservancy of British Columbia (TLC), a society which operates as a land trust to protect lands 
considered to have ecological, agricultural or cultural importance. 
The parties in contention were the University of British Columbia (UBC), a beneficiary under the will, and the 
TLC which had encountered financial difficulties and could no longer maintain the properties in its portfolio. 
On 28 October 2013 TLC received an unsolicited offer to purchase the Binning House for $1.6 million. The 
principal of the prospective purchaser was a collector of Dr Binning’s artwork who planned to preserve the 
character of the Binning House. TLC sought court approval of the sale and proposed to use the sale proceeds 
as operating funds for its restructuring process and other expenses. 
UBC did not object to the sale but maintained that the sale proceeds should be paid to it. However, objections 
to the sale were raised by the Attorney General of British Columbia and the District of West Vancouver based 
on the provisions of the Charitable Purposes Preservation Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 59, and common law trust 
obligations. The chambers judge adjourned TLC’s application for approval of the sale for reasons related to the 
objections raised by the Attorney General of British Columbia and the District of West Vancouver. The issues 
raised by those objections did not form part of this matter. This matter arose from the chambers judge’s 
dismissal of UBC’s application. UBC appealed from that decision.  
TLC had taken over the Binning House after the will of the testatrix had insufficient funds in it for all the cash 
legacies to be paid and to provide a fund to maintain the house. TLC, a nonprofit charity with a mandate for 
the preservation, protection and public programming of historic British Columbia properties, seemed to the 
trustees to fit with Mrs Binning’s wishes for the use and preservation of the Binning House. Legal advice was 
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obtained by the trustees as to whether they had the power to transfer the Binning House to TLC. Because of a 
difficulty identified in the will, a new charitable society was formed to take over the Binning House. Thus, a 
new society called Binning Heritage Property Society (the New Society) was incorporated on 3 July 2008. On 16 
October 2008, title to the Binning House was transferred by the trustees to the New Society. Immediately 
thereafter, the New Society transferred the Binning House to TLC. The two transfers were registered by the 
Estate Lawyers in the land title office under consecutive registration numbers. 
Another document dated 16 October 2008, entitled ‘Deed of Gift’, which does not appear to have been 
prepared by the Estate Lawyers, witnessed that the New Society gifted the Binning House to TLC ‘for the 
purpose of restoring, developing and preserving the Binning House, formerly the home of B.C. Binning, for 
historical purposes with a view to educating the public and commemorating the site’. However, TLC’s financial 
difficulties meant that it could not now undertake that task. 
UBC had argued in the court below that the will only contemplated one of two possible actions: the 
establishment of the entity to hold, maintain and use the Binning House, or the sale of the Binning House. This 
was rejected in the court below. On appeal, UBC had to argue that the transfer of the house was a fraud on the 
power contained in the will authorizing the trustees to transfer it. As His Honour judge Tysoe (giving the 
judgement on appeal) said ‘the phrase “fraud on a power” is a term of art, and it does not connote fraud in the 
usual sense of dishonesty’ (at [42]). The two basic elements of a fraud on a power are: 
(a)  a disposition beyond the scope of the power by the donee, whose position is referable to the 
terms, express or implied, of the instrument creating the power; and 
(b)  a deliberate breach of the implied obligation not to exercise that power for an ulterior purpose. 
Thus, the first issue to consider was the interpretation of the will to determine whether the disposition of the 
Binning House by the trustees was beyond the scope of the power given to them in the will. The second issue 
was a consideration of the trustees’ actions. 
On the scope of the power issue, the court held that the judge below had erred in finding that there was a 
wide discretion under the will for the trustees to act as they did (at [55]–[56]): 
While there is no question that Mrs Binning hoped the Binning House would be preserved for 
historical purposes, the question is whether the power given to the Trustees under the Will on its 
proper interpretation permitted them to transfer it to the New Society in circumstances where it was 
contemplated that the New Society would immediately transfer the Binning House to TLC. In my 
opinion, the transfer was outside the scope of the power given to the Trustees. When the Trustees 
established the New Society and transferred the Binning House to it, they knew there was no residue 
of the estate that could be distributed to the New Society for the purpose of maintaining the Binning 
House, and they knew it was not feasible and practical for the New Society to hold, maintain and use 
the Binning House. They had agreed that the New Society would immediately transfer the Binning 
House to TLC, and it was never intended for the New Society to retain it for any length of time. This 
was outside the scope of the power contained in clause 4(g)(iii) of the Will. 
Was the exercise of the power for an ulterior purpose? An exercise of a power may be fraudulent if it was 
made (1) pursuant to an antecedent agreement or bargain between the donee and an object of the power 
whereby a non-object is to benefit; or (2) for a corrupt purpose; or (3) for purposes foreign to the power. 
There was no suggestion in this case that there was an agreement prior to the making of the will that the 
trustees would exercise their discretion under the will for the benefit of TLC. Nor was there any suggestion 
that the trustees exercised their discretion for a corrupt purpose. The question was whether they exercised 
their discretion ‘for purposes foreign to the power’. The court held that the trustees had done so (at [67]): 
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The Trustees had received legal advice from the Estate Lawyers that the Binning House could not be 
transferred directly to TLC or, in other words, TLC was not a proper object of the power given to them 
under the Will. The Trustees then set out to do indirectly that which they knew could not be done 
directly. They transferred the Binning House to the New Society with the intention that the New 
Society would immediately transfer it to a non-object, TLC. The Trustees deliberately used the power 
in the Will for the purpose of benefiting a non-object. They used it for an ulterior purpose. 
However, the trustees were held to have acted in good faith, though wrongly and for an ulterior purpose. The 
Binning House was ordered to be transferred back to the estate of the late Mrs Binning. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2014/2014bcca473/2014bcca473.html 
Implications of this case 
The trustees in this case were held to have acted in good faith. They were endeavouring to fulfil Mrs Binning’s 
hope that the Binning House be preserved for historical purposes. However, dishonesty or bad faith is not 
essential for there to be a fraud on a power in trust law. The corollary is that good faith is not a defence to a 
claim of a fraud on a power. 
 
2.9.27 UNIVERSITY OF LONDON V PRAG [2014] EWHC 3564 (CH) (ENGLAND AND WALES 
HIGH COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION, PROUDMAN J, 6 NOVEMBER 2014) 
This case concerned a number of questions arising out of a Trust Deed (the Deed) dated 28 November 1944 
and made between (1) Eric Max Warburg ‘on behalf of the Warburg Family’, (2) Viscount Lee of Fareham ‘on 
behalf of the Warburg Society’ and (3) the University of London (UOL). Questions had arisen over time, as to 
the scope of the Deed, the ownership of property, the status of funding and the propriety of the 
administration by UOL under the Deed. 
UOL is a body incorporated by Royal Charter established for exclusively charitable purposes, (an exempt 
charity for the purposes of section 22 of, and Schedule 3 para 2 to, the Charities Act 2011), although it is 
commonly seen as a federation of numerous institutions which have varying degrees of autonomy. 
The questions related to a large collection of books and photographs given to UOL in 1944. The question of 
who were the then owners of the Warburg Library (the Library) was deliberately left vague in the Deed. 
Members of the Warburg family were apparently reluctant to be named as owners of the collection both for 
fiscal and for political reasons. However it seems to have been clear that the owners were members of the 
Warburg family, or possibly the Warburg Society, a charitable association whose stated aim under its founding 
Deed of 17 May 1934 was to ‘house and maintain in England all or some part or parts of the library and 
collection of photographs hitherto held by the Warburg Institute at Hamburg and to cause such library and 
collection to be exhibited studied and enjoyed…’. 
The Library was established in Hamburg as the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg in about 1900. It 
was founded by Professor Aby Warburg with the financial support of his four brothers. It had the object of 
promoting research on comparative lines into European cultural history. In 1933, because of the rise of 
Nazism, the Library and some of its staff moved to London at the invitation of certain individuals, including 
Lord Lee and Samuel Courtauld, who provided funds to support it until December1943. The terms ‘Warburg 
Library’ and ‘Warburg Institute’ were both in use before the Deed was contemplated. By a deed dated 13 May 
1934 an unincorporated body, the Warburg Society, was constituted. Its first members and first committee 
were the parties to the deed including Lord Lee and Eric Warburg, although it seems from a letter from Lord 
Lee written in 1944 that the Society actually did very little. The general purpose of the Society was the 
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promotion of science, literature and fine arts, but the specific purpose can be gleaned from the deed where it 
says: 
…the first work of the Society shall be to house and maintain in England all or some part or parts of 
the library and collection of photographs hitherto held by the Warburg Institute at Hamburg and to 
cause such library and collection to be exhibited studied used and enjoyed for purposes and in 
manner consistent with the above stated general purposes of the Society. 
Her Honour traced the history of the Library. Initially it had no permanent home in England, although it was 
established properly as an Institute. It was not until 1944 that the Library was placed with UOL under the 
Deed, again in the form of an Institute. Funding for the Library and the Institute was provided by the UOL from 
1945 under various funding models. However, the UOL no longer wished to provide funding because of 
restrictions in its budget. It wished to roll the Library into a general library structure within UOL (i.e. as part of 
its own university property). However, Her Honour held that the Library was not the property of the UOL. It 
was held on charitable trusts, and had to be maintained separately from university property, because (at 
[133]): 
…as a matter of construction UOL is the trustee for the Institute, and not merely the 1944 Collection, 
and as, again as a matter of construction, the Deed imposes a duty on UOL to manage the Institute as 
‘an independent unit’ having regard to its ‘special character’…. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/3564.html 
Implications of this case 
Her Honour was clear in this decision that the Deed did not ‘calcify’ the 1944 collection as the subject of the 
trusts under the Deed. The trust related to the collection as it was in 1944, the many additions that had been 
made to it since, and to the Institute itself. Although the Institute was part of UOL, it was subject to its own 
special trusts under the Deed, and as such, could not be treated as UOL property.  
 
2.9.28 WESTERN DESERT LANDS ABORIGINAL CORPORATION (JAMUKURNU-YAPALIKUNU) 
RNTBC V MARTU PEOPLE LIMITED AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MARTU CHARITABLE 
TRUST [2014] WASC 417 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, LE MIERE J, 10 
NOVEMBER 2014) 
In this application, the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the first defendant (until further order) from 
passing any resolutions resolving to: 
(a) wind up the Martu Charitable Trust; and 
(b) distribute any of the surplus assets of the Martu Charitable Trust. 
The plaintiff had two claims. It claimed that the first defendant intended to wind up the Western Desert Lands 
Aboriginal Corporation (WDLAC) Kintyre Sub Fund, a sub-fund of the Martu Charitable Trust, without the 
consent of the plaintiff, contrary to the terms of the trust deed for the Martu Charitable Trust. Secondly, it 
claimed that on winding up the Martu Charitable Trust, the plaintiff intended to distribute part of the surplus 
assets of the Trust to Kalyuku Ninti Puntuku Ngurra Limited (KJ) contrary to the terms of the Martu Charitable 
Trust deed. 
The terms of the Martu Charitable Trust Deed were relevant. The first recital to the deed refers to the Native 
Title Determination by Consent with respect to the traditional lands of the Martu People by the Federal Court 
on 22 September 2002. The second recital states that the Martu Beneficiary Group wants to create a trust to 
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be known as the Martu Charitable Trust for the promotion of the Charitable Purposes. The Martu Beneficiary 
Group means the Martu persons whose names appear on the Martu Beneficiary Register. The Charitable 
Purposes are set out in a schedule to the deed. They include the usual charitable purposes and other purposes 
beneficial to the community including the promotion and advancement of Aboriginal law and culture. Recital E 
states that the trust has been created for the purpose of benefiting the Martu Beneficiary Group in the 
manner set out, and is established for charitable purposes only. 
The plaintiff's case turned on clause 21.6.7 of the Martu Charitable Trust Deed, concerning winding up the 
Trust. Its terms are: 
(a) The Trustee may only wind up the Trust with the prior written consent of the Martu Beneficiary 
Group, and any Contributor if required by the relevant Sub Fund Agreement. 
(b) The Trustee may only wind up a Sub Fund with the prior written consent of the Contributor with 
respect to that Sub Fund. 
(c) If, on the winding up of the Trust, any property remains after the satisfaction of all the Trust's 
debts and liabilities, the Trustee must give and transfer the property to or for one or more funds, 
authorities or institutions which are charitable at law and established for similar objects to the 
Trust Objects for the benefit of the Beneficiaries as the Trustee decides. 
Was consent required to wind up the sub-fund? His Honour held that it was not (at [6]): 
In my view cl 21.6.7(a) and (b) are directed to different subject matters. Paragraph (a) is directed to 
when the consent of a Contributor is required to wind up the Trust. Paragraph (b) is directed to when 
the consent of a Contributor is required to wind up a Sub Fund when the Trust is not being wound up. 
The winding up of the Trust necessarily involves the termination of the Sub Fund but that is not what 
(b) is directed to. Paragraph (b) is directed to when a Sub Fund is wound up without the Trust being 
wound up. The construction advanced by the plaintiff is contrary to the plain words of (a) which 
provides that the consent of a Contributor to the winding up of the Trust is necessary if required by 
the relevant Sub Fund Agreement and implicitly is not necessary if not required by the relevant Fund 
Agreement. The relevant Sub Fund Agreement does not provide that the consent of the plaintiff is 
required for the winding up of the Trust. The plaintiff's argument that its consent is required to the 
winding up of the Trust is not sufficiently arguable to give rise to a prima facie case. 
The plaintiff's alternative argument was that the first defendant intended to distribute part of the surplus Trust 
assets to KJ, and KJ did not meet the requirements of clause 21.6.7(c), because it was not a fund, authority or 
institution which was charitable at law and established for similar objects to the Trust Objects for the benefit 
of the Beneficiaries. However, at the hearing, the plaintiff had to accept that KJ was an organisation which was 
'charitable at law', but continued to claim that it did not meet the requirement or requirements of being 
'established for similar objects to the Trust Objects for the benefit of the Beneficiaries'.  On this point, His 
Honour said (at [8]–[10]): 
In my opinion the words 'established for similar objects to the Trust Objects for the benefit of the 
Beneficiaries' is a single composite requirement not a requirement that the organisation be 
established for similar objects to the Trust Objects and a further requirement that the property be 
given or transferred 'for the benefit of the Beneficiaries'. …. The plaintiff pointed to differences 
between the Trust Objects in cl 2.3 of the Trust Deed and the objects of KJ in cl 2.1 of the Constitution 
of KJ. In particular, senior counsel submitted that the Trust Objects are for the benefit of the 
Beneficiaries who are persons of aboriginal descent having a connection with or living in the Region 
and other people connected were associated with them. On the other hand the objects of KJ are to 
benefit Aboriginal people especially the Common Law Holders. There is little or no evidence to 
identify the Aboriginal people with a connection with or living in the Region or to distinguish them 
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from the Common Law Holders. Senior counsel for the plaintiff accepted that the two descriptions 
broadly cover the same people. In any event the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the objects of KJ 
are not similar to the Trust Objects and to the extent that that requires proving that persons with a 
connection with or living in the Region are different from the Common Law Holders, there is no or 
sufficient [sic] evidence of that. …. Clause 21.6.7(c) requires that the objects of the receiving 
organisation be similar to the Trust Objects for the benefit of the Beneficiaries, not that they be the 
same. In my opinion a comparison of the Martu Charitable Trust Deed with the KJ Constitution, in the 
absence of any evidence distinguishing people with a connection with or living in the Region from the 
Common Law Holders, fails to raise a prima facie case that the objects of KJ are not similar to the 
Trust Objects for the benefit of the Beneficiaries. 
Therefore, there was no prima facie case established, and no relief was granted to the plaintiff. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2014/417.html 
 
2.9.29 THE WOODLAND TRUST V LORING [2014] EWCA CIV 1314 (ENGLAND AND WALES 
COURT OF APPEAL, CIVIL DIVISION, LEWISON, CHRISTOPHER CLARKE LLJ, SIR 
COLIN RIMER, 16 OCTOBER 2014) 
This was an appeal concerning the disposition of bequests under a will made in 2001. The question on appeal 
was whether the amounts had been properly divided by the judge at first instance. 
Valerie Smith (the testatrix) died on 1 September 2011, leaving a will, clause 5 of which provided: 
MY TRUSTEES shall set aside out of my residuary estate assets or cash of an aggregate value equal to 
such sum as is at the date of my death the amount of my unused nil rate band for Inheritance Tax and 
… hold the same for such of the following as shall survive me and in the case of the grandchildren 
attain 23 and if more than one in equal shares absolutely. 
Clause 6 of the will left the remaining residuary to the Woodland Trust (the Trust), a registered charity. 
The net value of the estate was £680,805. At the date of the testatrix's death, the amount of her single unused 
nil-rate for inheritance tax purposes was that set out in Schedule 1 to the Inheritance Tax Act 1984.  This 
amount was, at that date, £325,000. Thus, the effect of clauses 5 and 6 of the will would have been to give 
£325,000 of the residuary estate to the Lorings in equal shares and the balance of £355,805 to the Trust. The 
will would have been 100% inheritance tax efficient: the £325,000 would have borne tax at the nil-rate, and 
the balance payable to the Trust would have been exempt, because it is a registered charity.  
However, a complication arose when there was a change in the law in 2008. The Finance Act 2008 introduced 
a new section 8A into the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 the effect of which was to increase the nil-rate portion for 
inheritance tax purposes of the testatrix’s estate (because she had not claimed her husband’s unused nil-rate 
portion when he had died in 1984) to £650,000. This meant that the portion to be given to the beneficiaries 
under clause 5 of the will was increased to £650,000 and the portion left for the Trust was reduced to £30,805. 
This was successfully argued at first instance.  The Trust appealed. 
On appeal, the judge’s interpretation of the correct amount of the unused nil-rate band was accepted as 
correct. The clauses in the will did not require complex interpretation. The testatrix’s intention was clear – she 
wished to benefit her family by leaving to them her unused nil-rate band amount (which had been increased 
100% by statute), and she wished to leave the remainder (whatever amount that was) to charity.  The family 
members benefited by the change in the law, which they were able to take advantage of. Therefore, the 
charity received only £30,805 instead of £355,805. 
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The case may be viewed at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/1314.html 
Implications of this case 
Two of the judges said they had difficulty in making this decision. The change in the law was favourable to the 
family beneficiaries, and disadvantageous to the charity.  However, the appeal court said to decide otherwise 
would be contrary to statute. 
 
2.10 MISCELLANEOUS 
2.10.1 1784773 ONTARIO INC V K-W LABOUR ASSOCIATION INC., 2014 ONCA 288 (CANLII) 
(COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO, FELDMAN, ROULEAU, HOURIGAN JJA, 14 APRIL 
2014) 
This was an appeal from 1784773 Ont. Inc. v K-W Labour Association et al, 2013 ONSC 5401 (CanLII), a 
summary judgement of Sloan J on 21 August 2013. The case concerned a property purchased by 1784773 
Ontario Inc (the plaintiff) from the defendant association. It emerged soon after the purchase (via a newspaper 
article) that the property was allegedly haunted by ghosts. The plaintiff commenced an action against the 
defendant association on the basis that the haunting (or a possible death or murder in the building) was a 
latent defect in the building which had not been disclosed by the defendant. A latent defect in a building is a 
quality affecting its fitness for habitation.  A vendor is not liable for damages for a latent defect of which the 
vendor has knowledge unless the defect renders the premises unfit for habitation or dangerous. If the latent 
defect is either unknown to the vendor or is of such a nature that it does not make the vendor liable for 
concealment or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, then there is no redress. 
In this case there were no facts presented concerning a death or murder in the building, and evidence was put 
that the matter had been raised as a joke after a ‘few beers’ at a social function. His Honour described the 
alleged ghost story as ‘double hearsay rumour’ (at [17]). His Honour said that there was almost no case law on 
the issue of the stigmatization of a building as infested with ghosts in Canada (at [15], [18]): 
I am not aware of any case law that would obligate the vendor of a commercial building to disclose to 
the purchaser that someone has died in the building, how they died or that there is a rumour that the 
building might be haunted.... 
There is no suggestion that the building is unfit for habitation as a commercial building, the purpose 
for which it was purchased in the first place. There is no suggestion that the purchasers intended to 
use the building for anything other than commercial purposes. 
His Honour pointed out that it was difficult to know how evidence would be adduced as to the presence of 
ghosts, so there could be no issue requiring a trial. He granted summary judgement for the plaintiff.  
In this appeal decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario had little time for the issue of ghosts or hauntings (at 
[1]): 
Counsel acknowledge that there is no direct evidence of economic loss or damage as a result of the 
stigma of a haunted property, nor is there any direct evidence from anyone who observed any 
strange occurrences in the property. In those circumstances, we see no error in the motion judge’s 
conclusion that the case is a proper one for dismissal on summary judgment.  
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
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The summary judgement decision may be viewed at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2013/2013onsc5401/2013onsc5401.html 
This appeal decision may be viewed at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca288/2014onca288.html 
 
2.10.2 FREEBURN V THE CAKE DECORATORS ASSOCIATION OF NSW INC [2014] NSWDC 88 
(DISTRICT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, GIBSON DCJ, 4 JULY 2014) 
This was a case concerning defamation. The plaintiff brought proceedings for defamation against the 
publishers of Pipeline, the bimonthly newspaper of the Cake Decorators Association of New South Wales Inc 
(the association), and two individuals who were members of the association’s committee. The association is an 
incorporated association under the Associations Incorporations Act 2009 (NSW). The matter complained of 
was a notice published on 21 November 2012 in the December issue of Pipeline, of a motion to be moved by 
the State Committee of the association on 23 February 2013. The contents of the motion (as written) were: 
That Mrs Kay Freeburn be expelled as a member from the Association at teh [sic] 2012 AGM and not 
allowed to rejoin the Association as a member.Reason For [sic] continually bombarding memebes [sic] 
with letters for her personal agenda. For committing acts that bring the Association into disrepute - 
for failure to follow the Constitution. For accusing the State committee of mal-administration and 
suppling [sic] NO proof of this. For causing members distress by her repeated letters to them and 
brenaches [sic]. Failure to give good reason why the Committee should not rescind her membership. 
Various imputations about the plaintiff were said to arise from this notice. These were: 
(a) That the plaintiff made allegations of maladministration by committee members of the association 
when she had no evidence of such allegations. 
(b) That the plaintiff was dishonest in that she made allegations of maladministration by committee 
members of the association when she had no evidence of such allegations. 
(c) That the plaintiff had attempted to deceive the members of the association. 
(d) That the plaintiff had not acted fairly and reasonably. 
(e) That the plaintiff had a personal agenda which was not in the best interests and was to the 
detriment of the association. 
(f) That the plaintiff was motivated by personal and selfish reasons. 
(g) That the plaintiff had acted outside the bounds of the constitution of the first defendant. 
(h) That it was necessary to expel the plaintiff as a member of the association in order to resolve the 
alleged improper conduct of the plaintiff. 
(i) That it was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from ever again rejoining as a member of the 
association in order to resolve the alleged improper conduct of the plaintiff. 
(j) That the plaintiff was unfit to be a member of the association. 
Three applications were brought before the court in this case: 
(a) The defendants’ application to ‘strike in’ the whole of the December issue of ‘Pipeline’; 
(b) The plaintiff’s application to ‘strike in’ the motion from the August 2012 edition of ‘Pipeline’; and 
(c) The defendants’ objections to the form and capacity of the imputations pleaded. 
Application (a) was unopposed and allowed by consent. Application (b) was refused, because on a careful 
consideration of the relevant authorities, Her Honour concluded that the passage from the August issue of the 
association’s publication was not connected even though the imputations were first made in the August issue. 
The issues were four months apart. Her Honour said that the correct course of action was to commence 
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proceedings separately in respect of each issue, because they could not be considered part of a series of 
defamatory statements with a four month gap between them. 
As to the form and capacity of the imputations pleaded, imputation (f) was not pressed by the plaintiff and so 
was not considered. As to the remainder, the association challenged them all. The association firstly 
contended that imputations (a) and (b) were not capable of being conveyed. Her Honour agreed and said that 
they were effectively the same (at [15]–[17]): 
The dictionary definitions of conduct amounting to ‘maladministration’ refer to such conduct as 
inaction, delay, incompetence and failure to deal with administrative issues. The ordinary reasonable 
reader would not read anything more sinister into such a word. The word ‘NO’ in capital letters, in the 
context of the other conduct attributed to the plaintiff such as prolix correspondence and raising 
matters on her own agenda, would be seen by the ordinary reasonable reader as being a response to 
the lack of proof rather than a claim that the plaintiff was making these claims dishonestly or 
deceitfully. The overall impression is that the plaintiff is a nuisance and troublemaker who does not 
provide any proof for her claims, rather than a person dishonestly or deceitfully making false 
allegations knowing that she has no proof. Applying the test for capacity as most recently enunciated 
by the NSW Court of Appeal in Toben v Milne [2014] NSWCA 200, neither of these imputations is 
conveyed. In addition, if the failure to offer proof is the basis upon which imputation (b) is pleaded, 
these imputations do not differ in substance: Toben v Milne, supra, at [10]. Both are pleaded as acts, 
and both could only arise from the reference to failure to provide proof, as this is the only conduct in 
the matter complained of with any capacity to support any imputation of deceitful conduct. While the 
test for capacity of an imputation is at a very low level... neither of these imputations is capable of 
being conveyed and, in addition, do not differ in substance 
Imputations (b) and (c) were both struck out. Imputations (d) and (e) were ordered to be amended to ‘the 
plaintiff does not act fairly’ and to delete the reference to detriment respectively. Imputations (h) and (i) were 
struck out with leave to replead. Her Honour did not comment on imputation (g). Imputation (j) as to unfitness 
was struck out completely. This was because, as a general rule, imputations of being ‘unfit’ are regarded as a 
rhetorical flourish. As Her Honour explained (at [29]–[30]): 
Generally speaking, such an imputation is permissible only if the fitness for a specific profession is 
capable of this kind of specific definition, where an imputation of being unfit for that position is 
capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Where this occurs, the nature of the unfitness is 
generally specified in the imputation, such as being unfit to be a councillor after failing to disclose a 
conflict of interest (Bennison v O'Neil [2012] NSWSC 360), being unfit to be a director after displaying 
bad commercial judgement (Heugh v Askin [2014] WASC 30), or being unfit to be in charge of Olympic 
swimmers because of his improper sexual attentions to a minor (Hodge v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd 
[2006] NSWSC 933).  
Without being disrespectful to the importance of cake decorating, the matter complained of refers to 
the basis upon which the plaintiff should be expelled from an organisation membership of which says 
nothing about her character. ... [A] general allegation of unfitness for membership of the Cake 
Decorators Association would say nothing about the plaintiff, except possibly being [an un]interested 
or poor cake decorator. No such imputation is capable of being conveyed.  
Therefore, some of the imputations remained ((a), (d) and (e)), and two were given leave to be repleaded ((h) 
and (i)). Costs were awarded against the plaintiff with all parties ordered to enter into mediation. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWDC/2014/88.html 
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Implications of this case  
Defamation is a tort or civil wrong, and if it is proved, substantial damages can be payable. This case is a timely 
reminder to associations, particularly smaller associations, that unconsidered statements published in any 
form, to anyone (perhaps especially in association newsletters and similar publications, or on association 
websites and social media) can result in defamation proceedings issuing. It is for the court to decide whether 
the material published is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. 
 
2.10.3 GALLAGHER V MCCLINTOCK & ORS [2014] QCA 224 (QUEENSLAND COURT OF 
APPEAL, HOLMES JA, ANNE LYONS, FLANAGAN JJ, 5 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
The appellant in this case was a regular attendant at, though not an official member of, the Wesleyan 
Methodist Church (the Church) at Yeppoon in Queensland. His several applications for membership of the 
Church had all been rejected. The respondents were members of the Church Board which included the pastor 
of the Church since 2008, Pastor Ron McClintock.  
The underlying dispute in this case appeared to be doctrinal. The appellant had been concerned for some time 
that Pastor McClintock was unqualified for his position and was implementing what the appellant described as 
‘Hybels/Warren style weirdo “Christian” theology’. The appellant had been observed distributing pamphlets at 
the Church which were entitled ‘The Rothschild Satanic Illuminati Reptilian Bloodline Connection For The 
Creation Of The NEW WORLD ORDER, GLOBAL, HARLOT CHURCH’. He was asked to leave the Church property. 
The land upon which the Church in Yeppoon is located is owned by, and registered in the name of, the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church of Australia in Queensland, a corporate entity. The Church Board wrote to the 
appellant on 2 September 2013 refusing him permission to enter the Church property. An application for 
interlocutory relief by the appellant went before McMeekin J on 25 October 2013. No relief was granted. The 
matter proceeded to this appeal. Both the application for interlocutory relief and this appeal were based on a 
freedom of speech argument, specifically Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. McMeekin J had dealt with that 
submission as follows (at [32]–[33] of the application for interlocutory relief): 
There is no section within the Australian Constitution which entitles a person to freedom of speech, 
nor is it enforced by the Bill of Rights of 1688. The specific section referred to by the applicant applies 
to the proceedings of parliament. It is commonly known as ‘parliamentary privilege’. It is a protection 
afforded to politicians to allow for open debate. The protection has now been codified in the 
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 and does not extend to the general public. That is not to say that 
there is no freedom of speech in our community or that the Constitution does not have a part to play 
in the preservation, at least, of freedom of political communication. What Mr Gallagher asserts is a 
right to enter someone else’s property and distribute pamphlets there. Freedom of speech has 
nothing to do with it.  
This appeal challenged McMeekin J’s interpretation of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. The Court of Appeal 
found no error in McMeekin J’s approach to the issue (at [24]–[25]): 
Since the appellant was not a member of the Church, he had no contractual right to be on the land. 
He was a licensee only. A licence is personal to the licensee and simply confers a personal right on the 
licensee to enter the land. It does not confer any proprietary interest in the land. The licence can be 
granted on both explicit and / or implied terms and conditions. The licence only authorises entry in 
accordance with those terms. These terms and conditions can limit or regulate, inter alia, the purpose 
for which entry to land is granted. Any right that the appellant had to be upon Church land prior to 1 
September 2013 was subject to implied limitations. The first was that the appellant’s licence was 
revokable at will by the owner of the land without prior notice or reason. The appellant’s licence to be 
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upon Church land would also be subject to him complying with all statutory requirements touching 
upon religious worship. This would include section 207 of the Criminal Code (Qld).... 
The Church Board had revoked the appellant’s licence to be on the Church land by its letter to him dated 2 
September 2013. Therefore, he had no proprietary or equitable right to enter onto the land after that date. 
The fact that the appellant did not have a legal or equitable right to be upon Church property was sufficient to 
dispose of his appeal in respect to any asserted right to freedom of speech. However, the Court of Appeal also 
rejected all of the appellant’s contentions relating to freedom of speech. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 
only applied to parliamentary privilege, and there was no relevant implied freedom of speech under the 
Constitution of Australia (at [44]): 
Even if one were to assume that the pamphlet, which the appellant wishes to distribute on Church 
property, constituted a communication that fell within the implied freedom, he simply has no legal or 
equitable right to be upon the land for the purpose of such distribution. Nor can it be said that the 
revocation of his licence to be upon Church land interferes with any asserted implied freedom. The 
Court is not dealing here with any proposed law which seeks to curtail the appellant’s right to express 
his opinions but simply with his rights (or lack thereof) to express those opinions on land from which 
he has been lawfully excluded. 
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QCA/2014/224.html 
 
2.10.4 KENNEDY V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES [2014] UKSC 20 
(SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, LORDS NEUBERGER, MANCE, CLARKE, 
WILSON, SUMPTION, CARNWITH, TOULSON, 26 MARCH 2014) 
This was appeal relating to the nature of information and its disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 (FOIA) in the UK. Kennedy (the appellant), an experienced journalist with The Times newspaper had been 
trying to obtain information from the Charity Commission for England and Wales (the Commission) relating to 
investigations by the Commission into a charity known as the Mariam Appeal (the charity). The charity was 
founded by a member of parliament, George Galloway, in 1998 and operated until 2003. The Commission had 
investigated the charity and produced two brief reports about its investigation findings, but these were 
challenged as inadequate by the press, and the appellant sought further information about them. 
The FOIA provides a framework within which there are rights to be informed on request, about the existence 
of information held by any public authority (such as the Commission), and to have the information 
communicated. However, the framework is not entirely open. The rights to information do not apply at all in 
cases which are described as “absolute exemptions” (section 2). In addition, the rights are subject to a large 
number of other qualifications.  
The Charity Commission argued that an absolute exemption contained in section 32(2) of the FOIA applied. 
This exempted the Charity Commission from any duty to disclose any document placed in its custody, or 
created by it, for the purposes of an inquiry which it had conducted in the public interest, in the exercise of its 
functions. The Charity Commission submitted that this exemption lasted until the document was destroyed, 
or, if the document was one that ought to be publicly preserved, that it lasted for up to 30 years (or, in future, 
20 years) under the Public Records Act 1958 section 3 (as amended for the future by the Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Act 2010 section 45(1)).  
The intention behind section 32(2) was to take information under it outside the framework of the FOIA. Any 
question as to disclosure was to be addressed under the different and more specific schemes and mechanisms 
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which govern the operations of and disclosure by courts, arbitrators, or persons conducting inquiries. With 
regard to the Charity Commission, the relevant scheme and mechanism are found in the Charities Act 1993, as 
amended by the Charities Act 2006 (since replaced by the Charities Act 2011), the construction of which is 
informed by a background of general common law principles relating to charity.  
The bulk of the information which the appellant sought was to be found in documents prepared by other 
public authorities, or private persons or bodies for the purposes of the Commission’s inquiry into the charity. 
The information requested also included some pre-existing documents and communications between the 
Commission, other public authorities, other entities, and Mr Galloway. 
The appellant’s appeal was based solely on the provisions of the FOIA. However, the Supreme Court took a 
wider view, considering the following questions in its judgement: 
(a) whether section 32(2) of the FOIA contained, as a matter of ordinary statutory construction, an 
absolute exemption which continued after the end of an inquiry;  
(b) if it did contain an absolute exemption, whether that was compatible with the appellant’s rights 
under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention).  
(c) if section 32(2) were not so compatible, then in the light of the duty in section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 to interpret primary legislation “so far as it is possible to do so … in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights”, should section 32 be read down so that either:  
(i) the absolute exemption ceased with the end of the relevant inquiry; or  
(ii) it contained only a qualified exemption (requiring a general balancing of the competing public 
interests) rather than an absolute exemption; and  
(d) if it was not possible to interpret section 32(2) in a manner that was compatible with the 
Convention, whether the Supreme Court should make a declaration of incompatibility.  
The Commission had conducted three investigations into the charity, two in 2003 and one in 2005. The 
Commission’s investigations had found that the charity had not been registered and did not operate under the 
provisions of the Charities Act 1993, as it should have. The investigations also uncovered other irregularities, 
some with international implications. Lord Mance (with whom Lords Neuberger and Clarke agreed) and Lord 
Toulson (with whom Lord Sumption concurred) gave the leading judgements. Lords Carnwath and Wilson 
dissented. In outlining the facts, Lord Mance said (at [12]–[14]): 
The report on the first and second inquiries confirmed Mr Kennedy’s belief that appeal monies had 
been used by Mr Galloway on travel and political campaigning to end the sanctions against Iraq and 
found that other monies had been received by other trustees as unauthorised benefits in the form of 
salary payments. Mr Kennedy maintains that these uses of funds were contrary to Mr Galloway’s 
original stated aim that appeal funds would be used first to treat Miss Mariam Hamza and thereafter 
to treat other Iraqi children also suffering from leukaemia, and that the inquiries, when holding that 
such use fell within or advanced the charity’s purposes, failed properly to address this aspect. He also 
maintains that, in closing the inquiries without taking or proposing further action, the Charity 
Commission showed a lack of interest in investigating what had become of the appeal funds. The 
report on the third inquiry found that the source of some of the appeal funds consisted in monies 
paid in connection with contracts which breached the UN sanctions against Iraq [related to the so-
called oil for food scandal]. This occurred in circumstances where one trustee...knew and “Mr 
Galloway may also have known of the connection”, a statement which Mr Kennedy understandably 
wishes to probe. Mr Galloway denounced this report, as containing “sloppy, misleading and partial 
passages” which could have been cleared up, “if the Commission had bothered to interview me 
during the course of its inquiry”. But a Commission spokesman subsequently informed Mr Kennedy 
that Mr Galloway, although giving written answers to questions posed, had failed to take up an offer 
of a meeting. Mr Kennedy wishes to follow up this discrepancy. More generally, Mr Kennedy says that 
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the very brief and unspecific nature of the two Commission reports and the conclusions reached, 
basically to leave matters as they were, raise questions about the manner in which the Charity 
Commission performed one of its central functions.  
Did section 32 FOIA contain an absolute exemption which continued after the end of an enquiry? 
The court first construed section 32 of the FOIA. In particular, the court considered whether the phrase in 
section 32(1) ‘for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter’ and in section 32(2) ‘for the 
purposes of the inquiry or arbitration’ represented a current or an historical condition for absolute exemption. 
The majority concluded that the more natural interpretation of section 32(2) was that the absolute exemption 
continued after the end of the relevant inquiry. The words ‘for the purposes of the inquiry or arbitration’ 
qualified the immediately preceding words in 32(2)(a) and (32)(2)(b) and referred to the original purpose for 
which the relevant documents were placed in the custody of, or were created by, a person conducting an 
inquiry. They did not refer to the purpose for which a public authority held the documents at the time of a 
request for information: see Lord Mance at [24–28] and Lord Toulson at [102–103].  
This more natural interpretation was also a better fit with the scheme of the FOIA. Under section 62(1), a 
record becomes a ‘historical record’ at the end of 30 years. Under section 63(1), information contained in an 
historical record cannot be exempt information by virtue of section 32. The natural inference is that 
information falling within section 32 would continue to be exempt for 30 years rather than cease to be exempt 
at the conclusion of an inquiry: see Lord Mance at [29–30] and Lord Toulson at [104). Therefore, the effect of 
section 32 was to take information falling within the absolute exemption outside the scope of the FOIA 
disclosure regime.  
Was section 32 incompatible with article 10 the Convention? 
The court said that the FOIA was never intended to determine whether or not information falling within the 
section 32 absolute exemption should be disclosed. Instead, any question as to its disclosure was governed by 
other rules of statute and common law. If the law otherwise entitled the appellant to disclosure or put him in a 
position no less favourable regarding disclosure than that which could be provided under article 10 of the 
Convention, then there could be no basis for reading down section 32 or concluding it was inconsistent with 
article 10: see Lord Mance at [6–8, 35–42] and Lord Toulson at [106]. That seemed to dispose of the appeal. As 
Lord Mance put it (at [42]): 
It follows from the above that Mr Kennedy’s claim, which has been made and argued on the basis that 
section 32 of the FOIA can and should be read down to have a meaning contrary to that which 
Parliament clearly intended, must fail. It also follows from the above that no basis exists for any 
declaration of incompatibility with article 10 of the Convention.   
However, the court went on to consider wider issues, albeit as obiter dicta (not a binding part of the decision) 
(stated at [42]). 
How was the Charity Commission affected by freedom of information requirements? 
It was said by Lord Mance (at [43]–[56]) that the Charity Commission had the power to disclose information to 
the public concerning inquiries on which it had published reports, both in pursuit of its statutory objective 
under the Charities Act 1993 (since replaced with the Charities Act 2011) of increasing public trust in, and the 
accountability of, charities, and under general common law duties of openness and transparency on public 
authorities. The exercise of that power was always subject to judicial review.  
Given the importance of the principles of openness and transparency, courts would apply a very high standard 
of review to any decision not to disclose information in answer to questions of real public interest raised by a 
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journalist in relation to inquiries on which the Charity Commission had published reports, and would take into 
account similar factors and provide a no less favourable standard of protection for a person seeking 
information, as any review under article 10 of the Convention (at [49]): 
The proper functioning and regulation of charities is a matter of great public importance and 
legitimate interest. The public interest in openness in relation to these questions is demonstrated 
positively by the objectives, the functions and, importantly, the duties given to and imposed on the 
Charity Commission under the Charities Act. The present request for further disclosure is made by a 
journalist in the light of the powerful public interest in the subject matter to enable there to be 
appropriate public scrutiny and awareness of the adequacy of the functioning and regulation of a 
particular charity. It is in these circumstances a request to which the Charity Commission should in my 
opinion accede in the public interest, except so far as the public interest in disclosure is demonstrably 
outweighed by any countervailing arguments that may be advanced.  
Lord Toulson (at [109]–[132]) said that open justice was a fundamental principle of the common law. Judicial 
processes should be open to public scrutiny, unless and to the extent that there are good reasons for secrecy 
(at [110]): 
Letting in the light, is the best way of keeping those exercising the judicial power of the state, up to 
the mark and for maintaining public confidence.  
These underlying considerations applied also to any quasi-judicial inquiries and hearings, such as an inquiry 
conducted by the Charity Commission, though the application of such principles would vary according to the 
context. Again, Lord Toulson held that the disclosure question was always open to judicial review. 
The scope of the right to receive information under article 10  
Lord Mance went on to consider the effect of article 10 of the Convention at [57]–[100]. Had it been necessary 
for the resolution of the appeal (which it was not), he said that the Supreme Court would have concluded that 
article 10 of the Convention did not contain a freestanding right to receive information from public authorities. 
Recent developments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights relied on by the appellant did not 
change this position. 
Dissenting judgments  
Lord Wilson (at [160–201]) and Lord Carnwath (at [202–248]) would have allowed the appeal on the basis that 
the appellant had a right to receive the requested information under article 10 of the Convention. The 
dissenting judges would have read down section 32(2) such that the absolute exemption expired at the end of 
the relevant inquiry. This would have preserved the FOIA as the mechanism for obtaining information, which 
they considered would offer a number of advantages to a person seeking information compared with the 
judicial review procedure referred to by the majority.  
The appeal was dismissed by a majority of 5 to 2. 
The case may be viewed at: http://supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2012_0122_Judgment.pdf 
Implications of this case 
This case was regarded as important in that charities which disclosed sensitive information to the Charity 
Commission in England and Wales might have had reason to fear that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
might have been used to obtain information which they would prefer not to have made public. Whilst the 
Charity Commission is a public body in the UK, and so subject to the provisions of the FOIA, there might be 
public interest reasons for the Commission maintaining the confidentiality of documents after one of its 
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enquiries was concluded. In this case, those reasons were recognised and upheld. However, these had to be 
balanced against the powerfully expressed reasons for openness from the Commission put forward by the 
Supreme Court in the non-binding part of its judgement. 
 
2.10.5 KUCZBORSKI V QUEENSLAND [2014] HCA 46 (HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FULL 
COURT, 14 NOVEMBER 2014) 
In this appeal, the plaintiff, a member of the Brisbane Chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (the Club), 
challenged the validity of various provisions of the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) 
(VLAD), the Criminal Code (Qld), the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) and the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). The plaintiff sought 
declarations that the impugned provisions were invalid. The provisions in question were: 
1. Significant additional penalties by way of imprisonment imposed by the VLAD Act upon persons 
convicted of declared offences who are participants in associations which have not been shown not to 
have a criminal purpose.  
2. New provisions in the Criminal Code provide for enhanced penalties to be imposed on persons 
convicted of certain offences against the Criminal Code, in the aggravating circumstance where such 
persons are participants in organisations which are found to be, or have been declared by the 
Supreme Court, or designated by regulation as criminal organisations.  
3. The amendments to the Bail Act impose constraints upon the grant of bail to persons who are 
participants in such organisations if they are charged with any offences. Further amendments to the 
Criminal Code create new offences which effectively impose restrictions upon the freedom of 
movement and association of participants in criminal organisations.  
4. Amendments to the Liquor Act proscribe the wearing or carrying in licensed premises of items bearing 
insignia and other markings of criminal organisations. 
The VLAD Act defines associations in section 3 as ‘any of a corporation, an unincorporated association, a club 
or league and any group of three or more persons by whatever name called, whether associated formally or 
informally and whether the group is legal or illegal’. The terms ‘vicious’ and ‘lawless’ were not defined in the 
Act and were, as the High Court pointed out, ‘a piece of rhetoric which is at best meaningless and at worst 
misleads as to the scope and substance of the law’ (at [14]). 
The plaintiff submitted that, as a member of the Club, he was a participant in the affairs of a ‘relevant 
association’ for the purposes of the VLAD Act. He could thus become subject to very significant penalties and 
other restrictions which would not apply to him if he were to cease to be a participant in the Club or any other 
association. He submitted that he had a real interest in the subject matter of the proceedings which exceeded 
that of a member of the general public. The High Court rejected this contention (at [19]): 
In a formal sense, the plaintiff's position under the VLAD Act is indistinguishable from that of any 
other member of the public who is a participant in the affairs of any association. It may be accepted, 
as a practical matter, that his current membership of the Club, which has been designated as a 
‘criminal organisation’ under two separate provisions of Queensland law, puts him at risk of exposure 
to a significant additional penalty if he were to be charged with a declared offence. It may be 
assumed that the risk he faces in that respect is greater than that of most other members of the 
public. Whether the VLAD Act would apply to him, however, would depend, among other things, 
upon whether he was charged with a declared offence and whether it was alleged that the conduct 
constituting that offence was done for the purposes of, or in the course of participating in the affairs 
of, the Club. It is not suggested that any of the contingencies which would attract the application of 
the VLAD Act provisions to the plaintiff has arisen. Given that the validity of the laws creating the 
declared offences is not in dispute, he could hardly expect to be heard by this Court on the basis that 
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he intended to contravene one or more of those laws. Nor does he do so. The risk of exposure to 
draconian penalties, which he invokes in support of the assertion that he has standing, is a risk that he 
will be charged with, and convicted of, committing a declared offence. The risks so based should not 
be accepted as founding a sufficiently concrete claim for declaratory relief. It is a foundation resting 
upon contingencies which, if they did occur, could occur in a variety of factual circumstances. It is a 
foundation which is singularly unattractive in terms of public policy as justifying access to the exercise 
of judicial power. The plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the validity of the VLAD Act. 
The same reasoning meant that the plaintiff did not have standing under the other impugned provisions 
either, except for under sections 60A, 60B(1) and 60C of the Criminal Code (since he was a member of a 
recognised criminal organisation), and sections 173EB to 173ED of the Liquor Act. 
The Court also held that none of sections 60A, 60B(1), 60B(2) and 60C of the Criminal Code or sections 173EB, 
173EC and 173ED of the Liquor Act was invalid on the ground that it infringed the principle in Kable v Director 
of Public Prosecutions [1996] HCA 24. The central Kable principle is that the Parliaments of the States may not 
legislate to confer powers on State courts which are repugnant to or incompatible with their exercise of the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth. However, as had previously been decided in the Queensland case of 
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7: 
 the notions of repugnancy and incompatibility were not susceptible of further definition in terms 
which necessarily dictate the outcome of future cases;  
 the repugnancy doctrine did not imply into the constitutions of the States the separation of judicial 
power required for the Commonwealth by Ch III;  
 content must be given to the notion of ‘institutional integrity’ and that, too, is a notion not readily 
susceptible of definition in terms which will dictate future outcomes. 
Thus as Hayne J said (at [104]): 
...although independence and impartiality are defining characteristics of all of the courts of the 
Australian judicial system, these are notions which connote separation from the other branches of 
government, at least in the sense that the courts must be and remain free from external influence. 
But, because the repugnancy doctrine does not imply into the constitutions of the States the 
separation of judicial power required for the Commonwealth by Ch III, there can be no direct 
application to the States of all aspects of the doctrines that have been developed in relation to Ch III. 
The repugnancy doctrine cannot be treated as simply reflecting what Ch III requires in relation to the 
exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Hence, there can be no direct and immediate 
application of what has been said in the context of Ch III about the ‘usurpation’ of judicial power [to 
the States]. 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s submissions about the usurpation of the power of the Queensland courts possibly 
arising from the impugned provisions were not accepted by the court.  There was no contravention of the 
Kable principles. 
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2014/46.html 
Implications of this case 
As French CJ pointed out (at [19]): 
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In a formal sense, the plaintiff's position under the VLAD Act is indistinguishable from that of any 
other member of the public who is a participant in the affairs of any association. 
None of the judges of High Court found that the VLAD provisions were invalid. The difference in the plaintiff’s 
position was that he was a member of a recognised ‘criminal organisation’ under the amended provisions of 
the Criminal Code in Queensland. However, having committed no offence, he was not more affected by the 
VLAD provisions than any other member of the public in Queensland, therefore he had no special standing to 
bring this appeal. While the court has wide inherent power to make a declaration, it will not exercise it without 
proper reason, and the applicant here was arguing on the basis of contingency. 
 
2.10.6 LIVING WORD OUTREACH INC V DEPUTY SHERIFF OF VICTORIA [2014] VSC 454 
(SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, MCMILLAN J, 16 SEPTEMBER 2014) 
This was an appeal under section 109 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) from a decision of Magistrate 
Crowe made on 2 December 2013. The appellant association had issued a summons returnable in the 
Magistrates’ Court seeking a stay of infringement warrants issued against it, the return of its vehicle, which 
had been seized pursuant to the warrants, the vacation of ‘void judgments’ against it, and damages. 
Magistrate Crowe dismissed the summons. 
The legislative framework for the issuing and enforcement of infringement notices is provided by the 
Infringements Act 2006 (Vic) (the Act). A person (including an association) issued with an infringement notice 
must pay the infringement penalty within the time period specified in the infringement notice. Alternatively, 
that person may elect to have the matter heard and determined by the Magistrates’ Court, or apply to the 
relevant enforcement agency for an internal review.  
Between 13 November 2009 and 3 November 2011 the appellant accumulated 47 infringement notices. The 
appellant failed to pay the infringement penalties, but it did not elect to have the matters heard in the 
Magistrates’ Court, nor did it apply for internal review. Between 11 May 2010 and 23 March 2012, the relevant 
enforcement agencies lodged details of the infringements with the infringements registrar. The opportunity 
for the appellant to apply for internal review was thereby extinguished. The infringements registrar 
subsequently made enforcement orders requiring the appellant to pay the infringements. The making of those 
orders extinguished the opportunity for the appellant to elect to have the infringement offences heard by the 
Magistrates’ Court. The appellant failed to pay the outstanding amounts within 28 days. Nor did it apply to the 
infringements registrar for revocation of the enforcement orders.  
Between 2 September 2010 and 11 October 2012, the infringements registrar issued infringement warrants. 
On 26 February 2013, a Ford Territory 2005 Wagon, which was registered to the appellant, was seized under 
the infringement warrants. The appellant’s opportunity to apply for revocation of the enforcement orders was 
thereby extinguished. By summons dated 24 April 2013, the appellant sought a stay of the infringement 
warrants, a stay of the disposal of the vehicle, the vacation of ‘void judgments’ against it, and damages for 
‘illegal and void’ fines and forfeitures. After Magistrate Crowe dismissed the appellant’s summons on 2 
December 2013, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on 17 January 2014. 
The appellant association based its argument against the infringement notices, seizure, and fines on rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights 1688. Magistrate Crowe observed that the mechanism for referring infringement 
matters to the Magistrates’ Court was provided by the Act. It was held that, as the appellant had not followed 
the procedure set out in the Act, its application failed. As for the appellant’s argument on the Bill of Rights 
1688, the magistrate held that the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Vic) did not permit the reasoning 
contended for by the appellant. The rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights 1688 were mainly civil and political 
in character, and had nothing to do with the situation in this case.  
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On appeal, the appellant sought that: 
(a) the decision of the magistrate be annulled;  
(b) the infringement claims against the appellant be declared void;  
(c) the infringement claims against the appellant be heard by a court of competent jurisdiction;  
(d) its vehicle be returned; and  
(e) the appellant be awarded damages for wrongful seizure of its vehicle. 
Her Honour said that the appeal centred on one question for the court: whether the magistrate erred in law in 
considering that the Act was not invalidated by operation of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 or for some 
other reason. The legislative scheme prescribed by the Act became law in Victoria on 1 July 2007. The 
appellant contended that the scheme imposed by the Act impermissibly curtailed its rights and liberties and 
was therefore invalid. The appellant submitted that the State’s law-making authority flowed from the 
authority of the Queen herself as sovereign and was subject to the same restrictions. On this point, Her 
Honour said (at [47], [50]–[51]): 
The power of the Victorian parliament to make laws is provided in the constitution [of Victoria]. 
Section 16 of the Constitution Act 1975 provides: 
The parliament shall have power to make laws in and for Victoria in all cases whatsoever. 
...the provisions of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 are not to be understood as being capable 
of striking down provisions in other statutes. Rather, the principles there enshrined lay the 
groundwork of the constitutional framework and find expression in more specific principles. 
Accordingly, I see no error in law in the decision of the learned magistrate to reject the appellant’s 
argument that the Act is somehow invalid. 
Her Honour held that there had been no lack of procedural fairness.  Everything had been done in strict 
accordance with the Act. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2014/454.html 
Implications of this case 
The appellant association in this case was represented by one of its directors, who made its submissions to the 
court. He submitted that the fountain of authority in Victoria was Queen Elizabeth II. His view was that the 
Magistrates’ Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria were subject to the authority of Her Majesty, and that 
the power vested in the State cannot exceed that of Her Majesty. The Queen’s power is subject to promises 
set out in various Imperial acts, to which the State, and by extension the Magistrates’ Court, were also bound. 
Thus, the appellant’s contention appeared to be that the Act was somehow void, unenforceable or invalid by 
reason of its conflicting with the Bill of Rights 1688, as transcribed in the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980. 
This reasoning was completely rejected both in the Magistrates’ Court and on appeal. 
 
2.10.7 NORTH COAST CHILDREN'S HOME INC. TRADING AS CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
SPECIALIST PROGRAMS & ACCOMMODATION (CASPA) V MARTIN [2014] NSWDC 125 
(DISTRICT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, GIBSON DCJ, 8 AUGUST 2014) 
This was a case concerning defamation of a nonprofit organisation, and two of its officers. The first plaintiff is 
an incorporated nonprofit organisation providing services for disadvantaged children in the form of foster care 
services and an accommodation facility at Lismore, known as the North Coast Children's Home. The second 
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plaintiff was employed by the first plaintiff as the Manager of Foster Care Services and the third plaintiff is the 
Chief Executive Officer of the first plaintiff. 
The defendant had applied to be a foster carer with the organisation (CASPA), and been successful.  However, 
the association between the two parties broke down after only nine months. The defendant became 
dissatisfied with the conduct of CASPA’s care services and published a total of twelve imputations about the 
plaintiffs on the internet (via a site on Facebook known as ‘Tommy versus the Anglican Church’) and in emails 
to various parties. 
The North Coast Children’s Home (the Home) had a long history, dating from 1919. Prior to incorporation in 
1989 the Anglican Diocese of Grafton was responsible for the affairs of the Home, but those affairs were now 
in the hands of a Board of Governance quite separate from the Anglican Church. During the time that the 
Anglican Diocese of Grafton was responsible (i.e. prior to 1989) it was common ground that substantial and 
serious abuse of children had occurred at the Home. Orphaned and neglected children in its care were victims 
of sexual, physical and psychological abuse. The Anglican Diocese of Grafton received a number of complaints 
in 2006 about historical acts of physical, sexual and psychological abuse at the Home, all of which occurred 
between the 1940s and 1980s. Thirty-nine of those claims were settled through negotiated payments. Two of 
those persons did not participate in the settlement, and instead brought proceedings. Seven others later came 
forward with similar claims. The Right Reverend Keith Slater, who acknowledged that he did not pass on all the 
complaints to the Church's Professional Standards Director as was required, resigned as Bishop in May 2013. 
These were serious matters which were the subject of inquiry by the current Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Abuse. However, as the court pointed out (at [10]): 
While the nature and extent of the abuses which occurred are the subject of current inquiry and 
evidence, the nature and extent of the inquiry currently being undertaken by the Royal Commission 
into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse (the Royal Commission) relates to periods well before the 
employment of the second and third plaintiff, and well before the first plaintiff, which is no longer a 
part of the Anglican Church but a separate organisation. It is neither controlled by, nor answerable to, 
the Anglican Church.  
The published imputations alleged dishonesty by the plaintiffs, lack of proper care of children, and abuse. All 
the imputations were held to be seriously harmful and defamatory. As the court said (at [63]–[64]): 
Publication of matter on social media forms part of publication of material of a highly attractive 
nature, available over the Internet, which is ‘publication to the world at large’. Seven of the 
publications were made on the Internet, to an audience which would have been quick to think the 
worst when reading material of such a sensational nature. The timing of the entries, in circumstances 
where [the website’s author, who was not the defendant, and not associated with him] was about to 
give evidence at the Royal Commission in November 2013, was critical. Out of the remaining 
publications...were made to persons with whom each of the plaintiffs had a professional relationship. 
Such publications are often described as hitting a plaintiff ‘where he/she/it lives’, in the sense that 
such publications, although limited, are the more hurtful for being sent to persons with whom the 
plaintiff has a close relationship. 
As the first plaintiff is a corporation it could not recover damages for hurt to feelings or for aggravated 
damages. However, all three plaintiffs were awarded damages of the types to which they were entitled. The 
fist plaintiff, as an incorporated body was awarded $50,000, and the two named plaintiffs, as individuals, were 
awarded $100,000 each. The defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiffs. 
The case may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWDC/2014/125.html 
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Implications of this case 
This was a case demonstrating that a nonprofit organisation can protect its reputation by an action for 
defamation where appropriate. The court described the actions of the defendant in publishing his remarks as 
‘intemperate’ and his defence before the court of ‘a generalised smear of the plaintiffs’. Moreover, given the 
current Royal Commission, the court characterised the type of Facebook entries posted by the defendant as 
‘generalised and unproved allegations’ that ‘are a nuisance to the current ongoing inquiries into historic abuse 
claims’. 
 
2.10.8 WILLIAMS V COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2014] HCA 23 (HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA, FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KEIFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ, 19 JUNE 
2014) 
This case followed on from a decision of the High Court in 2012: see Williams v The Commonwealth [2012] HCA 
23. That case raised serious implications for many government programs which might be paid for by the 
Commonwealth government as part of executive power, without supporting federal legislation. The decision 
overturned the common assumption that executive power extends to all things for which a head of legislative 
power exists in the Constitution of Australia (the Constitution).  This was held not to be so. The High Court held 
that although the Executive retains many powers, including prerogative powers, it was subject to the control of 
parliament on issues which involved expenditure from Consolidated Revenue.  
The government passed legislation to overcome this decision in late June 2012: see the Financial Framework 
Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) (FFLA Act). The FFLA Act amended the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) and the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 
(Cth) (FMA Regulations) in ways intended to provide legislative support not only for the making of agreements 
and payments of the kind which were in issue in the 2012 decision but also for the making of many other 
government arrangements and grants. This case concerned the validity of the amending legislation. 
The 2012 decision 
The 2012 decision dealt with the extent of executive power of the Commonwealth.  In particular, the case dealt 
with the power of the executive to enter into contracts and expend money. The High Court held by a majority 
of 6 to 1 that the National School Chaplaincy Program (NSCP) was unable to be paid for by the Commonwealth 
Executive without supporting legislation. 
The Constitution divides power between the executive, the legislature (parliament) and the judicature (the 
courts). Executive government is dealt with in Chapter II of the Constitution, and vests executive power in the 
Queen, exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative: section 61. The Governor-General 
is to be advised by the ‘Federal Executive Council’: section 62. 
There is no mention in the Constitution of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. This was because the parliament 
was always intended to operate on the ‘Westminster’ system (the same as the English parliament). The 
Westminster system allows for a Prime Minister, ministers in a Cabinet, government departments, and 
ministerial responsibility to the parliament. This was regarded as a given when Australia was constituted as a 
nation. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet effectively wield the executive power referred to in the 
Constitution.  
The plaintiff, Williams, challenged the Commonwealth’s power to enter into contracts with Scripture Union 
Queensland (SUQ) for the delivery of ‘chaplaincy’ services into schools operated by the Queensland State 
Government. In particular, he challenged the provision of such services to Darling Heights State School in 
Toowoomba, where his children attended primary school. Money was expended on chaplaincy services under 
this contract during 2007 to 2012. Although the expenditure was said by the Commonwealth to have met the 
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necessary condition of a parliamentary appropriation for each year in which it had been made, no Act of 
Parliament had conferred power on the Commonwealth to contract and expend public money in this way. 
Payments for chaplaincy services had first been implemented by the Howard government in 2006, and the 
services were extended in 2009 under the Rudd government and continued top operate under the Gillard 
government. Thus, both parties of government had supported the scheme since its inception. In the 2012 
decision, the Full Court of the High Court held that: 
1. Williams had standing to challenge certain payments made by the Commonwealth; 
2. Payments made from consolidated revenue to the Darling Heights Funding (DHF) Agreement in 
Toowoomba, Queensland, were beyond the power of the Commonwealth under section 61 of the 
Constitution; 
3. Payments made to Scripture Union Queensland pursuant to the Darling Heights Funding Agreement 
as above were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth under section 61 of the 
Constitution; 
4. None of the issues raised in the case were contrary to section 116 of the Constitution (the section 
which forbids the Commonwealth from establishing a religion, imposing any religious observance, 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or imposing a religious test on employment). 
The main points made by the majority of the High Court were as follows: 
On the extent of executive power of the Commonwealth to contract and spend 
1. Parliamentary appropriation (via an Appropriation Act) is not a source of spending power, contrary to 
long-standing assumption. 
2. Also contrary to common assumption, the Executive cannot spend money on anything it chooses 
which is the subject of a commonwealth head of power in the Constitution. 
3. There may be some scope, however, for payments to be made in this way in times of national disaster 
or national economic or other emergency: see Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 
23. 
4. The Commonwealth argued that the Executive is a legal person with ordinary powers to contract and 
spend. However, the Executive is not a separate juristic person. The Executive is a branch of the 
national polity. The character of the Executive Government as a branch of the national polity is 
relevant to the relationship between the power of that branch and the powers and functions of the 
legislative branch and, particularly, the Senate. 
5. Unlike a natural person, the Commonwealth’s power to contract and to pay money was constrained 
by the need for an appropriation and by the requirements of political accountability. The Executive 
spends public money, not its own money. 
6. The exercise of legislative power must yield a law able to be characterised as a law with respect to a 
subject matter within the constitutional grant of legislative authority to the Parliament. The subject 
matters of legislative power are specified for that purpose, not to give content to the executive 
power. Executive action, except in the exercise of delegated legislative authority, is qualitatively 
different from legislative action. 
7. The executive power of the Commonwealth does extend to the doing of all things which are 
necessary or reasonably incidental to the execution and maintenance of a valid law of the 
Commonwealth once that law has taken effect. That field of action does not require express statutory 
authority, nor is it necessary to find an implied power deriving from the statute. The necessary power 
can be found in the words ‘execution and maintenance ... of the laws of the Commonwealth’ 
appearing in section 61 of the Constitution. 
8. Neither the DHF Agreement nor the expenditure made under it was done in the administration of a 
department of State in the sense used in section 64 of the Constitution. Neither constituted an 
 196 
 
exercise of the prerogative aspect of the executive power. Neither involved the exercise of a statutory 
power, nor executive action to give effect to a statute enacted for the purpose of providing chaplaincy 
or like services to State schools.  
9. There was no statute, general or specific, identified by the parties, which could be invoked as a source 
of executive power to enter into the DHF Agreement and to undertake the challenged expenditure. 
10. Whatever the scope of that aspect of the executive power which derives from the character and status 
of the Commonwealth as a national government, it did not authorise the contract and the expenditure 
under it in this case.  
11. It is possible that there is no such power in the Constitution anyway i.e. it is possible that there could 
not have been a valid law about the provision of chaplaincy services. 
12. Section 61 therefore did not empower the Commonwealth, in the absence of statutory authority, to 
contract for or undertake the challenged expenditure on chaplaincy services in Darling Heights State 
School. 
On federal vs state powers 
1. Even if, as the Commonwealth argued, the DHF Agreement and expenditure under it could be referred 
to either section 51(xxiiiA) (the pensions payment power) or section 51(xx) (the corporations power) 
of the Constitution, they are fields in which the Commonwealth and the States have concurrent 
competencies subject to the paramountcy of Commonwealth laws effected by section 109 of the 
Constitution. The character of the Commonwealth Government as a national government does not 
entitle it, as a general proposition, to enter into any such field of activity by executive action alone. 
Such an extension of Commonwealth executive powers would, in a practical sense, correspondingly 
reduce those of the States and compromise the essential and distinctive feature of federal 
government.  
2. The existence of Commonwealth executive power in areas beyond the express grants of legislative 
power will ordinarily be clearest where Commonwealth executive or legislative action involves no real 
competition with State executive or legislative competence. 
3. The States have the legal and practical capacity to provide for a scheme such as the National School 
Chaplaincy Program (NSCP). The conduct of the public school system in Queensland, where the Darling 
Heights State School is situated, is the responsibility of that State. Indeed, Queensland maintains its 
own programme for school chaplains. 
4. If the Commonwealth's capacities to contract and to spend generally permitted the Commonwealth 
Executive to intrude into areas of responsibility within the legislative and executive competence of the 
States in the absence of statutory authority other than appropriation Acts, access to section 109 of the 
Constitution (which provides for Commonwealth paramountcy in the case of inconsistent legislation) 
may be impeded.  
The 2014 decision 
The FFLA Act inserted a new Division (Div 3B, Supplementary powers to make commitments to spend public 
money etc) into Pt 4 of the FMA Act. The central provision of Div 3B is section 32B. In addition, the FFLA Act 
inserted a new Part (Part 5AA, Supplementary powers to make commitments to spend public money etc) and a 
new Schedule (Schedule 1AA, Arrangements, grants and programs) into the FMA Regulations. Regulation 
16(1)(d) (inserted by the FFLA Act) provides that, for section 32B(1)(b)(iii) of the FMA Act, Part 4 of Schedule 
1AA specifies ‘programs’. One of the programs identified (in item 407.013) is: 
National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program (NSCSWP) 
Objective: To assist school communities to support the wellbeing of their students, including by 
strengthening values, providing pastoral care and enhancing engagement with the broader 
community. 
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The starting point 
The starting points in this decision were: 
 that the appropriation of moneys in accordance with the requirements of sections 81 and 83 of the 
Constitution does not itself confer a substantive spending power; and  
 that the power to spend appropriated moneys must be found elsewhere in the Constitution or in 
statutes made under it: see Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 23. 
Standing 
Did Williams have standing? The High Court said that he did ‘in the circumstances of this case, and to the 
extent necessary for the determination of this matter’. This was qualified standing, based on the fact that the 
Commonwealth, the SUQ and the States intervening had conceded standing. 
Were the provisions of the amending legislation invalid? 
In response to this question, the High Court said (at [32]): 
In their operation with respect to the SUQ Funding Agreement (being the Funding Agreement dated 
21 December 2011 between the Commonwealth and Scripture Union Queensland, the third 
defendant, as varied from time to time up to and including a Fourteenth Variation Deed dated 23 
January 2014) and with respect to the payments purportedly made under that Funding Agreement in 
January 2012, June 2012, January 2013 and February 2014, none of s 32B of the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth), Pt 5AA and Sched 1AA of the Financial Management 
and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) or item 9 of Sched 1 to the Financial Framework Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) is a valid law of the Commonwealth. 
The Court said that the FMA Act provides for the administration of public money i.e. money in the custody or 
under the control of the Commonwealth or of a person acting for or on behalf of the Commonwealth. Division 
3B of Part 4 of the FMA Act (and section 32B in particular) provides power to make commitments to spend 
public money. As enacted in the amending legislation, the Parliament’s legislative power to enact the FMA Act 
derives from every head of legislative power which supports the Commonwealth, or a person acting for or on 
behalf of the Commonwealth, being entitled to have custody or control of money or being entitled to make a 
payment of public money. Section 32B deals particularly with the power to make a commitment to make one 
or more payments of public money. And the Parliament’s legislative power to grant the authority to make a 
commitment to pay public money is founded in every head of legislative power which supports the making of 
the payments with which section 32B deals. This is a very wide power (at [36]): 
It may be that, taken literally, s 32B would have a very wide field of actual and potential application. It 
would be possible, for example, to read s 32B(1) as extending to cases where the Parliament does not 
have constitutional power to authorise the making, varying or administration of arrangements or 
grants. But ordinary principles of statutory construction require rejection of such a reading of those 
words. And, more generally, consistent with the requirements of s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 
1901 (Cth), s 32B should be read as providing power to the Commonwealth to make, vary or 
administer arrangements or grants only where it is within the power of the Parliament to authorise 
the making, variation or administration of those arrangements or grants. To read the provision in that 
way is to read it within constitutional power. To read it as having a wider operation might take the 
provision beyond either constitutional power or the meaning and operation which its words can fairly 
bear, or beyond both constitutional power and the fair reading of its text.  
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Were there benefits to students involved? 
The Commonwealth parties and SUQ each sought to support the impugned provisions, in their relevant 
operation, as laws with respect to the provision of benefits to students within section 51(xxiiiA) of the 
Constitution. This argument failed. The ‘objective’ set out in item 407.013 in Part 4 of Schedule 1AA to the FMA 
Regulations refers to assisting ‘school communities to support the wellbeing of their students’. The High Court 
said on this point (at [47]–[48]): 
Providing at a school the services of a chaplain or welfare worker for the objective described in item 
407.013 … is not provision of ‘benefits’ of the kind described [in previous cases]. Providing those 
services does not provide material aid to provide for the human wants of students. It does not 
provide material aid in the form of any service rendered or to be rendered to or for any identified or 
identifiable student. There is no payment of money by the Commonwealth for or on behalf of any 
identified or identifiable student. And the service which is provided is not directed to the 
consequences of being a student. There is no more than the payment of an amount (in this case to an 
intermediary) to be applied in payment of the wages of a person to ‘support the wellbeing’ of a 
particular group of children: those who attend an identified school. And the only description of how 
the ‘support’ is to be given is that it includes ‘strengthening values, providing pastoral care and 
enhancing engagement with the broader community’. These are desirable ends. But seeking to 
achieve them in the course of the school day does not give the payments which are made the quality 
of being benefits to students. Providing money to pay persons to provide such services at a school is 
not to provide benefits which are directed to the consequences of being a student. It is not a 
provision of benefits to students within the meaning of s 51(xxiiiA). 
Could section 51(xx) of the Constitution (the corporations power) be relied on? 
The High Court said that the corporations power did not apply. A law which gives the Commonwealth the 
authority to make an agreement or payment is not a law with respect to trading or financial corporations. 
Therefore, the impugned legislation was not supported by either section 51(xxiiiA) or by section 51(xx). 
The scope of Executive power 
The High Court said that the Commonwealth’s argument proceeded from a false assumption about the ambit 
of the Commonwealth’s executive power. In particular, the Commonwealth’s executive power was not as wide 
as that of the British parliament (at [78]–[80]): 
The Commonwealth parties submitted that determining the content of executive power (but not the 
limitations on its exercise) should proceed from only two premises. First, ‘a polity must possess all the 
powers that it needs in order to function as a polity’. Second, ‘the executive power is all that power of 
a polity that is not legislative or judicial power’. Both of those premises may be accepted. But the 
conclusion the Commonwealth parties sought to draw from those premises about the content of 
Commonwealth executive power does not follow unless there is a third premise for the argument: 
that the executive power of the Commonwealth should be assumed to be no less than the executive 
power of the British Executive. This third premise is false. What the submissions called ‘executive 
power at common law’ was executive power as exercised in Britain. Thus the assumption from which 
the second inquiry (about ‘limitations’) proceeded was that, absent some ‘limitation’, the executive 
power of the Commonwealth is the same as British executive power. But why the executive power of 
the new federal entity created by the Constitution should be assumed to have the same ambit, or be 
exercised in the same way and same circumstances, as the power exercised by the Executive of a 
unitary state having no written constitution was not demonstrated.... And questions about the ambit 
of the Executive’s power to spend must be decided in light of all of the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution, not just those which derive from British constitutional practice. 
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The High Court said that it by no means follows from an examination of the history of executive power that the 
Commonwealth can be assumed to have an executive power to spend and contract which is the same as the 
power of the British Executive. Australia has a written Constitution which distributes powers between the 
Commonwealth and the States (at [83]): 
The polity which, as the Commonwealth parties rightly submitted, must ‘possess all the powers that it 
needs in order to function as a polity’ is the central polity of a federation in which independent 
governments exist in the one area and exercise powers in different fields of action carefully defined 
by law. It is not a polity organised and operating under a unitary system or under a flexible 
constitution where the Parliament is supreme. The assumption underpinning the Commonwealth 
parties’ submissions about executive power is not right and should be rejected. 
Did the incidental power (section 51(xxxix)) in the Constitution apply? 
The court said that this power did not apply to assist the Commonwealth’s argument. The Commonwealth 
parties submitted that, in so far as the Appropriation Acts provided authority to spend appropriated moneys, 
the Appropriation Acts were supported by section 51(xxxix) as laws incidental to the power to appropriate. 
They further submitted that section 32B of the FMA Act was supported by the incidental power as a law 
incidental to the power to appropriate or the executive power under section 61 of the Constitution to spend 
and contract. The court rejected this argument (at [86]–[87]): 
To hold that the Parliament may make a law authorising the expenditure of any moneys lawfully 
appropriated in accordance with ss 81 and 83, no matter what the purpose of the expenditure may 
be, would treat outlay of the moneys as incidental to their ear-marking. But that would be to hold, 
contrary to Pape, that any and every appropriation of public moneys in accordance with ss 81 and 83 
brings the expenditure of those moneys within the power of the Commonwealth. Likewise, to hold 
that s 32B of the FMA Act is a law with respect to a matter incidental to the execution of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth (to spend and contract) presupposes what both Pape and 
Williams (No 1) deny: that the executive power of the Commonwealth extends to any and every form 
of expenditure of public moneys and the making of any agreement providing for the expenditure of 
those moneys. 
Conclusion 
Therefore, the amending legislation was held to be invalid. The Commonwealth’s entry into, and expenditure 
under, the SUQ funding agreement was unsupported by the executive power of the Commonwealth in section 
61 of the Constitution, or any power in section 51 of the Constitution.   
The 2012 decision may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/23.html 
This decision may be viewed at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2014/23.html 
Implications of this case 
While this case was about whether the impugned laws were enacted validly to provide benefits to students 
(within section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution), it raises the question in regard to other programs which might be 
paid for by the Commonwealth government as part of executive power, and thus without supporting federal 
legislation. The attempt by the Commonwealth to legislate around the 2012 decision was held to be invalid. 
The Executive is not all-powerful. Although the Executive retains many powers, including prerogative powers, it 
is subject to the control of parliament on issues which involve expenditure from Consolidated Revenue.  
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3.0 LEGISLATION 
 
3.1 COMMONWEALTH 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the Commonwealth (federal) jurisdiction include: 
 Corporations Act 2001 
 Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 
 Charities Act 2013  
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
 Australian Charities And Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 
ACNC Repeal Bill 
The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (Repeal) (No 1) Bill 2014 was introduced into 
Parliament on 19 March 2014 and had its second reading on 3 December 2014. It is the first of two linked Bills. 
The first Bill repeals the ACNC legislation in its entirety. The second Bill will detail arrangements for transfer of 
ACNC functions to other agencies. The explanatory material confirms that functions of ASIC and the ATO 
‘previously transferred to the ACNC … will return to those bodies’. This is likely to mean that: 
 the ATO will be responsible for determining charity status; and 
 elements of the Corporations Act 2001 which were ‘turned off’ by the ACNC legislation, relating to 
directors’ duties and reporting to ASIC, will be reinstated. 
The Department of Social Services conducted a consultation on the ACNC replacement arrangements and a 
report was prepared (see https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/communities-and-vulnerable-
people/programs-services/consultation-on-australian-charities-and-not-for-profit-commission-replacement-
arrangements). 
Fringe Benefits Tax 
The 2013 Budget papers indicated that the government intended to increase annual FBT caps, in order to 
protect the cash value of benefits received by employees of PBIs and health promotion charities, public and 
not-for-profit hospitals, public ambulance services and certain other tax-exempt entities. In addition, the fringe 
benefits rebate rate will be aligned with the FBT rate from 1 April 2015. This was legislated in the Tax Laws 
Amendment (Temporary Budget Repair Levy) Act 2014. 
Corporations Act and Charity Audits 
The federal government has passed legislation repealing the anomalous requirement to appoint an auditor 
even if an audit is not mandated (e.g., if a review can be conducted instead), but failed to include charitable 
companies in the repeal. The results of our enquiries suggest that this was simply an oversight, in which case, 
further correcting legislation may reasonably be expected soon. We take this opportunity to remind those 
companies registered with the ACNC that, while the Corporations Act requirement to conduct an audit or 
review has been ‘turned off’ by the ACNC legislation, the requirement to appoint an auditor has not! Those 
having reviews done under the ACNC legislation should also remember that the ACNC legislation requires 
reviews to be conducted by a registered company auditor. 
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Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (Bill) 
Appointment of auditors of a company limited by guarantee: proposed ss 327A(1A), 327B(1A) and note to s 
327C(1). 
The amendments proposed to ss 327A and 327B, and the proposed note to s 327C(1), are intended to relieve a 
small CLG, and a CLG with revenue falling within s 301(3) which elects to have its accounts reviewed rather 
than audited, from the obligation to appoint and replace an auditor. Those companies registered with the 
ACNC are still required to appoint an auditor. However, the Corporations Act requirement to conduct an audit 
or review was ‘turned off’ by the ACNC legislation.   
The ACNC has made a submission to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee inquiry into the provisions 
of this Bill, proposing amendments to extend the effect of some provisions to CLGs that are registered 
charities. The ACNC submits that the intent of the Bill is to remove the requirement to appoint an auditor 
where a CLG is not required to prepare audited financial reports, thereby reducing unnecessary regulatory (red 
tape) burden. However, the ACNC says that, as currently drafted, the Bill will not reduce red tape for a 
significant number of CLGs that are charities registered with the ACNC. 
ABN Changes 
The details required for the Australian Business Register were altered in December 2013. There has been a 
move from having to record just the Principal Place of Business (main office or Headquarters) to also require 
Business Locations (all places of business). The change appears to have been accomplished using the powers of 
the Commissioner with respect to prescribing taxation forms rather than a specific Act or Regulation. Premises 
are considered to be a business location if: 
 the business has a legal right as owner or lessee to use the premises; and/or 
 the business undertakes activities (including include production, storage, sales and service) at least 
once per quarter at these premises. 
For each location the following are required: 
 street address; 
 business activity details; 
 phone and email contacts. 
It appears that if a nonprofit entity operates from a volunteer’s home, the home may be considered a business 
location, on the basis of the following example, ‘an internet-based business managed from an individual home 
address or a tradesman who keeps their records and garages a business vehicle at home’.
5
 Entities are 
required to update their ABR records to include all their locations within 28 days of a change, this includes 
address changes and ABN authorised contact changes. It is not expected that the location information on the 
ABR will be available to the public, but may be made available to Commonwealth agencies. 
In addition, many other federal laws apply to nonprofit organisations, such as those governing employment of 
staff, anti-discrimination, using digital communication, sending funds overseas and being in receipt of 
government agency funding. 
All Acts and Regulations for the Commonwealth jurisdiction can be found at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
 
                                                          
5
 https://abr.gov.au/For-Business,-Super-funds---Charities/Applying-for-an-ABN/What-you-need-for-your-ABN-
application/Business-locations/  
 202 
 
3.2 NEW SOUTH WALES 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in New South Wales are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 2009  
 Association Incorporation Regulation 2010  
 Charitable Fundraising Act 1991 
 Charitable Fundraising Regulation 2008 
 Charitable Trusts Act 1993 
 Co-operatives (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012  
 Co-operatives (New South Wales) Regulation 2014 
 Lotteries and Art Unions Act 1901 
 Lotteries and Art Unions Regulation 2014 
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2014 amended section 76 of the Associations Incorporation Act to 
allow the Commissioner for Fair Trading, Office of Finance and Services to cancel the registration of an 
association if satisfied that the association’s committee has not appointed a public officer (or not appointed a 
public officer who meets the current requirements of the Principal Act relating to age and residency in New 
South Wales). 
The Charitable Fundraising Amendment (Exempt Religious Bodies or Organisations) Regulation 2014 under the 
Charitable Fundraising Act prescribed the Australian Asian Church (AAC) Incorporated and the Hope Mission 
Centre Incorporated as religious bodies or organisations to which the Act does not apply (apart from section 
48, which deals with the remuneration of members of the governing bodies of charitable organisations). 
The Co-operatives (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW) commenced on 3 March 2014. This Act is part of 
the process of developing uniform laws for co-operatives, provided for in the Australian Uniform Co-operative 
Laws Agreement (AUCLA). The principal legislation for regulating co-operatives under the AUCLA is the Co-
operatives National Law (CNL). All States and Territories are intending to apply the CNL or alternative 
consistent legislation in their jurisdictions. The CNL will be supported by national and local regulations: 
 National regulations will deal with matters that it has been agreed will be uniform for all the States 
and Territories; 
 Local regulations will contain matters that may vary between the States and Territories, such as 
procedural arrangements and fees. Each State and Territory will make its own local regulations that 
will apply in its jurisdiction: see the NSW regulation made in 2014 listed above. 
It had been agreed that jurisdictions would have until 18 May 2014 to secure proclamation of the CNL or 
alternative consistent law. To date, only New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia have passed relevant 
legislation. The South Australian legislation had not commenced as at February 2015. 
The Lotteries and Art Unions Regulation 2014 commenced on 1 September 2014, replacing the previous 2007 
regulation: see details at http://www.olgr.nsw.gov.au/promos_home.asp 
All Acts and Regulations for New South Wales can be found at: http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/ 
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3.3 VICTORIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Victoria are: 
 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 
 Associations Incorporations Regulations 2009  
 Charities Act 1978  
 Charities Regulations 2005  
 Co-operatives National Law Application Act 2013 
 Co-operatives National Law (Victoria) Local Regulations 2014 
 Fundraising Act 1998  
 Fundraising Regulations 2009  
 Gambling Regulation Act 2003  
 Gambling Regulation Regulations 2005  
Minor consequential changes were made to the Fundraising Act (definition of ‘authorised officer’ in relation to 
infringement notices amended as a consequence of amendments to the Victoria Police Act and changes to 
section 68 (Application of Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012) as a consequence of changes to 
consumer legislation). 
The following changes relate to the Gambling Regulation Act: 
 Effective from May 2014, new tax rates for club venue and hotel venue operators apply (State 
Taxation Legislation Amendment Act 2014).  
 The Gambling and Liquor Legislation Amendment (Red Tape Reduction) Act 2014 came into effect on 
14 May 2014. It removed the requirement for an RSL branch to obtain the authorisation of the 
Minister to conduct games of two-up on Anzac Day or at functions commemorating Anzac Day at 
Licensed Premises.   
 The Gambling Regulation Amendment (Pre-commitment) Bill 2013 requires all venue operators to link 
to a state-wide pre-commitment system by 1 December 2015.  
 Effective from 15 October 2014, financial institutions do not need to be listed on the Roll of 
Manufacturers, Suppliers and Testers in order to repossess electronic gaming machines from a venue 
operator who defaults on a loan repayment. This means that financial institutions currently listed on 
the Roll may choose to surrender their listing.  
 Legislation which commenced on 15 October 2014 has amended certain gambling licence periods and 
other requirements:  
o Current licences for bingo centre operators and commercial raffle organisers have been extended 
from five to ten years.  
o Current registrations for bookmakers and bookmakers’ key employees have been extended from 
five to ten years.  
o Bookmaking partnerships will no longer need to be renewed every three years.  
 Once the Gambling and Liquor Legislation Further Amendment Act 2014 which received Royal Assent 
on 9 September 2014 comes into effect, those running national game of chance promotions will not 
need to obtain a permit in Victoria. These changes are mooted for early 2015. The Gambling 
Regulation Act 2003 currently requires a permit to be obtained to run a game of chance promotion in 
Victoria where the total prize pool is $5,000 or more.   
The Co-operatives National Law commenced in Victoria on 3 March 2014.  
All Acts and Regulations for Victoria can be found at: http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/ 
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3.4 QUEENSLAND 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Queensland are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 
 Collections Act 1966 
 Collections Regulation 2008 
 Cooperatives Act 1997 
 Charitable Funds Act 1958 
 Charitable and Non-Profit Gaming Act 1999 
 Charitable and Non-Profit Gaming Regulation 1999 
The Charitable and Non-Profit Gaming Act was amended to reduce red tape by providing for a regulation 
making power, to specify by regulation (rather than amending the Act) the amount of gross proceeds that 
would define ‘other games’ (e.g. art unions or calcutta sweeps) as being category 1, 2 or 3. The regulations 
were altered, and Category 1 games are now raffles (art unions), sweeps, Calcutta sweeps, football doubles, 
lucky door prizes, bingo where the gross proceeds are not more than $2,000. Category 2 games are now 
raffles, sweeps, Calcutta sweeps, football doubles, lucky door prizes, bingo where the gross proceeds are more 
than $2,000 but not more than $50,000. Category 3 games are now raffles or art unions where the gross 
proceeds are more than $50,000. 
All Queensland Acts and Regulations can be found at: https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm 
 
3.5 WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Western Australia are:  
 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1988  
 Charitable Collections Act 1946 
 Charitable Collections Regulations 1947 
 Charitable Trusts Act 1962 
 Co-operatives Act 2009 
 Co-operatives Regulations 2010 
 Gaming and Wagering Commission Act 1987 
 Gaming And Wagering Commission Regulations1988 
 Street Collections (Regulation) Act 1940 
 Street Collections Regulations 1999 
No material changes were made to this legislation during 2014. Western Australia’s associations incorporation 
legislation is being updated through the Associations Incorporation Bill 2014 but this process is still ongoing. 
When passed, the Bill will repeal the Associations Incorporation Act 1987. It was last considered in the 
Legislative Assembly of Western Australia on 27 November 2014. 
All Acts and Regulations for Western Australia can be found at: 
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/default.html 
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3.6 SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in South Australia are:  
 Associations Incorporation Act 1985  
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 2008  
 Collections for Charitable Purposes Act 1939 
 Cooperatives National Law (South Australia) Act 2013  
 Gaming Machines Act 1992 
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Act 2011 
 Health Services Charitable Gifts Regulations 2011 
 Lottery and Gaming Act 1936  
 Lottery and Gaming Regulations 2008 
 Not-for-Profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act 2013  
There were no changes to relevant laws in South Australia during 2014. Note that the Co-operatives National 
Law (South Australia) Act 2013 (reported in the 2013 almanac) was passed as part of the national scheme for 
co-operatives, but had not commenced operation at 1 March 2015. The Act adopts the Co-operatives National 
Law in Schedule 1. 
All Acts and Regulations for South Australia can be found at: http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/index.aspx 
  
3.7 TASMANIA 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in Tasmania are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
 Associations Incorporation Regulations 2007 
 Associations Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulations 2007 
 Collections for Charities Act 2001 
 Collections for Charities Regulations 2011 
 Cooperatives Act 1999 
 Gaming Control Act 1993 
 Gaming Control Regulations 2014 
The Gaming Control Regulations 2014 took effect on 22 December 2014. The new regulations deal with fees, 
licensing and definitional matters. 
The Co-operatives National Law (Tasmania) Bill 2014 had its third reading in the House of Assembly on 26 
November 2014, but has not progressed any further as at 1 March 2015. 
All Acts and Regulations for Tasmania can be found at: http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/index.w3p 
 
3.8 AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the ACT are: 
 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1991 
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 Charitable Collections Act 2003 
 Charitable Collections Regulation 2003 
 Cooperatives Act 2002 
 Gaming Machine Act 2004 
 Gaming Machine Regulation 2004 
 Lotteries Act 1964 
 Unlawful Gambling Act 2009 
 Unlawful Gambling Regulation 2010 
The Gaming Machine Act 2004 was amended by the Gaming Machine (Red Tape Reduction) Amendment Act 
2014 and the Gaming Machine (Red Tape Reduction) Amendment Act No 2 2014. The amendments were minor 
and technical in nature. 
All Acts and Regulations for the ACT can be found at: http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/  
3.9 NORTHERN TERRITORY 
The relevant Acts and Regulations in the Northern Territory are: 
 Associations Act  
 Associations Regulations 
 Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 
 Cooperatives Act 
 Cooperatives Regulations 
 Gaming Control Act  
 Gaming Control (Community Gaming) Regulations 
 Gaming Machine Act 
 Gaming Control (Gaming Machines) Regulations 
 Gaming Control (Internet Gaming) Regulations 
 Gaming Machine Regulations 
 Gaming Machine Rules 
The Associations Act was modified by Commonwealth regulation – the Stronger Futures in The Northern 
Territory Regulation 2013 (Cth) which was signed by the Governor-General on 25 July 2013. The Stronger 
Futures program, involving over $1 billion in Commonwealth funding to the Northern Territory is taking place 
over ten years. The most substantial change to the Associations Act was amending section 110, Dealings with 
prescribed property, to add paragraph (e) to subsection 110(6). That subsection lists the circumstances under 
which the Minister may consent to disposal of, charge over, or dealing with certain prescribed land. Paragraph 
(e) now adds: 
or (e) to grant a lease or licence in relation to part of the land to an incorporated association, an 
incorporated trading association, an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander corporation or a person, for 
any purpose related to a use or development allowed under the Northern Territory Planning Scheme, 
including the following: 
(i)  commercial purposes, including a community store; 
(ii)  purposes relating to infrastructure; 
(iii)  public purposes, including the provision of essential services. 
All Acts and Regulations for the Northern Territory can be found at 
http://dcm.nt.gov.au/strong_service_delivery/supporting_government/current_northern_territory_legislation
_database  
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3.10 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN JERSEY 
Frances Hannah 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
The Charities (Jersey) Law 2014 was passed by the States Assembly (Jersey’s legislature) on 18 July 2014. At the 
time of writing, it had yet to receive final approval from the Privy Council in London. Jersey previously had no 
statute law specifically relating to charities, using the common law definition of charity in the Statute of 
Elizabeth 1601. Tax exemptions for charity were dealt with by the Income Tax (Jersey) law 1961.  
The Charities (Jersey) Law (CJL) introduces a new definition of charitable purposes, a charity test and a 
registration process for charities. It complements existing legislation in the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 and the 
Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009. The process of introducing the legislation, with full regulatory impact, is 
expected to take from 2015 to 2018. 
Basic structure of the CJL 
 Part 1: Articles 1-2: Interpretation (definitions of terms etc) 
 Part 2: Articles 3-4 (and Schedule 1): Jersey Charity Commissioner 
 Part 3: Articles 5-7: Charity test 
 Part 4: Articles 8-17: Charity Register 
 Part 5: Articles 18-20: Governors of registered charities 
 Part 6: Articles 21-25: Use of the terms ‘charity’, ‘charitable’ and related terms 
 Part 7: Articles 26-31: Information and enforcement provisions 
 Part 8: Articles 32-36 (and Schedule 2): Appeals to the Charity Tribunal 
 Part 9: Articles 37-44: Miscellaneous and final provisions 
Key elements 
The CJL has five key elements: 
1. A charity test: The test sets out that a charity can only have charitable purposes and must provide 
public benefit. 
2. A charity register: Registered charities will be able to access charitable tax reliefs and will be entitled 
to call themselves a charity. 
3. A Charity Commissioner and Charity Tribunal: The Commissioner (a corporation sole) will be 
responsible for determining if an entity passes the charity test and, if so, will place it on the register. 
The Commissioner will issue guidance setting out how it should be determined whether an entity 
passes the charity test. The Tribunal of four to eight persons will hear appeals against the decisions of 
the Commissioner and will have the power to overturn those decisions. Jersey chose not to have a 
multiple-person Charity Commission because of cost issues. 
4. The duties of governors: Governors of charities are required to ensure that a charity acts in 
accordance with its charitable purposes and delivers a public benefit. In addition, they must comply 
with the requirements of the CJL, including in relation to registration and annual returns. 
5. Restrictions on use of the terms ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’. 
Use of the expressions ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’ in the CJL  
 A ‘charity’ will be an entity registered as a charity in Jersey. 
 A ‘Jersey charity’ will be a Jersey entity registered as a charity in Jersey. 
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 The term ‘charitable’ will not be able to be used when soliciting public donations unless the entity is a 
registered charity in Jersey. 
 A ‘non-Jersey charity’, such as a UK charity, can be called a ‘charity’ in Jersey but cannot be registered 
in Jersey if it is registered, or exempt from registration, in the UK (and potentially in other 
jurisdictions). A non-Jersey charity will also be one which is: 
o entitled to be called a charity in the UK;  
o wholly or mainly managed or controlled outside Jersey;  
o not engaged in any activity in Jersey except fundraising activity.  
Charity test – charitable purposes 
The charitable purposes under the CJL are: 
 citizenship  or community development;  
 education;  
 arts, heritage;  
 culture, science;  
 health;  
 human rights;  
 conflict resolution, reconciliation;  
 public participation in sport;  
 recreational facilities to improve life;  
 religious or racial harmony;  
 relief of poverty;  
 religion;  
 saving lives;  
 environmental protection or improvement;  
 equality and diversity;  
 relief for those in need (age; health; disability; financial hardship; other);  
 animal welfare.  
These charitable purposes are based on those of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005. A 
charity can only have charitable purposes, but will be able to have more than one. It will also be able to 
undertake activities which are incidental to its charitable purposes. The States of Jersey will be able to add new 
charitable purposes in future by Regulation. 
Charity test - public benefit  
A public benefit will be any benefit gained by members of that entity or others, other than as members of the 
public. The benefit can be provided in Jersey or elsewhere, and must be provided ‘to a reasonable degree’ (a 
test to be determined by guidance provided by the Commissioner at a future date). Public benefit will not be 
presumed just because an entity has charitable purposes. A disbenefit to the public will occur where the 
benefit is restricted to a section of the public, or where there are restrictions on obtaining the alleged benefit. 
The charity register  
Under the CJL, registration as a charity will be voluntary. However, if a charity is not registered it will not be 
able to: 
 be called a charity;  
 use the term ‘charitable’ when fundraising;  
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 receive charitable tax reliefs.  
Registration will apply to all charities regardless of size.  Jersey chose to follow the Scottish charities’ law 
model with respect to this issue. 
Registration as a charity 
In order to register as a charity, the entity will have to:  
 pass the charity test;  
 have a written constitution;  
 carry out relevant activity (more than just fundraising);  
 have an acceptable name.  
Registration will apply to all charities regardless of legal form (incorporated, unincorporated etc). 
General registration 
General registration will apply to all charities in Jersey which do not meet the ‘restricted’ definition (see 
below), such as public charities. Such charities: 
 must register, and all registration information will be public (unless there is a risk to people or 
property);  
 can solicit public donations; 
 can call themselves charities; 
 can take advantage of full tax reliefs available. 
General registration will include the following information: 
 name;  
 charity number;  
 address;  
 constitutional form; 
 names of all governors;  
 registered charitable purpose statement and registered public benefit statement;  
 if the constitution permits a States Minister to act as a charity governor;  
 if governors are to be paid; 
 if annual returns have been furnished; 
 if a required steps notice has been issued. 
Restricted registration 
Restricted registration will apply to all charities in Jersey which do not solicit donations from the public. These 
will be private charities such as trusts and foundations.  Such charities: 
 must register, but some registration information may be restricted from the public domain; 
 cannot solicit public donations; 
 can call themselves charities; 
 can take advantage of full tax reliefs available. 
Restricted registration will require the same information to be provided as general registration, plus a 
statement as to why the registration is restricted. The information in the public domain will be: 
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 charity number; 
 registered charitable purpose statement and registered public benefit statement; 
 explanation as to why the charity is on the restricted part of the register. 
Historic registration 
This applies to previously registered charities which have been deregistered. The information to be supplied to 
the register, and available to the public will be: 
 charity number; 
 name; 
 reason for deregistration. 
Effects of registration  
Registration is to be a one-step process under Articles 11 to 14. Registration as a charity in Jersey will also 
mean that the entity will be registered as a nonprofit organisation under the Non-Profit Organisations (Jersey) 
Law 2008, and will be registered for charitable tax reliefs. Registration will mean that the charity: 
 can only use property in accordance with its statements;  
 cannot change statements without approval;  
 must provide an annual return.  
In the event of misconduct or to secure property, the court will have power to:  
 appoint someone to take over management of the charity; 
 suspend or remove governors of the charity; 
 prevent the charity from parting with property.  
Effect of de-registration  
Deregistration is dealt with in Articles 15 to 17. If the charity no longer meets the charity test or has failed to 
comply with a ‘required steps notice’, it may be deregistered. On deregistration, property must still be applied 
in accordance with the entity’s previously registered statements. The Commissioner can issue a required steps 
notice if: 
 the charity no longer meets the charity test;  
 there has been misconduct;  
 the charity requires a name change.  
The required steps notice will set out the action to be taken and the time frame within which it must be done. 
Charity governors 
A charity’s governors will be the people who form its governing body. These are often referred to in other 
jurisdictions as trustees, board members, committee or council members. The governors must ensure that the 
charity complies with the CJL and delivers its charitable purpose and public benefit. Governors can be paid, but 
this must be disclosed on the register. Remuneration of governors on the general register will be in the public 
domain. 
For charities which are unincorporated bodies or associations, there are additional duties imposed on 
governors, which are similar to those in the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984. This is because there is no other Jersey 
law imposing duties on governors of such bodies. 
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Interestingly, there is no age limit on who can be a charity governor (such as people under the age of 16), 
although it is expected that guidance may be issued by the Commissioner on this matter at a later date. 
Tax reliefs available to charities in Jersey 
All tax reliefs available to charities will be subject to review after the CJL commences in 2015. The current 
charitable tax reliefs available to charities in Jersey are: 
 Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961:  
o exemption from income tax;  
o lump sum donation reclaim scheme (for amounts over £50); 
o deed of covenant scheme;  
 GST Law and Regulations:  
o exemption from the need to register for GST and to charge GST on sales;  
o repayment of GST incurred on purchases;  
 Taxation (Land Transactions) (Jersey) Law 2009:  
o reduced rates of Land Transaction Tax;  
 Stamp Duties and Fees (Jersey) Law 1998:  
o reduced rates of stamp duty.  
Consequential amendments to tax laws  
Exemption from income tax under the CJL will be available to: 
1. registered charities. An entity must apply to be a registered charity regardless of whether or not it 
was previously eligible for charitable tax relief. 
2. charitable trusts and foundations that are not registered charities but which (insofar as their income 
is applied to donations to registered Jersey charities or excepted foreign charities): 
(a) only have charitable purposes (as defined in the CJL); 
(b) do not solicit voluntary donations; 
(c) notify the Comptroller of Taxes that they intend to make use of the exemption before any income 
is received; 
3. charitable trusts and foundations, that do not fall into (1) or (2) above, but were previously eligible for 
exemption from income tax under the Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961, if that trust or foundation was 
established before Article 41 of the CJL comes into effect, for any of the following purposes: 
(a) the advancement of education; 
(b) the relief of poverty; 
(c) the furtherance of religion; 
(d) a purpose beneficial to the whole community; or 
(e) the service of any church or chapel or any building used solely for the purpose of divine worship; 
and providing they do not solicit voluntary donations once Article 41 comes into effect and that their 
income is used for the purposes detailed above. 
Relief from GST, stamp duty and Land Transaction Tax and repayment of income tax on donations made under 
both the lump sum donation and the deed of covenant schemes will only be available to registered charities 
(i.e. an entity must apply to be a registered charity regardless of whether or not it was previously eligible for 
charitable tax reliefs). 
Foreign charities operating in Jersey 
 A foreign charity can apply to become a Jersey-registered charity if it carries out substantial activity in 
Jersey and it has a principal address in Jersey.  
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 A foreign charity, which is not registered in Jersey, can call itself a charity if it is classed as an 
‘excepted foreign charity’. To be an ‘excepted foreign charity’ it must be established under the laws of 
the UK, or in a jurisdiction recognised by the Minister, and entitled to call itself a charity under the 
laws applicable in that jurisdiction.  
 A foreign charity which is not an ‘excepted foreign charity’ cannot call itself a charity whilst operating 
in Jersey.  
 A foreign charity, which is not registered in Jersey, cannot receive any form of charitable tax reliefs, 
unless it falls within the current Income Tax Law arrangements for UK and Guernsey charities. It is 
envisaged that these arrangements will be maintained for the time being, although this will be 
reviewed together with the other charitable tax reliefs available after the CJL commences in 2015. 
For a copy of the legislation, with explanatory statements included, see: 
http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyPropositions/2014/P.108-2014.pdf 
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5.0  SPECIAL ISSUES FOR 2014 
 
5.1 NOT-FOR-PROFIT MERGERS  
Paul Paxton-Hall 
Paxton-Hall Lawyers 
Introduction  
The word ‘merger’ is not capable of precise definition because it means different things to different people, 
depending on the context. A definition of merger that is helpful is:  
a combination of 2 or more firms or corporations, usually such that one is absorbed into the structure 
of the other or others and loses its separate identity.  It involves one company acquiring shares or 
assets in another.  A corporation is prohibited from acquiring shares in a body corporate or the assets 
of a person if this would substantially lessen competition in a market …
6
 
Another description is: ‘merging a company in a group structure under a holding company.  A merger may be 
horizontal or vertical’. The first definition is clearly specific to the for-profit sector where much of the work 
written around mergers concerns trade practices implications of a merger substantially lessening competition. 
There is a dearth of material concerning not-for-profits and the little there is seems to have a US focus. 
However, having said all that, the concepts are the same in that in the not-for-profit space, ‘merger’ or 
‘integration’ can involve: 
 the acquisition of assets by one company from another; 
 the absorption by one company of another; or 
 vertical integration by means of the acquisition of a subsidiary company.  
The essence is integrating or combining two or more separate organisations into one entity which is then 
responsible for the combined program/charitable purpose, administration and governance.
7
 
Merger/integration can be contrasted to strategic alliances between two or more not-for-profit organisations.  
Alliances won't involve a change in corporate structure, although sharing of services could be a feature.  
Current industry trends   
For any not-for-profit entity considering merger, regard should be had to current industry trends. Some of 
those include: 
 Business complexity: business (including not-for-profit business) has grown more complex in recent 
years exacerbated by complex government funding contracts and community expectations. This trend 
has heightened the need for greater sophistication in management, governance and administration 
and heightened the need for highly competent and experienced boards;  
 Paying directors' fees: larger charities realise the need to pay directors' fees to attract top quality 
directors; 
                                                          
6
  Lexis Nexis Australia, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary  
7
  It could include a wholly owned group of companies in the situation where the merger was effected by vertical 
integration. 
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 Diminishing pool of nominee directors: at the same time, the pool of available and willing nominees 
to board positions has diminished for some charitable organisations;  
 Diminished government funding: diminished government funding due to current government 
budgetary constraints (both State and Federal); 
 Consumer contestability: with a trend to give greater power to the hands of the needy by direct 
funding, consumers are having a greater say in where they buy their community services from. The 
field is being set for greater competition for the community service dollar and the possible entry of 
for-profit operators. This in turn is fuelling the merger of a number of not-for-profit community 
service providers and a perception that greater size leads to greater efficiency; 
 Need for capital: the growth in competition is driving a need for capital resources to fund acquisition 
or growth or both. Funding inevitably means the entry into banking covenants with financiers and the 
possibility of charges being granted over assets for the first time for a lot of not-for-profits; and 
 For-profit corporates’ infrastructure investment: some large corporates are looking at investing in 
the community services sector as a form of infrastructure investment with long investment time 
horizons. 
Desirable outcomes for any Public Benevolent Institution—Health Promotion Charity merger  
The tax outcomes for merger will be influenced by the status of the companies involved, whether they are only 
tax concession charities or whether they are public benevolent institutions (PBIs) or health promotion charities 
(HPCs) and therefore endorsed as deductible gift recipients (DGRs). A merger by two or more PBIs or HPCs 
should aim to achieve the following tax outcomes:  
Income Tax GST FBT Tax Deductibility 
TCC endorsement in 
its own right as a 
single entity for tax 
exemption under 
Div.50 
TCC endorsement  Full FBT exemption as 
a public benevolent 
institution 
DGR endorsement as a 
PBI in its own right as 
a single entity for tax 
deductibility of gifts 
pursuant to Div.30 
 
In addition to concerns about tax outcome and achieving a sense of ‘single entity’ post-merger, outcomes for 
any merger need to consider: 
 simplicity (and with it cost); 
 the ability to centralise services if efficiencies are to be gained; 
 risk and compliance; 
 the possible separation of management operations from ownership of assets for asset protection 
reasons; 
 relevant legislative constraints under legislation such as the Aged Care Act and the National 
Regulatory System (NRS) (for affordable housing providers etc.); and 
 the ultimate primary focus of the organisation, namely, its mission.  
From the point of view of governance considerations the sorts of things that need to be borne in mind include: 
 maintaining the right balance between strategic and operational issues with a priority to the issues of 
strategic direction; 
 ensuring an appropriate skill mix of board members; 
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 appropriate succession planning for board members with perhaps consideration given to rotation of 
directors; 
 preparedness to review performance, both individually and as a group; 
 appropriate educational opportunities for board members;  
 an appropriate framework for accountability to the stakeholders; and 
 the need, following merger, for a good, well-considered constitution is essential for the merged entity 
and, depending on merger structure, a members' agreement can also be helpful to deal with such 
matters as funding that can't otherwise be addressed in the constitution.  
M & A considerations (from a legal perspective) 
Consider current structure  
Consider relevance of the current structure i.e.  
 letters patent; 
 incorporated association; 
 unincorporated association; 
 company limited by guarantee.  
Letters patent entities 
A letters patent entity or incorporated association is now able to convert seamlessly to a company limited by 
guarantee under the Corporations Act, following amendments to the Associations Incorporations Act (AIA). 
Beware of this though, because prior to enactment of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
Act, a letters patent entity had: 
 no reporting obligation at all;  
 no legal obligation to audit accounts; 
 no restrictive insurance regime such as applies to incorporated associations. 
Moreover, there is a dearth of law concerning letters patent entities, which effectively gave considerable 
flexibility to their structure; and letters patent entities, like charitable trusts, do not have members, which can 
be a structural advantage. On the other hand, the AIA is very restrictive in how it applies to associations, is 
administered by the Office of Fair Trading at a State level and is otherwise restrictive of modern day corporate 
governance best practice. 
Companies limited by guarantee 
Companies limited by guarantee (CLGs) are the preferred structuring vehicle for charities today. Some 
advantages of CLGs from a structuring perspective include: 
 if it is an affordable housing provider, then NRS Tier 1 registration prescribes corporate structure 
under the Corporations Act; 
 government and others may prefer dealing with companies as opposed to letters patent entities or 
associations;  
 CLGs afford great flexibility in terms of constitution structure and allow vertical integration in a way 
that incorporated associations may not; and 
 the main advantage is the clarity around rights and obligations in the Corporations Act.   
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Wholly owned subsidiary  
Traditionally, one concern with the incorporation of a new entity as a subsidiary company of another (vertical 
integration/merger) was that the directors of the new entity (Newco) owed their primary responsibility to 
Newco and not to the holding company. However, the Corporations Act was amended in recent years to 
overcome this problem. Now, if the constitution of Newco expressly authorises the directors to act in the best 
interests of the holding company, then the directors, in this case, could make decisions which were in the best 
interests of the holding company even if they were not necessarily in the best interests of Newco.
8
 
A company has all the powers of an individual. However, the Corporations Act allows for express restrictions or 
prohibitions in the company's exercise of its powers. This in turn means that effective reserve powers can be 
held by the holding company if need be e.g. if the holding company wanted to retain control over certain 
events such as change in objects, expenditure controls beyond a certain sum and approval of an annual 
budget. Intellectual property of the holding company (e.g. brand, course-work/curriculum papers or systems) 
can be controlled by the holding company by way of licence granted to the subsidiary company. 
Other control features are possible such as: 
 the constitution could require that Newco’s annual budget be approved by the holding company (this 
may not be necessary if the constitution enshrines that the board of the holding company is to be the 
board of the subsidiary company, or words to that effect); 
 the constitution could require that the directors of the subsidiary company can only appoint the CEO 
with the prior approval of the holding company;   
 the holding company can be required to approve any property disposal; 
 a mission statement could be included as part of the subsidiary company's constitution.  
Merger/integration alternatives  
Though not exclusive, the main merger alternatives (assuming that the merging entities are structured as 
incorporated associations or companies limited by guarantee) are: 
Alternative 1  
‘A’ gifts its assets and liabilities (including employees) to ‘B’ (and sometimes on the basis that members of ‘A’ 
will become members of ‘B’). ‘A’ then winds up. 
 
 
                                                          
8
  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 187. 
Members A Members B Members + 
A B 
Transfer of assets & liabilities 
(A winds up) 
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Alternative 2 (the reverse of Alternative 1) 
‘B’ gifts its assets and liabilities (including employees) to A (and sometimes on the basis that members of ‘B’ 
will become members of ‘A’). ‘B’ then winds up. 
 
 
Alternative 3  
‘A’ and ‘B’ establish a wholly owned subsidiary (Newco) to which ‘A’ and ‘B’ each transfer/gift certain assets 
and liabilities (including employees). This alternative could be used for 2 or more entities wanting to come 
together for a specific project which would not upset existing structure for their continuing respective 
purposes. It could also be used as a model for sharing administrative services that Newco could operate for the 
benefit of both ‘A’ and ‘B’. 
 
 
Alternative 4 
‘A’ becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of ‘B’ on the basis that there is no transfer of assets or liabilities.  In 
this alternative, members of ‘A’ may become members of ‘B’. This structure enables merger to be effected by 
constitution change on the basis that CLG membership is not a property right that can be sold/transferred in 
the way that shares in a proprietary company can.   
A Members 
A 
B Members 
B 
Newco 
Transfer of specific 
assets and liabilities  
Transfer of specific 
assets and liabilities  
50% 
50% 
A Members B Members B Members + 
A B 
Transfer of assets & liabilities 
(B winds up) 
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These alternatives show the vertical/horizontal alternatives referred to earlier. Without going into detail on 
the pros and cons of the various alternatives, advantages around Alternative 4 include: 
 there is no disposal of assets or liabilities; 
 there need not be any change in employees; their contract of employment with A continues 
unaffected;  
 there is no assignment or change and so funding agreement covenants may not be affected (although 
careful regard to the terms of any funding agreement would be required).  
Charitable trusts  
Charitable trusts are accorded a number of privileges at law because of their focus on community benefit, e.g.: 
 favourable tax treatment (tax exemption and sometimes tax deductibility);  
 exemption from the law against perpetuities; 
 they exist for a purpose and not for certainty of objects; 
 if there are insufficient directions in the trust deed, the Court will supply them by designing an 
appropriate scheme under section 106 of the Trusts Act (statutory scheme); and 
 Courts may apply trust property cy-près in the event of impracticality or impossibility in the discharge 
of a charitable trust's purposes where there is a general charitable intention. 
The difference between cy-près and an administrative scheme is the difference between ends and means. A 
cy-près scheme can be directed when it is impossible and impracticable to carry out the objects of the trust. 
On the other hand, an administrative scheme supplements and/or clarifies any provisions which the settlor has 
stipulated concerning the manner in which the objects of the trust are to be pursued when practical 
circumstances show that the settlor's stipulation of the means is inadequate or impractical.
9
  
Examples of practical impossibility are those involving bequests that are insufficient in amount to adequately 
fulfil their intended purpose, that are in favour of institutions that no longer exist, or that are disclaimed by the 
                                                          
9
 Corish v A-G (NSW) [2006] NSWSC 1219. 
A Members  A Members + B Members 
 
A B 
A 
100% 
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intended trustee. Other examples include gifts to an institution that no longer carries on the work for which 
the disposition is expressed and gifts that an institution is prohibited by its constitution from accepting.
10
 It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the cy-près doctrine in detail, but suffice it to say that this doctrine, 
coupled with the primary duty of the trustee of a charitable trust to observe the terms of the trust deed 
strictly, means that ‘merging’ a charitable trust with another entity for reasons of commercial exigency is 
problematic to say the least. If, for reasons of impracticality or impossibility, a charitable trust cannot pursue 
its objects, then it needs to apply to the Court for directions to apply trust assets cy-près.   
The same principle applies where a charitable institution, like a church, has received bequests impressed with 
a charitable trust obligation. Such trusts cannot be disposed of or applied in a different manner by merger or 
otherwise without the sanction of the Court.  
Are companies limited by guarantee or incorporated associations bound to obtain Court approval 
prior to a merger? 
A charity may be structured as a trust or as a corporate entity e.g. a CLG. The legal implications of the two 
alternative structures are quite different. For example, the law dealing with trustees is different from that for 
directors of a company and there are different statutory overlays for the two types of structure. However, that 
does not mean that a charity structured as a company or incorporated association is free from notions of a 
trust. A trust can co-exist with other structures and therein lies one of the more challenging issues affecting 
charity law today i.e. is all property held for charitable purposes, through whatever structure, necessarily held 
on charitable trust?
11
 
One of the advantages of a CLG over a trust is flexibility in changing purpose because this is something the 
members of a CLG can do by amendment to its constitution. For charitable trust deeds one needs to consider 
the terms of the trust instrument as to whether it can be varied. Even if it can, a change in charitable purpose 
is problematic. 
Despite the flexibility of CLGs, the better view seems to be that a charity structured as a CLG holds its property 
on trust for its charitable purposes. This in turn means that it must exercise its powers in pursuit of those 
purposes only. If the directors of a CLG form the view, acting in the best interests of the company and 
therefore the charitable purposes of the company, that commercial exigency requires a merger with another 
entity to pursue its charitable purposes better, then I do not think there is anything to restrain the directors 
from acting in that way. This approach needs to be taken with some caution though, particularly if there are 
any embedded trusts that exist for a specific purpose. If the merger affected such a trust, then that would 
probably require Court sanction in advance. This is because the cases around incorporated charities distinguish 
between: 
 money or property given to a charitable corporate body for a specified charitable purpose (i.e. 
embedded trusts); and 
 monies or property given for a charitable corporate body's general purposes.   
If held for a specified charitable purpose, then a trust relationship clearly exists and the property must be used 
for that purpose unless permitted by a cy-près scheme. On the other hand, in relation to assets held by an 
incorporated charity for its general purposes, there are a number of legal alternatives; namely: 
 there is no trust; 
 trust or trust-like obligations apply in some cases that will be within the discretion of the Court; 
 a trust always arises; or 
                                                          
10
 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity 2010, para 15.20. 
11
 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity, para 17.2. 
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 the assets are held on a constructive trust.   
It is sufficient to say that the Courts have had no difficulty in finding that a corporate charity is in an analogous 
trustee-like capacity for charitable purposes to support a cy-près scheme order.   
The difficult issue though arises where the members of a CLG charity that does not hold property on any 
embedded trusts change the objects by special resolution. Is that action one that requires the sanction by the 
Court of a cy-près scheme?
12
 This is a difficult charity law question not capable of clear answer. It is likely that 
we are going to see further case law in this area in coming years with the number of charitable mergers taking 
place.   
An example—Freemasons Hospital v The Attorney-General of Victoria13 
Facts 
Freemasons Hospital was a corporate entity and trustee of the hospital fund of the United Grand Lodge of 
Masons in Victoria (Grand Lodge). The trustee had operated a private hospital for many years. The hospital 
needed major expenditure which was beyond the scope of the trust to facilitate and it faced growing 
competition and debts. The trustee decided to sell the hospital. Freemasons Hospital as trustee applied to the 
Court to seek directions as to how proceeds of sale should be applied. The Attorney-General for Victoria was a 
party to the proceedings and argued that net sale proceeds should not be distributed to the United Grand 
Lodge but rather should be applied cy-près. 
Costs of establishing and the subsequent development of the hospital were funded in large part by levies and 
contributions from Victorian Freemasons. Freemasons Hospital submitted to the Court that the intention 
should be inferred that at least part of the sale proceeds represented funds contributed by the Grand Lodge 
and so should revert to the Grand Lodge for its general masonic purposes.   
Held 
The Court found that normal charity rules did not apply in this instance. This was because all funds, or at least 
the majority of funding for the Hospital, had been derived over the years by Freemason contributions. As such, 
the Court said that moneys were given to Freemasons Hospital as a ‘qualified dedication’. This means that 
funds were given on the understanding that the Hospital would be run, or at least ultimately controlled by, the 
Grand Lodge. Gifts to the Hospital were not an absolute gift. The Court held that because it was a qualified 
dedication, the gift was determinable if the Hospital ceased to be run by the Grand Lodge and so allowed net 
sale proceeds to be applied to the Grand Lodge and not by way of a cy-près scheme.
14
 
Implications  
This case shows how important the facts of a particular case are to the outcome around purpose and the 
application of funds on a winding up. Similar principles have to be borne in mind when a charity, however 
structured, intends to join with another. 
                                                          
12
 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity, para 17.70 
13
 [2010] VSC 373 
14
 The Freemason case followed an earlier decision of the NSW Supreme Court in 2005, Cram Foundation v Corbett-Jones 
[2006] NSWSC 495 and also A-G v Corporation of the Lesser Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Brisbane (the St John's 
Cathedral/St Martin's Hospital case heard by the High Court in 1976). 
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Factors affecting the merger process  
The MAP for Non-profits research project depicted the merger process in the following way:
15
 
 
The MAP research project, not surprisingly, identified the following factors as key to a successful merger: 
 ensuring key stakeholder involvement with the need to have an executive staff member champion 
merger and strong board commitment from both entities;  
 involvement by staff from both entities, in planning and execution of the process; 
 careful integration of both formal and informal structure to ensure cultural integration. Boards need 
to work together and there needs to be mission integration; 
 appropriate due diligence so that there is a clear decision-making process with clear and realistic 
timeframes set. A clear understanding of the legal and financial status of both organisations is 
essential.  
 
  
                                                          
15
 MAP for Non-Profits Paper What do we know about non-profit mergers? Joint research project for MAP for non-profits in 
Wilder Research Minnesota US March 2011, p 15. 
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5.2 CHARITABLE HOUSING – UPDATE AND FUTURE TRENDS 
Mark Fowler  
Neumann & Turnour Lawyers 
Whilst the uncertainty for the charitable sector canvassed elsewhere in this Almanac is also visited upon the 
charitable housing sector, some new policy developments provide certainty in unexpected areas, and also the 
potential for further growth.  
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Interpretation Statement: Provision of 
Housing by Charities  
In December 2014, after a period of consultation, the ACNC Commissioner released an Interpretation 
Statement on the provision of Housing. The Interpretation Statement provides a handy first point of access for 
many of the central legal issues facing housing charities within Australia. It addresses the following matters: 
1. What charitable purposes may be fulfilled through the provision of housing?  
2. To whom can charitable housing be provided?  
3. What kinds of housing can be provided as charitable?   
4. How does commercial activity fit with the provision of charitable housing?  
5. What kind of interaction can occur between Government and charitable housing providers? 
In so doing, it provides a helpful analysis of the circumstances in which the provision of housing will be 
charitable with reference to the charitable purposes set out in section 12 of the Charities Act 2013 (Cth), 
including:  
1. the purpose of advancing health (s.12(1)(a))  
2. the purpose of advancing social or public welfare (s.12(1)(c)), and  
3. any other purpose beneficial to the general public that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to, 
or within the spirit of, any of the purposes mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (j) (s.12(1)(k)).  
The Interpretation Statement, whilst not binding on courts or government agencies, is binding on ACNC 
assessors and to that end, provides useful guidance to charities on matters such as participation in the 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), and in innovative schemes such as rent to buy or shared equity 
housing purchase schemes. 
Portents of Change at the Federal Level  
The National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA) (replacing the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement) 
and associated National Partnership Agreements are the central State and Federal arrangements governing 
policy and government funding towards housing. In October 2013, then Minister for Social Services, Kevin 
Andrews expressed his concerns with the NAHA, and what he considered to be a failure of delivery, a lack of 
incentives, a lack of accountability and a shortage of transparency in funding issued under the NAHA. 
Subsequently, Round 5 of the NRAS was discontinued, amidst media coverage criticising, amongst other 
matters, the ability of foreign nationals to access supported accommodation in the Scheme. For many 
community housing providers, the NRAS represented an example of the kind of innovative types of private—
public engagements required to meet the shortage of affordable housing within Australia.  The June 2014 
report into the NRAS confirmed that approximately 21,000 dwellings had been constructed and that a further 
16,000 were expected to be delivered.  
In late 2014, the Commonwealth Government announced that the long-awaited Ministerial review of housing 
and homelessness would be conducted as part of the Reform of the Federation White Paper process. As a 
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component of that process the Government released an Issues Paper titled ‘Roles and Responsibilities in 
Housing and Homelessness’ in December 2014. The overall review is guided by six principles: accountability of 
outcome; subsidiarity; national interest; equity, efficiency and effectiveness of delivery, durability and fiscal 
sustainability. Against this matrix, the Issues Paper seeks to investigate how ‘clarifying the roles and 
responsibilities of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories could improve the operation of direct 
government housing assistance and homelessness services’. Whilst the Issues Paper does not call for 
submissions, the Government intends to publish a Green Paper in the second half of 2015, setting out options 
for reform for which submissions will be called. This will be followed by the White Paper in 2016.  
Finally, at the end of 2014 a number of national homelessness or housing peak bodies were notified that their 
funding would not be renewed, or would expire early.  
Future Movements 
Looking forward into 2015, several key matters to keep an eye on include: 
1. At the time of writing, the release of the report of the Senate Inquiry into Affordable Housing in 
Australia is anticipated. The Senate Inquiry is investigating matters such as the role of all levels of 
government in facilitating affordable home ownership, affordable private rental, and in public and 
social housing and homelessness and has been keenly anticipated as a possible signpost for directions 
in forthcoming policy.    
2. After a series of State-based pilots, the National Regulatory System for Community Housing (NRSCH) 
will continue its roll out across Australia. For some providers, registration is relevant to access to 
Commonwealth and State funding. Inclusion on the Register is preconditioned on the satisfaction of 
certain requirements, including stipulations imposed on not for profit winding up clauses. Once 
registered, providers are subject to ongoing reporting requirements and compliance reviews.  
3. The national rollout of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is planned from July 2016. 
Given its focus on consumer directed support, the NDIS has inspired consideration of the means by 
which NDIS funding may be directed to the provision of housing. There are several challenges for the 
roll-out of the NDIS in the housing space, including: 
(a) The pooling of NDIS financial support in order to provide shared accommodation, and the 
nature of the legal arrangements between those persons pooling funds. Also relevant is how 
such agreements would interact with the law concerning pooled investments.  
(b) The relationship between body corporate strata engagements, property management and 
the appointment (and replacement) of a joint support provider.  
(c) The means to combine NDIS funding with existing funding sources, such as tenant or parent 
equity, community housing providers, State or Territory government, local government, 
Commonwealth Rental Assistance, NRAS funding, debt, philanthropy, planning dividends, or 
income from disability service trusts.  
(d) How NDIS funds may be utilised through innovative arrangements such as shared equity, 
shared ownership, mixed equity, subsidised home ownership or cooperative equity schemes. 
(e) Finally, how pooled or innovative housing arrangements may satisfy the overarching NDIS 
requirement that services be ‘reasonable and necessary’. 
  
 224 
 
5.3 PUBLIC ANCILLARY FUNDS – TIME TO UPDATE THE TRUST 
DEED? 
Alice Macdougall  
Special Counsel, Herbert Smith Freehills 
Update trust deeds by 1 July 2015 
The Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011
16
 came into operation on 1 December 2012. They apply to all public 
ancillary funds including those which have been in existence for many years prior to 2012. The guidelines 
require all trust deeds for public ancillary funds to contain certain provisions. Transitional rules have been in 
operation to allow trustees until 1 July 2015 to amend the deeds to comply with these guidelines (Guideline 
54.3).  
What are public ancillary funds? 
Public ancillary funds are trusts created to raise funds from the public and make grants to one or more 
deductible gift recipients. Public ancillary funds are referred to in item 2 of the table in section 30-15 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 97) and therefore they are referred to as item 2 DGRs on the Australian 
Business Register. There are a number of laws which public ancillary funds must comply with, the guidelines 
are only one of many. 
Do all trust deeds need to be amended? 
A trust deed for a public ancillary fund only needs to be amended if the deed: 
 is contrary to the guidelines; 
 does not contain the provisions which must be provided for under the guidelines; or 
 prevents compliance with any part of the guidelines. 
Trustees must therefore review the deed and the guidelines to identify whether the deed should be updated. 
Trustees can also compare the deed with the ATO’s model trust deed. It may be worth considering updating 
the deed to ensure ongoing compliance with the guidelines. 
Before amending any trust deed, care must be taken in identifying whether the trustee has the power to make 
the amendments. If there is a power to amend, trustees must ensure they comply with any provisions relating 
to the power to amend including obtaining any necessary prior consents to the amendment. 
What must be in the public ancillary fund trust deed? 
The trust deed must include the following: 
1. An objects clause that clearly sets out and reflects the purpose of the fund (Guideline 10.1). It is not 
specified in the guidelines but it is recommended that these objects/purposes specify that 
distributions can only be made to eligible item 1 DGRs. This is to ensure compliance with this 
requirement in section 30-15 ITAA 97. See clause 4.1 of the ATO’s model trust deed and various 
definitions of ‘Eligible Entity’.  
                                                          
16
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 issued under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 by Tax Laws Amendment (2011 
Measures No. 7) Bill, Schedule 8 – Public ancillary funds. Available through the ATO website in a link in  ‘Non-Profit News 
Service No. 0349 - Public ancillary funds: legislation passed’. 
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2. A winding up and revocation of DGR status clause that provides if the public ancillary fund is wound 
up or ceases to be endorsed as a public ancillary fund by the ATO, the fund’s net assets must be 
provided only to item 1 DGRs (Guideline 10.2). See clause 17 of the ATO’s model trust deed. 
3. A not-for-profit clause that sets out and reflects that the trust is established and operated as a not-
for-profit entity (Guideline 11.1). This can be as simple as noting that the trust is established as and 
must operate as a not-for-profit entity, as drafted in clause 4.4 of the ATO’s model trust deed. 
4. Limitation on the trustee’s indemnity so as to prohibit the public ancillary fund from indemnifying 
the trustee, or an employee, officer or agent of the trustee, for loss or liability attributable to certain 
actions referred to in Guideline 18. See clause 9.2 of the ATO’s model trust deed. 
5. Though not expressly required to be included in the trust deed in the guidelines, the schedule to the 
application for endorsement as a deductible gift recipient issued by the ATO, asks the applicant to 
identify where in the trust deed the following additional clauses are. Trustees may therefore consider 
including these clauses in the trust deed, if it is being amended: 
(a) Preventing the fund from providing any material benefit to the founder, trustee, donors and 
others (Guideline 42 and clause 5.2 of the ATO’s model trust deed, though the wording of the 
deed does not absolutely reflect the guideline). 
(b) Providing receipts must be issued in the name of the fund (and should include the 
information required by section 30-228 of ITAA97) (Guideline 46 and clauses 11.7(b) and (c)). 
(c) Requiring the public to be invited to contribute to the fund (Guideline 45 and clause 4.6). 
(d) Requiring that a majority of those managing and controlling the public ancillary fund must 
meet the responsible person requirements of the ATO (TR 95/27 and Guideline 14, and 
clause 6),  
(e) Provide for the winding up of the gift account or cessation of the gift account as a result of 
revocation of the trust endorsement as a DGR, which generally means a clause setting out 
the establishment of the gift account (section 30-125, ITAA97 and clause 10). 
Can the trust deed be replaced with the ATO’s model trust deed? 
If the trust deed does not contain the requirements set out above, then the deed can either be amended 
(subject to the power of amendment in the trust deed) to incorporate these specific provisions or, again if your 
trust deed permits, amend the deed by a deed of amendment which revokes and amends the provisions of the 
trust deed so that they read and take effect as per provisions in an annexure to the deed of amendment and 
then the annexure can set out clauses 1-18 of the ATO’s model public ancillary fund deed as the substantive 
amendments (varied as necessary to accommodate existing features of the trust relating to purposes, relevant 
law and remuneration, for example).  
This methodology should avoid the possibility of resettlement of the trust as far as the ATO is concerned, but it 
is up to the trustee to take its own advice regarding the possibility of resettlement under State and Territory 
trust and duty laws. 
There are a number of provisions in the ATO model trust deed incorporating requirements from the public 
ancillary fund guidelines which will assist the trustee in ongoing compliance. 
There is no need to replace the trust deed, if the trustee can comply with the public ancillary fund guidelines 
and the deed contains the necessary clauses.  
Notification to the ATO 
All amendments to the trust deed must be notified to the ATO in the approved form within 21 days of the 
change. The ACNC will also need to be provided with the amended trust deed. 
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ATO acceptance of trust deeds not amended? 
Watch for any announcements from the ATO which may accept that deeds which can comply with the 
guidelines are acceptable even without making the necessary amendments to include the above specific 
clauses required under the guidelines. This occurred with the Private Ancillary funds, though these were only 
ever created with deeds based on the ATO’s model trust deed, whereas public ancillary funds have been 
created in many different ways and terms over the years. This acceptance is found in the Private ancillary 
funds – frequently asked questions document on the ATO website in the answer to question 1.11. At the time 
of writing there is no indication that the ATO will issue the same acceptance of not amending trust deeds for 
public ancillary funds. 
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5.4 THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PUBLIC ANCILLARY FUNDS AND 
OTHER DGR FUNDS BY SCHOOLS, TO FUND RECURRENT AND 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE WITH DEDUCTIBLE GIVING 
Andrew Lind and Jessica Lipsett 
Corney and Lind Lawyers 
Background 
Schools are often familiar with the concept of philanthropic fundraising to the extent of a Building Fund, 
however with adequate active fundraising by the school itself, the benefits of tax deductible gifts can be 
applied in a variety of ways to assist with both capital and recurrent needs. Through careful structuring of 
various philanthropic funds by schools, it is possible for these income streams not only to assist with 
fundraising for capital purposes, but also boost the recurrent income of the school. 
Philanthropic structures – an overview 
As an overview, there are several key Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) Funds which schools may operate in 
order to either raise funds or utilise these funds for capital or recurrent income purposes. These are: 
 Public Ancillary Funds; 
 Building Funds;  
 Scholarship Funds;  
 Libraries (often incorrectly referred to as ‘Library Funds”); and 
 Necessitous Circumstances Funds.  
Generally, it will also be necessary to schools to establish a ‘trustee company’, normally a company limited by 
guarantee to act as trustee of the Public Ancillary Fund. Broadly and practically speaking, the trustee company 
acts as trustee of the Public Ancillary Fund, which then distributes funds raised to the various other DGR funds 
operated by the School at its discretion, depending on the particular capital and recurrent income needs of the 
school in any given financial year.  
Ancillary funds & Fundraising 
In recent years, the Australian government has given considerable attention to the promotion and 
development of ancillary funds. Despite these Funds having strict requirements for both their establishment 
and continued operation, they provide an effective vehicle for public philanthropy for schools.  
What are Ancillary Funds? 
Ancillary funds are funds which are entitled to deductible gift recipient (DGR) endorsement, and are therefore 
entitled to receive donations which are tax deductible. These funds essentially operate as a tax deductible 
fundraising mechanism to distribute to other DGRs, and cannot engage in any other activities.  
Ancillary funds fall within two categories: 
 Private ancillary funds – these allow private entities to  establish and donate to a charitable trust of 
their own, without the seeking contributions from the public, for the purpose of disbursing funds to 
other DGRs.  
 Public ancillary funds (PAFs) – these funds are distinct from private ancillary funds in that they invite 
the public to contribute to the fund, and it is these funds which are generally utilised by schools to 
conduct their philanthropic fundraising.  
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There are clear public policy benefits to the effective operation of a PAF by schools - the intention of the 
Government is that such Funds will grow to a point of becoming self-perpetuating (or endowed), with growth 
occurring each year over and above minimum distribution requirements, to provide long-term solutions to 
schools for deficiencies in both capital and recurrent income streams.  
PAFs are classified as Item 2 DGRs pursuant to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), meaning that they 
are a fund set up solely for providing money, property or benefits to Item 1 DGRs, or the establishment of such 
DGRs – a PAF can therefore not distribute funds to another ancillary fund (public or private).
17
 Item 1 DGRs 
include most other funds, authorities or institutions with DGR endorsement, and certainly include all typical 
funds to which PAF disbursements may be made in a school environment.  
Careful consideration should be given to the Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 (‘the Guidelines’) regarding 
the extensive requirements for such Funds prior to their establishment and indeed throughout their operation 
to ensure compliance – the considerations set out below are by no means exhaustive. 
Establishment of a PAF 
PAFs are established by trust deed. Pursuant to the Guidelines, the Fund must be maintained as a valid trust 
under State legislation.
18
 Being a trust, a PAF must have a trustee who is willing to submit to the strict 
requirements imposed by the ATO for the operation of the Fund. The Guidelines require that the majority of 
individuals involved in the decision-making of the fund must be ‘individuals with a degree of responsibility to 
the Australian community as a whole’.
19
 The majority of directors of the trustee company must therefore be 
‘Responsible Persons’ as defined by the ATO.
20
  
The Rules of the Fund must also clearly set out the Objects and purpose of the Fund, which must be the sole 
purpose of providing money property or benefits to eligible entities in accordance with the Guidelines (other 
DGRs who are not ancillary funds).
21
 The Rules must also stipulate that the Fund is established and must 
operate as a not-for-profit entity.
22
  
In order to conduct fundraising activities, PAFs will also need to be registered with the Office of Fair Trading 
pursuant to the Collections Act 1966 (Qld) or the equivalent in the State or Territory in which the PAF makes 
public appeals for support. 
Distribution requirements 
Given the maintenance costs for operating a PAF and acknowledging that it can take some time to build a 
substantial fund, PAFs are not required by the ATO to make distributions during the financial year in which the 
fund was established or within the next four financial years.
23
 Ideally, this allows trustees to accumulate funds 
in the trust to the point where thefund is self-perpetuating.  Following this five year grace period, each 
financial year PAFs are required to distribute 4% (with a minimum distribution amount of $8,800.00) of their 
market value of the Fund’s net assets as valued at the end of the previous financial year.
24
  
                                                          
17
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, s 30.15 
18
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 8. 
19
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 14.  
20
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 15. 
21
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 10.1 
22
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 11. 
23
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 19.2 
24
 Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011, 19 
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Utilizing Other Deductible Gift Recipients  
Once a PAF is established by a school and raising income through philanthropic donations and investments, 
there is a wide variety of DGRs that schools can establish for PAF funds to be distributed to in accordance with 
the mandatory distribution requirements.  
A major benefit of utilizing a PAF for raising income to distribute later to other DGRs is the level of control that 
the trustee of the PAF retains in deciding where to direct distributions. Depending on the needs of the school, 
and the terms under which the funds were raised, distribution can be made in proportions that reflect the 
particular capital or recurrent funding needs of the school in any given year.  
Common DGR Funds maintained by schools may include a building fund, scholarship fund, library and 
necessitous circumstances fund.  
Building Funds 
Building Funds are a principal mechanism through which schools are able to raise capital funds for the purpose 
of expanding, developing and maintaining school buildings. Building Funds are established by Rules adopted by 
a trustee company. School building funds must have the following characteristics: 
 The fund must be a ‘public fund’; 
 There must be a building (or planning for a building); 
 The building must be used as a school by a qualifying body; and  
 The use of the fund must be for an acquisition, construction or maintenance of a building.  
Allowable expenditure of Building Funds 
Once established, a school building fund must be used solely for the purpose of providing money for the 
acquisition, construction or maintenance of school buildings for the purpose of using that building as a school. 
Taxation Ruling TR 2013/2 provides quite extensive guidance as to what costs are appropriate to be paid from 
a school building fund, and these allowances are quite broad. Issues may arise where buildings are to be 
shared use with another institution, for example a church.  
We also note that the cost of building and maintaining facilities that are not buildings, such as sports fields, 
landscaping, playgrounds and open air car parks, cannot be paid from a school building fund.  
The fact that DGR funds can be used for maintenance of buildings allows some recurrent expenditure to be 
defrayed by DGR funds. Taxation Ruling TR 2013/2 provides some guidance as to disbursements that may be 
made from the Fund in respect of maintenance. 
Scholarship Funds 
Scholarship Funds are the principal means by which a school may boost their recurrent income whether 
through funds distributed by the PAF or given directly to the Scholarship Fund. Scholarship Funds are 
established by Rules adopted by a trustee company. To operate as a Scholarship Fund, a Fund must have the 
following characteristics: 
 It is a ‘public fund’ (discussed above);  
 It is a registered charity (ie. registered with the ACNC); and 
 It is established and maintained for the sole purpose of providing funds for eligible scholarships, 
bursaries or prizes.  
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Recurrent expenditure – value of scholarships 
The PAF distributes to the Scholarship Fund which in turn funds the school in terms of ‘usual fees forgone’ for 
the ‘cost’ of the scholarship or bursary. In this way, general purposes income of the school is substantially 
increased via DGR funds. Schools can often interest donors in ‘sponsoring’ children who may not otherwise 
have the capacity to attend the school. The donors may give more if they can obtain a tax deduction on further 
giving. 
Libraries 
Often incorrectly referred to as ‘Library Funds’, schools may apply for DGR endorsement for their Library, 
allowing tax deductible giving to be utilized for the purpose of purchasing resources, and the maintenance and 
development of the Library’s facilities and the recurrent pay expense of Library staff.  To obtain DGR 
endorsement, Libraries must be registered as a charity with the ACNC. Additionally, the following 
requirements apply: 
 The Library must be owned or controlled by persons having a degree of responsibility to the 
community; 
 The collection must be made available to the public (a school community is usually sufficiently public);  
 It is constituted as a Library, recognised as such by other people, and conducts itself in a way 
consistent with such a character; and 
 It is an Institution (as defined by the ATO). 
Recurrent expenditure – all Library expenses 
If separately structured as an ‘Institution’ (which is the basic requirement for all DGR Libraries in any event), all 
expenses of the Library including staff wages and subscriptions can be funded through DGR funds. 
Necessitous Circumstances Funds 
Necessitous Circumstances Funds are defined by the ATO as a public fund established and maintained to 
provide relief for persons in Australia who are in necessitous circumstances. ‘Necessitous circumstances’ refers 
only to financial necessity, rather than extending to need more generally, due to factors such sickness, 
incapacity or age. Whilst the term may refer to poverty, a person need not be in abject poverty or destitution 
in order to be considered ‘in necessitous circumstances’ – simply put, a person may be considered to be in 
necessitous circumstances when they don’t have enough financial resources to have a modest standard of 
living by Australian standards.  
Recurrent expenditure – Fee Relief to Families in Necessitous Circumstances. 
Likely examples in a school context may include the loss of employment for a tuition-paying parent, or an 
illness which puts significant financial pressure on the family, resulting in the inability to meet tuition fees. Fee 
relief for families in need is common place in schools and generally a large ‘hole’ in the recurrent budget. 
Funds that have been accumulated in a necessitous circumstances fund can be paid to the school for the cost 
of the fee relief provided to families in such circumstances. 
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5.5 TROUBLE IN THE HOUSE – RESOLVING INTERNAL DISPUTES 
IN NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
Derek Mortimer 
DF Mortimer & Associates 
Introduction  
This paper briefly discusses our law firm’s approach to internal disputes in not-for-profit (NFP) organisations. 
These are disputes between members of a NFP organisation, and disputes between one or more members and 
the NFP.  
Why internal disputes can be emotional  
Parties to NFP internal disputes often display high degrees of emotion
25 
for various reasons, such as:
26
  
 Some NFPs have a ‘family’ feel to their operations, which may result in the dynamics of family-based 
groups;  
 Some NFPs offer limited normative experiences to guide members’ behaviour.  
 Affected members may act out emotional responses arising from frustration related to dealing with a 
health or disability problem; 
 NFPs can provide a sense of belonging, self-worth, identity and purpose in life, so disputes may cause 
a more significant personal impact;  
 Disputes are a natural (albeit uncomfortable) part of an organisation as it passes through the 
‘forming, storming, norming and performing’ cycles of growth. 
Why emotions challenge lawyers involved with NFP internal disputes 
As lawyers, it can be exceedingly difficult to obtain instructions from a client without first addressing 
underlying emotional tensions, and achieving a lasting settlement to an NFP internal dispute (as distinct from 
achieving a particular legal action) is almost bound to fail without addressing these tensions. Unfortunately, 
the intervention of lawyers can actually escalate the emotional intensity of NFP internal disputes, since 
lawyers are generally trained to focus on technical legal challenges and may not be willing to confront 
underlying emotional tensions.
27
  
Popular NFP governance theories such as agency and stakeholder theory assume economically rational 
behaviour and do not address emotional motivators.
28
 However as respected academic commentators note: 
                                                          
25 For example: ‘……voluntary non-profit organisations have a reputation for producing very personal and spiteful 
conflicts’- Myles McGregor-Lowndes, The Visitor-Facilitation of internal dispute resolution in non-profit Organisations 
(Working Paper No. PONC 82, QUT, 1998) 3; Fiona Hudson ‘Disgruntled player takes scrabble stoush to court’ Herald-Sun 
Melbourne 27 December 2014 np.  
26
 McGregor-Lowndes above n 25, 3; Alan Hough, Myles McGregor-Lowndes, and Christine Ryan, ‘Theorising about Board 
Governance of Nonprofit Organisations: Surveying the Landscape’ (paper presented at the 34
th
 Annual Conference of the 
Association for Research on Non-profit Organisations and Voluntary Action, Washington DC, 17-19 November 2008) 45; 
Bruce Tuckman ‘Developmental sequence in small groups’ (1965) Psychological Bulletin 63, 384-399. 
27
 John Ellis and Nicola Ellis ‘A New Model for seeking meaningful redress for victims of church related sexual assault’ 
(2014) 26(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 31, 39 – the authors suggest that it is a sign of lack of confidence when 
lawyers become ‘overly legalistic and defensive’. 
28
 In an experience involving a complete breakdown of trust between an NFP’s factions, a commercial litigator observed ‘at 
least parties to hard-nosed for-profit disputes can still agree that their dispute is about money!’ 
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Psychoanalytic theories offer potentially profound insight into the work of governing boards, 
especially in small nonprofits.
29
  
As a consequence of these observations we adapted our own approach to NFP internal disputes. At first 
adapting the approach intuitively, we subsequently found that techniques developed from the field of 
psychotherapy (particularly ‘narrative therapy’) have informed our legal practice in a methodical way to 
address NFP internal disputes. 
Some techniques developed from the field of psychotherapy  
Techniques developed using insights from the field of psychotherapy that inform our legal practice include: 
 Therapeutic jurisprudence considers whether an assertion or adjustment of a client’s legal rights will 
be beneficial or deleterious to the client’s wellbeing.
30
   
 Transformative mediation uses techniques with the client alone or with both parties in a dispute to: 
o assert their own identity, options and goals;  
o respond to relationships and recognise (but not necessarily reconcile with) the other party’s 
perspectives to the dispute.
31
 
Transformative mediation assumes humans to be fundamentally social, motivated by desires for both 
autonomy and interaction.
32
  
 Narrative mediation uses techniques based on narrative therapy
33
 that develop causally and 
chronologically coherent narratives of events and affirming statements. These narratives can be 
modified if parties do have an opportunity to discuss each other’s narrative.  
Transformative and narrative mediation techniques can enhance procedurally fair dispute processes.
34
  
Application to NFP internal disputes 
Use of the word ‘mediation’ suggests the techniques described in this paper should only be used by 
mediators.
35
 However the techniques can also be directly applied by legal practitioners and by chairs of NFP 
meetings
36
 to encourage structured discussions in situations such as: 
 Meetings with a client to take instructions or to discuss settlement options 
 Communications between parties and their legal representatives that fall outside NFP internal dispute 
processes 
 Within procedurally fair NFP internal dispute processes mandated by an NFPs rules and legislation
37
  
                                                          
29
 Alan Hough, Myles McGregor- Lowndes, and Christine Ryan above n 26, 45. 
30
 John Ellis and Nicola Ellis above n 27, 36; Michael King ‘Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rise of 
Emotionally Intelligent Justice’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1096, 1122- ‘A client’s inability to resolve 
emotional issues … may be a barrier to resolving a case without bitter and protracted litigation.’. 
31
 Kathy Douglas and Rachael Field, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Providing Some Answers to the Neutrality Dilemma in 
Court-Connected Mediation’ in Greg Reinhardt. and Andrew Cannon (eds) Proceedings Third International Conference on 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Transforming Legal Processes in Court and Beyond, Perth, Western Australia (7-9 June 2006), 
81-83. 
32
 Dorothy Della Noce, Robert Bush and Joseph Folger ‘Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications 
for Practice and Policy’ (2002) 3(1) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Journal 39, 51. 
33
 Douglas and Field above n 31, 15. 
34
 Douglas and Field above n 31, 80. 
35
 See for example, appointment of a mediator under model rule 27 for an association incorporated under the Associations 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic). 
36
 The ‘chair’ could include the ‘visitor’-see McGregor-Lowndes above n 25. 
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 At NFP board meetings  
 At NFP general meetings (whether called by the board or members).  
Conclusion 
The techniques briefly described in this paper can enhance the quality and outcome of NFP internal disputes. 
Our clients can feel that they have been really listened to, report a (relative) sense of calm during the dispute 
and express satisfaction with the legal outcome and settlement (whatever the legal outcome). Most 
importantly perhaps, the techniques can help to build essential trust and understanding between NFP 
members. This trust in turn helps to build that most highly praised feature of NFPs, ‘social capital’.
38
  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37
See Macedonian Orthodox Community of Australia Ltd v Subeski [2013] NSWSC 22, [7]–[8] (for companies limited by 
guarantee); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), s 71(3); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic), s 54 & 55 
(amongst others, for incorporated associations). 
38
 Eva Cox ‘Raising social capital’ in A Truly Civil Society Boyer lectures, 14 November 1995 ABC Sydney. 
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7.0 CONTRIBUTING ORGANISATIONS 
THE AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT 
STUDIES 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (ACPNS) is part of the QUT Business School which 
is internationally recognised for its high quality teaching and research.  
ACPNS brings together academics and research students from a wide variety of disciplines, however all have 
expertise in philanthropy, nonprofit organisations, and the social economy.  
The Centre’s research activities incorporate a wide range of issues of interest and concern to  philanthropic 
and nonprofit organisations and government including: 
Accounting and Finance 
 QUT Standard Chart of Accounts (now the National Standard Chart of Accounts) 
Nonprofit Governance 
 Governance and management 
 Nonprofit board assessments 
Nonprofit Regulation 
 Law reform policy 
 Taxation 
 Liability 
 Human services contract and partnerships 
Philanthropy and Fundraising 
 High net worth giving 
 Professional adviser’s role in philanthropy 
 Philanthropy for Indigenous and Torres Strait Islanders’ causes 
 Planned giving 
Social Enterprise 
 Mapping and scoping the sector 
 Strategic management of social enterprises 
 Social enterprise and public policy 
 Legal issues affecting social enterprise 
Apart from the research activities of its members, staff associated with the Centre also teach programs 
designed for students interested in following careers in the management of philanthropic and nonprofit 
organisations or in public administration associated with nonprofit organisations. The Graduate Certificate in 
Business (Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies) comprises eight core units which provide the basis for 
articulation into the Master of Business (Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies). The Graduate Certificate is 
available to students based outside of Brisbane via flexible delivery mode. 
The Centre has an active community service and continuing professional education program and has 
conducted public and specialist seminars for several years. The Centre also publishes working papers, manuals 
and monographs. 
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Mission 
...to bring to the community the benefits of teaching, research, technology  and service relevant to 
philanthropic and nonprofit communities. 
History 
Established in 20-01, the Centre builds on the former Program on Nonprofit Corporations (PONC), which 
commenced in the School of Accountancy, Faculty of Business in 1991. PONS involved various staff within the 
Faculty of Business in research, consultancy and community service in the areas of law, tax, management, 
marketing, fundraising, ethics and nonprofits organisations. 
The Program developed a strong reputation for research and community service in the legal, accounting, 
taxation and public policy aspects of philanthropic and nonprofit entities. 
In 2001, generous support was received from The Myer Foundation and the Reid Family Charitable Trusts. This 
support was matched by QUT. In 2007, the Centre became a fully accredited member of the Nonprofit 
Academic Centers Council. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 
Not-for-profit Law (previously PilchConnect) is a specialist community legal service established to provide free 
and low cost legal assistance to not-for-profit organisations in Victoria and New South Wales. It operates as a 
program of Justice Connect, a community legal centre committed to improving access to justice through pro 
bono, and aims to develop a sector-based hub of not-for-profit legal expertise and support. 
Not-for-profit Law ‘helps the helpers' by providing tailored legal information, advice and training to not-for-
profit community organisations. Its focus is on improving access to legal help for not-for-profit community 
organisations, and on improving the legal landscape in which they operate.  Not-for-profit Law’s policy and law 
reform work is focused on reducing red tape for the not-for-profit sector, helping not-for-profits be more 
efficient and better run, and ensuring that reform takes into account impacts on the not-for-profit sector. 
By relieving the burden of legal issues, Not-for-profit Law aims to empower organisations to better focus their 
time and energy on achieving their mission - whether that's supporting vulnerable people, delivering 
community services, enhancing diversity or bringing together the community.  Not-for-profit Law works with a 
range of community peak bodies, including a formal partnership with the Australian Centre for Philanthropy 
and Nonprofit Studies, and are grateful to the ACPNS for their tremendous support and encouragement. 
THE AUSTRALIAN CHARITY LAW ASSOCIATION 
The Australian Charity Law Association was established in 2009 in response to the emerging need for 
accountable, charity-related legal services in Australia. The Association is registered as a charity with the 
Australian Charity and Not-for-profit Commission (ACNC). 
The Association’s aim is to provide a forum for professionals, academics and charity and not-for-profit (NFP) 
employees or volunteers who have an interest in charity and NFP law to increase their knowledge in this area 
and, as a consequence, raise the standard of legal assistance provided to charities and NFP organisations. This 
education is provided through seminars and conferences conducted by members as well as international and 
Australian guest speakers. 
The many recent reforms targeting the charity and NFP sector serve to highlight the importance of education 
to keep abreast of current legislative requirements, whether from a compliance or advisory perspective. 
Recent events hosted by the Australian Charity Law Association have included the July 2013 Conference, held 
in Melbourne, which included presentations on Tax Reforms, the Definition of “Charity” and Freedom of 
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Religion. In April 2014 the Association hosted a panel of International Charity Regulators in conjunction with 
their annual forum hosted in Melbourne the week prior to the seminar. The Associations's 2014 Conference 
was held in Sydney at the UNSW CBD Campus, Level 6, 1 O'Connell Street on Friday 29 August and included 
information in relation to the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, social benefits and impact 
investing. 
For more information about the Association and upcoming events, the contact details are as follows: 
Merrin Marks 
Administrator 
Australian Charity Law Association 
PO Box 550, North Sydney, NSW 2059 
M +61 401 486 844  
F +61 2 8920 0126  
admin@charitylawassociation.org.au  
 
CONTACT INFORMATION
The Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
Queensland University of Technology
Phone +61 7 3138 1020 
Email acpns@qut.edu.au 
Website: www.qut.edu.au/business/acpns 
GPO Box 2434 BRISBANE 
QLD Australia 4001 
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